Washington v. Garcia

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEX,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS □ Aus 26 □□□□

AMARILLO DIVISION

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COUR

LEON WASHINGTON, § By—___,__“<_)

TDCJ-CID No. 0528549, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

§ 2:19-CV-131-Z-BR

§

CIPRIANO GARCIA, ef al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DISMISSING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

Before the Court is Plaintiff's civil-rights Complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“Complaint”) (ECF No. 3), filed June 25, 2019. Plaintiff filed suit pro se while incarcerated in

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (““TDCJ’), Correctional Institutions Division. The Court

granted Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 6. For the reasons discussed

herein, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint WITH PREJUDICE.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts that on March 1, 2019, Defendant Garcia intentionally destroyed Plaintiff's

personal property. ECF No. 3 at 4. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Flenory lied about the

destruction of property during an investigation into the incident and Defendant Richerson failed to

properly process Plaintiffs grievances and oversee the investigation concerning this incident. Jd.

Plaintiff asserts that his property was destroyed in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Jd.

LEGAL STANDARD

When a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility brings an action

with respect to prison conditions under any federal law, the Court may evaluate the complaint and

dismiss it without service of process, Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (Sth Cir. 1990), if it is

frivolous,’ malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2). The

same standards will support dismissal of a suit brought under any federal law by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, where such suit concerns prison

conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). A Spears hearing need not be conducted for every pro se

complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (Sth Cir. 1991).*

ANALYSIS

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State

shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.

AMEND. XIV. To any extent that Plaintiff sues Garcia in his official capacity, Eleventh Amendment

bars such claims, and those claims must be dismissed. See Houston v. Zeller, 91 F. App’x 956, 957

(Sth Cir. 2004). To the extent that Plaintiff sues Garcia in his individual capacity, such claim is

frivolous.

' A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (Sth Cir. 1993).

2 Green vs. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Of course, our discussion of Spears should not be

interpreted to mean that all or even most prisoner claims require or deserve a Spears hearing. A district court should

be able to dismiss as frivolous a significant number of prisoner suits on the complaint alone or the complaint together

with the Watson questionnaire.”). Dismissals may also be based on adequately identified or authenticated records.

Banuelos vy. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995).

Zz

Under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine,° “a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property

interest caused by a state employee’s random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a § 1983

procedural due process claim, unless the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation

remedy.” McClure v. Turner, 481 F. App’x 167, 172 (Sth Cir. 2012) (citing Zinermon v. Burch,

494 USS. 113, 115 (1990)). The Fifth Circuit held:

This Court has recognized that Texas’s tort of conversion provides an adequate

state postdeprivation remedy for prisoners who claim procedural due process

violations based on deprivation of their property. Even if we assume that the alleged

seizures and destruction of [the prisoner’s] property were random, unauthorized

acts, [the prisoner] does not meet his burden of showing why we should now revisit

our prior ruling.

McClure, 481 F. App’x at 172 (citing Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543-44 (Sth Cir. 1994));

see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 501.007 (providing up to $500 to remedy Texas inmate’s claim of

lost or damaged property). A postdeprivation remedy is not inadequate merely based on allegations

that the state institution or employee refuses to assist inmates with filing state tort suits, fails to

provide legal assistance, or does not stock books regarding such suits in the library. See id.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Garcia intentionally used a pair of handcuffs

to destroy/break his personal property, and that Defendant Flenory observed this intentional

behavior before lying about the destruction during an investigation into the matter. Plaintiff fails

to provide any explanation why the state postdeprivation remedy was not pursued or was

inadequate. ECF No. 3 at 3-4.

Hudson specifically extended the postdeprivation state-court remedy doctrine to include

instances where intentional deprivation of property occurred, and Texas tort remedies also provide

5 This is the doctrine of adequate postdeprivation state court remedies established by two precedential Supreme

Court decisions. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in

part on other grounds in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).

for damages for intentional theft. See generally Amir-Sharif v. Bostic, No. 01-15-00697-CV, 2016

WL 7164019 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 8, 2016, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (holding alleged

due-process violation based on intentional destruction of inmate’s property by prison officials had

a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for such destruction under Texas Government Code

§ 501.007). But even if Plaintiff was unaware such remedy existed to cover intentional deprivation,

his unawareness does not indicate such remedy was inadequate. Plaintiff does not assert Defendant

Garcia’s alleged intentional damage to Plaintiff’s property was anything other than “random and

unauthorized” because no TDCJ policy allows for intentional damage to an inmate’s property.

See ECF No. 3. Conduct is not “random and unauthorized” under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine if

the state “delegated to [the defendants] the power and authority to effect the very deprivation

complained of.” Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147, 149 (Sth Cir. 2004) (citing Zinermon v. Burch,

494 U.S. 113, 138 (1990)). Here, Plaintiff does not assert that there is a TDCJ policy that allows

for this intentional conduct by Garcia.

Plaintiff claims Defendant Garcia’s intentionally destroyed Plaintiff's property, which

would be unauthorized, clearly distinguishable from the facts in Allen. In Allen, a prison directive

allowed property to be seized in a specific instance. See id. The Allen plaintiff was, in effect,

challenging the fact that a prison official followed a specific prison directive. See id. The Allen

plaintiff argued the prison directive itself was a violation of due process. Jd. By contrast, Plaintiff

does not challenge the current system; he challenges a specific unauthorized act by a TDCJ

employee. In fact, Plaintiff states in his grievance attached to his complaint “TDCJ isn’t at fault,

but the sole perpetrator Sgt. Garcia is liable!” ECF No. 3 at 6. Plaintiffs facts are distinguishable

from the Allen case because there is no prison directive that allows for intentional destruction of

property during a cell search. See Leggett v. Williams, No. 1:05-CV-110-BI, 2007 WL 9747622,

at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2007), amended in part, No. 1:05-CV-110-BI, 2007 WL 9747625 (N.D.

Tex. May 3, 2007), and aff'd, 277 F. App’x 498 (5th Cir. 2008). No prison directive authorized

Defendant Garcia to destroy property during a cell search. This is precisely the type of case where

the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies. Plaintiff makes no claims that the state-court remedy would

be inadequate. Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claim against Defendant

Garcia for the destruction of personal property as frivolous.

Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Flenory provided a false statement during an investigation

into the destruction of property. ECF No. 3 at 3. To state a claim for relief in an action brought

under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show that he has been deprived of a right secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Plaintiff's claim regarding the alleged false

statement made in the course of an investigation into the deprivation of his personal property does

meet this standard and so is not actionable herein. See Thompson v. Dretke, No. 6:06-CV-50, 2006

WL 1207890, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2006) (“[I]f forged records... were placed in [the

plaintiff's] file, this could be a violation of prison regulations or even state law, but there is no

showing that it is a violation of any rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.”); Hicks v. Margie, No. 08-CV-835, 2008 WL 4566995, at *2 (W.D. La., Sept. 19, 2008)

(“To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for . . . fraud, forgery, or deception,

such claims are not cognizable under § 1983.”). Plaintiff's conclusory statement that Defendant

Flenory made a false statement to cover up the actions of Defendant Garcia, while against policy,

is not a Constitutional violation. The Court thus DISMISSES the claim as frivolous.

Finally, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant Richerson — a warden at the Bill

Clements Unit of TDCJ — for obstructing the investigation into his grievance related to this issue.

ECF No. 3 at 3. Allegations of dissatisfaction with the investigation or rejecting of grievances fail

to state a cognizable constitutional claim. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (Sth Cir. 2005)

(prisoners lack federally protected liberty interest in having grievances investigated, let alone

resolved in their favor); Mahogany v. Miller, 252 F. App’x 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding

plaintiff lacked actionable Section 1983 claim based on prison officials’ failure to process

grievances because plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in processing of grievances); Jones

v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137-38 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)

(applauding institution of grievance procedures by prisons but noting such procedures are not

constitutionally required). The Court also DISMISSES this claim as frivolous.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2) and 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint WITH PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.

August Lz 2022 phir eimai”

M HEW J. KACSMARYK

ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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