Taylor v. El Centro College

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

REGINALD DARREL TAYLOR, §

§

Plaintiff, § Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-0999-D

§

VS. §

§

EL CENTRO COLLEGE, et. al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Reginald Darrel Taylor (“Taylor”) moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)1

to reopen this case after he previously voluntarily dismissed all defendants. Defendants El

Centro College, Dallas County Community College District, Dallas College, Dallas Campus

Police, Lieutenant Byron Stewart, Captain Smith, Officer Guerro, Officer Valdez, Chancellor

Joe May, and President Jose Adames (collectively, “defendants”) oppose the motion. For

the reasons the follow, the court denies the motion.

1In his reply brief, Taylor also contends that he is entitled to relief under Rule 59, but

motions under Rule 59 must be filed within 28 days after the entry of judgment. See Rule

59(b), (d), and (e). The electronic order in which the court directed that the clerk of court

treat Taylor’s April 7, 2022 notice of dismissal without prejudice for all defendants as a Rule

41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal without prejudice of all remaining defendants was entered

on April 8, 2022, and Taylor filed the instant motion on May 18, 2022. Because Taylor filed

his motion more than 28 days after the order was entered, the court only considers his motion

under Rule 60.

I

The court assumes the parties’ familiarity with its prior memorandum opinion and

order in this case, see Taylor v. El Centro College, 2022 WL 102611, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Jan.

10, 2022) (Fitzwater, J.), and recounts the factual and procedural history only as is necessary

to understand this decision.

Taylor, an African-American male, is a 2016 graduate of what is now the El Centro

campus of Dallas College. According to Taylor, when he returned to the El Centro campus

on June 26, 2019 to use the library to make photocopies, he was denied access based, inter

alia, on his race and gender. On December 13, 2019 Taylor again attempted to enter the El

Centro library, but was refused access.

Taylor filed this suit on May 3, 2021, alleging, inter alia, claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Federal Trade

Commission Act, Titles VI, VII, and IX of the Civil Rights Act, and state law. On April 6,

2022 Taylor filed an “Emergency Notice to the Court Requesting Voluntary Dismissal,” in

which he posited that he had erroneously served United Educators Association instead of

United Educators and requested that the court dismiss his case without prejudice. On April

7, 2022 the court entered an order treating Taylor’s notice as a notice of dismissal of

defendant United Educators under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The order stated that if Taylor

intended to dismiss other defendants in addition to United Educators he must file a separate

notice. That same day, Taylor filed a “Second Emergency Notice to the Court Requesting

Voluntary Dismissal” in which he confirmed that he sought dismissal without prejudice as

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to all defendants. On April 8, 2022 the court directed the clerk of court to close this case on

the basis that Taylor had voluntarily noticed the dismissal without prejudice of all remaining

defendants. See supra note 1. On April 22, 2022 Taylor filed an “Amended/Corrected

Complaint.” The court issued an order notifying Taylor that this filing had no effect because

the case had not been reopened and ordering the clerk of court to strike Taylor’s pleading.

On May 18, 2022 Taylor filed the instant motion to reinstate and reopen this case under Rule

60(b). Defendants oppose the motion, which the court is deciding on the briefs.

II

“[A] Rule 41(a)(1)(A) voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies as a ‘final

proceeding[,]’” and “is subject to vacatur under Rule 60(b).” Yesh Music v. Lakewood

Church, 727 F.3d 356, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2013). Rule 60(b) provides that a district court may

grant relief from a final judgment for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct of an

adverse party; (4) a void judgment; or (5) a judgment that has been reversed or otherwise

vacated. Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). The court can also set aside a judgment for “any other reason

that justifies relief.” Rule 60(b)(6). Relief under this “catch-all” provision is available,

however, “only if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212,

216 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir.

1995)).

The burden of establishing at least one of the Rule 60(b) requirements is on the

movant, and a determination of whether that burden has been met rests within the discretion

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of the court. See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th

Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075

n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).

III

Although it is somewhat unclear what grounds Taylor relies on in his motion to

reopen, he seems to argue that the court should reinstate this case due to excusable mistakes

or misinterpretations, the discovery of new evidence, misconduct of an adverse party, and

extraordinary circumstances.

A

To the extent Taylor argues that the court should reopen this case due to “excusable

mistakes or misinterpretations,” the court concludes that he has not demonstrated that he is

entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).

Taylor does not provide any explanation of the mistake or neglect that resulted in his

voluntary dismissal of this case. And the record reflects that Taylor made a deliberate choice

to voluntarily dismiss all defendants after the court alerted him that he had only noticed the

dismissal of United Educators. In its April 7, 2022 order the court stated that, if plaintiff

intended by his notice to dismiss defendants in addition to United Educators, he must file a

separate notice (if Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) applied to a party to be dismissed) or motion (if Rule

41(a)(2) applied to a party to be dismissed).

Rule 60(b)(1) “was not intended to relieve [a party] of the consequences of decisions

deliberately made, although subsequent events reveal that such decisions were unwise.”

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Nat’l City Golf Fin. v. Scott, 899 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original)

(quoting Fed.’s Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1977)); see also In re

Pettle, 410 F.3d 189, 193 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Where a party makes a considered choice . . . he

cannot be relieved of such a choice [under Rule 60(b)] because hindsight seems to indicate

to him that, as it turns out his decision was probably wrong.” (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zang, 248 F.3d

1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001))). And the fact that Taylor is proceeding pro se does not entitle him to

relief under Rule 60(b)(1). See Vafaiyan v. City of Wichita Falls, 398 Fed. Appx. 989, 990

(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Even pro se litigants must comply with procedural rules, and

ignorance of the law is not a basis for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.” (citations omitted)). Thus even

liberally construing Taylor’s argument as positing that he did not understand the

consequences of his decision to voluntarily dismiss this action, Taylor has not met his burden

to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).

B

Taylor contends that this case should be reopened under Rule 60(b)(2) because he has

newly discovered evidence consisting of four previously unidentified witnesses. He

maintains that two witnesses were employees at the El Centro campus who saw the allegedly

discriminatory treatment of Taylor and were terminated due to their association with him.

He posits that a third witness has agreed to communicate his version of the alleged

discriminatory events, and that the fourth witness helped Taylor obtain unspecified evidence

from an account that he was previously unable to access. Defendants respond that Taylor has

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not met his burden under Rule 60(b)(2) because he has failed to describe his diligence in

obtaining this evidence and he does not provide any explanation as to how the information

the witnesses allegedly possess would change the outcome of this case.

To succeed on a Rule 60(b)(2) motion for relief from judgment based on newly

discovered evidence, “a movant must demonstrate: (1) that [he] exercised due diligence in

obtaining the information; and (2) that the evidence is material and controlling and clearly

would have produced a different result if present before the original judgment.” Hesling v.

CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom,

340 F.3d 238, 257 (5th Cir. 2003)). “The movant must strictly satisfy these requirements.”

Nat’l City Golf Fin., 899 F.3d at 418 (quotation omitted).

Taylor has not met his burden under Rule 60(b)(2). He has not demonstrated that he

exercised due diligence in obtaining the newly discovered evidence. His only specific

contention related to his diligence is that he unexpectedly encountered one anonymous

witness and was himself surprised by the encounter, but this does not demonstrate that he

exercised due diligence or explain why he could not have attempted to contact this witness

or any of the other witnesses before his case was dismissed. Moreover, Taylor has not

sufficiently explained what information he obtained from these witnesses; thus he has not

demonstrated how the information provided by the anonymous witnesses is material and

controlling and clearly would have produced a different result in this case.

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C

Taylor contends that he is entitled to have this case reopened under Rule 60(b)(3)

because of the misconduct of defendants. He maintains that defendants misrepresented that

they held no position as to his motion for Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) voluntary dismissal, but later

responded that they were opposed.2

A party making a Rule 60(b)(3) motion must establish by “clear and convincing

evidence (1) ‘that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct’ and (2) ‘that this

misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his case.’” Id. at

418-19 (quoting Hesling, 396 F.3d at 641).

Taylor has failed to demonstrate either that defendants engaged in fraud or other

misconduct or that the misconduct prevented Taylor from fully and fairly presenting his case.

The email messages between Taylor and defendants clearly state that defendants took no

position on the merits of Taylor’s motion for voluntary dismissal only if the purpose of the

motion was “to merely inform the Court that you have served the wrong entity . . . .” P. App.

2. And defendants requested that “[i]f [the motion] serves some other purpose, please

explain so we may provide an informed response.” Id. There is no evidence in the record

2To the extent Taylor argues that defendants’ alleged misrepresentation of their

potential opposition to his motion for voluntary dismissal rendered the order dismissing this

case void, the court disagrees. The Fifth Circuit has recognized two circumstances in which

a district court’s judgment may be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4) as void: (1) if the district

court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the case, or (2) if the district court

acted in a manner contrary to due process. See Brumfield v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 806 F.3d

289, 298 (5th Cir. 2015). Because neither circumstance is present in this case, Taylor has

failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4).

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that defendants misrepresented their position as to Taylor’s motion for voluntary dismissal.

Moreover, Taylor has not demonstrated how any misrepresentation regarding defendants’

potential opposition to his motion prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case

given that he was the party seeking voluntary dismissal.

D

Finally, Taylor has failed to show extraordinary circumstances that would entitle him

to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

Rule 60(b)(6) is “mutually exclusive” with Rule 60(b)’s other clauses and extends

relief only in “extraordinary circumstances . . . .” Hess, 281 F.3d at 215-16 (quotation

omitted); see also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528-29 (2005) (“Rule 60(b)(6) . . .

permits reopening when the movant shows ‘any . . . reason justifying relief from the

operation of the judgment’ other than the more specific circumstances set out in Rules

60(b)(1)-(5).” (second alteration in original) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition

Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.10 (1988))). “Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of

‘manifest injustice’ and will not be used to relieve a party from the ‘free, calculated, and

deliberate choices he has made.’” Yesh Music, 727 F.3d at 363 (quoting Edward H. Bohlin

Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1993)).

Taylor fails to allege any extraordinary circumstances that would entitle him to relief

under Rule 60(b)(6). He appears to contend that the court should have appointed counsel or

otherwise intervened to prevent him from dismissing this case due to “numerous extenuating

circumstances, [including] natural disasters, COVID-19, and deaths of family members . . . .”

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P. Br. 7 n.10. The fact that Taylor is proceeding pro se is not an extraordinary circumstance.

See Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that

plaintiff’s pro se status did not “rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance entitling

him to relief under Rule 60(b)(6)”); Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir.1986)

(holding that pro se status, limited education, and ignorance of legal rights did not satisfy

requirements for Rule 60(b)(6) relief). And Taylor does not otherwise explain or provide

information concerning how, if at all, these circumstances contributed to his decision to

voluntarily dismiss this case, first as to United Educators alone and then as to all defendants.

See Hale-Wells v. Wells Fargo Servs., 2006 WL 3044460, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2006)

(Rosenthal, J.) (denying Rule 60(b)(6) motion because plaintiff failed to provide information

or evidence about alleged illness that would support an extraordinary circumstances finding).

Moreover, as the court has explained, the record reflects that Taylor clearly intended

to voluntarily dismiss all defendants in this case, and Rule 60(b)(6) is not designed to relieve

a party from the consequences of his deliberate choice. See Yesh Music, 727 F.3d at 363.

The court therefore concludes that Taylor is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), or any

of Rule 60(b)’s subsections, and denies his motion to reopen and reinstate this case.

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os * os

For the reasons explained, the court denies Taylor’s motion to reopen this case under

Rule 60(b).

SO ORDERED.

July 11, 2022.

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SIDNEY A. FITZWATERS

SENIOR JUDGE

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