The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
AUSTIN REEVES, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
§
C. A. FRANEY; §
M. HERNANDEZ; § Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-03232-X
E. CASTELLANOS; §
D. CARSON; §
NEAL CAMPBELL; and §
CITY OF GARLAND, §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Austin Reeves alleged that several officers used excessive force
against him during an incident at the Garland Detention Center. He also alleged
they made patently false representations that ultimately led to him being indicted
and prosecuted on false charges. Reeves sued the officers and the City of Garland
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Officer Campbell is one of those officers.
Previously, the Court granted Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the other
officers involved in the case, as well as a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim filed by the City of Garland. At that time, the Court refrained from ruling on
Officer Campbell’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 91] but allowed him to file a Motion
for Summary Judgment, which he subsequently did [Doc. No. 99]. Today the Court
GRANTS Officer Campbell’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that his
conduct did not violate Reeves’s constitutional rights, and DISMISSES AS MOOT
Campbell’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 91].
I. Facts
Most of the facts of the case are not in dispute. The Garland Police Department
dispatched Patrol Officer Franey to a domestic disturbance call. At the scene,
bystanders informed Officer Franey that a man hit his girlfriend and fled, but the
girlfriend refused to give a statement. While Officer Franey remained on the scene,
Austin Reeves returned to the dispatch location. Reeves matched the description of
the suspect and had visible scratches and marks on his chest, neck, and back—which
appeared to be from a recent altercation. Reeves told Officer Franey that his
girlfriend lived at the dispatch location and that he returned to get his phone. Officer
Franey then initiated a background check, revealing that Reeves had an outstanding
City of Dallas arrest warrant for public intoxication. Officer Franey then arrested
Reeves and transported him to the Garland Detention Center. At the detention
center, Reeves called his girlfriend using the center’s telephone. Reeves started
loudly arguing with her and became so upset that he slammed the phone into its base,
breaking the phone.
This is where the parties’ stories start differing. After Reeves broke the phone,
the defendant officers claim they instructed him to return to his cell. But Reeves
ignored the officers’ instructions, walked away from his cell, and slammed both arms
and his head against the glass cell pod door. In an attempt to maintain control,
Officers Carson and Castellanos (followed by Officer Campbell) approached and
confronted Reeves. The officers then claim that Reeves lunged at Officer Castellanos,
striking her in the chest and knocking her to the ground. Officer Castellanos tore her
MCL in the fall. Reeves next turned and “squared up” to fight the other officers.1
The officers, including Officer Campbell, engaged Reeves and brought him to
the floor, where Reeves remained on his hands and knees in what the officers viewed
as an attempt to get back on his feet. The officers claim that Reeves remained in this
position despite their attempts to wrestle control of his arms and legs and their
repeated commands to stop resisting and get on the ground. Two officers then
delivered what they identified as “trained strikes” to Reeves’s legs and neck/shoulder
region to stun him and regain control.2 Reeves reportedly kicked Officer Carson in
the face during this struggle, causing minor bleeding. Eventually the officers secured
and cuffed Reeves’s limbs, at which point the trained strikes ceased.
Reeves, however, tells a different story. Although admitting to hitting the pod
door with one hand (but not his head or the other hand), Reeves claims he otherwise
obeyed the officers’ directions and was returning to his cell until the officers tackled
him. Reeves denies striking Officer Castellanos, claiming she merely fell during the
fray. He also denies attempting to fight the officers or kicking Officer Carson. Reeves
also denies attempting to “stand back up” after being tackled and maintains that he
only remained on his hands and knees to protect his face from smashing against the
1 Doc. 70 at 8.
2 at 9.
floor.3 Finally, Reeves denies ever being told to “stop resisting” or “get on the ground”
and instead claims the officers “thoroughly beat” him until he collapsed to the floor.4
Officer Franey, who was not present during the detention-center altercation,
later prepared an affidavit of probable cause that included these events. To prepare
the affidavit, Officer Franey reviewed security video footage of the incident and
interviewed Officers Hernandez, Castellanos, and Carson, who described the events
as they have in this case. Officer Franey presented the affidavit to a magistrate judge
to determine probable cause, and Reeves was later charged with two counts of assault
on a public servant for striking Officer Castellanos and kicking Officer Carson. These
two charges were later dropped. Detention center staff took Reeves to Baylor, Scott
& White Medical Center the following day where he was diagnosed with leg and wrist
contusions and prescribed Motrin.
Officer Campbell was present during the altercation but was not involved in
the preparation of affidavit prepared by Officer Franey. Officer Campbell was not
named in the original complaint, but Reeves added him to the lawsuit in his Fourth
Amended Complaint [Doc. 82]. Subsequently, Officer Campbell moved to dismiss the
suit as time barred. In resolving the claims against the other officers and the City,
the Court did not rule on Officer Campbell’s motion to dismiss, but in the interest of
judicial efficiency allowed Officer Campbell to file a Motion for Summary Judgment
in light of the order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims
3 Doc. 75 at 15.
4
against the officers named in the original lawsuit.
II. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate only if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”5 “A material fact is one which ‘might affect the outcome of the suit’” and “[a]
factual dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”6 Courts “resolve factual controversies in favor of
the nonmoving party, but only where there is an actual controversy, that is, when
both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.”7 Thus, “the nonmoving
party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.”8
But qualified immunity affects that analysis. The purpose of qualified
immunity is to protect government officials from suit and liability for civil damages
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”9
Consequently, qualified immunity “alters the usual summary judgment burden of
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
6 Thomas v. Tregre, 913 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
7 Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 2013).
8 Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
9 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
proof.”10 Courts still draw all factual controversies in favor of the nonmovant, but
once a government official asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.11 A plaintiff seeking
to defeat qualified immunity must show genuine disputes of material fact about
whether: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether
the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.12 The
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from the
use of excessive force at the state level.13 Thus, the Court must determine whether,
viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Reeves,
Officer Campbell violated Reeves’s Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to be
free from excessive force, and whether the defendants’ actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in
question.14 This is a high hurdle to overcome because qualified immunity protects
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”15
10 Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
11 Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010).
12 Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016)
13 The Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of pretrial detainees. Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391 (2015). The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments protect the rights
of post-conviction detainees. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989) (Fourth Amendment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 2 (1992) (Eighth Amendment). Because
Reeves was a pretrial detainee, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment protections are not relevant
to the Court’s analysis.
14 Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 391–92.
15 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
III. Application
A. The Detention Center Security Footage
The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed that courts “need not accept a plaintiff’s
version of the facts ‘for purposes of [qualified immunity] when it is “blatantly
contradicted” and “utterly discredited” by video recordings.’”16
Here, Reeves claims that he did not attack any of the detention officers, that
he followed all orders, and that aside from breaking the facility telephone and
spontaneously smashing his fists against the A-Pod door, he generally conducted
himself in a manner that posed no security risk or physical threat to jail staff. The
video footage, however, shows otherwise. After smashing his arms and face against
the glass pod wall, the video shows that Reeves continued walking past the open A-
Pod door the officers directed him to enter. Next, Officers Castellanos, Carson, and
Campbell moved to confront Reeves. A struggle then ensued and the video captured
Reeves’s outstretched arm connecting with Officer Castellanos’s chest as she was
knocked off her feet. The next few frames showed Reeves turn to face the rest of the
officers and move backwards for several feet over several seconds before the entire
group fell into a pile on the floor. The footage then showed Reeves kneel with his
hands and knees tucked underneath him while the officers, including Officer
Campbell, attempted to wrestle his limbs and force him flat onto the floor. Meanwhile
the officers gave multiple commands to “stop resisting” and “get on the ground.”
16 Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
Reeves did not heed these commands. The officers also delivered knees, kicks, and
strikes to Reeves’s body. All strikes ceased as soon as Reeves was flat onto the floor
with the officers securing his arms and legs.
Far from the unprovoked use of force alleged by Reeves, the footage is
consistent with the officers’ account that Reeves refused the order to return to his
cell, punched Officer Castellanos, and then turned to fight the other officers before
being brought to the ground. The video footage blatantly contradicts Reeves’s
account, and accordingly the Court need not credit Reeves’s account as true.17
B. Excessive Force
The issue is then whether Officer Campbell’s use of force under these
circumstances amounted to a violation of Reeves’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
be free from excessive force while awaiting trial.18 An actionable claim that detention
officers used excessive force in violation of Reeves’s Fourteenth Amendment rights
must demonstrate that Officer Campbell purposefully or knowingly used force that
was objectively unreasonable.19 A court, however, “cannot apply this standard
mechanically.”20 Objective reasonableness “turns on the facts and circumstances of
each particular case,” and must be determined “from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with 20/20
17 Garza, 943 F.3d at 744.
18 Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 397.
hindsight.”21 Because these types of cases typically involve jail facilities and
detention centers, courts “must also account for the legitimate interests that stem
from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is
detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in th[e] judgment of
jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.”22 Finally, the Supreme Court’s non-exhaustive list of factors
for assessing reasonableness includes: (1) the relationship between the need for the
use of force and the amount of force used; (2) the extent of the plaintiff's injury; (3) any
effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; (4) the severity of
the security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
(6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.23
Here, applying the Kingsley factors establishes that Officer Campbell’s use of
force was not “objectively unreasonable.” First, there is a reasonable relationship
between the need for force and the force used. Reeves was unsecured, refusing
commands to return to his cell, attacking multiple officers, and resisting restraint.
In response, Officer Campbell and the other officers tackled him, wrestled his limbs,
and limited themselves to trained, unarmed strikes that ceased once they secured
Reeves.
Second, Reeves’s injuries were minimal. Reeves was taken to Baylor, Scott &
White Medical Center the following day where the only diagnosed injuries
21 Id. (quotation marks omitted).
22 Id. (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
23 Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
attributable to the officers’ use of force were leg contusions, for which the medical
staff prescribed Motrin.24 Third, the officers tempered their use of force by employing
only trained, unarmed strikes (which apparently caused little to no physical damage)
and ceasing all strikes as soon as they secured Reeves.
Fourth, the severity of the security problem was significant. Reeves argues
that he was unarmed, outside the immediate presence of other detainees, and highly
unlikely to be capable of escaping the detention center altogether. That is true, but
Reeves was still roaming unsecured while actively damaging property and injuring
officers. Security in a jail setting can be fragile and even small chaotic events can
snowball into larger disasters if unaddressed. Here, the officers perceived a
significant security problem.25 Because Kingsley counsels the Court to “account for
the legitimate interests that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility
in which the individual is detained” and “appropriately defer[] to policies and
practices that in th[e] judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security,” the Court will defer to their
risk assessment.26 This also applies to the fifth factor, the threat reasonably
perceived by officers.
Finally, Reeves was actively resisting the officers. Reeves insists that he did
not resist the officers’ attempts to secure him but merely chose to remain kneeling on
24 Doc. No. 71 at 70.
25 See Declaration of Detention Officer Hernandez, Doc. No. 71 at 31 (“Because of the security
and injury risks associated with [Reeves’s] actions, we needed to secure him on the ground.”).
26 Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
his hands and knees, rather than lay on the floor as directed, in order to protect his
face from hitting the floor. As a detainee, however, Reeves has no authority to make
that kind of executive decision. Even taking Reeves’s explanation as true, refusing
the officers’ demands to lay on the floor with his arms and legs out, in this situation,
was active resistance.
Given the application of the Kingsley factors here, the Court concludes that the
use of force employed by Officer Campbell in this situation was not objectively
unreasonable. Accordingly, Officer Campbell did not violate Reeves’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force.27 Thus, Reeves’s excessive force
claim fails as a matter of law.
C. Bystander Claim
Reeves also alleges a “bystander” section 1983 claim against Officer Campbell.
The Fifth Circuit recognizes bystander liability under section 1983 where an officer
“(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights;
(2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”28
The implicit requirement here, however, is that the fellow officers must be violating
an individual’s constitutional rights. Because the Court determined that no officers
violated Reeves’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, there
is accordingly no bystander liability against Officer Campbell.
27 Id. at 396–97.
28 Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013).
D. Malicious Prosecution, Sixth Amendment, Continued Seizure
Reeves further claims a series of constitutional violations stemming from his
allegation that Officer Campbell made patently false statements regarding the
detention-center incident.29 The false representations allegedly occurred via Officer
Franey’s affidavit to the magistrate judge and the other officers’ statements to Officer
Franey, made for the purpose of creating that affidavit. Specifically, Reeves argues
that the video footage clearly established that he did not assault the detention
officers, and therefore the officers falsified information by reporting an assault.
According to Reeves, as a result of this falsification he was charged and prosecuted
without probable cause, denied a fair trial (although the charges were voluntarily
dismissed before a trial), and his liberty was impermissibly restricted in violation of
his Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The parties have spilt much ink weighing whether these rights exist under
these circumstances in our Constitution. That analysis, however, is irrelevant
because each constitutional claim rests on the premise that the information given
was false. Here, the video makes clear that Reeves did assault the officers. Officer
Franey’s affidavit and the other officers’ statements reflect the events captured on
video. Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
officers falsified information—they simply did not. Reeves’s assorted constitutional
29 While the Fourth Amended Complaint does not directly allege that Officer Campbell had
anything to do with the preparation of Officer Franey’s affidavit, the causes of action are stated against
the “Individual Defendants,” which presumably includes Officer Campbell.
claims fail as a matter of law because the officers cannot have violated his rights by
falsifying information if the information they gave was not false.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 99] as to all claims against Officer Campbell, based on the finding
that his conduct did not violate Reeves’s constitutional rights. Because the Court
grants summary judgment here, the Court DISMISSES AS MOOT Campbell’s
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 91].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2021.
ond yp STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13