“However, liability will not attach where an officer is not present at the scene of a constitutional violation.”
How later courts described this case
- “However, liability will not attach where an officer is not present at the scene of a constitutional violation.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
AUSTIN REEVES, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
§
C. A. FRANEY; §
M. HERNANDEZ; § Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-03232-X
E. CASTELLANOS; §
D. CARSON; §
NEAL CAMPBELL; and §
CITY OF GARLAND, §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Austin Reeves alleges that a number of officers used excessive force
against him in an incident at the Garland Detention Center. He also alleges they
made patently false representations that ultimately led to him being charged and
prosecuted on false charges. Reeves sued the officers and the City of Garland under
42 U.S.C § 1983. Before the Court are three ripe motions. Officers Franey,
Castellanos, Hernandez, and Carson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.
69]. Both Officer Campbell [Doc. No. 91] and the City of Garland [Doc. No. 86] filed
separate Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court GRANTS the
Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that the officers’ conduct did not violate
Reeves’s constitutional rights. Because this conclusion also resolves the claims
against the City, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss as well. Finally, the
Court refrains from ruling on Officer Campbell’s motion to dismiss but will allow him
to file a motion for summary judgment.
I. Facts
Many of the facts here are undisputed. Garland Police Department Patrol
Officer Franey was dispatched to a domestic disturbance call. At the scene,
bystanders informed Officer Franey that a man hit his girlfriend and fled, but the
girlfriend refused to give a statement. While Officer Franey remained on the scene,
Austin Reeves returned to the dispatch location. Reeves matched the description of
the suspect and had visible scratches and marks on his chest, neck, and back, which
appeared to be from a recent altercation. Reeves told officer Franey that his girlfriend
lived at the dispatch location and that he returned to get his phone. Officer Franey
then initiated a background check, which reflected that Reeves had an outstanding
City of Dallas warrant for public intoxication. Officer Franey arrested Reeves and
transported him to the Garland Detention Center. At the detention center, Reeves
called his girlfriend using the center’s telephone. Reeves began arguing with her and
became so upset that he slammed the phone into its base, breaking the phone.
This is where the parties’ stories begin to differ. After breaking the phone, the
defendant officers claim they instructed Reeves to return to his cell. But Reeves
ignored the officers’ instructions, walked away from his cell, and spontaneously
slammed both arms and his head against the glass cell pod door. Feeling the
necessity to maintain control, Officers Carson and Castellanos approached and
confronted Reeves. The officers then claim that Reeves lunged at Officer Castellanos,
striking her in the chest and knocking her to the ground. Officer Castellanos tore her
MCL in the fall. Reeves next turned and “squared up” to fight the other officers.
The officers engaged Reeves and brought him to the floor, where Reeves
remained on his hands and knees in what the officers categorized as an attempt to
get back to his feet. The officers claim that Reeves remained in this position despite
their attempts to wrestle control of his arms and legs, and their several commands to
stop resisting and get on the ground. Two officers then delivered what they identify
as “trained strikes” to Reeves’s legs and neck/shoulder region to stun him and regain
control. Reeves reportedly kicked Officer Carson in the face during this struggle,
which caused minor bleeding. Eventually the officers secured and cuffed Reeves’s
limbs, at which point the trained strikes ceased.
Reeves, however, has a somewhat different story. Although admitting to
hitting the pod door with one hand (but not his head or the other hand), Reeves claims
he otherwise obeyed the officers’ directions and was returning to his cell until the
officers tackled him. Reeves denies striking Officer Castellanos, claiming she merely
fell in the fray. He also denies attempting to fight the officers or kicking Officer
Carson. Reeves further denies trying to “stand back up” after being tackled and
maintains that he only remained on his hands and knees to protect his face from
smashing against the floor. Finally, Reeves denies being told to “stop resisting” or
“get on the ground” and instead claims the officers “thoroughly beat” him until he
collapsed to the floor.
Officer Franey, who was not present during the detention center altercation,
later prepared an affidavit of probable cause that included these events. To do so,
Officer Franey reviewed security video footage of the incident and interviewed officers
Hernandez, Castellanos, and Carson, who described the events as they have in this
case. Officer Franey presented the affidavit to a magistrate judge to determine
probable cause, and Reeves was later charged two counts of assault on a public
servant for striking Officer Castellanos and kicking officer Carson. These two
charges were later dropped. Detention Center staff took Reeves to Baylor, Scott &
White Medical Center the following day where he was diagnosed with leg and wrist
contusions and proscribed Motrin.
II. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate only if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”1 “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit’” and “[a] factual
dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.’”2 Courts “resolve factual controversies in favor of the
nonmoving party, but only where there is an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.”3 Thus, “the nonmoving party
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
2 Thomas v. Tregre, 913 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
3 Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 2013).
cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.”4
But qualified immunity affects that typical process. The purpose of qualified
immunity is to protect government officials from suit and liability for civil damages
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”5 Thus
qualified immunity “alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof.”6 Courts
continue to draw all factual controversies in favor of the nonmovant, but once a
government official asserts the defense of qualified immunity the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.7 A plaintiff seeking to defeat
qualified immunity must show genuine disputes of material fact about whether:
(1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.8 The Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause protects State-level pretrial detainees, and the
Fifth, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments protect incarcerated convicts from excessive
force.9 Thus, the Court must determine whether, viewing the summary judgment
evidence in the light most favorable to Reeves, the individual defendants violated
4 Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
5 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
6 Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
7 Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010).
8 Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016)
9 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (Fourth
Amendment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 2 (1992) (Eighth Amendment); Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391 (2015) (Fourteenth Amendment).
Reeves’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force, and whether the
defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law
at the time of the conduct in question.10 This is a high hurdle because qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.”11
III. Application
A. The Detention Center Security Footage
The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed that courts “need not accept a plaintiff’s
version of the facts ‘for purposes of [qualified immunity] when it is “blatantly
contradicted” and “utterly discredited” by video recordings.’”12
Here, Reeves claims that he did not attack the detention officers, followed all
orders, and, aside from breaking the facility telephone and spontaneously smashing
his fists against the A-Pod door, generally conducted himself in a manner that posed
no security risk or physical threat to jail staff. The video footage, however, shows
otherwise. After smashing his arms and face off the glass pod wall, the video shows
Reeves continue walking past the open A-Pod door the officers were directing him to
enter. Next, Officers Castellanos and Carson move to confront Reeves. A struggle
then ensues and the video captures Reeves’s outstretched arm connecting with Officer
Castellanos’s chest as she is knocked off her feet. The next few frames show Reeves
turning to face the rest of the officers and moving backwards for several feet over
10 Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 391–92.
11 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
12 Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
several seconds before the entire group falls into a pile on the floor. The footage then
shows Reeves kneeling with his hands and knees tucked underneath him while
officers attempt to wrestle his limbs and force him flat onto the floor. Meanwhile the
officers are heard giving multiple commands to “stop resisting” and “get on the
ground.” They also deliver knees, kicks, and strikes to Reeves’s body. All strikes
cease as soon as Reeves is brought flat onto the floor with his arms and legs held by
officers.
Far from the unprovoked use of force alleged by Reeves, the footage is
consistent with the officers’ account that Reeves refused the order to return to his
cell, punched Officer Castellanos, and then turned to fight the other officers before
being brought to the ground. The video footage blatantly contradicts Reeves’s
account, and accordingly the Court need not credit Reeves’s account as true.13
B. Excessive Force
The remaining issue is then whether the officers’ use of force under these
circumstances amounts to a violation of Reeves’s 14th Amendment right to be free
from excessive force while awaiting trial.14 An actionable claim that detention
officers used excessive force in violation of a pre-trial detainee’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights must demonstrate only that officers purposefully or knowingly
used force that was objectively unreasonable.15 A court, however, “cannot apply this
13 Garza, 943 F.3d at 744.
14 Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97.
15 Id.
standard mechanically.”16 Objective reasonableness “turns on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case,” and must be determined “from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not
with 20/20 hindsight.”17 Since these types of cases typically involve jail facilities and
detention centers, “a court must also account for the legitimate interests that stem
from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is
detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in th[e] judgment of
jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.”18 Finally, the Supreme Court’s non-exhaustive list of factors
for assessing reasonableness includes: (1) the relationship between the need for the
use of force and the amount of force used; (2) the extent of the plaintiff's injury; (3) any
effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; (4) the severity of
the security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
(6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.19
Here, applying the Kingsley factors establishes that the officers’ use of force
was not “objectively unreasonable.” First, there is a reasonable relationship between
the need for force and the force used. Reeves was unsecured, refusing commands to
return to his cell, attacking officers, and resisting restraint. In response, officers
16 Id. at 397.
17 Id. (quotation marks omitted).
18 Id. (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
19 Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
tackled him, wrestled his limbs, and limited themselves to trained, unarmed strikes
that ceased once they secured Reeves.
Second, Reeves’s injuries are minimal. Reeves was taken to Baylor, Scott &
White Medical Center the following day where the only diagnosed injuries
attributable to the officers’ use of force were leg contusions, for which the medical
staff proscribed Motrin.20 Third, the officers tempered their use of force by employing
only trained, unarmed strikes (which apparently caused little to no physical damage)
and ceasing all strikes as soon as they secured Reeves.
Fourth, the severity of the security problem was not insignificant. Reeves
argues that he was unarmed, outside the immediate presence of other detainees, and
highly unlikely to have been able to escape the detention center altogether. True;
however, Reeves was still roaming unsecured while actively damaging property and
injuring officers. Security in a jail setting can be fragile and even small chaotic events
can snowball into larger disasters if unaddressed. Here, the officers perceived a
significant security problem.21 Because Kingsley councils the Court to “account for
the legitimate interests that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility
in which the individual is detained” and “appropriately defer[] to policies and
practices that in th[e] judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security,” the Court will defer to their
20 Doc. No. 71 at 70.
21 See Declaration of Detention Officer Hernandez, Doc. No. 71 at 31 (“Because of the security
and injury risks associated with [Reeves’s] actions, we needed to secure him on the ground.”).
risk assessment.22 This also applies to the fifth factor, the threat reasonably
perceived by officers.
Finally, Reeves was actively resisting the officers. Reeves insists that he did
not resist the officers’ attempts to secure him but merely chose to remain kneeling on
his hands and knees, rather than lay on the floor as directed, in order to protect his
face from hitting the floor. As a detainee, however, Reeves has no authority to make
that kind of executive decision. Even taking Reeves’s explanation as true, refusing
the officers’ demands to lay on the floor with his arms and legs out, in this situation,
is active resistance.
Given the application of the Kingsley factors here, the Court concludes that the
use of force employed by these officers in this situation was not objectively
unreasonable. Accordingly, because the officers use of force was not objectively
unreasonable, they did not violate Reeves’s 14th Amendment right to be free from
excessive force.23 Thus, Reeves’s excessive force claim fails as a matter of law.
C. Bystander Claim
Reeves also alleges a “bystander” section 1983 claim against each officer. The
Fifth Circuit recognizes bystander liability under section 1983 where an officer
“(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights;
(2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”24
The implicit requirement here, however, is that an officer must be violating an
22 Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
23 Id. at 396–97.
24 Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013).
individual’s constitutional rights. Because the Court determined that no officers
violated Reeves’s 14th Amendment right to be free from excessive force, there is
accordingly no bystander liability here.25
D. Malicious Prosecution, Sixth Amendment, Continued Seizure
Reeves further claims a series of constitutional violations stemming from his
allegation that the officers made patently false statements regarding the detention
center incident. The false representations allegedly occurred via Officer Franey’s
affidavit to the magistrate judge and the other officers’ statements to Officer Franey,
made for the purpose of creating that affidavit. Specifically, Reeves argues that the
video footage clearly established that he did not assault the detention officers, and
therefore the officers falsified information by reporting an assault. According to
Reeves, this falsification caused him to be charged and prosecuted without probable
cause, denied a fair trial (although the charges were voluntarily dismissed before a
trial), and have his liberty impermissibly restricted all in violation of his 4th, 6th,
and 14th Amendment rights.
The parties have spilt much ink weighing whether these rights exist under
these circumstances in our Constitution. That analysis, however, is irrelevant
because each constitutional claim rests on the premise that the information given
was false. Here, the video makes clear that Reeves did assault the detention officers.
Officer Franey’s affidavit and the other officers’ statements reflect the events
25 Further, even if a constitutional violation had occurred, Officer Franey would still be free
from bystander liability because he was not physically present at the scene. Textually speaking,
bystanders must be standing by. See id. (“However, liability will not attach where an officer is not
present at the scene of a constitutional violation.”).
captured on video. Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the officers falsified information—they simply did not. Reeves’s assorted
constitutional claims fail as a matter of law because the officers cannot have violated
his rights by falsifying information if the information they gave was not false.
E. Officer Campbell
Reeves also named Officer Campbell, one of the detention officers involved in
this incident, as a defendant. Officer Campbell was not added to this lawsuit until
after the statute of limitations lapsed, due to difficulties identifying him. Officer
Campbell moved to dismiss the suit as time barred. In the interest of judicial
efficiency, the Court will not rule on this motion as there may be another issue that
resolves the claim. The Court will, however, allow Officer Campbell to file a motion
for summary judgment in light of this order.
F. City of Garland
Finally, Reeves pled a section 1983 claim against the City of Garland arguing
that its policy of allowing police and detention officers to regularly use excessive force
caused the violation of his constitutional rights here. As a municipality, Garland can
only be liable under section 1983 where the “the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”26 It is well
established, however, that “every Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional
26 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
violation.”2” Here, because the Court already determined that Reeves’s constitutional
rights were not infringed, there is no underlying violation to serve as the basis for
Monell liability against the City of Garland. The City is entitled to dismissal as well.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary
judgment [Doc. No. 69] as to all claims against Officers Franey, Castellanos,
Hernandez, and Carson, based on the finding that the defendant officers’ conduct did
not violate Reeves’s constitutional rights. Likewise, the Court GRANTS the City of
Garland’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No 86] because there are no constitutional
violations for Monell liability to attach to. Finally, the Court refrains from ruling on
Officer Campbell’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 91] but will allow Officer Campbell to
file a motion for summary judgment on or before October 19, 2020.
IT ISSO ORDERED this 29th day of September, 2020.
ond STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
27 Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 808, 808 (2017) (quotation marks omitted).
13