Opinion

Vodicka v. Ermatinger

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
Mar 26, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

STEVEN B. AUBREY, et al., §

Plaintiffs, :

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-0056-B

D MAGAZINE PARTNERS, L-P., et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant Scott Robert Sayers’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third

Amended Complaint (Doc. 128) and Defendant Robert L. Ermatinger’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 129). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Sayers’s

motion (Doc. 128) WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Sayers reasserting qualified immunity following

narrowly tailored discovery. Likewise, to the extent Ermatinger seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 claims brought against both Ermatinger and Sayers, the Court DENIES Ermatinger’s motion

(Doc. 129) WITHOUT PREJUDICE. But to the extent Ermatinger seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’

remaining claims against him, the Court GRANTS Ermatinger’s motion (Doc. 129) and

DISMISSES these claims WITH PREJUDICE.

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I.

BACKGROUND1

A. Factual History

1. May 2016: The Tobolowsky murder investigation

Plaintiffs, Steven B. Aubrey and Brian E. Vodicka, are a married couple that lived in Dallas,

Texas, when the following events occurred. Doc. 121, Third Am. Compl. (TAC), ¶¶ 27 (5), 38 (6).

On May 13, 2016, Ira Tobolowsky died in a suspicious early morning fire at his home. Id. ¶ 28 (5).

Days later, the Dallas Police Department (DPD) contacted Vodicka about the murder. See id. ¶ 36

(6).

Next, over a five-month period that began in May 2016, Plaintiffs allege, City of Dallas and

its employees “submitted 11 perjured affidavits for search warrants,” each of which “involved Aubrey,

Vodicka, or both.” Id. ¶ 46 (7–8). According to Plaintiffs, Lieutenant Derrick Cherry of the Dallas

Fire-Rescue Department authored two of the affidavits; Defendant–Detective Robert Ermatinger,

Jr. of DPD authored three; and Defendant–Detective Scott Robert Sayers of DPD authored the

remaining six. See id. ¶¶ 51–160 (8–38). When Aubrey complained to City of Dallas’s Public

Integrity Unit about the affidavits, he claims his complaint “was investigated and ignored . . . .” Id.

¶ 341 (76).

About one year after these events, Plaintiffs explain, Ermatinger had retired from DPD and

“shar[ed] false information” with D Magazine, a local news outlet, about Plaintiffs and the

1 Only pertinent facts for this motion to dismiss have been included for the sake of brevity. The third

amended complaint consists of 487 paragraphs spanning 110 pages. Because the third amended complaint

consists of inconsistent paragraph numbering, the Court cites the paragraph to which it refers, followed by

the page number in parentheses, throughout this Order.

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Tobolowsky murder investigation. See id. ¶ 45 (7). Plaintiffs allege that Ermatinger was “a constant

source for leaking information” before he retired, too. Id. ¶ 250 (55).

2. October 2016: Aubrey’s arrest on prostitution charges

Additionally, in October 2016, Plaintiffs allege, an undercover DPD officer arranged to

receive a massage from Aubrey at a hotel. Id. ¶ 224 (51). After the officer met Aubrey in a hotel

room and put money on a desk in the room, additional DPD officers entered the room and arrested

Aubrey for prostitution. Id. ¶¶ 233–34, 236 (52).

Meanwhile, Plaintiffs allege, while Vodicka was at home, Ermatinger and Sayers “entered

Plaintiffs’ residence, illegally, without a warrant on Vodicka or the residence . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 240–42

(53). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, around 2:30 pm on the afternoon of Aubrey’s arrest, Vodicka

sent Aubrey a text message, which stated: “Someone knocking I can’t see anybody[.]” Id. ¶ 241 (53).

After sending this message, Vodicka claims he went back to sleep. Id. ¶ 243 (53). “[M]inutes later,”

however, “he was woken up by [Ermatinger] and [Sayers] in his dimly lit bedroom with [Ermatinger]

sitting at the foot of his bed touching [his] leg to wake him up.” Id. Thereafter, Plaintiffs allege,

Ermatinger told Vodicka, “We arrested Steve [Aubrey.]” Id. ¶ 244 (54). Plaintiffs believe that

Ermatinger and Sayers intended “for Vodicka to think Aubrey was arrested for the murder of Ira

Tobolowsky” and wanted “to interrogate Vodicka without the presence of an attorney and without

Aubrey in their way.” Id. ¶¶ 245–46 (54).

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida on May 17, 2018. See

Complaint, Aubrey v. D Magazine Partners, L.P., No. 18-CV-61117 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2018), ECF

No. 1. The district court dismissed the complaint on November 8, 2018, due to a lack of personal

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jurisdiction. See Omnibus Order, Aubrey v. D Magazine Partners, L.P., No. 18-CV-61117 (S.D. Fla.

Nov. 8, 2018), ECF No. 122.2

Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this Court on January 8, 2019, bringing claims

against Defendants D Magazine Partners, L.P.; Allison Media, Inc.; Jamie L. Thompson; Robert L.

Ermatinger, Jr.; Scott Robert Sayers; Judge Eric Vaughn Moyé; City of Dallas; Dallas County; and

Does 1-20. See Doc. 3, Compl. One day later, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. See Doc. 4,

Notice of Correction. In response to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, all named Defendants filed

motions to dismiss. See Doc. 21, Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 29, Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 31, Mot. to

Dismiss; Doc. 32, Mot. to Dismiss. Subsequently, Plaintiffs sought to amend their operative

complaint. See Doc. 47, Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl. Three days later—before this Court

ruled on Plaintiffs’ motion—Plaintiffs filed another motion for leave to amend the complaint, which

Defendants opposed. See Doc. 50, Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl., 1–2. The Court

granted Plaintiffs’ motion, and Plaintiffs then filed their second amended complaint. See Doc. 52,

Electronic Order; Doc. 54, Pls.’ Second Am. Compl.

Subsequently, all Defendants moved to dismiss the claims in the operative complaint. See

Doc. 63, Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 65 Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 67, Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 71, Mot. to

Dismiss; Doc. 72, Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 73, Mot. to Dismiss. On June 20, 2019, the Court dismissed

all claims against Defendant Judge Moyé. See Doc. 92, Mem. Op. & Order.

2 Since the date on which Plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed in the Southern District of Florida is

relevant to the Court’s statute-of-limitations analysis, the Court must clarify this date. The order dismissing

Plaintiffs’ claims is dated November 8, 2018, but the order was not entered on the Southern District of

Florida’s electronic filing system until November 9, 2018. See id. Because Plaintiffs could not have received

notice of the order prior to November 9, 2018, this is the date the Court relies upon in considering Sayers’s

and Ermatinger’s statute-of-limitations arguments.

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Thereafter, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a third amended complaint. See Doc. 102, Pls.’ Mot.

for Leave to File Third Am. Compl. The Court granted leave to amend only “insofar as they [sought]

to include allegations of six newly-discovered search-warrant affidavits.” Doc. 114, Order, 10. Thus,

the third amended complaint (Doc. 121) is now the operative complaint in this case.

Sayers and Ermatinger filed their motions to dismiss the third amended complaint (Docs. 128

and 129, respectively) on January 6, 2020. Plaintiffs filed a response to both motions (Doc. 141) on

January 27, 2020. Finally, on February 10, 2020, Sayers and Ermatinger filed reply briefs (Docs. 149

and 150, respectively) in support of their motions. Accordingly, the motions are now ripe for review.

I.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a) (2). Rule 12 (b) (6) authorizes a court to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Id. 12(b) (6). In considering a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss,

“t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). “The court’s review

[under 12(b) (6)] is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any

documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the

complaint.” Ironshore Europe DAC v. Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., 912 F.3d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 2019)

(emphasis added) (quoting Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387

(5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)).

5.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

When well-pleaded facts fail to achieve this plausibility standard, “the complaint has alleged—but

it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (cleaned up). And “[a]lthough

dismissal under [R]ule 12(b) (6) may be appropriate based on a successful affirmative defense, that

defense must appear on the face of the complaint.” Kelly v. Nichamoff, 868 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir.

2017).

Ill.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs bring a multitude of claims against Sayers and Ermatinger for the Court to examine:

(1) a § 1983 claim against Sayers and Ermatinger based on the falsification of search-warrant

affidavits; (2) a § 1983 claim against Sayers and Ermatinger based on their warrantless entry into

Plaintiffs’ home; (3) a § 1983 claim against Ermatinger based on the distribution and misuse of

confidential information; (4) adefamation claim against Ermatinger; (5) a defamation-by-implication

claim against Ermatinger; (6) a defamation-per-quod claim against Ermatinger; and (7) a civil

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conspiracy claim against Ermatinger.’ See Doc. 121, TAC 19 333-45 (74-77); 346-50 (77-78);

395-407 (90-93); 416-26 (95-98); 427-38 (98-100); 447-54 (102-05); 455-61 (105-06).

Sayers and Ermatinger move to dismiss the three § 1983 claims on two grounds: (1) statute

of limitations, and (2) qualified immunity. See Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 1, 12; Doc. 129,

Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss, 1, 16. Further, as to the third § 1983 claim against Ermatinger, he also

contends that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Doc. 129,

Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss, 24. In addition, Ermatinger seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state-law

claims against him based on: (1) the statute of limitations, and (2) failure to state a claim. Id. at 1.

Below, the Court first addresses whether the applicable statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’

§ 1983 claims against Sayers and Ermatinger. The Court ultimately declines to conclude, at this stage

of the proceedings, that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Second, the Court analyzes whether Sayers and Ermatinger are entitled to qualified immunity

on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims premised upon Plaintiffs’ allegations of the falsified affidavits and the

warrantless entry. Because the Court lacks the facts necessary to make such a determination, the

Court denies Sayers and Ermatinger’s motion to dismiss these claims without prejudice to re-asserting

qualified immunity upon the close of limited discovery.

Third, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Ermatinger based on his alleged

distribution of confidential information. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently

allege this § 1983 claim and thus dismisses the claim with prejudice. Based on this conclusion, the

Court declines to address Ermatinger’s entitlement to qualified immunity on this claim.

> Vodicka, rather than both Plaintiffs, brings claims (2) and (6).

Fourth, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Ermatinger. Because Plaintiffs

concede to the dismissal of one of the claims, and the remaining claims are barred by the applicable

statute of limitations, the Court dismisses all state-law claims against Ermatinger with prejudice.

Moreover, because the Court dismisses these claims based on the statute of limitations, the Court

declines to address Ermatinger’s alternative arguments—that Plaintiffs have failed to state claims

upon which relief may be granted.

A. Whether the Applicable Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims*

The Court declines to hold, at the motion-to-dismiss stage of proceedings, that Plaintiffs’

§ 1983 claims are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs do not dispute that

the Texas statute of limitations of two years applies to this case. See Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to

Dismiss, 6; Doc. 141, Pls.’ Resp., 5—6.° Further, Sayers explains, and Plaintiffs fail to contest, that

Plaintiffs’ claims against Sayers and Ermatinger accrued in May and October of 2016. See Doc. 128,

Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 6. Because Plaintiffs filed this case on January 8, 2019—over two years and

seven months after the date of accrual—Sayers raises a statute-of-limitations affirmative defense,

contending that Texas’s two-year statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Id. at 6-7.

But Plaintiffs argue that Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code $ 16.064 allows the statute

of limitations to toll for sixty days since they filed “these same original claims in the U.S. District

“ Sayers and Ermatinger both raised the statute of limitations as a basis for dismissal. But because

Sayers’s and Ermatinger’s arguments pertaining to the statute of limitations are identical, the Court refers only

to Sayers’s arguments when resolving this issue.

> “The statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of

limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576

(5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Texas has a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a).

8.

Court, Southern District of Florida” within the two-year limitations period. See Doc. 141, Pls.’

Resp., 5.

Under § 16.064, the applicable statute of limitations is suspended:

for the period between the time one action is dismissed and the time the same action

is re-filed in a different jurisdiction if (1) the original action was dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction, and (2) the second action was commenced in the proper jurisdiction no

later than the 60th day following the dismissal.

Mathers Family Tr. ex rel. Mathers v. Cagle, 2013 WL 3455489, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2013) (citing

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.064(a)). But the statute of limitations is not tolled under

§ 16.064 “if the adverse party has shown in abatement that the first filing was made with intentional

disregard of proper jurisdiction.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.064(b).

Here, Plaintiffs re-filed in the Northern District of Texas sixty days after the dismissal in the

Southern District of Florida for lack of personal jurisdiction,® thus satisfying both elements of

§ 16.064(a). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.064(a). Nevertheless, Sayers argues that

Plaintiffs filed in Florida “with intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction.” Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot.

to Dismiss, 8 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.064(b)).

Specifically, Sayers contends that Plaintiffs “made a strategic decision to file suit in Florida” and “had

full knowledge that all the Defendants’ alleged conduct occurred in Dallas, Texas.” Id. at 9, 10.

® The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims on November 9, 2018. See supra at 4 n.2. Plaintiffs filed

suit in this Court on January 8, 2019. See Doc. 1, Compl. Thus, Plaintiffs filed suit on the sixtieth day

following dismissal, and the Court therefore rejects Sayers’s suggestion that, irrespective of the tolling,

Plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. See Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 11. Further, even assuming, for the

sake of argument, that Plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed on November 8, 2018, Sayers has not demonstrated

that this is the date upon which the district court’s dismissal “[became] final... .” TEX. ClV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 16.064(a); see, e.g., Henneberger v. Ticom Geomatics, 2018 WL 6589472, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 12,

2018) (concluding a dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction became final when it was affirmed on

appeal).

9.

In response, Plaintiffs explain that they originally filed suit in Florida based upon Defendants’

minimum contacts with the forum state. Doc. 141, Pls.’ Resp., 6 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of

Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Specifically, Plaintiffs

state that because the actions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims against D Magazine, another Defendant

in this case, took place while Plaintiffs resided in Florida, Plaintiffs had a “strong basis” for

jurisdiction in Florida over D Magazine. Id. at 6-7. And based on this jurisdictional theory, Plaintiffs

argue that they brought their claims against “all Defendants in Florida in good faith ....” Id. at 7.

Nonetheless, Sayers suggests that Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate an intentional disregard

of proper jurisdiction. Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 9. For example, Sayers points out that

Plaintiffs asserted, in their initial complaint in the Southern District of Florida, that venue in Texas

would be improper due to prejudice that Plaintiffs would suffer if Plaintiffs brought suit there. Id. at

9-10.

Though Plaintiffs may have known that their claims hinged on conduct that occurred in

Texas, the Court holds that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, this does not amount to an intentional

disregard of proper jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Texas has clarified that “a mistake of law may

be a sufficient excuse” to satisfy a plaintiff's burden of demonstrating that “he did not intentionally

disregard proper jurisdiction when filing the case.” See In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d

299, 312-13 (Tex. 2010) (citation omitted).

Further, Section 16.064 “is to be given a liberal construction to effectuate ‘its manifest

objective—relief from penalty of limitation bar to one who has mistakenly brought his action “in the

wrong court.””” Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 461 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet.

denied) (emphasis in original) (quoting Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. Civ.

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App.—Austin 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.)). Following this objective, Texas courts have noted that “a

mistake of law may be a sufficient excuse under [§] 16.064 . . . because capable lawyers often make

good faith mistakes about the jurisdiction of Texas courts . . . .” Integrity Glob. Sec., LLC v. Dell Mktg.

L.P., 2019 WL 2147622, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin May 17, 2019) (quotation marks omitted) (citing

In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d at 312). In contrast, § 16.064 “does not protect a plaintiff

who misfiles as a part of a ‘strategic decision to seek relief’ from a court that lacked jurisdiction.” Id.

(citing In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d at 313).

In this case, Plaintiffs assert that they mistakenly relied on Florida’s long-arm statute to confer

personal jurisdiction over all Defendants since one Defendant, D Magazine, harmed them while

Plaintiffs lived in Florida. Doc.141, Pls.’ Resp., 7. The Court notes that this could constitute a good-

faith mistake of law—rather than a strategic decision. See Integrity Glob. Sec., LLC, 2019 WL

2147622, at *9. Because the Court lacks evidence that Plaintiffs filed suit in Florida in intentional

disregard of jurisdiction, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Sayers and

Ermatinger based on the statute of limitations at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

B. Whether Qualified Immunity Bars Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims Against Sayers and Ermatinger

Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” so it

is important to “resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985);

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). Courts examine each public official’s actions

independently to determine whether he or she is entitled to qualified immunity. Newman v. Guedry,

703 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2012)(citing Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2007)).

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Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must

negate the qualified immunity defense. Newman, 703 F.3d at 761. “A public official is entitled to

qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly

established law at the time of the violation.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011).

Courts have discretion in deciding which of the two prongs should be addressed first. Kitchen v.

Dallas Cty., 759 F.3d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236), abrogated on other

grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).

While qualified immunity protects defendants asserting the defense from pretrial discovery,

there are exceptions to this principle. See Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014).

Specifically, “if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of . . . [the

qualified immunity] defense,” discovery “narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule

on the immunity claim” may be permitted. Id. (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir.

2012)). But first, the district court must carefully ascertain that the plaintiff has alleged “specific facts

that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm

he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Id.(quoting Backe,

691 F.3d at 648). This inquiry “incorporates the pleading standards established in Twombly and

Iqbal.” Jackson v. Mississippi, 2012 WL 5185726, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 18, 2012) (citing Backe, 691

F.3d at 648).

Assuming the allegations meet this standard, then and only then, if the court still cannot

resolve the qualified immunity defense without further factual development, the court may defer its

qualified immunity ruling and order discovery “narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed

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to rule on the immunity claim.” Zapata, 750 F.3d at 485 (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504,

507–08 (5th Cir. 1987)). And, given what is at stake—overcoming qualified immunity’s protection

from pretrial discovery—the district court’s review process has been described as a “careful

procedure.” Id. (quoting Backe, 691 F.3d at 648).

Employing this procedure, the Court analyzes Plaintiffs’ two § 1983 claims below.

1. Section 1983 claim against Sayers and Ermatinger based on falsified search-warrant

affidavits

Plaintiffs bring a § 1983 claim against Sayers and Ermatinger, alleging that they violated

Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right “to be free from unreasonable searches” by

authoring search-warrant affidavits that contained falsified facts. See Doc. 121, TAC, ¶¶ 334–39

(74–76).7

To support their claim, Plaintiffs set forth numerous statements from search-warrant affidavits

purportedly authored by Sayers and Ermatinger that Plaintiffs allege to be false or misleading. See,

e.g., id. ¶¶ 74–86 (16–19); 123–30 (28–30). Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Sayers and Ermatinger

“failed to include known exculpatory evidence,” thus “omitting known material facts” from the

affidavits. Id. ¶ 334 (74–75). In support, Plaintiffs allege some facts that they believe Ermatinger and

Sayers knew, but failed to include, in their search-warrant affidavits. See, e.g., ¶ 71 (15); 119 (27).

7 “Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection

against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing such a claim.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273

(1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted).The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable

searches, and, “[w]ith some limited exceptions, it requires police officers to secure a search warrant supported

by probable cause . . . .” United States v. Ortega, 719 F. App’x 319, 323 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citations

omitted). Thus, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ claim as alleging a violation of the Fourth, rather than the

Fourteenth, Amendment.

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“Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), ‘a Fourth Amendment violation may be

established where an officer intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, includes a false

statement in a warrant application.” Samadian v. Meade, 2011 WL 13180181, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec.

22, 2011) (quoting Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 2006)).“Likewise, the

intentional or reckless omission of material facts from a warrant application may amount to a Fourth

Amendment violation.” Kohler, 470 F.3d at 1113.

Additionally, under Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), “[a] police officer may be held

liable in his individual capacity for filing an application for [a] warrant without probable cause[.]”

Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 1989); Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256,

264 (5th Cir. 2017). In contrast with a Franks violation, a Malley violation “is not the presentment

of false evidence, but the obvious failure of accurately presented evidence to support the probable

cause required for the issuance of a warrant.” Melton, 875 F.3d at 264.

Though Plaintiffs make a passing reference to the lack of probable cause underlying Sayers’s

and Ermatinger’s search warrants, see Doc. 121, TAC, 1337 (75), they repeatedly rely upon a Franks

theory of liability. See, eg., id. 191 337-38 (75); Doc. 141, Pls.’ Resp., 15. Accordingly, the Court

analyzes Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim as one premised upon a Franks violation.

Under Franks, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the violation of a clearly established

constitutional right. An official violates a citizen’s rights under Franks where he:

swears to false information in an affidavit in support of asearch... warrant, provided

that: (1) the affiant knew the information was false or would have known it was false

except for the affiant’s reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the warrant would not

establish probable cause without the false information.

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Blake v. Lambert, 921 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations

omitted).8 The first step of the analysis—if satisfied—demonstrates that the official “acted objectively

unreasonably.” See Winfrey v. San Jacinto Cty., 481 F. App’x 969, 980 (5th Cir. 2012).

Sayers contends that though Plaintiffs characterize several of his statements as false, Plaintiffs

are “not . . . privy to Sayers’s investigation.” Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 14. According to

Sayers, his affidavits “set [forth] facts and circumstances establishing probable cause . . . .” Id. at 15.

Likewise, Ermatinger asserts that Plaintiffs’ allegations of falsity are conclusory, and that Ermatinger

established probable cause through his affidavits. See Doc. 129, Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss, 18–19.

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged, for purposes of these

motions to dismiss, that Sayers and Ermatinger violated a clearly established right and acted in an

objectively unreasonable manner. Plaintiffs point to specific statements from the search-warrant

affidavits submitted by Sayers and Ermatinger, and Plaintiffs claim these statements are false. See,

e.g., Doc. 121, TAC, ¶ 335 (75). Though Sayers and Ermatinger contest whether the statements are

false, such as those statements pertaining to the affiant’s state of mind, they do not offer evidence

demonstrating the veracity of the statements. See, e.g., Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 14; Doc.

129, Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss, 18. And Plaintiffs allege that Sayers and Ermatinger made these

misrepresentations “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth . . . .” Doc.

8 Sayers and Ermatinger recite a third step in the analysis, stating Plaintiffs must show that no

reasonably competent officer could have concluded that a warrant should issue. See Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot.

to Dismiss, 15–16; Doc. 129, Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss, 19. But the Fifth Circuit has clarified that this

“third step” applies only in “civil suits challenging arrests,” not searches. See Jones v. Perez, 790 F. App’x 576,

580 n.1 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

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121, TAC, 1337 (75). Further, Plaintiffs allege that, without these misrepresented facts, “probable

cause did not otherwise exist.” Id.

Though these factual assertions may prove inaccurate, they are, if true, sufficient to overcome

the defense of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See, e.g., Cunningham v. City of

Balch Springs, 2016 WL 235966, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2016) (finding that the plaintiffs

allegations were sufficient to sustain his § 1983 claim premised on the defendant—officers’ roles “in

procuring [a] warrant with false information” where the plaintiff alleged that “the evidence will

show” that the defendant-officers “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the

truth,” presented an affidavit to a judge with misleading facts); Reitz v. City of Abilene, 2017 WL

3046881, at *17 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2017) (concluding that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the

plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support his Franks violation § 1983 claim based on a falsified arrest-

warrant affidavit where the plaintiff alleged he committed no crime and the defendants “knew or

should have known that fact”), adopted by 2017 WL 3034317 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2017).

Thus, the Court may permit narrow discovery to clarify the facts underlying Plaintiffs’

assertions. Zapata, 750 F.3d at 485 (citation omitted). Upon the close of discovery limited to

qualified immunity, the Court will reassess whether Sayers and Ermatinger are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim alleging a Franks violation. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Sayers’s and Ermatinger’s motions to dismiss this claim.

2. Section 1983 claim against Sayers and Ermatinger based on warrantless entry into

Plaintiffs’ home

Next, Vodicka alone brings a § 1983 claim against Sayers and Ermatinger based on their

October 2016 entry into Plaintiffs’ home on the day of Aubrey’s arrest. Doc. 121, TAC, 11 346-50

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(77–78). Vodicka alleges that this entry was “objectively unreasonable because no public official

would enter the residence of a private citizen without a warrant [sic] without reason or cause to do

so.” Id. ¶ 347 (78).9

Neither Sayers nor Ermatinger devotes much argument to whether Vodicka has alleged a

violation of a clearly established right; rather, they contend that their conduct was not objectively

unreasonable. See Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 18; Doc. 129, Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss,

22.10 Nonetheless, the Court first addresses whether Vodicka has sufficiently alleged a violation of

a clearly established right.

Here, Vodicka alleges that, after he heard knocking on his door, he went back to sleep, and

he awoke to Sayers and Ermatinger inside his home. Doc. 121, TAC, ¶¶ 241–44 (53–54). Further,

he alleges Sayers and Ermatinger had neither a warrant nor consent to enter the residence. See id.

¶ 347 (77). In their motions to dismiss, both Sayers and Ermatinger appear to raise the exigent-

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, though they do not set forth any facts

supporting its application. See Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 17; Doc. 129, Ermatinger’s Mot.

to Dismiss, 20.

Although a “warrantless search of a person’s home is presumptively unreasonable,” the

“existence of exigent circumstances justifying immediate action” is an “exception to the warrant

9 Though Vodicka asserts that Sayers and Ermatinger violated both his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, the Court treats his § 1983 claim as one based upon a violation of the Fourth

Amendment. See supra at 13 n.7.

10 Sayers and Ermatinger mention that Vodicka alleges only an entry into his residence—not a search.

Doc. 128, Sayers’s Mot. to Dismiss, 17; Doc. 129, Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss, 20. But this is a distinction

without a difference, as “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth

Amendment is directed.” United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).

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requirement . . . .” Linicomn v. Hill, 902 F.3d 529, 535–36 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). For

example, “[e]xigent circumstances exist where . . . officers must enter a home to provide emergency

assistance to preserve life or prevent serious injury.” Id. at 536.

Based on the limited facts before the Court, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Sayers and

Ermatinger violated Vodicka’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the Fifth

Circuit has held—prior to 2016—that an individual’s failure to respond to knocking at the front door

does not constitute an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry. See id. at 537 (citing

United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Gomez-Moreno,

479 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 2007). Thus, in the absence of additional facts establishing exigent

circumstances, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Sayers and

Ermatinger’s entry violated Vodicka’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

Next, the Court turns to whether Sayers and Ermatinger’s entry was objectively unreasonable.

This inquiry is intertwined with the Court’s analysis of the violation of a clearly established right,

because “[w]hether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless [entry] depends on whether,

given the totality of the circumstances, the [entry] was objectively reasonable.” Linicomn, 902 F.3d

at 536 (citation omitted). As mentioned above, Sayers and Ermatinger have not pointed to facts

warranting the application of the exigent-circumstances exception. Thus, the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the entry of Sayers and Ermatinger was objectively

unreasonable.

Since the Court lacks a sufficient factual basis for determining whether Sayers and Ermatinger

are entitled to qualified immunity for their warrantless entry, the Court opts to permit narrow

discovery on the issue of qualified immunity. Upon the close of discovery, the Court will re-examine

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whether Sayers and Ermatinger are shielded by qualified immunity. Thus, the Court DENIES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Sayers’s and Ermatinger’s motions to dismiss Vodicka’s § 1983 claim.

C. Whether Plaintiffs Sufficiently Pled Their § 1983 Claim Against Ermatinger Based on the

Distribution of Confidential Information

Next, Plaintiffs bring a § 1983 claim against Ermatinger, based upon his alleged distribution

of information from DPD files “during the course of his employment with DPD and following his

termination of employment with DPD . . . .” Doc. 121, TAC, ¶ 400 (91–92). Before Ermatinger

retired, Plaintiffs allege, he was “a constant source for leaking information about the active murder

investigation . . . .” Id. ¶ 250 (55). In their response, Plaintiffs specify that Ermatinger “distributed

a non-public photo of Aubrey at the George Allen Courts Building” and “to NBC . . . .” Doc. 141,

Pls.’ Resp., 18–19.

These actions, Plaintiffs contend, violate their constitutional rights under the “Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments,” as well as “General Orders” of DPD and a provision from the Texas Open

Records Act. Doc. 121, TAC, ¶¶ 398–403 (91–92) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 552.305(a),

552.352 and Dallas Police Dep’t Gen. Orders §§ 323.04(B) and 323.05(A)).

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs cannot state a § 1983 claim based upon violations of the

Texas Open Records Act and DPD General Orders. “[A] violation of a state statute alone is not

cognizable under § 1983 because § 1983 is only a remedy for violations of federal statutory and

constitutional rights.” Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to bring a § 1983 premised upon violations of state or

municipal law, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.

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Turning to Plaintiffs’ allegations of constitutional violations, the only specific constitutional

right cited by Plaintiffs is “the fundamental . . . right to privacy.” Doc. 121, TAC, ¶¶ 396–97

(90–91). Moreover, Plaintiffs generally assert that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated. Id. ¶ 396 (91). Because “[t]he prohibition against government dissemination of private

information . . . is found in the ‘Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty,’” the Court

analyzes Plaintiffs’ claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d

485, 489 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

The Court holds that Plaintiffs’ allegations are wholly insufficient to sustain Plaintiffs’ § 1983

claim premised on Ermatinger’s distribution of confidential information. “Disclosure of personal

matters can violate a person’s right to privacy.” Lyle v. Dedeaux, 1994 WL 612506, at *6 (5th Cir.

Oct. 24, 1994) (per curiam) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). “In the context of

government disclosure of personal matters, an individual’s constitutional right to privacy is violated

if: 1) the person had a legitimate expectation of privacy; and 2) that privacy interest outweighs the

public need for disclosure.” Mathews v. City of Beaumont, 2012 WL 12906090, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar.

13, 2012) (citing Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 806 (5th Cir. 1996)). Further, “[a]n expectation of

privacy with regard to a certain zone of personal information may be legitimate where statutes

recognize its confidential character.” Id. (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,

25 F.3d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 1994)).

Here, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged any legitimate expectation of privacy in the photo

allegedly distributed by Ermatinger. Most notably, in their complaint, Plaintiffs never contend that

this photo was personal, nor that Aubrey had a privacy interest in the photo. See Doc. 121, TAC,

¶¶ 42 (7), 395–407 (92–93). Rather, in their response, Plaintiffs attempt to re-characterize the photo

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as “non-public . . . .” Doc. 141, Pls.’ Resp., 19. Moreover, though Plaintiffs allege that Ermatinger

violated the Texas Open Records Act by disseminating the photo, see Doc. 121, TAC, ¶ 398 (91),

Plaintiffs do not cite to any provision in the Act conferring Aubrey with a legitimate privacy interest

in his photo. See Mathews, 2012 WL 12906090, at *4 (concluding, after analyzing provisions of the

Texas Open Records Act, that “[t]here is no authority that the disclosure of investigative files is

legally prohibited or that such files are legally confidential”). Likewise, Plaintiffs’ citation to the

General Orders of DPD also fails: Plaintiffs have not pointed to any General Order conferring

Aubrey with a privacy interest in a photo obtained by DPD. See Doc. 121, TAC, ¶ 399 (91).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have insufficiently pled their § 1983 claim based on Ermatinger’s alleged

distribution of Aubrey’s photo.

To support their § 1983 claim, however, Plaintiffs also allege that Ermatinger distributed

confidential information after retiring from DPD. See Doc. 121, TAC, ¶ 400 (91–92). Indeed,

Plaintiffs allege that Ermatinger did so “[a]s a private citizen . . . .” Id. ¶ 252 (55). But to sustain a

§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted “‘under color’ of state law.” Filarsky v.

Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Though “a private citizen may be held

liable under § 1983 where [a] plaintiff alleges ‘that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert

with state actors,’” Glotfelty v. Karas, 512 F. App’x 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation

omitted), such is not the case here. See, e.g., Doc. 121, TAC, ¶¶ 251–53 (55) (describing only

Eramtinger’s alleged disclosure of information).Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state a § 1983 claim

against Ermatinger for his post-retirement disclosure of information.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim premised upon the distribution

of confidential information against Ermatinger WITH PREJUDICE.

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D. Whether the Statute of Limitations Bars the Remaining Claims Against Ermatinger

Finally, Plaintiffs bring several claims against Ermatinger under Florida and Texas state law:

defamation under Florida law; defamation by implication under Florida law; defamation per quod

under Texas law; and civil conspiracy for invasion of privacy under Texas law. See Doc. 121, TAC,

¶¶ 416–26 (95–98); 427–38 (98–100); 447–54 (102–05); 455–61 (105–06). Plaintiffs have since

conceded that the “Texas state law claims for defamation” should be dismissed. See Doc. 141, Pls.’

Resp., 4, 9.11 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Vodicka’s defamation-per-quod claim WITH

PREJUDICE.

As to the remaining state law claims, Ermatinger asserts that all are barred under the

applicable statute of limitations. Doc. 129, Ermatinger’s Mot. to Dismiss, 12–13. In their response,

Plaintiffs contend that “the Florida claims for defamation should survive under Florida state law as

they would have if only [the district court in the Southern District of Florida] had transferred the

case from the Southern District of Florida to the Northern District of Texas . . . .” Doc. 141, Pls.’

Resp., 9–10. Plaintiffs explain that had this transfer happened, the state law of the transferor

court—here, Florida law—would govern. Id. at 10.12

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ transfer argument. The Fifth Circuit has held

that “following a section 1404(a) transfer from a district in which personal jurisdiction over the

11 The Court is uncertain whether Plaintiffs intend to concede their civil conspiracy claim under

Texas law. In an abundance of caution, the Court addresses the claim below.

12 Plaintiffs also appear to claim that Vodicka is disabled because he receives disability income

pursuant to the Ryan White Care Act, and that this warrants tolling of the statute of limitations under Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.001. See Doc. 121, TAC, ¶ 23 (3); see also id. ¶ 448 (102). This does

not amount to disability under § 16.001 (defining “legal disability” as being under eighteen-years-old or of

“unsound mind”).

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defendant could not be obtained, the transferee court must apply the choice of law rules of the state

in which it sits . . . .” Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1110 (5th Cir. 1981). Given that the

district court in the Southern District of Florida found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the

Defendants in this case, even if the court had elected to transfer the action, this Court—as the

transferee court—would still be bound by Texas choice-of-law rules.

Now, the Court turns to the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ remaining claims:

defamation under Florida law; defamation by implication under Florida law; and civil conspiracy for

invasion of privacy under Texas law.

Generally, “a federal court applies the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.” United

States ex rel. Varco Pruden Bldgs. v. Reid & Gary Strickland Co., 161 F.3d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1998).

Further, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has held that Texas applies its own statute of limitations, regardless [of]

what substantive law applies.” Woolley v. Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells, L.L.P., 2004 WL 57215,

at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2004) (citations omitted).13 For defamation claims, Texas has a one-year

statute of limitations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.002(a). This “one-year limitation

likewise applies to other causes of action for which the gravamen of the complaint is injury to a

plaintiff’s reputation because of allegedly defamatory statements.” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch.

Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 741–42 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Further, these defamation-related

claims accrue, for statute-of-limitations purposes, on the “first date of publication,” irrespective of

whether the alleged defamatory statement is in print or on the Internet. See id. at 742 (citations

omitted).

13 Because of this principle, the Court need not decide whether Florida or Texas substantive law

governs Plaintiffs’ claims.

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Here, Plaintiffs’ three claims—defamation, defamation by implication, and civil conspiracy—

are premised upon Ermatinger’s comments to D Magazine, which, Plaintiffs allege, published

allegedly defamatory statements on April 26, 2017; May 3, 2017; May 8, 2017; and May 9, 2017. See

Doc. 121, TAC, ¶¶ 416–26 (95–98) (defamation claim); 427–38 (98–100) (defamation by

implication claim); 455–61 (106) (civil conspiracy claim); 259 (57) (alleged dates of publication);

348 (65) (alleged dates of publication). Two of Plaintiffs’ claims sound in defamation, and “the

gravamen of [Plaintiffs’ third claim, civil conspiracy,] is injury to [Plaintiffs’] reputation because of

allegedly defamatory statements.” See Walker, 938 F.3d at 741–42; Doc. 121, TAC, ¶¶ 455–61 (106).

Thus, all three claims are subject to Texas’s one-year statute of limitations. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 16.002(a); Walker, 938 F.3d at 741–42.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Ermatinger was implicated in all of the alleged

defamatory publications, the latest date of publication alleged is May 9, 2017. But Plaintiffs did not

bring these claims until May 17, 2018. Doc. 121, TAC, ¶ 20 (3). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ defamation,

defamation by implication, and civil conspiracy claims are time-barred, and the Court DISMISSES

these claims against Ermatinger WITH PREJUDICE.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based upon

the statute of limitations. Thus, to the extent Sayers and Ermatinger urge the Court to do so, the

Court DENIES their motions (Docs. 128 and 129, respectively).

Moreover, the Court DENIES Sayers’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims based upon

qualified immunity (Doc. 128) WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Sayers re-asserting qualified immunity

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following limited discovery. Similarly, the Court DENIES Ermatinger’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 129)

to the extent he asserts qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims premised on the falsification

of search-warrant affidavits and the warrantless entry. He, too, may re-assert qualified immunity on

these claims upon the close of the discovery period.

Further, the Court ORDERS the parties to conduct discovery narrowly tailored to the issue

of Sayers’s and Ermatinger’s entitlement to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ two remaining claims.

Specifically, the Court ORDERS discovery limited to the issues of:

1. Whether the statements alleged by Plaintiffs to be false in the search-warrant

affidavits authored by Sayers and Ermatinger are, indeed, false;

2. If so, whether Sayers and Ermatinger included these false statements in their

affidavits with reckless disregard for the truth;

3. Whether, absent any demonstrably false statements from the search-warrant

affidavits, Sayers’s and Ermatinger’s search-warrant affidavits support a finding of

probable cause;

4. Whether there are facts supporting the application of the exigent-circumstances

exception, or any other exception to the warrant requirement, to Sayers’s and

Ermatinger’s October 2016 entry into Plaintiffs’ residence.

All such discovery must be completed on or before May 20, 2020. Any summary-judgment motion

based on qualified immunity shall be filed on or before June 17, 2020.

Finally, to the extent Ermatinger seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based upon the

distribution of confidential information, as well as Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Ermatinger, the

Court GRANTS Ermatinger’s motion (Doc. 129) and DISMISSES these claims WITH

PREJUDICE.

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SO ORDERED.

SIGNED: March 26, 2020.

JANE J. BOY

UMTED ST S DISTRICT JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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