Hollins v. Miller

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

YUSEF HOLLINS, §

(a.k.a, Anthony Collins, Kenneth § JUN - 3 2020

Williams) §

TDCF-CID No. 01864680, CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff, § By Deputy

§

§ = 2:17-CV-153-Z-BR

§

BRITTANY S. MILLER, ef al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DISMISSING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's pro se suit against the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges official (1) harassment; (2)

retaliation; and (3) indifference toward his medical needs. See Complaint§ VIII, at 5-7, filed

August 22, 2017 (ECF No. 3). The Court granted Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma

pauperis. See ECF No. 9. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff regularly files grievances against TDCJ officials at his prison facility. He filed two

such grievances in January 2016, and a TDCJ officer wrote him up for a disciplinary infraction

two months later. Plaintiff thereupon filed another grievance alleging retaliation. See Complaint at

10. TDCJ rejected that grievance at both Step 1 and Step 2 of the internal TDCJ offender grievance

process. See Complaint at 9-10. Plaintiff has since reiterated the same grievance at least three

times, with TDCJ fully reinvestigating his claims once and returning the grievance form twice for

redundant filings within the grievable time period. See Complaint at 9-16. In Plaintiff's most recent

Step 2 grievance, he asserts two additional claims against TDCJ officials: (1) harassment by means

of a pretextual search of his cell; and (2) withholding mental health treatment. See Complaint at

15-16. Plaintiff lastly finds fault with the grievance process itself, asserting that his claims never

were investigated or examined. See Complaint at 16.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Frivolous Claims

When a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility brings an action

with respect to prison conditions under any federal law, the Court may evaluate the complaint and

dismiss it without service of process, Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (Sth Cir. 1990), if it is

frivolous,! malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). The same standards will support dismissal of a suit brought under any federal law

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, where such suit concerns

prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). A Spears hearing need not be conducted for every

pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (Sth Cir. 1991).”

' A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993);

see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992). To determine whether a complaint is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(d), the Court must inquire whether there is an arguable ‘“‘factual and legal basis of constitutional dimension for

the asserted wrong.’” Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (Sth Cir. 1985) (quoting Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886,

892 (5th Cir. 1976)). The review of a complaint for factual frivolousness nevertheless is quite limited and “only

appropriate in the limited class of cases wherein the allegations rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly

incredible,” not just to the level of the unlikely. Booker, 2 F.3d at 114. Nor is /egal frivolousness synonymous with

mere unlikeliness. The Supreme Court of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

repeatedly counsel district courts against dismissing petitions that have some chance of success. See, e.g., Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989); Booker, 2 F.3d at 116. That caution

notwithstanding, a “claim against a defendant who is immune from suit is frivolous because it is based upon an

indisputably meritless legal theory. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Booker, 2 F.3d at 116.

2 Green vs. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (Sth Cir. 1986) (“Of course, our discussion of Spears should not be

interpreted to mean that all or even most prisoner claims require or deserve a Spears hearing. A district court should

B. Retaliation Claims

To state a claim of retaliation, “a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional right,

(2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a

retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (Sth Cir. 2006)

(quoting McDonald v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998)). A prisoner has a heavy burden

to establish a claim of retaliation; he must do more than make mere conclusory allegations. Woods

v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Sth Cir. 1995); see Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (Sth

Cir. 1997). Where a prisoner is unable to establish a specific constitutional violation, his claim is

not cognizable. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (Sth Cir. 1999).

C. Deliberate Indifference Claims

Deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs constitutes unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104 (1976). Such indifference may be “manifested by prison doctors in their response to the

prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or

intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Jd. Medical records showing sick

calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate’s allegations of deliberate

indifference. Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995). A delay in medical care

can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation only if deliberate indifference results in substantial

harm. See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (Sth Cir. 1993).

Deliberate indifference “is an extremely high standard to meet.” Hernandez v. Tex. □□□□□

of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 882 (Sth Cir. 2004). (“We begin by emphasizing

be able to dismiss as frivolous a significant number of prisoner suits on the complaint alone or the complaint together

with the Watson questionnaire.”) ;

that our court has interpreted the test of deliberate indifference as a significantly high burden for

plaintiffs to overcome.”). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference “only if (A) he knows

that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and (B) he disregards that risk by failing

to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006)

(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); see also Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174,

176-77 (Sth Cir. 1994)). Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, and medical

malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his

medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances. Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693 (5th Cir.

1999); Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1999); Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d

232, 235 (Sth Cir. 1995); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (Sth Cir. 1991).

Rather, a showing of deliberate indifference requires the prisoner to submit evidence that

prison officials “‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly,

or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious

medical needs.’” Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (Sth Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit has

defined a “serious medical need” as “one for which treatment has been recommended or for which

the need is so apparent that even a layman would recognize that care is required.” Gobert, 463

F.3d at 345 n.12 (emphasis added).

D. Supervisor Liability Claims

In section 1983 suits, government officials are not held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates solely on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Nor are supervisory officials subject to vicarious

liability under section 1983 for the omissions of their subordinates. See Mouille v. City of Live

Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (Sth Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Consequently, absent direct

personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation, a plaintiff must prove that each

individual defendant either implemented an unconstitutional policy that directly resulted in injury

to the plaintiff or failed to properly train a subordinate employee. See Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d

440, 446 (Sth Cir. 2011); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (Sth Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

A. Retaliation and Perjury Claims

Plaintiff claims that the cell search was retaliatory is premised solely on the proximity of

the date he filed one grievance and the date of the search. That causal connection is tenuous at

best, as Plaintiff's frequent grievance filings leave few days in recent years when he was not at

some stage of a grievance process. Plaintiffs retaliation claims regarding the cell search are

therefore circumstantial and conclusory. Even if Plaintiff offered more than circumstantial

evidence and conclusions, prisoners do not have an expectation of privacy in their cells, which

prison officials may search at any time. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528-29 (1984).

Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Miller perjured herself at a disciplinary hearing likewise

are conclusory for a least two reasons. First, Defendant Miller testified about an incident that

occurred before the cell search and the filing of the most recent grievance. To the best of the

Court’s knowledge, Defendant Miller has not discovered time travel and so could not have perjured

herself by reporting falsely about a future action. Second, Plaintiff has filed many past grievances

but none from before the cell search appear to have been lodged against Defendant Miller. She

consequently could not have retaliated against Plaintiff on the grounds he asserts. The Court

therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff's retaliation and perjury claims.

B. Deliberate Indifference Claims

Plaintiff contends Defendant Garcia showed deliberate indifference to his mental health in

two ways. First, he states Defendant Garcia released him from crisis management, following a

suicide attempt by Plaintiff, without conducting an adequate consultation. See Complaint { 7, at 6.

Second, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Garcia discontinued Plaintiff's psychiatric medication. See

Complaint { 6, at 6. Even if accepted as true, these claims reflect only disagreement with the

treatment Defendant Garcia provided, 1.e. not deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical

needs. To the contrary, Plaintiff himself provides the Court with facts sufficient to indicate TDCJ

personnel met their duty of care; they placed Plaintiff in crisis management following his suicide

attempt, and medical personnel subsequently monitored his status. Plaintiff asks for further

evaluation but does not specify any reason why additional evaluation is medically required. The

Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims.

C. TDCJ Disciplinary Process Claims

In section 1983 suits, government officials are held liable for neither the conduct nor the

omissions of their subordinates solely on a theory of vicarious liability. The Court therefore

DISMISSES Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Warden, Andrew, Gruver, and Dean.

For the reasons set forth above and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2), as well

as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), it is ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to state a claim, and with prejudice as frivolous with respect to his claims

against supervisory officials and grievance officers.

SO ORDERED.

June 2020. ee

MATHEW J. KACSMARYK

TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE