DC v. Dallas Independent School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

D.C., §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-02981-E

§

DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; §

ALAN E. MILES, INDIVIDUALLY, §

§

Defendants.M EMORANDUM OR§D ER AND OPINION

Before the Court is Defendant Alan E. Miles’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff D.C.’s Deemed Admissions (Doc. No. 57). Having considered the motion, submissions,

and applicable law, the Court determines the motion should be granted for the following

reasons.

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are taken from D.C.’s First Amended Complaint. While a

student at Skyline High School in the Dallas Independent School District (DISD), D.C. was

assaulted by another student (Student 2) on campus. Miles, a DISD police officer,

apprehended D.C. by “slanging him head first into lockers located in the hallway at the

school,” “plac[ing] D.C. into a chokehold with his forearm[,] and dragg[ing] D.C. several feet

down the hall and into a classroom.” D.C. was “held there,” where Miles “slammed [D.C.’s]

head against the desk.” Miles arrested D.C., who was charged with resisting arrest. The

apprehension and arrest “caused multiple contusions and bruised to D.C.’s neck, face,

forehead, and lips.”

D.C. brought this action against Miles alleging claims for violations of D.C.’s Fourth

1

and Fifth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 17). Miles filed a partial

motion to dismiss the Fifth Amendment-based section 1983 claim, and the Court granted the

motion (Doc. Nos. 27 & 37). see also

Miles subsequently served D.C. with requests for admission (Doc. No. 49-1;

Doc. No. 54). D.C. failed to timely respond to the requests, and Miles filed a motion to deem

matters admitted (Doc. No. 48). D.C. did not respond to the motion, which the Court granted

(Doc. No. 54), and D.C. has not moved to withdraw the admissions. Accordingly, the matters

in the requests for admission are deemed admitted and are conclusively established for

purposesS oefe this action under Federal Rule of CiviMl Purrorceelld vu. rCea 3st6e ralninde this Court’s Order (Doc.

2

No. 54). FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1), (a)(3), (b); , 307 F. App’x 778, 780

th

(5 Cir. 20D08u)k e(sd ve. eSm. Ceadr oaldinma iIsnssio. Cno .on essential issue can serve as basis for summary

judgment); , 770 F.2d 545, 548–49 (5th Cir. 1985).

1

D.C. also sued DISD; the Court previously dismissed the claims against DISD (Doc. No. 38).

2

In per tinent part, Rule 36 provides:

(a) SCO PSEc AoNpDe PROCEDURE.

(1) . A party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the

pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) related to: (A) facts,

the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described

Tdiomcue mtoe Rnetss.p ond; Effect of Not Responding

* * *

(3) . A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being

served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer

or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney. . . .

* * *

(b) EFFECT OF AN ADMISSION; WITHDRAWING OR AMENDING IT. A mater admitted under this rule is conclusively

established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended. . . .

F ED. R. CIV. P. 36.

Among others, the following factual matters set out in Miles’s requests to D.C. are

admitted:

In October 2015, D.C. was involved in a physical altercation with Student 2 on the

campus of Skyline High School. Miles and another DISD police officer, Johanna Williams,

received a call about the fight and responded to the scene. Thereafter, D.C. attempted to start

a second fight with Student 2. To prevent the assault, Miles restrained D.C., who resisted by

pushing and shoving Miles and grabbing Miles by the throat. There were no lockers in the

“parking lot/courtyard” were the apprehension took place, and Miles did not “slang and/or

slam” D.C. into lockers during the apprehension.

Miles instructed D.C. to calm down and demanded that D.C. place his hands behind his

back. D.C. refused to comply, and Miles placed his left forearm around D.C.’s upper body and

“pulled,” but did not “drag,” D.C. to a school security office. This walk lasted less than fifteen

seconds, and there were no lockers in the hallway leading to the office. Miles continued to

try to subdue D.C., but D.C. continued to resist arrest. Miles and Williams were met by

campus officer Anthony Allen in the office, and Miles, with the assistance of Williams and

Allen, placed D.C. in handcuffs. Miles then arrested D.C. for disorderly conduct and resisting

arrest, search, or transport. Miles did not “slam” D.C. against a desk. D.C. was not injured

during the arrest, and his broken lip, neck and back pain, and contusions resulted from his

previous altercations with Student 2.

3

Miles now has moved for summary judgment on D.C.’s remaining Fourth

Amendment-based section 1983 claim, which alleges Miles used excessive force. Miles

asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity based on the deemed admissions.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute

as to any Nmoartweerigaila fna cBtu alkn dT rtahne smp.o Av/aSn vt .i Isn etn’l tMitalerdin teo Tjuedrmgmineanlst Paas rat nmeartstheirp of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a); , 520 F.3d 409, 411

(5th Cir. 2008). “A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the

nonmoving party or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmNoorvwinegg ipaanr tByu liks

Tinrsaunfsfipc.i Aen/St to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor.”

, 520 F.3d at 411–12 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The “usual summary juBdrgomwenn vt. bCuarlldaehna onf proof” is altered when the movant asserts a

qualified immunity defense. , 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). When a

government official pleads qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

demonstrate the defense’s inapplicability by “establishing a genuine fact issuBer oaws nto whether

the officCilaulb’s Raelltergoe, dLl.Ly. Cw. rvo. Hngilftuoln conduct violated clearly established law.” , 537 F.3d

at 253; , 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009). The court must view all

facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the record “in the light most favorable to” a

plaintiff opposing the motion, but the plaintiff cannot rest on conclusory allegations or

3

Miles also filed a motion to dismiss D.C.’s claim based on D.C.’s failure to comply with an order requiring him

to serve initial disclosures and responses to interrogatories and requests for production (Doc. No. 54). Because

the Court resolves D.C.’s claim on summary judgment, Miles’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot.

Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C. Poole v. City

aosf sSehrrteiovenpso. rt , 832 F.3d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 2016);

, 691 F.3d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 2012).

ANALYSIS

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estabPliesharesdo ns tva. tCuatlolaryh aonr

constitutional rights of which a reasHonaarlbolwe pve. rFsiotzng weroauldld have known.’” ,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Courts

use a two-part test to determine if a government official is entitled to qualified imTmeurnryit yv..

FHiurbste,r tthe court determines if the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right.

, 609 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2010). For an excessive force claim, “[t]he second prong

of the test ‘is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated

constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether

the conduct of theG rdigegfesn vd. aBnret wwears objectively unreasonable in light of that Ttahrevne rc vle. aCritlyy

eosf tEadbnliashed law.’” , 841 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting

, 410 F.3d 745, 7P5e0a r(s5otnh Cir. 2005)). Courts may decide which of the two prongs

should be decided first. , 555 U.S. at 232.

Miles contends the summary judgment evidence establishes he is entitled to qualified

immunity under both prongs of the defense. To overcome the defense, D.C. has the burden

to direct the Court to evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

(1) Miles “violated a federal constitutional or statutory rigEhstc aorrc e(2g)a tvh. eJo vrdioalnated right was

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” , 701 F. App’x

338, 341 (5th Cir. 2017).

With respect to the first prong, D.C. alleges Miles violated his Fourth Amendment right

by using excessive force in apprehending and arresting him. To prevail on an excessive-force

claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of

force that wasC ocolpeaerr lvy. Berxocwenssive, and (3) the excessiveness of whEiclhiz owndaos v.c Gleraerelny

unreasonable.” , 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting ,

671 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2012)). His excessive forcGe rcalahiamm i sv .“ aCnoanlnyozred under the Fourth

Amendment's ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” , 490 U.S. 386, 396

(1989). To determine the objective reasonableness of the force used, a court must balance

“the amount of force used against the need for that force, taking theP pooerlespective of a

reasonable officer on the scene without the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” , 691 F.3d at

628 (internal quotations omitted). Considerations include the severity of the offense,

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safeGtrya hoaf mthe officer or othe. rs, and

whether the suspect resisted or attempted to evade arrest. , 490 U.S. at 396

The summary judgment evidence precludes finding that Miles’s use of force was

clearly excessive. D.C. was attempting to assault Student 2 when Miles intervened. D.C.

resisted Miles’s efforts to restrain him verbally and physically by pushing and shoving Miles

and grabbing Miles by the throat. A reasonable officer present at the scene could have

perceived D.C.’s conduct as posing an immediate threat to the safety of Student 2 and Miles.

Indeed, D.C. admitted his conduct posed a serious threat to both Student 2 and Miles. D.C.

continued to resist efforts to restrain him, refusing to comply with Miles’s instructions to

calm down and place his hands behind his back. Miles then placed a forearm around D.C.’s

upper body and “pulled” D.C. to a school security office. D.C. continued to resist arrest, but

Miles was able to place D.C. in handcuffs with the assistance of Williams and Allen. Viewed

objectively, the summary judgment evidence shows Miles reactSeede wGaitlvha n“m ve. aCsiutyr eodf aSnadn

aAsncteonndioing” actions in his efforts to apprehend and arrest D.C.

, 435 F. App’x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2010) (use of force involving “measured and

ascending responses” was reasonable when plaintiff resisted arrest).

D.C. alleged Miles “slanged” D.C. into lockers, slammed his head against a desk, placed

him into a “chokehold,” and dragged him “several feet” into a classroom, butS ethee W uanlslawcoer vn.

Talelxe.g Taeticohn Us niniv .his amended complaint are not summary judgment evidence.

, 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[P]leadings are not summary judgment

evidence.”). Further, the deemed admissions conclusively establish those events did not

occur. Balancing the amount of force used against the need for that force with “tsheee

pPeoroslepective of a reasonable officer on the scene without the 20/20 vision of hindsight,”

, 691 F.3d at 628, the Court concludes D.C. has failed to produce evidence showing

Miles’s actions were clearly excessive or unreasonable.

D.C. also is required to show he suffered an injury aSntedp htheen sionnju vr.y M recCsuleltlleadn d“directly

and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive.” , 632 F.

App’x 177, 184 (5th Cir. 2015). D.C.’s allegations that his apprehension and arrest “caused

multiple contusions and bruised to D.CS.e’se nWeaclkl,a cfaece, forehead, and lips” do not constitute

cnoomnep etent summary judgment proof. , 80 F.3d at 1047. And, D.C. admits that

of his alleged injuries resulted from his interactions with Miles and, instead, were the

result of his altercations with Student 2. Without evidence of an injury or that any injury was

sustained as a result of his apprehension and arrest, D.C. cannot maintain an excessive force

See Carlton v. Fearneyhough

claim against Officer Miles. , No. 07-10676, 2008 WL 686595, at

*2 (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008) (when conceding he suffered no injury in defendant’s request for

admissions, plaintiff “failed to make out a prima facie case of an excessive force claim”).

By failing to demonstrate any evidence that Miles violated D.C.’s Fourth Amendment

right, D.C. cannot satisfy his burden of raising a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

Miles is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Court need not address the second

prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

CONCLUSION

D.C., by admitting facts demonstrating Miles’s conduct did not violate any of his

constitutional or statutory rights, fails to raise a genGuiRnAe NdTisSpute of material fact on Miles’s

qualified immunity defense. Therefore, the Court Miles’Ds IMSMotIiSoSnE fSor Summary

Judgment on Pwliatihn tpifrfe Dju.Cd.’isc eDeemed Admissions (Doc. No. 57) and D.C.’s claim

againstS MOi lOeRs DERED. .

Signed January 14, 2020.

U__N__I_T__E__D__ S__T_A__T__E__S_ _D__I_S_T__R__IC__T__ _J_U__D__G_E_

ADA BROWN