Opinion

Conoly Brown v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed: Jun 21, 2013
Status: Published
On the bench: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 29.1%

passage of zoning ordinance is legislative act

How later courts described this case

passage of zoning ordinance is legislative act
municipal authorities act in legislative capacity in enacting or amending zoning ordinance or rezoning certain area
enacting or amending zoning ordinance is legislative function
legislative zoning decisions involve determination and enactment of zoning policies and cannot be delegated to other governmental bodies

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 17, 2011 Session

CONOLY BROWN, ET AL. v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF

NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 10C2390 Amanda Jane McClendon, Judge

No. M2011-01194-COA-R3-CV - Filed June 21, 2013

The Metropolitan Council adopted a series of three ordinances that (1) created a new zoning

classification called Specific Planning (SP); (2) rezoned over 700 parcels of property to SP

zoning; and (3) amended permitted uses in SP zones to exclude certain types of financial

services, specifically check cashing services not part of a bank. The plaintiffs owned

property on which that type of service was conducted and another parcel on which they

intended to conduct the excluded services. Their parcels were among those rezoned as SP.

We reverse the trial court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ challenge should have been brought

as a common law writ of certiorari action because the act of rezoning by amending the zoning

ordinance is a legislative act which is reviewable in a declaratory judgment action. We also

hold that the ordinance rezoning the 700 parcels was invalid because it was not consistent

with the enabling ordinance creating the SP classification.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Reversed and Remanded

P ATRICIA J. C OTTRELL, P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which F RANK G.

C LEMENT, J R. and RICHARD H. DINKINS, JJ., joined.

Peter H. Curry, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellants, Conoly Brown, David Hood, and

Tennessee Quick Cash, Inc.

Kathryn S. Evans, Cynthia E. Gross, and Jason P. Bobo, Nashville, Tennessee, for the

Appellee, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.

OPINION

I. B ACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this case are Conoly Brown, David Hood, and Tennessee Quick Cash,

Inc. (“TQC”) (collectively, “Landowners”). Messrs. Brown and Hood own the property

located at 3100 Gallatin Pike, Nashville Tennessee (the “Property”). Messrs. Brown and

Hood are the sole shareholders of TQC, a Tennessee corporation which operates a financial

services business on the Property that provides a range of services for its customers including

check cashing, consumer loans, electronic payment of bills, telephone payment plans, and

check advances, among others. Messrs. Brown and Hood also own property located at 934

Gallatin Road which they purchased in 2007 for the purpose of opening another financial

services business providing, inter alia, check cashing, cash advances, and title loans services.

Through a series of actions by the county legislative body, the Metropolitan Council,

the properties owned by the Landowners have been rezoned in a way that prohibits use of the

properties to provide the types of financial services they have provided and intend to provide.

This result was accomplished through several pieces of legislation, each of which is briefly

described below.

A. Creation of New Zoning Classification

In 2005 the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

(“Metro”) created a new zoning classification known as “Specific Planning” (“SP zoning”).

The classification was created through the Metro Council’s adoption of Ordinance No.

BL2005-762, now codified as Section 17.40.105 [Specific Plan – Purpose and intent] and

Section 17.40.106 [Development plan]. Section 17.40.105 sets forth the purpose and intent

of the SP zoning:

The specific plan (SP) district is an alternative zoning process that may permit

any land uses, mixture of land uses, and alternative design standards, as may

be required to address the unique characteristics of an individual property

through a site specific plan. In return, a SP district requires the site specific

plan to be designed such that, at a minimum, the location, integration and

arrangement of land uses, buildings, structures, utilities, access, transit,

parking, and streets collectively avoid monotony, promote variety, and yield

a context sensitive development. The site specific plan must comply with the

building, fire and life safety codes adopted by the Metropolitan Government.

-2-

B. Rezoning of Gallatin Pike Corridor to SP Zoning

On July 23, 2007, the Metro Council approved Ordinance No. BL2007-1523, the

stated purpose of which was to “chang[e] various zoning districts to SP zoning, various

properties located along Main Street and Gallatin Pike (263.71acres), to regulate land uses

and establish sign and development standards . . . .” The specific plan adopted by this

ordinance was titled The Gallatin Pike Improvement District Specific Plan (the “GPIDSP”).

This plan rezoned 766 parcels of land located along the Main Street and Gallatin Pike

corridor, running from South Fifth Street in East Nashville north to Briley Parkway in

Madison. Prior to the enactment of this ordinance these 766 properties had various zoning

classifications; for example, some properties were zoned for residential use and some were

zoned for commercial use. As a result of Ordinance BL2007-1523, all 766 properties were

rezoned as SP zoning. Both the Landowners’ properties are located within this corridor and

are subject to this ordinance.

The GPIDSP contained a section entitled “Excluded Uses,” and among the thirty-one

uses that were specifically excluded from the Main Street and Gallatin Pike Corridor Plan

is “Title loan.”

C. Addition of Excluded Uses in SP Zoned Property

On October 14, 2008, the Metro Council approved Ordinance No. BL2008-169, which

added five new use definitions to the zoning regulations: “financial institution,” “check

cashing,” “pawnshop,” “title loan,” and “cash advance.” “Financial institution” was defined

as “an establishment [that] provides a variety of financial services, including generally,

banks, credit unions, and mortgage companies.” “Check cashing,” “title loan,” “pawnshop,”

and “cash advance” were all defined “as regulated by Title 45 . . . of the Tennessee Code

Annotated.”

Check cashiers are licensed under Title 45, Chapter 18; title loan lenders are licensed

pursuant to Title 45, Chapter 15, and cash advance lenders are governed by Title 45, Chapter

17. The Landowners contend that the only reason for adopting these new definitions was to

distinguish between mainline banks that cashed checks for a fee, made short term cash

consumer loans, and made automobile loans secured by the vehicle’s title, from the other

businesses providing the same services, like TQC, so that these latter businesses could be

prohibited in the GPIDSP.1

The drafters of the GPIDSP apparently intended to exclude title loans, check cashing, and cash

(continued...)

-3-

As stated earlier, the result of these ordinances was to prohibit businesses, other than

banks, which make title loans, cash checks, and make cash advances, as defined by

ordinance, from being located in the Gallatin Pike Corridor, including the two properties

owned by Landowners.

II. P ROCEEDINGS IN T RIAL C OURT

Landowners filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Davidson

County, in which they challenged the legitimacy of Ordinance Nos. BL2005-762, BL2007-

1523, and Substitute BL2008-198.2 They sought a declaration (1) that Ordinance No. 2007-

1523, establishing the GPIDSP, be declared null and void because it purported to enact

zoning amendments that go beyond the changes envisioned, described, and authorized by the

ordinance creating the SP Zoning classification and was adopted in violation of the

requirements of that ordinance; (2) that Ordinance No. BL2008-169, purporting to define a

difference between a financial institution and check-cashiers, cash advance, and title loan

companies, be declared null and void; and (3) that the portion of the GPIDSP Plan

prohibiting the uses Landowners engage in, including making title loans, cash advances, and

check cashing, be declared null and void because the ordinances that restrict their rights to

use their property lack any reasonable or rational basis, thereby violating their constitutional

rights to due process and equal protection of the law.

Upon motion by the Metropolitan Government, the trial court dismissed the petition

in its entirety. In its Memorandum Opinion granting the dismissal, the trial court addressed

each of the arguments raised by Landowners. The court held that the Landowners were

(...continued)

advances from the acceptable uses in the area covered by the GPIDSP, but only included “title loans” in the

list of excluded uses. This oversight was later corrected when the Metro Council amended the GPIDSP to

include “check cashing” and “cash advances” as excluded uses in the area through Substitute Ordinance BL-

198 and BL2007-1523. According to Landowners, the “new plan” referenced in Substitute Ordinance No.

BL2008-198 did not include the prohibitions of check cashing, pawn shops, and cash advance uses as it was

meant to do. This led to an amended Substitute Ordinance No. BL2008-198 to fix the error of the earlier

substitute ordinance.

One contention made by Landowners was that the adoption of Ordinance No. BL2005-762 (creating

SP zoning classification) was ultra vires and, therefore, void or voidable because the Metro Council lacked

the requisite delegated authority to adopt SP zoning districts. In reliance on Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-201(a)

[Grant of power], 13-7-103 [Purposes of zoning regulations], 13-4-310 [Power of municipal planning

commission to promulgate provisions for development], and 13-3-413 [Power of regional planning

commission to promulgate provisions for development], the trial court held the enactment of BL2005-762

was “a valid exercise of power and purpose by Metro.” Landowners do not challenge this holding on appeal.

-4-

required to challenge Ordinances No. BL2007-1523 and BL2008-198 by writ of certiorari,

rather than by a petition for declaratory judgment, and that the time had passed for the filing

of a petition for writ of certiorari. The court acknowledged that the resolution of this issue

required it to determine whether Metro Council had engaged in an administrative or a

legislative function when it adopted Ordinance No. BL2007-1523. The trial court

determined the adoption of BL2007-1523 and BL2008-198 were “administrative decisions

because Metro applied previously established criteria set forth in Ordinance 2005-762

(codified at Metropolitan Code §17.40.105 et seq.).”

Finally, the trial court addressed the challenge to Ordinance No. BL2008-169, which

defined some of the permitted and prohibited uses in the area covered by the GPIDSP.

Concluding that the Landlords “cannot show that Metro’s ordinance is not reasonably related

to a legitimate government interest,” the court dismissed this challenge as well.

III. M ETHOD FOR C HALLENGING M ETRO C OUNCIL’S R EZONING

On appeal, the Landowners challenge the validity of the ordinance applying the SP

zoning classification to their properties as part of the rezoning of 766 parcels in the creation

of the Gallatin Pike Improvement District Specific Plan. The trial court did not rule on this

issue because it found that the Landowners could not bring this claim in a declaratory

judgment action but, instead, were required to bring it in an action under the common law

writ of certiorari. Therefore, we must first review that decision by the trial court.

The distinction between the avenues for access to the courts to review local

land use decisions was explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1983 in

Fallin v. Knox County Bd. of Com’rs, [656 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. 1983)], wherein

the Court established the rules to be applied:

It is our opinion that an action for declaratory judgment, as

provided by T.C.A. §§ 29-14-101 – 29-14-113, rather than a

petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to be employed by

one who seeks to invalidate an ordinance, resolution or other

legislative action of county, city or other municipal legislative

authority enacting or amending zoning legislation.

***

We wish to point out, however, that the remedy of certiorari

provided by T.C.A. §§ 27-8-101, 27-9-101--27-9-113 will

continue to be the proper remedy for one who seeks to overturn

-5-

the determination by Board of Zoning Appeals as provided by

T.C.A. § 13-7-106 et seq. and T.C.A. § 13-7-205 et seq. This

distinction in remedies is made because the determinations made

by a Board of Zoning Appeals are administrative

determinations, judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, and are

accompanied by a record of the evidence produced and the

proceedings had in a particular case, whereas, the enactment of

ordinances or resolutions, creating or amending zoning

regulations, is a legislative, rather than an administrative, action

....

Moore & Associates, Inc. v. West, 246 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting

Fallin v. Knox Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 656 S.W.2d at 342).

The distinction made by the courts is rooted in the two separate statutory grants of

authority to local governments regarding land use. The Tennessee General Assembly has

delegated to local governments the authority to regulate use of private property through

zoning ordinances. Lafferty v. City of Winchester, 46 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2001). The General Assembly has also delegated to local officials the authority to apply and

enforce zoning ordinances through the exercise of the police power to protect the health,

safety, and welfare of their citizens. Hoover, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 955

S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

The basic test for distinguishing between an administrative act and a legislative act

is whether the challenged action involves making law or enforcing existing law. McCallen

v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 639 (Tenn. 1990) (holding the test for determining

whether the governmental action is legislative or administrative is whether it “makes new law

or executes one already in existence.”)

The Landowners herein argue that Ordinance No. BL2007-1523, on its face and in its

application, is a rezoning ordinance that is legislative in nature and, therefore, reviewable by

a declaratory judgment action. The summary or purpose paragraph of the ordinance in

question provides:

An ordinance to amend Title 17 of the Metropolitan Code of Laws, the Zoning

Ordinance of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson

County, by changing from various zoning districts to SP zoning, various

properties located along Main Street and Gallatin Pike (263.71 acres), to

regulate land uses and establish sign and development standards, all of which

is described herein.

-6-

The body of the ordinance, in pertinent part, also provides:

Section 1. That Title 17 of the Code of Laws of the Metropolitan Government

of Nashville and Davidson County, is hereby amended by changing the

Official Zoning Map for Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, which

is made a part of Title 17 by reference, as follows:

By changing various zoning districts to SP zoning. . . .

Section 2. . . . the Metropolitan Clerk is hereby authorized and directed, upon

the enactment and approval of this ordinance, to cause the change to be made

on . . . said Official Zoning Map . . . and to make notation thereon of reference

to the date of passage and approval of this amendatory ordinance.

This language makes it clear that the Ordinance was a re-zoning ordinance, amended

the existing zoning ordinance, and required changes in the official zoning map. Each of

these descriptions qualifies the ordinance as a legislative action.

The authority to establish land use limitations, through zoning, is delegated to the

local legislative body. Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-201 (chief legislative body of municipality);

Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-101 (the county legislative body).3 Once a zoning ordinance is

enacted, any amendment to the ordinance, including the official maps, requires legislative

action. Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7- 204; Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7- 105 (“The county legislative

body may, from time to time, amend the number, shape, boundary, area or any regulation of

or within any district or districts or any other provision of any zoning ordinance”). State

statutes also require that the local legislative body authenticate, compile, update, maintain,

and make available to the public the zoning ordinance, map, and all amendments. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 13-7- 119; Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7- 212.

Thus, the authority to enact and amend a zoning ordinance and accompanying map

has been delegated exclusively to the local legislative body. Such acts require adoption by

the legislative process, including certain statutorily mandated procedures. There exists no

State enabling statutes require that the local planning commission certify a zone plan to the

legislative body, which is then required to follow certain procedures before it enacts the plan, which includes

text and/or maps. Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-104; Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-202 (“Whenever the planning

commission of the municipality makes and certifies to the chief legislative body a zoning plan, including

both the full text of a zoning ordinance and the maps, representing . . . .”)

-7-

authority for an administrative body or officer to enact or amend a zoning ordinance, and

such actions are never administrative in nature.

Accordingly, it is universally held that adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance

and amendment of the official zoning map are legislative acts. See Ball v. Jones, 132 So.2d

120, 123 (Ala. 1961) (municipal authorities act in legislative capacity in enacting or

amending zoning ordinance or rezoning certain area); Fritz v. City of Kingman, 957 P.2d 337,

338 (Ariz. 1998) (passage of zoning ordinance is legislative act); Konigsberg v. Board of

Aldermen of City of New Haven, 930 A.2d 1, 17-18 (Conn. 2007) (amending zoning

ordinance and zoning map constitute legislative acts); Hume v. Franklin Cnty. Fiscal Court,

276 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Ky. 2008) (decision to rezone and decision to amend zoning map are

both legislative functions); Summerwind Cottage, LLC v. Town of Scarborough, 61 A.3d

698, 702 (Me. 2013) (drawing of zoning map boundary lines is legislative, not

administrative, function); Richmarr Holly Hills, Inc. v. Am. PCS, L.P., 701 A.2d 879, 893

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (adopting zoning map is quintessentially legislative function);

City of Monett, Barry Cnty. v. Buchanan, 411 S.W.2d 108, 113-14 (Mo. 1967) (legislative

body is entrusted with sole power to enact comprehensive zoning or rezoning ordinance);

Application of Frank, 164 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Neb. 1969) (zoning ordinance constitutes

exercise of legislative function and city council that adopts rezoning ordinance amending

general zoning ordinance acts in legislative capacity); Munch v. City of Mott, North Dakota,

311 N.W.2d 17, 22 (N.Dak. 1981) (enactment of zoning ordinance is legislative function);

Schlagheck v. Winterfeld, 161 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ohio 1958) (board of township trustees act

in legislative capacity when adopting or amending zoning regulation or ordinance); O’Rourke

v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782, 784-85 (Okla. 1969) (enacting or amending zoning ordinance

is legislative function); Maynard v. Beck, 741 A.2d 866, 872 (R.I. 1999) (municipality

enacting zoning ordinance is acting in legislative capacity); City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616

S.W.2d 173, 175 (Tex. 1981) (enacting and amending zoning ordinances are exercises of

municipality’s legislative powers); Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 51 (Utah 2003)

(legislative zoning decisions involve determination and enactment of zoning policies and

cannot be delegated to other governmental bodies); Sampson v. Karnes, 415 S.E.2d 610, 612

(W.Va. 1992) (enactment of zoning ordinance is legislative function); Quinn v. Town of

Dodgeville, 364 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Wis. 1985) (because zoning is legislative act, rezoning

by amending an ordinance is also legislative in nature).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has similarly recognized the unquestionably legislative

nature of such actions. “[Z]oning ordinances and their amendments are clearly legislative

acts and subject to attack by a complaint for declaratory judgment . . . .”, McCallen, 786

-8-

S.W.2d at 639 (citing 8A E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §10.06 at 995

3rd ed. (1986)).4

Accordingly, we hold that the enactment of Ordinance No. BL2007-1523, which

rezoned 766 parcels and amended the zoning ordinance, was a legislative act and, therefore,

subject to judicial scrutiny through an action for declaratory judgment. Therefore, we reverse

the trial court’s judgment dismissing the action on the basis it was required to be brought as

a common law writ of certiorari action.

IV. V ALIDITY OF R EZONING O RDINANCE

Landowners assert that Ordinance No. BL2007-1523, which created the GPIDSP and

rezoned a large number of parcels, was invalid.5 The primary reason, they assert, is that it

does not comply with the enabling ordinance, i.e., the ordinance that created the new zoning

classification, Specific Planning (“SP”).

In order to decide this issue, it is necessary to examine the nature of the SP zoning

classification. “Zoning is the regulation by the municipality of the use of land within the

community, and of the buildings and structures which may be located thereon, in accordance

with a general plan and for the purposes set forth in the enabling statute.” 1 Rathkopf’s The

Law of Zoning and Planning § 1:3 (4th ed.). Early zoning ordinances generally created

various zones or districts within the local city or county and assigned a specific type of

zoning, or a specific zoning classification, to each district. The zoning classification, inter

alia, limited the types of uses available to land within the district.

Metro has argued that this court should apply the test enunciated in some opinions to determine

whether a governmental land use decision is administrative or legislative, i.e., “whether the enabling

ordinance provides sufficient standards to preclude the exercise of unbridled discretion. In order to qualify

as an administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial act, the discretionary authority of the government body must

be exercised within existing standards and guidelines.” McCallen, 786 S.W.2d at 639. Metro argues that

the ordinance establishing the new zoning classification provided sufficient standards and guidelines to allow

the Council to determine that the GPIDSP met those standards. Landowners point out that Ordinance No.

BL2005-762, the “enabling ordinance,” contains no standards or criteria by which to guide the Metro Council

in deciding whether to approve the proposed GPIDSP. Rather, section 4 of the ordinance provides that the

“Development standards shall be as specifically listed in the site specific SP ordinance.” We need not

resolve this issue, however, because the test urged by Metro simply does not apply to the enactment or

amendment of zoning ordinances, which is clearly a legislative act.

Landowners also argue that the effect of the ordinances, i.e., to eliminate specified uses carried on

by their businesses while allowing the same service when performed by a “financial” institution is

discriminatory. In other words, they assert that the distinction has no rational basis and, therefore, the

enactments should be set aside. Because of our decision herein, we need not address this issue.

-9-

The concept of zoning as embodied in early zoning codes was fairly simple

and straightforward, as were the codes themselves. The municipality was

divided geographically into several different use districts, usually residential,

business, and industrial, with a specification of what uses were allowed in

these respective districts. The codes then imposed fixed restrictions such as

height, bulk, and setback, among others, on the uses allowed in each district.

Use districts generally were, and still are, set out on an official zoning map

with corresponding allowed uses and restrictions described, as they still are

today, in the accompanying zoning code.

Id.6

More recently, however, local governments have employed other or additional zoning

techniques, generally to provide more flexibility and more control. 1 Rathkopf’s The Law

of Zoning and Planning § 1:14 (4th ed.). In fact, procedures providing flexibility and

discretion have become the trend and not the exception.7 Id. Zoning measures have evolved

away from Euclidian zoning into a process involving individualized and detailed

discretionary review of any significant development application.

Among the techniques that provide flexibility and control of development detail is the

“floating zone.” Sheridan v. Planning Bd., 266 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1969) (stating that a

floating zone “meets the need for flexibility in modern zoning ordinances.”); 3 Rathkopf’s

The Law of Zoning and Planning § 45:1 (4th ed.); 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning

§ 41. Metro’s SP zoning classification, as described in the ordinance creating it, is a floating

zone.

[A] “floating zone” is . . . defined as a two-step zoning technique whereby a

municipality first creates a particular use district in its zoning regulation so that

the zone is said to “float” over the entire municipality until at some future

time, in a second step, the municipality amends its zoning regulations and map

to locate, or “settle” the zone on a particular parcel of land. The first step

This type of zoning has become known as “Euclidian zoning,” because it is the type of zoning that

was challenged in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–89, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L.

Ed. 303 (1926), wherein the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of zoning.

Procedures in wide use that involve flexibility and individualized review include a floating zone or

planned development application, a site plan or design review process, or a special permit or conditional use

application. 1 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 11:4 (4th ed.). The Planned Unit Development

(PUD) zoning classification is generally considered a type of floating zone.

-10-

makes the floating zone available and the second step places it on the land by

a rezoning action, ordinarily at the request of an individual property owner.

80 A.L.R.3d 95 § 1[a]. Another statement describing a floating zone reads:

A floating zone is a special detailed use district of undetermined location in

which the proposed kind, size and form of structures must be preapproved. It

is legislatively deemed compatible with the area in which it eventually locates

if specified standards are met and the particular application is not

unreasonable. A floating zone is a device permitting the establishment of

tracts of parcels of land in a specialized use category in accord with the

comprehensive plan, without predetermining the exact location by leaving that

decision to future needs and demands of a community as they are recognized

from time to time. A floating zone is initiated on the instigation of a

landowner within the district rather than that of the legislative body. . . . If the

zoning body, acting in its legislative capacity, determines that all relevant

criteria and conditions have been or can be met, the zone change is approved

and the zone floats down upon the designated area to establish physical

boundaries.

8 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 25:100 (3d ed.), see Sheridan v. Planning Board, 266 A.2d 396

(Conn. 1969) (using this definition).

Thus, the floating zone procedure establishes a site-specific rezoning and development

process with some typical characteristics. It is initially created, or made possible, as a use

classification not initially delineated on a zoning map, but one that may later be established

on the zoning map by rezoning. Thus, it involves a two-step process wherein the legislative

body first creates the classification or special use district with an undetermined location.

After the first step, a floating zone exists in the text of the zoning code but not on the zoning

map. In the second step the legislative body applies that classification to a specific site or

parcel by rezoning that parcel at the request or initiation of the owner. It generally requires

a site-specific development plan showing proposed size and form of structures and other

development details, a review of the site-specific plan by the planning commission, and

approval by the legislative body for rezoning. Sometimes, conditions or restrictions are

imposed for the rezoning. If rezoning is approved, a zoning amendment places the floating

zone on the specific location or parcel on the zoning map. 1 Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning

and Planning § 1:14 (4th ed.); 3 Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning §§ 38:5, 45:1,

45:2 (4th ed.).

-11-

In the case before us, the SP classification was created through the Metro Council’s

adoption of Ordinance No. BL2005-762, now codified as Section 17.40.105 [Specific Plan

– Purpose and intent] and Section 17.40.106 [Development plan]. This ordinance is the

enabling legislation for any future action to rezone property to SP. Section 17.40.105 sets

forth the purpose and intent of the SP zoning: