Edwards v. Shelby County, Tennessee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

REBECCA EDWARDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 22-cv-02682-TMP

)

SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )

a Tennessee municipality )

operating as the SHELBY COUNTY )

HEALTH DEPARTMENT, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the court is defendant Shelby County’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed on March 5, 2024.1 (ECF No. 38.) For the

reasons below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Edwards’s Job

Rebecca Edwards was hired by the Shelby County Health

Department (“SCHD”) as a “Contact Tracer Health Investigator” on

August 3, 2020. (ECF No. 38-3 at PageID 187 (July 17, 2020

Employment Letter).) The hire letter Edwards received upon

accepting this position stated, “This position is funded by the

1The parties have consented to having the undersigned conduct all

proceedings in this case including trial, the entry of final

judgment, and all post-trial proceedings. (ECF No. 13.)

federal CARES Act. The funding for this grant is expected to end

on December 30, 2020.” (Id.) Edwards applied for and received a

promotion to be an “Environmentalist Contact Tracer Inspector,”

effective December 16, 2020. (ECF No. 38-4 at PageID 190 (Dec.

1, 2020 Employment Letter).) The December 1, 2020 hire letter

for this new position stated that it was a “durational appointed

position” and that it was “not a Civil Service Merit System

classified position.” (Id.) The letter also stated that

“[s]hould this durational position end, you will have no right

to reinstatement to your current position.” (Id.) Edwards signed

this hire letter on December 2, 2020. (Id. at PageID 191.) The

job description also stated that the position assumed by Edwards

was grant-funded and durational. (ECF No. 38-9 at PageID 386

(Job Description).) Edwards held this position from December 16,

2020, until her termination. (ECF No. 38-1 at PageID 165–66; ECF

No. 42-1 at PageID 442–43.)

B. Edwards’s Termination

Edwards was diagnosed with asthma in 2018 and has since

carried a rescue BREO inhaler with her. (ECF No. 43-4 at PageID

593–94 (Dep. of Rebecca Edwards, Vol. I).) When her asthma

flares up, she has difficulty performing household tasks and

maintaining conversation. (Id. at PageID 594.) Edwards testified

that her asthma would flare up at the smell of marijuana and

smoke, explaining that, “[e]ven if I have my BREO and all is

well, if someone were to walk in here right now with marijuana

or smoke, then we got issues.” (Id. at PageID 595.) She also

suffers from night blindness. (Id. at PageID 592.) This means

that Edwards tries not to drive at night, limiting any night

driving to “within a three-mile radius” of her house, taking

back streets, and avoiding highways or any streets with

“blinding light.” (Id.)

At the time of her promotion, in December 2020, Edwards

underwent a medical screening exam to verify that she was

physically able to perform the job. (Id. at PageID 590–92.)

During the exam, Edwards did not disclose that she had issues

with breathing. (Id.) On a medical form, the doctor performing

the exam checked the boxes that stated Edwards “[m]ay work

without limitations/restrictions” and she was “[a]ble to perform

job-related functions defined by Shelby County Government.” (Id.

at PageID 591–92.) The doctor performed a Titmus test and an

Ishihara test for Edwards’s vision. (Id.) Edwards’s vision was

tested at 20/15 for distance vision and 20/20 for near vision.

(Id.) Edwards was neither asked about nor tested for night

vision issues, but she also did not report any. (Id.) Edwards

had not been informed that driving alone past 11:30 p.m. could

be a part of the job. (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 614–15 (Dep. of

Rebecca Edwards, Vol. II).)

During Edwards’s employment between August 2021, and

October 8, 2021, she reported to Susie Suttle, the manager of

the COVID Response Unit. (ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 579, 583; ECF

No. 43-6 at PageID 660 (Dep. of Susie Suttle).) Edwards

testified that, on September 15, 2021, she “had not taken the

BREO in a while, . . . was having breathing issues, . . . was

coughing, . . . was wheezing, and . . . had not slept.” (ECF No.

43-5 at PageID 624.) Edwards did not have her BREO inhaler

because it was out of stock, and her symptoms were made worse by

changes in air pressure. (Id.) Edwards called Suttle’s office

phone at 4:00 a.m. and left a message referencing her asthma

directly and stating: “I’m having breathing issues. I haven’t

been able to sleep. I’m coughing, and I won’t be coming in.”

(Id.) Edwards testified that Suttle called her back around 7:30

a.m., insisted that Edwards needed to meet her at Walmart to

“get this child seat” because Suttle no longer had “time to get

anybody, and Nick can’t handle this family of eight by himself.”

(Id. at 625.) Edwards reiterated that her asthma was causing her

breathing difficulties on the 7:30 a.m. call with Suttle. (Id.)

On that phone call, Edwards agreed to go to work and did, in

fact, work on September 15, 2021. (Id.; ECF No. 22 at PageID 88

(Amended Complaint); ECF No. 24 at PageID 115 (Answer to Amended

Complaint).)

Edwards testified that on October 4, 2021, Suttle created a

new shift from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. at the Econo Lodge

Lakeland (“Econo Lodge”) and assigned it to Edwards. (ECF No. 22

at PageID 91.) During their conversation about this change,

Edwards stated she could not work that shift because she was

worried about criminal activity in the area and concerned about

driving twenty miles at night because she suffers from

nyctalopia, or night blindness. (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 629.)

According to Edwards, Suttle responded first by saying “You can

drive at night. It’s no problem. You’ve driven at night before.

You can drive at night[,]” before agreeing to talk to Deputy

Administrator Jennifer Kmet, but nevertheless said that Edwards

would have to work the shift until told otherwise. (Id. at

PageID 629-30.) Edwards stated that she would get a doctor’s

statement confirming her night blindness condition. (ECF No. 43-

4 at PageID 589; ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 684–85.) Edwards

testified that either that day or the next, she called her

optometrist and her pulmonologist in order to get statements,

though both were off that day and did not respond. (ECF No. 43-4

at PageID 589.) Edwards claims she never received any follow-up

questions about a doctor’s note or her condition from anyone

else at SCHD. (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 635.)

The morning of October 5, 2021, Suttle called Edwards

several times to confirm that Edwards did not intend to work the

entire 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. shift. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 92;

ECF No. 24 at PageID 119.) Edwards informed Suttle that she

would report to her shift but would do so “under protest.” (ECF

No. 43-5 at PageID 630.) At 4:07 p.m. on October 5, Edwards

emailed Suttle and Kmet that she would work at the Econo Lodge

that day and October 6, but “under protest” and noted criminal

activities at the Econo Lodge, including a specific criminal

incident she witnessed on September 13, 2021. (ECF No. 43-20 at

PageID 756–57.)

Before Edwards’s shift began, and before Edwards sent the

4:07 p.m. email, Suttle spoke with Kmet to discuss Edwards’s

objections to the nighttime shift and whether an alternative

schedule could be arranged. (ECF No. 43-19 at PageID 743–44

(Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. of Jennifer Kmet).) In that conversation,

Suttle also complained about Edwards’s absenteeism and

insubordination, for which Kmet advised her to provide

documentation. (Id.) Kmet also agreed to change Edwards’s hours

so that her shift could end at 7:00 p.m. (Id. at PageID 744.)

Suttle did not inform Edwards about this change on October 5.

(ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 631.) At 11:45 a.m. on October 5, 2021,

after their conversation but before Edwards’s shift was set to

begin, Suttle emailed Kmet a report for the purpose of removing

Edwards as one of Suttle’s specialist employees. (ECF No. 43-8

at PageID 715 (Suttle Report Email); ECF No. 43-6 at PageID

683.) Suttle’s October 5, 2021 report stated the following:

Rebecca Edwards’ Behavior

In the month of August, there were several occasions

that I met Ms. Thomas at the Waffle House to purchase

breakfast and Ms. Edwards was not there. At that time,

the shift started at 8:00 am. I assisted Ms. Thomas

with loading the breakfast in my vehicle and

transported it over to the Econo Lodge. Ms. Edwards

showed up after 9:30 am.

09/20/2021 Ms. Edwards was instructed to report to the

Dividend location to assist with updating the data

spreadsheet for the patients at the Econo Lodge. She

was instructed to work from 8:00 am to 4:30 pm at the

Dividend location due to her inconsistently at the

Econo Lodge. Ms. Edwards informed me that she had a

doctor’s appointment. She left at 9:00 am. She was

instructed to return to the office after her doctor’s

appointment. Ms. Edwards did not show back up to the

office until after 4:00 pm. She did not follow

instructions provided to complete the spreadsheet. I

am in the process of finalizing that spreadsheet now.

09/21/2021 Ms. Edwards was to report to work at 8:00

am. She did not show up to Dividend until 4:09 pm. I

met her in the hallway. I am not sure what she worked

on but I was here until approximately 7:30 pm. I went

to where she normally sits before I left for the

evening. She was not there, so I am not sure what time

she left.

10/04/2021 Ms. Edwards reported to the Dividend

location. She has been on vacation from 09/23/2021

through October 03, 2021. She completed the FEMA

training but did not do anything else all day. She

left the office before 4:00 pm and didn’t go out to

the Econo Lodge at all. I spoke to Ms. Edwards earlier

and explained to her again that I called her back into

the office due to her behavior at the Econo Lodge. She

was expected to complete date entry but she has not.

Therefore, I am requesting her to report back to the

Econo Lodge. I explained that she is expected to work

from 3:00 pm to 11:30 pm to take care of the patients

at the Econo Lodge. Ms. Edwards stated that she could

not work at the Econo Lodge until 11:30 pm. I

explained to Ms. Edwards that those are the shifts

they agreed to work. Ms. Edwards states that she did

not agree to any shift. She stated that she cannot

drive from the Econo Lodge at night and that she has a

doctor’s statement. I informed Ms. Edwards that maybe

the shifts can be adjusted but allow me to speak to

Jennifer first. I informed her that she would need to

work that shift until I get back to her or work

something out with the other two staff. Ms. Edwards

never said anything else about the shift. She did not

assist with meal delivery during her shift on

yesterday.

10/05/2021 I followed up with Ms. Edwards this morning

to discuss her not assisting with meal delivery on

yesterday. Ms. Edwards stated again that she is not

going to work at the Econo Lodge until 11:30 pm. She

states that she can assist with lunch and dinner but

that she cannot drive from the Econo Lodge at night. I

informed Ms. Edwards that there is only one patient at

the Econo Lodge right now and that she is basically

monitoring to make sure that the patient’s needs are

being met. She stated again that she will assist with

lunch and dinner but that she is not driving from the

Econo Lodge at night. So, I asked her was she refusing

to work her shift? She stated that she has a doctor’s

statement. I asked her what does her doctor’s

statement say? She then stated that she did not have a

doctor’s statement but she will get one. Ms. Edwards

went on to say that there is prostitution and a known

drug dealer on the Econo Lodge property. She stated

that a bounty hunter came on the property to look for

someone.

(ECF No. 43-8 at PageID 716–17.) No person in Human Resources,

including Laviette Crutchfield, the Senior Human Resources

Manager, assisted or consulted with Suttle in creating this

report. (ECF No. 43-2 at PageID 497 (Dep. of Laviette

Crutchfield).)

Edwards began her assigned shift at the Econo Lodge on

October 5, but left sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m.

because she did not feel safe driving home later. (ECF No. 43-5

at PageID 631.) On October 6, 2021, Suttle called Edwards to

inform her that Edwards had been moved to an earlier shift

starting at 10:30 a.m., and it was to begin that day. (ECF No.

43-4 at PageID 587.) Edwards testified that she received this

call after 10:30 a.m., and Suttle said “I know this is late. Get

there when you can.” (Id.) Edwards was scheduled for a COVID-19

test that day, and so did not get out to the Econo Lodge until

“a little after 1:30[.]” (Id.) She testified that she stayed

until after 7:00 p.m. (Id.)

That day, at 1:53 p.m., Suttle emailed a second report to

Kmet, which largely restated the October 5 report, with a few

additions. (ECF No. 43-7 at PageID 712–14 (Suttle Updated Report

Email Chain.) She added the following:

There was a complaint from Community Healthcare that

Ms. Edwards gave patients in transport water and asked

them to take their masks off to drink the water while

in transport. The workers complained that they were

being exposed to COVID-l9 due to Ms. Edwards asking

the patients to take off their masks.

. . .

10/05/2021 Ms. Edwards’s shift starts at 3:00 pm. She

called the other staff around 3:15 pm and informed him

that I asked him not to order dinner and that she was

going to order dinner. I never instructed her to tell

him the employer that.

10/06/2021 Ms. Edwards was contacted this morning

around 10:30 am and informed that her shift has been

changed temporarily. She was instructed to report to

the Econo Lodge after getting dressed and that she

will work from 10:30 am to 7:30 pm. I checked with the

Environmentalist currently on duty at 1:30 pm and Ms.

Edwards still has not arrived at the Econo Lodge. I

called Mr. Patel to see whether or not he has seen or

talked with Ms. Edwards. He states that she has not

arrived.

(Id. at PageID 713–14.)

On October 7, 2021, at 9:33 a.m., Administrator of

Epidemiology Cassandra Brown emailed Suttle, instructing her to

“document your investigation into Rebecca’s allegations and the

modification made to her schedule (which includes security

coverage) to accommodate her. Can you please respond to Rebecca

and copy me and Jennifer [Kmet].” (ECF No. 43-21 at PageID 758

(Brown email).) Kmet forwarded Suttle’s updated report to Brown

eleven minutes later, stating “FYI — I haven’t reviewed yet.”

(ECF No. 43-7 at PageID 712.) At 9:51 a.m., Brown e-mailed

Crutchfield, attaching Suttle’s updated report listing her

allegations against Edwards, asking to “please let us know steps

to initiate a disciplinary process if allowable. There is a

pattern of refusing to follow directives.” (Id.) After Brown’s

email, Suttle received four statements total, three from

Edwards’s coworkers and one from the Econo Lodge’s manager or

owner, Mr. Patel.

Velma Thomas, an Environmental Specialist who was under

Suttle’s supervision along with Edwards, emailed Suttle at 7:33

p.m. on October 7, stating she had “never witnessed any criminal

activities at the EconoLoge [sic] in Lakeland, TN.” (ECF No. 43-

22 at PageID 759 (Thomas email); ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 661.)

Thomas also stated: “When it comes to my colleague (Rebecca

Edwards) regarding the delivery of morning meals, she usually

showed up well after 9:00 am on several occasions and by then,

the morning meals have already been delivered.” (ECF No. 43-22

at PageID 759.) Patel, in an email sent on October 7 at 8:27

p.m., stated that the hotel monitors the room rented out to the

county, and that “[w]e do have the sheriffs department come

through the property on a routine basis and if any suspicious

activity is noticed we notify them.” (ECF No. 43-23 at PageID

760 (Patel email).) The following day, Suttle received emails

from two other employees stating they had not witnessed any

criminal activity at the Econo Lodge on September 29, 2021, and

October 6, 2021. (ECF No. 43-24 at PageID 761 (Broom email); ECF

No. 43-25 at PageID 762 (Blasingame email).)2

2Edwards disputes that there were no safety concerns at the Econo

Lodge. She asserts that on August 17, 2021, at an Inspector

Assignment meeting in which Edwards, Suttle, and other

management were present, Suttle stated that County employees

working at Econo Lodge “should be male and female at all times

because you never know what you’re going to run into,” and, “I

think you should go in twos[.]” (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 616; ECF

No. 43-6 at PageID 664.) On September 7, 2021, a Care

Edwards was not informed that she was under investigation

prior to leaving work for her scheduled leave on October 7,

2021. (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 635, 637.) At 8:52 a.m. on October

8, 2021, Crutchfield emailed Brown and Kmet, informing them that

Edwards would be terminated because of “Acts of Insubordination;

Attendance; Falsification of Information.” (ECF No. 43-9 at

PageID 718 (Crutchfield Oct. 8 email).) That day, Edwards

asserts that Suttle called her and asked that Edwards come into

the office the morning of October 11, 2021, but did not explain

why. (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 637.) On October 11, 2021, Edwards

met with Suttle and Brown. (Id. at PageID 638; ECF No. 43-6 at

PageID 693.) In the meeting, Edwards was walked through the

Disciplinary Action Form (“DAF”). (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 638;

ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 693.) Although Suttle asserts that Brown

read from the DAF, (ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 693), Edwards insists

that it was Suttle who read the document. (ECF No. 43-5 at

PageID 638).

The DAF states:

Coordination meeting took place that included Deputy Director

Travis Green, Brown, Kmet, Suttle, and Edwards in which Edwards

stated that there were criminal activities occurring at the

Econo Lodge, such as drug dealing and prostitution. (ECF No. 22

at PageID 86; ECF No. 24 at PageID 114.) At that meeting, Green

stated his intention to end the contract with Econo Lodge and

arranged for security to be present at Econo Lodge for the

following two weeks. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 87; ECF No. 24 at

PageID 115.)

Based on information from Ms. Susie Suttle, the direct

supervisor of Ms. Edwards: A complaint was received

from Community Healthcare, the transportation provider

for the CRU, stating that Ms. Edwards gave water to

COVID positive patients and asked them to take their

masks off to drink the water while in transport, which

is a violation of COVID-19 protocols and the Shelby

County Health Directive. 09/20/2021 - Ms. Edwards was

instructed to report to the COVID-19 Response Unit

(CRU) at [REDACTED] from 8:00 am to 4:30 pm, due to

her inconsistency in reporting to the SCHD Shelter

Facility Site (Econo Lodge, Lakeland, TN) as directed.

Ms. Edwards was reassigned to perform data entry. Ms.

Edwards stated she had a doctor’s appointment; left at

9:00 am and did not return until after 4:00 pm. Ms.

Edwards did not submit leave. Subsequently, Ms.

Edwards did not complete data entry tasks. 09/21/2021

Ms. Edwards did not report to the CRU until 4:09 pm.

Prior to Mrs. Suttle leaving the CRU at 7:30, she went

to Ms. Edward’s work station and she was not there. It

is unclear what time Ms. Edwards left for the evening.

10/04/2021 Ms. Edwards reported to the CRU, but did

not perform data entry tasks as assigned beginning

9/20/2021. She left work early at 4:00 pm. Due to Ms.

Edwards inability to complete these tasks, she was

reassigned to case management and client monitoring

on-site at the SCHD shelter facility from 3:00 pm to

11:30 pm. Ms. Edwards refused to work this shift and

cited several reasons why, which were later found to

be untrue after being investigated by Ms. Suttle, and

obtaining witness statements from Community

Healthcare, the Econo Lodge, and other

Environmentalists also assigned to the shelter

facility. Mrs. Edwards did not report to work.

10/05/2021 On follow up with Ms. Edwards regarding her

not assisting with meal delivery on 10/4/2021, Ms.

Edwards stated again she is not going to work at the

Econo Lodge until 11:30 pm. 10/06/202 In an effort to

accommodate Ms. Edwards and in response to her

complaint, she was allowed to work 10:30 to 7:00 pm

with security present. According to another

environmentalist on duty and the hotel owner, at 1:30

pm Ms. Edwards had not arrived.

(ECF No. 43-27 at PageID 764–65 (DAF).) Despite initial

disagreement,3 the parties agree that Edwards was terminated

effective October 8, 2021. (ECF No. 38-1 at PageID 166; ECF No.

42-1 at PageID 443.) Although Shelby County asserts that Edwards

was terminated “for cause,” Edwards disputes this claim. (ECF

No. 38-1 at PageID 166; ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 443–45.) The DAF

states that Edwards’s termination was pursuant to Personnel

Policy 703 for “Acts of Insubordination, Habitual tardiness

and/or absenteeism, Falsification of any Information that is

required by the County” as well as under the Attendance Policy.

(ECF No. 43-27 at PageID 764.) Shelby County provided Edwards

neither a pre-termination hearing nor an opportunity for a post-

termination appeal. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 96; ECF No. 24 at

PageID 122.)

C. Suttle’s Reports

In her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,

and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Material Facts,

Edwards challenges each of the assertions made against her in

Suttle’s two reports and the final DAF. Suttle’s initial report

claimed that there were occasions in August 2021 when Edwards

did not show up at the Waffle House and that Suttle “assisted

3Shelby County initially contended that Edwards was terminated

effective October 11, 2021. (ECF No. 24 at PageID 112.)

Ms. Thomas with loading the breakfast in [Suttle’s] vehicle and

transported it over to the Econo Lodge.” (ECF No. 43-8 at PageID

716.) Edwards responds that:

During this lawsuit, Defendant stipulated that “All

receipts submitted by Susie Suttle for meal purchases

made at the Waffle House for clients housed at the

Econo Lodge – Lakeland, whether using petty cash or

other means, have been produced by the County, and in

August 2021, specifically only for the following four

dates: August 26, 27, 28, and 30, 2021.” [(ECF No. 43-

2 at PageID 500.)] However, Edwards was off work on

August 26 and 27, and delivered meals with coworker

Velma Thomas on August 28 and 29 without any

assistance from Suttle. [(ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 588;

ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 623–24.)] Also, Edwards’

mileage report, signed by Suttle on September 4

confirms Edwards drove 92 miles and her destination

was Lakeland. [(ECF No. 43-14 at PageID 734.)] The

meal delivery schedule for August 2021 also shows

Edwards was not scheduled to deliver meals on August

30 and 31. [(ECF No. 43-15 at PageID 735.)] Suttle is

unable to state any specific dates for her visits to

Waffle House necessitated by Edwards allegedly failing

to show up for work. [(ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 688–89

.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 446–47.) In response to Suttle’s

statement that on September 20, 2021, Edwards left work for a

doctor’s appointment at 9:00 a.m. and did not return until 4:00

p.m. (ECF No. 43-8 at PageID 716), Edwards avers that

she left the office about 10 am on September 20 to

attend a doctor’s appointment. [(ECF No. 43-5 at

PageID 626.)] At 9:07 am, an e-mail from Jasmine

Hamlin to Suttle and others stating, “I have letters

at the office for pickup.” [ECF No. 43-5 at PageID

625.)] At 10 am, Suttle replied “Jasmine, I gave the

letters to Rebecca.” (Id.) The letters needed to be

delivered to patients at the Econo Lodge. [(Id.)]

Edwards also delivered more letters to the Econo Lodge

after she returned from her doctor’s appointment.

[(Id. at PageID 626.)] Importantly, regarding this

allegation, Suttle agrees Edwards asked for permission

to attend her doctor’s appointment, Suttle approved

the request, and Suttle did not ask Edwards’ for a

doctor’s note. When Edwards returned to the office,

Suttle cannot recall why she did not confer with

Edwards about her doctor’s appointment or how she

verified the alleged amount of time Edwards spent

outside the office that day. [(ECF No. 43-6 at PageID

689–90.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 448.) The parties also disagree about

when Edwards returned from her appointment. Compare ECF No. 22

at PageID 89 (“On September 20, 2021, at about 2:30 PM, Ms.

Edwards returned to COVID Response Unit[.]”), and ECF No. 43-4

at PageID 585 (“I got back to the office at 2:30.”), with ECF

No. 24 at PageID 116 (“Plaintiff returned to her assigned post

at approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 20, 2021.”). Edwards

alleges that she saw and spoke to Suttle when she returned at

2:30 p.m., waited for the letters Suttle assigned her to

deliver, and spoke to Suttle as she left to deliver them at 4:30

p.m. (ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 585.) Edwards did not submit any

documentation that she was taking, or had taken, sick leave.

(Id.)

Regarding what Suttle detailed as Edwards’s absenteeism on

September 21, 2021, (ECF No. 43-8 at PageID 716.), Edwards

counters that:

Here, by contrast, at 7:07 pm on September 20, Suttle

e-mailed Edwards to instruct her to be at the Econo

Lodge at 8 am the next day. Edwards only saw Suttle’s

e-mail because she checked her cell. [(ECF No. 43-5 at

PageID 626–27; ECF No. 43-17 at PageID 737.)] Suttle

told Edwards to use her own vehicle to inventory and

transport the belongings of patients leaving the Econo

Lodge and moving to a homeless shelter, with one trip

at 8 AM and a second trip at 10 AM. [(ECF No. 43-5 at

PageID 627.)] Edwards stated Suttle told her to report

to the CRU after transporting the belongings of the

patients from the Econo Lodge and then would have left

work at about 4:40 PM. [(ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 627.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 448–49.) In response to Suttle’s

report’s entry for October 4, 2021, (ECF No. 43-8 at PageID 716–

17), Edwards alleges:

By contrast, Edwards states there was no data entry

assignment on October 4 because there was County work

to be done, including Homeland Security and FEMA.

Edwards denies leaving work at 4 pm. [(ECF No. 43-4 at

PageID 587.)] Suttle is unable to recall if Edwards

worked at the Econo Lodge that day. [(ECF No. 43-6 at

PageID 691.)] Edwards states Suttle told her to work

at the CRU on October 4 because there was only one

patient at the Econo Lodge. [(ECF No. 43-4 at PageID

582, 588-89.)] Edwards denies Suttle spoke to her

about her alleged behavior on October 4, or on any

other date. [(ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 589.)] Instead,

on October 4, Edwards told Suttle about her nyctalopia

— a night-blindness impairment — and Edwards offered

to obtain a letter from her doctor to confirm this

impairment made it unsafe for her to drive at night,

specifically after 11:30 pm. [(ECF No. 43-5 at PageID

629–31.)] Suttle responded by arguing, “You’ve driven

at night before. You can drive at night.” (Id.) Suttle

concluded this conversation by stating she would talk

to Kmet, but Edwards needed to work the shift in the

meantime. [(Id. at PageID 629–30.)] Further, Suttle

admits Edwards did not return from vacation until

October 4. [(ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 691.)] Edwards

confirms she was on vacation on October 3 — the “shift

on yesterday” and therefore, plainly, would not have

assisted with meals on that day. [(ECF No. 43-5 at

PageID 630.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 449–50.) In response to Suttle’s

report’s entry for October 5, 2021, (ECF No. 43-8 at PageID

717), Edwards states:

Edwards denies Suttle called her on October 5 about

assisting with meal deliveries on October 4 because

Suttle had told her on October 4 that her assistance

was not needed on account of just one patient being at

the Econo Lodge. [(ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 630.)]

However, Suttle did call her three or four times on

the morning of October 5 to ask whether she was

refusing to work the new shift, and Edwards confirmed

she would work “but [] under protest” before assisting

with the meals for the rest of the day. [(Id.)]

Edwards states she only discussed a doctor’s letter on

October 4 with Suttle, and not on October 5. [(Id.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 450–51.)

In response to Suttle’s October 6, 2021 addition regarding

the August complaint about Edwards allowing COVID-19-positive

patients to remove their masks, (ECF No. 43-7 at PageID 713),

Edwards states:

Here, Suttle cannot recall when she allegedly received

this complaint, cannot recall the name of the person

allegedly complaining, cannot recall if she made any

notes about the complaint, and cannot recall if she

informed her superiors[. (ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 690–

91.)] Suttle only recalls telling Edwards about the

complaint and Edwards denied it. [(Id.)] Edwards

disputes the allegation and specifically recalls she

gave a patient bottled water and told her she could

not drink it until she got to the hotel. [(ECF No. 43-

4 at PageID 584–85.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 449.) Regarding Suttle’s October 6, 2021

addition about Edwards’s alleged start time and phone call on

October 5, 2021, (ECF No. 43-7 at PageID 714), “Edwards asserts

the comment simply confirms she was performing her job and

cannot explain why the allegation is even included by Suttle in

her report.” (ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 451 (citing ECF No. 43-4 at

PageID 589–90)). Regarding Suttle’s October 6, 2021 addition

about alleged tardiness on October 6, (ECF No. 43-7 at PageID

714), Edwards states:

Here, Edwards arrived at the Econo Lodge while Suttle

was on the telephone with her coworker. [(ECF No. 43-4

at PageID 590.)] Edwards states she is not required to

check-in with Mr. Patel, the owner of Econo Lodge,

when arriving at Econo Lodge. [(Id.)] Meanwhile, by

her own admission, Suttle did not call Edwards about

her new shift until after it began, following a day

when Edward [sic] was scheduled by Suttle to work

until 11:30 pm. In fact, on October 5, Suttle had told

her superior, Jennifer Kmet, that Edwards did not want

to work at night because she could not drive at night,

and Kmet responded to Suttle that same day to confirm

Edwards’ shift could end at 7 pm instead of 11:30 pm.

[(ECF No. 43-19 at PageID 744.)] However, Suttle

waited to call Edwards until “after 10.30 [AM]” on

October 6 to tell Edwards that Kmet changed her

schedule, and “I know this is late. Get there when you

can.” [(ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 587.)] Edwards already

had a COVID test scheduled for 1 pm and headed to the

Econo Lodge after it was completed. [(Id.)]

Additionally, on October 5 at 4:07 PM, Edwards emailed

Suttle and Kmet to confirm she would work at the Econo

Lodge that day, and again on October 6, but “under

protest” and complained about the dangerous

environment at the Econo Lodge, with a specific

example of criminal activities she witnessed on

September 13. [(ECF No. 43-20 at PageID 756–57.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 451–52.)

With the DAF, Edwards largely renews her responses to

Suttle’s reports, but raises several additional objections.

First, Edwards points out that the August 2021 claims made in

Suttle’s reports were no longer present in the DAF. (Id. at

PageID 454.) Further, regarding the conversation between Suttle

and Edwards on October 4, 2021, Edwards states:

Here, Suttle’ [sic] allegation has evolved. The DAF

omits all reference to Edwards’ medical impairment or

medical basis for requesting her shift be modified to

not end at 11:30 pm, and Edwards’ agreement to still

work the shift under protest. As stated, Edwards was

not shown any of the statements that allegedly

contradicted her claims of criminal activities at the

Econo Lodge. [ECF No. 43-6 at PageID 692.)] . . .

Further, the record shows that Defendant’s patients

were not the only people staying at the Econo Lodge

between August and October 2021. [(ECF No. 43-19 at

PageID 747.)] Defendant did not conduct a prior

criminal background check on clients, nor did they

check for history of warrants. [(Id. at PageID 746.)]

Kmet’s department did not keep track of reports of

crime at the Econo Lodge between August and October

2021. [(Id. at PageID 747.)] Defendant did not have

any way of tracking if the police were called to the

Econo Lodge. [(Id.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 455–56.) Finally, although the DAF

claims there was security present at the Econo Lodge on October

6, 2021, Shelby County stated that “Universal Security provided

security services at the Econo Lodge Lakeland on an as-needed

basis. They did not provide services for the month of October

2021[.]” (ECF No. 43-28 at PageID 772 (“Shelby County’s

Responses to Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories and

Requests for Production”).)

Edwards further contends that Shelby County can provide no

proof of her absences generally, because

according to Defendant’s pay records for Edwards, she

worked 81.25 hours for every bi-weekly pay period

without any missing work time. Indeed, the pay

statement for October shows a stipend bonus payment of

$5,000. [(ECF No. 43-11 at PageID 725 (Shelby County

Attendance Policy).)] Suttle admits Edwards would turn

in a time sheet between August and October 2021, but

she is unable to recall any other details of how

working hours were recorded because the events

discussed were two years ago. [(ECF No. 43-6 at PageID

673.)] Edwards states 81.25 hours represented standard

working hours and was recorded by Suttle without any

input from her, and no issues with her working time

were raised with her by Suttle in August 2021. [(ECF

No. 43-5 at PageID 623; ECF No. 43-13 at PageID 731.)]

(ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 445.) Edwards does admit, however, that

as an exempt employee, her pay stubs always said 81.25 hours,

regardless of how many hours she actually worked. (ECF No. 43-5

at PageID 641.)

C. Procedural History

Following her termination, Edwards filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission, which

was subsequently transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF No. 22 at PageID 81.) Edwards filed

her initial complaint before obtaining her Notice of Right to

Sue from the EEOC. (Id.) On January 18, 2023, the EEOC issued

the plaintiff her Notice of Right to Sue, (ECF No. 51 at PageID

894), and she subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on January

24, 2023 (ECF No. 22). In this complaint, Edwards alleges that

Shelby County violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying her

procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution and the Shelby County Civil

Service Merit Act of 1971, also known as 1971 Tenn. Priv. Acts,

ch. 110, and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (as

amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008) (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §

12101 et seq. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 79–80.) Regarding her

procedural due process claim, Edwards states that she was denied

a pre-termination hearing and a post-termination appeal in

violation of her due process rights. (Id. at PageID 99.)

Regarding the disability claim, Edwards states that Shelby

County engaged in discrimination by failing to accommodate her

requests for time off, provide her an altered work schedule so

that she would not have to drive at night, and address her

complaints of unsafe working conditions. (Id. at PageID 100.)

She further claims that she was subject to disparate treatment

on the basis of her disability and that her ultimate termination

was in retaliation for her requests for accommodations. (Id. at

PageID 100.)

On March 5, 2024, Shelby County filed the present motion

for summary judgment. (ECF No. 38.) Regarding Edwards’s

procedural due process claim, it argues that Edwards never had a

property interest in her job because Edwards knowingly accepted

an unclassified position upon her promotion. (ECF No. 44 at

PageID 829–30.) As for her ADA claims, Shelby County asserts

that Edwards’s claimed conditions do not qualify as disabilities

under the ADA and that, regardless, her firing was made for

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and she cannot show

pretext. (ECF No. 38-2 at PageID 177–86.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “the

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden

to “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Once

the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not entitled

to trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant

probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint.”

Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1991). Rule

56(c) provides that a party must support an assertion of fact by

citing to materials in the record, “including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of

the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other

materials[,]” or a party must show “that the materials cited do

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or

that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B).

When analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Huckaby v. Priest, 636 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir.

2011) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In doing so, the court may not make

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Jordan v.

Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 490 F. App’x 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2012)

(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Rather, it must decide

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Block v. Meharry

Med. Coll., 723 F. App’x 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52)).

B. Edwards’s Procedural Due Process Claim

1. Procedural Due Process – Property Interest

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids

a state from depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, cl. 3.

For Edwards’s procedural due process claim, she must show: (1)

that she was deprived of a protected liberty or property

interest; and (2) that the deprivation occurred without adequate

procedural protections. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672

(1977); Crosby v. Univ. of Ky., 863 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir.

2017). Only the first prong is at issue here.

“Property interests are not created by the Constitution[;]

‘they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing

rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

such as state law.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470

U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 577 (1972)). “A property interest can be created by a state

statute, a formal contract, or a contract implied from the

circumstances.” Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d

555, 565 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593, 602 (1972)). “Although the underlying substantive interest

is created by ‘an independent source such as state law,’ federal

constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the

level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the

Due Process Clause.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S.

748, 757 (2005) (citation omitted). “A job or government benefit

is a property interest if there are ‘rules or mutually explicit

understandings that support [a plaintiff’s] claim of entitlement

to’ it.” Kaplan v. Univ. of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 577–78

(6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 601)). “The hallmark

of property . . . is an individual entitlement grounded in state

law, which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’” Logan v.

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).

Where a state civil service system categorizes public

employees as classified — that is, not subject to

removal at will — employees have a state-law-created,

constitutionally protectable property interest in

maintaining their current employment. Conversely,

unclassified employees have no property right in

maintaining their jobs; and the State may terminate

them summarily.

Kizer v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, 649 F.3d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 2011)

(citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. 538–40) (citations omitted).

2. Shelby County’s 2020–21 Compensation Policy

As the district court in Kizer explained:

In 1971, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted

Chapter 110 of the Tennessee Private Acts,

establishing the Tennessee Civil Service Merit System

for employees of Shelby County, Tennessee. The Act

established Defendant Shelby County Civil Service

Merit Board as the body charged with determining how

each available county job should be classified under

the Merit System. If the Board determines that a

position is “classified,” the Act requires that civil

service protections apply to that position. Shelby

County must fill classified positions through open,

competitive evaluations after advertising the job

openings for thirty days. Classified employees are not

terminable at will.

Kizer v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 08-2570, 2010 WL 297861, at *1

(W.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Kizer, 649 F.3d 462

(citations and abbreviations omitted). The Shelby County Charter

(“the Charter”) sets out the general framework for the county’s

government. Shelby Cnty. Charter, arts. I–V (2018). Discussing

civil service, the Charter states:

No classified person defined in the civil service law

shall be removed from[,] or discriminated against with

respect to, any county position or appointive county

administrative office because of race, creed, color,

sex, national origin or political opinions or

affiliations. The maintenance and administration of an

effective civil service system shall be in accordance

with Chapter 110 of the Private Acts of 1971, as

amended, until the effective date of this charter, and

all existing rules and regulations promulgated there

under. After the effective date of this charter, the

terms and provisions of that Act may be amended by

ordinance, not contrary to law, provided that nothing

in this section or in the charter shall impair or

diminish the rights and privileges of the existing

employees under civil service.

Id. § 6.09 (alteration in original). The Shelby County Code of

Ordinances states that “[f]or unsatisfactory performance of

duties or other just cause, an employee in the classified

service may be subject to the following discipline. . . .

[d]ismissal from service.” Shelby Cnty. Code of Ordinances, §

14-41. Differentiating unclassified and classified employees,

the Code of Ordinances states:

(a) The job positions of the county are hereby divided

into the unclassified and classified services.

(b) Those employed in positions deemed to be included

in the unclassified service are not included and not

covered under the provisions of the civil service

merit system. The unclassified service shall include:

(1) Officials elected by popular vote and persons

appointed to fill vacancies in such elective

offices;

(2) Members of duly established boards and

commissions of the county;

(3) Any person retained by the county on a

consulting basis and/or any professional person

hired in his professional capacity as determined

by the board;

(4) Any employee of the county whose employment

is on a temporary basis;

(5) Any person who provides services to the

county on a volunteer basis or who receives no

compensation for such services;

(6) Such person occupying the position of

department head, deputy department head, chief

clerk, manager responsible for policy-making,

personal assistant to a department head or

personal secretary to a department head as is

designated by an appointing authority and

approved by the board. The intent of this

provision is to restrict positions in the

unclassified service to those which involve

sensitive policymaking duties. In granting its

approval the board shall consider this intent as

well as the size of the department in question. A

list of these additional positions shall be

prepared and maintained by the secretary;

(7) All county employees of the Shelby County

Head Start Program.

(c) The classified service shall comprise all offices

and positions of employment for the county not

specifically included in the unclassified service.

(d) Unclassified positions are excluded from the civil

service merit system and are considered non-civil

service. The classified/unclassified status of a job

position is determined when the job position is

initially established and/or each time the duties,

responsibilities and scope of the position are

reviewed by human resources. The

classified/unclassified status may be changed as

initiated by the appointing authority upon

determination by the administrator of the human

resources department that the job position duties,

scope and relationship to the appointing authority

have changed significantly to warrant such change in

status. The board must approve a position change from

classified status to unclassified status.

Id. § 14-28. The Charter defines an ordinance as follows:

The word “ordinance” when used in connection with any

action taken by the board of county commissioners

shall mean any local legislation adopted by that body

which is adopted according to the formalities as set

forth in this charter and is of countywide concern in

a permanent nature in its effect, whether in a

governmental or proprietary nature, including, but not

limited to, all types of former actions ratified by

the board of county commissioners in the nature of

private acts.

Shelby Cnty. Charter, § 5.03(A). Discussing chartered counties,

Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-211(d)(5) states that “[n]o ordinance

shall be amended except by a new ordinance.”

On May 7, 2020, the Shelby County Board of County

Commissioners passed a resolution approving a 2020-21

Compensation Policy (“Compensation Policy”) for county

employees. (ECF No. 44-1 at PageID 835 (Shelby County

Resolution).) Unlike an ordinance, the Charter defines a

resolution as follows:

The word “resolution” shall mean any measure adopted

by the board of county commissioners which is not an

ordinance, requiring a majority vote for passage

unless otherwise required by law for the issuance of

bonds, notes or other evidence of indebtedness of the

county and dealing in matters of a temporary or

special nature, generally involving administrative

matters.

Shelby Cnty. Charter, § 5.03(B). Comparing the three main

categories of employment status, the Compensation Policy stated:

1. Regular Permanent

An employee designated as a regular employee may be a

full-time or part-time employee. This employee will

have successfully completed the new employment

probation period.

2. Durational

A Durational Employee is an employee who is employed

for a specific period (i.e., grant, contract or

project) of twelve months or longer. Durational

employees receive all benefits and are considered to

be in the unclassified service and the equivalent of

permanent employees except for the term nature of

their employment.

3. Temporary

A temporary employee is an employee who averages no

more than 25 hours per week for nine (9) months in a

12 month period -- appointed in the unclassified

service.

(Id. at PageID 842.) Prior to this policy, durational employees

were considered classified. When the new Compensation Policy was

adopted, it expressly sought to reclassify durational employees:

Durational Employees which include (Grant, Contract,

and Project) employees should be changed to

“Unclassified”. Because of the required goals,

timelines, and impact expected from these roles,

attendance and performance are critical to the

achievement of work assigned to these types of

positions. Poor attendance and/or performance has an

immediate and direct impact on the departments [sic]

ability to achieve their goals, therefore the

department need [sic] to have the flexibility to

terminate poor performance quickly and efficiently.

(Id. at PageID 870) (emphasis in original).

Edwards argues that because the Compensation Policy was a

resolution and not an ordinance, the county did not utilize the

proper legal channels to make durational employees unclassified.

(ECF No. 42 at PageID 410, 412.) To further support her claim

that improper procedures were followed, she cites to the powers

of the county’s Civil Service Merit Board (“Merit Board”), which

is tasked with “hear[ing] the appeal of any employee in the

classified civil service following his/her removal, suspension

or reduction in rank or compensation by the appointing

authority, as provided in section 14-42[.]” (Id. (quoting Shelby

Cnty. Code of Ordinances, § 14-64).) She suggests that because

“the Civil Service Merit Board failed to even apply the

Ordinance to the duties of Edwards’ position,” Edwards was

improperly classified, leaving her “in limbo, as the Civil

Service Merit Board never acted to determine her to be

unclassified, with her department of the County erroneously

believing she was unclassified per se, by a Compensation

Policy.” (Id. at PageID 411 n.7.)

3. Due Process and Edwards’s Property Right to the Job

Edwards spills much ink arguing that the county’s alleged

failure to follow procedure means that she, as a durational

employee, should have been classified and therefore was entitled

to a pre-termination hearing and a post-termination appeal. But

this argument misses the forest for the trees. Edwards never had

a property right in her job, and therefore, regardless of the

county’s alleged failure to follow its protocol, she cannot

demonstrate that her procedural due process rights were

violated.

In Kizer, the Sixth Circuit addressed a situation in which

the Merit Board had categorized several positions as

unclassified, and the now-fired employees sought to prove that

they nonetheless possessed a property right because they should

have been categorized as classified. 649 F.3d at 463–65. In

rejecting this argument, the Sixth Circuit made several points.

First, the court recognized that appellants “accepted their

appointments knowing” that they would be unclassified employees.

Id. at 467. The court also noted that the appellants served in

their positions for “years . . . without making a single request

to have the status of their positions altered in any way.” Id.

Second, “and more importantly[,]” the Sixth Circuit explained

that this issue had previously been addressed in Christophel v.

Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 486 (6th Cir. 1995). Id. As the Kizer

court explained:

In Christophel, the plaintiff claimed that although

she was hired as an unclassified civil servant, she

should have had classified status. Christophel alleged

that her former employer, a state university,

systematically labeled employees as unclassified when

they should have been given classified status. Id. The

defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that

they were entitled to qualified immunity because they

had not violated a clearly established constitutional

right to due process. Id. at 484. The district court,

however, denied that motion after concluding that

genuine issues of material fact remained about whether

the University had a system of misclassifying

employees. Id. According to the district court, if

Christophel were correct in her assertion that she was

misclassified as an unclassified civil servant in

violation of Ohio law, the defendants would have been

acting outside their discretion regarding that

classification and would not be entitled to the

protection of qualified immunity. Id.

On appeal, we rejected Christophel’s claim that

because her position should have been classified, she

was entitled to the due process rights of a classified

civil servant at the time her position was abolished.

Id. at 486. “Implicit in Christophel’s syllogism,”

this court noted, “is a crucial premise, i.e., that,

under Ohio law, an unclassified civil servant’s

contention that she should be placed in the classified

service automatically bestows on her the rights which

accompany classified status, and automatically imposes

on the defendants the duties owed to those having

classified status.” Id. (emphasis added). Finding no

support in Ohio law for Christophel’s argument, this

court emphasized the “fundamental difference” between

“the attainment of a state-recognized status, and the

mere assertion of a right to that status.” Id. The

Christophel court concluded that “[u]ntil the state

bestows the right or benefit, there is no property

right, and nothing for the procedural protections

afforded by the Due Process Clause to protect.” Id.

Id. at 467–68 (emphasis in original). Comparing the Kizer

plaintiffs’ claim to the one in Christophel, the Sixth Circuit

concluded:

The facts of this case require the same result. The

Appellants were hired as unclassified civil servants.

They were not subject to the merit selection

requirements, acceded to their status as unclassified

employees, and enjoyed the benefits associated

therewith. The Appellants now claim, like Christophel

did, that their positions have been miscategorized all

along. Their claim boils down to this: they were

entitled to the due process protections afforded to

classified employees because they should have been

categorized as classified employees. But this amounts

to nothing more than an “asserted” right to classified

status. And, just like in Christophel, this “so-called

right is no more than an inchoate claim, not yet

adjudicated or otherwise acted upon.” Id.

In other words, asserting a right to a certain

classification does not make it so. If simply claiming

to be entitled to classified status could trigger the

due process rights attendant to that actual

classification, the distinction between classified and

unclassified employees would be meaningless. Any

unclassified or appointed employee claiming that his

position was miscategorized could demand, and the

County government would be required to provide, due

process to people hired or appointed as at-will

employees. Such a result defies logic and finds no

support in Tennessee law. Because the Appellants were

not hired pursuant to the procedures bestowing

classified status upon an employee, they failed to

show that they have a constitutionally protected

property interest in their employment. And, without a

legitimate property interest, the Due Process Clause

offers no procedural protections to these former

employees.

Id. at 468.

Edwards contends that Kizer is distinguishable from the

present case because there is a distinction between a position

having been wrongly categorized by the Merit Board and a

position having been re-categorized because the “County

misinterpreted the legislative framework, and the Civil Service

Merit Board failed to even apply the Ordinance to the duties of

Edwards’ position, as required by law.” (ECF No. 42 at PageID

411 n.7.) However, Kizer stands for the proposition that

knowingly accepting an unclassified position, even if it may

have been miscategorized, prevents a person from later claiming

the benefits of a classified one. Edwards signed her December 1,

2020 hire letter that clearly stated her new position was “not a

Civil Service Merit System classified position.” (ECF No. 38-4

at PageID 190.) She was thus unequivocally “not hired pursuant

to the procedures bestowing classified status upon an employee,”

and therefore cannot now claim a property interest in the

position. Kizer, 649 F.3d at 468; see also Wood v. Davis, No.

M2013-01008-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 2568568, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.

June 5, 2014) (“Like the employees in Kizer, Wood accepted the

job knowing the classification as executive service, worked for

several years without trying to do anything about it, and

complained only when he was terminated. He had no property

interest that was protected.”).

This is a fundamentally different scenario from one where a

county employee was initially hired as a classified employee.

Had this employee been reclassified due to improper legislative

procedures, and then been fired as an unclassified employee,

Kizer arguably would not apply because the employee was

initially hired pursuant to the procedures bestowing classified

status upon her. Edwards’s case does not present such a

question, and therefore the court need not make any further

determination as to the validity of the Compensation Policy in

relation to the Shelby County Code of Ordinances.

Edwards next argues that, even as an unclassified employee,

the Shelby County Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure

internal regulations (“Discipline Policy”), as well as the

Shelby County Employee Handbook (“Employee Handbook”) and the

Code of Ordinances Section 14-42(b), nonetheless grant her a

property right. (ECF No. 42 at PageID 412–13.) She first cites

the Discipline Policy, which was still in effect both at the

time of Edwards’s hiring, as well as her termination, which

states: “Any permanent or durational employee demoted in rank or

compensation, suspended without pay for a period exceeding ten

(10) days, or terminated, may within seven (7) calendar days

after service of the order of demotion, suspension or

termination, appeal to the Board.” (ECF No. 38-10 at PageID 391

(Discipline Policy).) She also points to the Employee Handbook,

which describes several appeals procedures for disciplinary

action:

1. Administrative Grievance Procedure - For appeals of

any disciplinary action that cannot be appealed to

the Civil Service Merit Board

2. Civil Service Merit Board - For discipline involving

a demotion in rank or compensation, suspension

without pay for more than 10 days and termination.

To be eligible for a Civil Service Merit Board

appeal, an employee must file a written request with

the Administrator of Human Resources within seven

calendar days of receipt of the written notice of

the disciplinary action.

Within 30 days of the filing of an appeal, the Board

will schedule a hearing on the matter. An employee

is entitled to appear, have a public hearing,

produce evidence, and be represented by legal

counsel. At the end of the hearing, the Board will

deliberate and publish its decision. The Board may

affirm, modify, or revoke the discipline.

(ECF No. 43-3 at PageID 540 (Employee Handbook)) (emphasis in

original). Edwards notes that the “Administrative Grievance

Process” was cited in the DAF. (ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 440

(citing ECF No. 38-6 at PageID 355).) Edwards cites the Code of

Ordinances for her final support, stating:

The Code of Ordinances states at Sec. 14-42(b), states

that “Any employee demoted in rank or compensation,

suspended without pay for a period exceeding ten

calendar days, or dismissed, may, within seven

calendar days after service of the order of demotion,

suspension or dismissal as hereinabove provided,

appeal to the board.” Although the County argues this

only applies to classified employees, and Edwards was

unclassified, this sentence stating, “any employee” is

written differently than the proceeding sentence in

Sec. 14-42(a), which begins with “any employee in the

system . . . .”

(ECF No. 42 at PageID 412–13.) Edwards is effectively claiming

that she had a property interest in the procedures used by

Shelby County for its employees. However, where there is no

property interest in the job, there is no protected property

interest in the procedures which attend the decision to

terminate the job. See Elion v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 08-2411-

P, 2012 WL 7110531, at *9–10 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2012)

(collecting cases); see also Stiger v. Johnson, 608 F. App’x

321, 324 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Elion with approval).

Finally, in its undisputed statement of facts, Shelby

County states that “Edwards was terminated for cause effective

October 8, 2021.” (ECF No. 38-1 at PageID 166.) Edwards, in her

response, vehemently denies that the firing was “for cause,” and

discusses the ways in which the county allegedly failed to

follow its “just cause” termination policies for Edwards. (ECF

No. 42-1 at PageID 443–46.) This distinction is nonetheless

irrelevant for purposes of Edwards’s procedural due process

claim because Shelby County had the authority to terminate

Edwards with or without cause, and there is no protected

property interest in the procedures which attend the decision.

Elion, 2012 WL 7110531, at *9–10. Edwards has not shown that she

has a “constitutionally protectable property interest in

maintaining [her] employment,” and thus “the Due Process Clause

offers no procedural protections” to her. Kizer, 649 F.3d at

468. Therefore, Shelby County’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED as to Edwards’s procedural due process claims, and those

claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Edwards’s Discrimination Claims

Under the ADA, employers may not “discriminate against a

qualified individual on the basis of disability” regarding the

“terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(a). Disability discrimination claims may be based on

either direct or indirect evidence. Lovell v. Champion Car Wash,

LLC, 969 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). “[A] plaintiff

need only prove one or the other, not both.” Hedrick v. Western

Rsrv. Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 2004). “Direct

evidence of disability discrimination ‘does not require the fact

finder to draw any inferences [to conclude] that the disability

was at least a motivating factor.’” Fisher v. Nissan N. Am.,

Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hostettler v.

Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 853 (6th Cir. 2018)). In this

case, Edwards does not appear to assert that she has direct

evidence of discrimination.

When a disability discrimination claim for wrongful

termination is based on indirect evidence, it is instead

analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Babb v.

Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir.

2019). Under this framework, Edwards has an initial burden of

presenting sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude

that she has made a prima facie case for disability

discrimination. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Ford Motor Co.,

782 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2015). To establish a prima facie

case for wrongful termination under the ADA, Edwards must

demonstrate the following:

1) that [s]he is disabled; 2) that [s]he is otherwise

qualified for [her] previous position with [Shelby

County], with or without reasonable accommodation; 3)

that [s]he suffered an adverse employment decision; 4)

that [Shelby County] knew or had reason to know of

[her] disability; and 5) that [s]he was replaced or

that [her] position remained open while [Shelby

County] looked for other applicants.

Plant v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000). If

Edwards makes such a showing, the burden shifts to Shelby County

to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her

termination. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814

F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2016). Finally, if Shelby County makes

this showing, the burden shifts back to Edwards to show that the

proffered reason was pretextual. Id. Unlike with direct

evidence, where discrimination need only have been a motivating

factor, in cases with indirect evidence, “[i]t is the

plaintiff’s ultimate burden to show that she was terminated ‘on

the basis of disability,’ 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), meaning she must

show that her disability was a ‘but-for’ cause of her

termination.” Lockhart v. Marietta City Sch., No. 20-4308, 2021

WL 4810172, at *7 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 2021) (quoting Lewis v.

Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir.

2012) (en banc)). It does not appear contested that Edwards was

qualified for her position at Shelby County, nor that she

suffered an adverse employment decision. The court also notes

that Shelby County does not appear to challenge Edwards’s prima

facie case regarding the “similarly-situated” prong.

Failure-to-accommodate claims, however, do not involve the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach for claims based on

indirect evidence. Instead, “ADA failure to accommodate claims

are analyzed pursuant to the direct test.” Fisher, 951 F.3d at

417. As the Sixth Circuit explained in Kleiber v. Honda of Am.

Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007):

[F]ailing to make a reasonable accommodation falls

within the ADA’s definition of “discrimination.”

Accordingly, claims premised upon an employer’s

failure to offer a reasonable accommodation

necessarily involve direct evidence (the failure to

accommodate) of discrimination. Bultemeyer v. Fort

Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996).

This conclusion is consistent with the definition of

direct evidence, for if the fact-finder accepts the

employee’s version of the facts, no inference is

necessary to conclude that the employee has proven

this form of discrimination. See Jacklyn v. Schering–

Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921,

926 (6th Cir. 1999) (sex-discrimination case; defining

direct evidence as “that evidence which, if believed,

requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination

was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s

actions”); Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865

(6th Cir. 2003) (race-discrimination case; noting that

direct evidence does not require the fact-finder to

draw any inferences to conclude that the defendant

discriminated against the plaintiff). It is further

consistent with our analysis in Monette v. Electronic

Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1182–84 (6th Cir.

1996), in which we noted that claims for failure-to-

accommodate fall within the category of cases in which

the employer relies on the employee’s disability in

its decision-making, and consequently are suitable for

analysis under the direct-evidence framework. See also

Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d

719, 724–30 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying direct-evidence

standard to claim for failure to accommodate).

Id. at 868–69 (quoting Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 452). The prima

facie standard for a failure-to-accommodate claim is as follows:

[T]hat (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the

ADA; (2) she was otherwise qualified for her position,

with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) [Shelby

County] knew or had reason to know about her

disability; (4) she requested an accommodation; and

(5) [Shelby County] failed to provide the necessary

accommodation.

Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 F.3d 834, 839 (6th

Cir. 2018) (citing Deister v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 647 F. App’x

652, 657 (6th Cir. 2016)). For a failure to accommodate claim,

[o]nce the employee “establishes a prima facie showing

that he proposed a reasonable accommodation,” [Rorrer

v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1041 (6th Cir. 2014)],

“the employer has the burden of showing how the

accommodation would cause an undue hardship,”

Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 202–03

(6th Cir. 2010). If the interactive process was

triggered but not successfully resolved, “courts

should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown

and then assign responsibility.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at

871 (quoting Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100

F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Fisher, 951 F.3d at 421. Edwards must put forth sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find in her favor on each of

these elements. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, No. 3:11-

cv-232, 2013 WL 322493, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013) (citing

Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.

2000)).

1. Whether Edwards was disabled under the ADA

The ADA defines a disabled person as one who (1) has a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more of the major life activities of such individual, (2) has a

record of such impairment, or (3) does not have an impairment,

but is regarded as having one. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “Major life

activities are those ‘that are of central importance to daily

life,’ such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and

working.’” Brady v. Potter, 273 F. App’x 498, 502 (6th Cir.

2008) (quoting, respectively, Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.

Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) and Mahon v. Crowell, 295

F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2002)). “A substantial limitation of

such an activity exists when the individual’s ability to perform

that activity is limited to a large degree. It is not enough for

the impairment to cause merely moderate or intermittent

interruptions in the performance of the activity.” Id. (citation

omitted).

Shelby County first argues that Edwards’s conditions —

asthma and night blindness — do not qualify her to be considered

disabled under the first prong of the disability definition

under the ADA. (ECF No. 38-2 at PageID 177.) It insists that

there is “no medical testimony, medical opinion, or other

evidence in the record proving that” Edwards faced substantial

limitations to one or more of her life activities. (Id. at

PageID 180.)

Edwards, under oath, attested to her night blindness and

asthma conditions. (ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 592–94.) Although the

Sixth Circuit has not addressed whether night blindness

qualifies as a disability, the Second, Ninth, and Third Circuits

have all held that, at a minimum, when a plaintiff presents

evidence that night blindness prevented her from being able to

drive at night, “such evidence was sufficient to submit the

question to the jury because most people in the general

population could see well enough to drive at night.” Harris v.

MatureCare of Standifer Place, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-64, 2015 WL

4662441, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2015) (citing Capobianco v.

City of New York, 422 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2005); Livingston v. Fred

Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738, 740 (9th Cir. 2010); and

Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010)). The

court finds that, based on Edwards’s testimony in her deposition

regarding her night blindness and its effect on her ability to

drive, there is a genuine dispute as to whether her night

blindness qualifies as a disability.

Unlike night blindness, asthma has been discussed at great

length by courts in the Sixth Circuit. “Asthma has typically

been found to rise to the level of a substantial limitation on

the major-life-activity of breathing where the plaintiff has a

long history of asthmatic attacks and endures numerous and

severe restrictions on daily activities as a result of the

condition.” Boker v. Sec’y, Dept. of Treasury, No. 1:07-cv-446,

2009 WL 3199074, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2009). “Where a

plaintiff suffers asthma attacks only in response to particular

stimuli and is able to engage in almost all normal life

activities, courts have been less likely to conclude that the

plaintiff is substantially limited in the major-life-activity of

breathing.” See id. (collecting cases). Edwards testified that

her asthma is severe and, when activated, can cause her

difficulty performing household tasks and maintaining

conversations. (ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 594.) The court finds

that, based on the testimony in her deposition, coupled with her

description of her asthma condition when she did not have access

to the BREO inhaler, there is a genuine dispute as to whether

her asthma qualifies a disability.

Shelby County separately argues that Edwards was not

“regarded as” having a disability under the third prong of the

ADA disability definition. Because the court has found that both

of Edwards’s alleged conditions are supported by sufficient

evidence that a reasonable jury could find that she is disabled

under the ADA’s definition, the “regarded as” prong need not be

addressed.

2. Whether Shelby County knew or had reason to know of

Edwards’s disability

Shelby County argues next that it neither knew nor had

reason to know that Edwards suffered from asthma and night

blindness. It relies primarily on the fact that Edwards did not

mention either of these conditions during her pre-promotion

medical screening, and the vision tests did not demonstrate any

issues with her normal vision. (ECF No. 38-1 at PageID 166; ECF

No. 38-2 at PageID 181.)

Under the burden-shifting analysis, generally, “[a]n

employer has notice of the employee’s disability when

the employee tells the employer that he is disabled.”

Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 450 (6th

Cir. 1999). In discussing an analogous claim under the

Rehabilitation Act, we required that the plaintiff

establish “that the defendant knew or believed that

the plaintiff was disabled, or knew of the plaintiff’s

symptoms that were caused by the disability.” [Burns

v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 844 (6th Cir.

1996)]. As we reasoned in Burns, this inquiry is

crucial because “unless the [employer] knew or

believed that the plaintiff was disabled, or knew that

the symptoms were caused by a disability as defined by

law, it would be impossible for the [employer] to have

made its decision because of the disability.” Id. It

is also reasonable to conclude, however, that an

employer is on notice of a disability if an employee’s

symptoms are “severe enough to alert” it, giving it

either knowledge or “some generalized notion” of the

disability. Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 Fed.

Appx. 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Hedberg v.

Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir.

1995) (“it may be that some symptoms are so obviously

manifestations of an underlying disability that it

would be reasonable to infer that an employer actually

knew of the disability.”).

Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc., 625 F. App’x 729, 737 (6th

Cir. 2015) (all alterations in original except full case

citation). Although Edwards did not disclose either condition

during the screening, she testified in her deposition that she

spoke to Suttle about both her asthma and her night blindness

when she was seeking accommodations. (ECF No. 43-5 at PageID

624, 629-30, 684–85.) The court finds that Edwards has produced

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that she communicated both of her alleged disabilities to

Suttle, putting Shelby County on notice of her two conditions.

Edwards has thus created a genuine dispute as to each prong

of her prima facie case, shifting the burden to Shelby County to

articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Ford

Motor, 782 F.3d at 767 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S.

at 507).

3. Whether Edwards sought, and Shelby County made,

reasonable accommodations available for Edwards’s

alleged disabilities

Before addressing Shelby County’s proffered reasons, the

court will address Edwards’s reasonable accommodation claim. The

ADA defines “reasonable accommodation” to include:

(A) making existing facilities used by employees

readily accessible to and usable by individuals with

disabilities; and

(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work

schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,

acquisition or modification of equipment or devices .

. . [or] other similar accommodations for individuals

with disabilities.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). An ADA plaintiff “bears the initial burden

of proposing an accommodation and showing that that

accommodation is objectively reasonable.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at

870 (quoting Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 457). “An employer, then, has

the burden of persuasion to show that an accommodation would

impose an undue hardship.” Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 457.

Importantly, an employee cannot force her employer to provide a

specific accommodation if the employer offers another reasonable

accommodation. Id.

Medical documentation is not required to request an

accommodation under the ADA. King v. Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., 30

F.4th 551, 564 (6th Cir. 2022). The ADA does not require the use

of any “magic words like accommodation, disability, or ADA” when

an employee requests an accommodation. Childers v. Hardeman

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 13–1209, 2015 WL 225058, at *8 (W.D.

Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015) (citing Leeds v. Potter, 249 F. App’x 442,

449-50 (6th Cir. 2007)). The plaintiff must instead “tie the

request for accommodation to her existing medical condition.”

Id. Once an employee requests a reasonable accommodation, “the

employer ha[s] a duty to explore the nature of the employee’s

limitations, if and how those limitations [affect] her work, and

what types of accommodations [can] be made.” Equal Emp.

Opportunity Comm’n v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d 428, 434 (6th

Cir. 2018) (citing Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 and 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(o)(3)).

On September 15, 2021, Edwards states that she sought an

accommodation for her asthma, asking Suttle to take the day off

because she was struggling to breathe without her BREO inhaler.

(ECF No. 43-5 at PageID 624.) Edwards testified that in

response, Suttle stated that she no longer had “time to get

anybody, and Nick can’t handle this family of eight by himself.”

(Id. at 625.) Nowhere in its briefing does Shelby County argue

that Edwards’s request was unreasonable, and the county does not

suggest that it would have resulted in undue hardship. Because

the moving party bears the initial burden to “demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact[,]” Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323 (1986), and Shelby County makes no mention of this

particular argument in its briefs, the court DENIES the motion

for summary judgment as to Edwards’s failure to accommodate her

asthma claim.

Edwards also claims that Shelby County failed to reasonably

accommodate her request for a schedule change when she was given

a shift on October 5, 2021, which required her to drive at

night. Again, the court finds that this request falls under a

request for a modified work schedule and, therefore, a jury

could find that it was objectively reasonable. Edwards was given

a new schedule on October 6, 2021, the next day, and only spent

one day with a late shift, which she admits to having left

early. (ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 587.) Even though Edwards alleges

that the initial decision was made on October 5, and Suttle

merely failed to inform her until the following day, no

reasonable jury could find that Shelby County’s actions were

unreasonable. Edwards requested an accommodation and was

immediately provided one. Therefore, the court GRANTS Shelby

County’s motion as to Edwards’s failure to accommodate her night

blindness, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

4. Whether Shelby County has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for Edwards’s termination

Returning to Edwards’s disability discrimination claim,

Shelby County argues that, even in the event that Edwards was

disabled and it knew or should have known she had the

conditions, it is still entitled to summary judgment on her

wrongful termination claim because there were alternative

reasons for Edwards’s termination. An employer need only

establish “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the

termination to satisfy its burden. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.

at 802. Between the DAF, Suttle’s two reports, and the emails

sent between the various SCHD employees, Shelby County has

undoubtedly produced evidence sufficient to demonstrate

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Edwards’s termination.

These include alleged violations of COVID-19 protocols, as well

as tardiness and absences at work. (ECF No. 43-27 at PageID 764–

65.)

5. Whether the stated reasons for Edwards’s firing were a

pretext for discrimination

Once the defendant meets its burden of producing a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden of production

shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate pretext. Nguyen v.

City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2000). A

plaintiff may meet her burden to demonstrate pretext by showing

that the proffered reason “(1) [has] no basis in fact, (2) did

not actually motivate [defendant’s] action, or (3) [was]

insufficient to warrant [the adverse] action.” Smyer v. Kroger

Ltd. P’ship I, No. 22-3692, 2024 WL 1007116, at *4 (6th Cir.

Mar. 8, 2024) (citing Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys.,

921 F.3d 599, 612 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Chen v. Dow Chem.

Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009))). “To survive summary

judgment a plaintiff need only produce enough evidence to

support a prima facie case and to rebut, but not to disprove,

the defendant’s proffered rationale.” Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689

F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Blair v. Henry Filters,

Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 2007)).

To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff “must put forth

evidence which demonstrates that the employer did not ‘honestly

believe’ in the proffered non-discriminatory reason for its

adverse employment action.” Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d

488, 494 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155

F.3d 799, 806–807 (6th Cir. 1998)). Additionally, Edwards

ultimately has the burden of showing that but-for the alleged

discrimination, she would not have been terminated. Lewis, 681

F.3d at 321.

Shelby County argues that “there is no evidence that any of

Ms. Edwards’ superiors did not ‘honestly believe’ that she had

subpar job performance.” (ECF No. 38-2 at PageID 185–86.) To the

contrary, Edwards has provided more than sufficient evidence

from which a jury could conclude that Edwards’s termination

resulted from the alleged discrimination. “The key in assessing

whether an employer had an honest belief is ‘whether the

employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision

before taking an adverse employment action.’” Jones v. St. Jude

Med. S.C., Inc., 504 F. App’x 473, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Smith, 155 F.3d at 807). “An employer has an honest belief in

its rationale when it ‘reasonably relied on the particularized

facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.’”

Id. (quoting Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274

F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 2001)) (additional quotation marks and

citation omitted). Until Edwards sought accommodations, there

was no record that she was subject to discipline while working

at SCHD. (ECF No. 43-4 at PageID 583–84; ECF No. 43-5 at PageID

613.) In a matter of four days, Edwards was terminated. (ECF No.

38-1 at PageID 166; ECF No. 42-1 at PageID 443.) In that time,

Suttle, apparently working alone, compiled two reports –

alleging all sorts of behavior but largely lacking in

substantiated facts – the first of which was sent to Kmet less

than twenty-four hours after Edwards first disclosed her night

blindness. (ECF No. 43-8 at PageID 717.) The second report

included an anonymous witness statement about an alleged

incident in August 2021 involving Edwards violating COVID-19

protocols. (ECF No. 43-7 at PageID 713.) No prior record had

been made of the incident, yet this was listed as a reason for

her termination in the DAF. (ECF No. 43-27 at PageID 764.) A

reasonable jury could find that Suttle’s involvement in every

step of the termination process, the fact that the stated

reasons in the DAF were almost entirely based on Suttle’s own

reports, and the speed at which the process was conducted, do

not lend themselves to the decision having been “reasonably

informed and considered[.]” Jones, 504 F. App’x at 477. A

reasonable jury could also conclude that these actions, taken

together, suggest that Suttle had unstated, discriminatory

intentions when she sought to fire Edwards, and that these

discriminatory intentions were the but-for cause of the ultimate

termination.

The many listed incidents in the DAF and Suttle’s reports,

as described in the Findings of Fact, could all be legitimate

reasons for her termination, but Edwards’s extensive briefing

and attached records in response to Shelby County’s motion

manage to assert a plausible, alternative explanation for each.

It appears from the summary judgment record that the extent of

Suttle’s investigation into Edwards amounted to soliciting four

emails primarily about criminal activity at the Econo Lodge,

which a jury could find to be an insufficient investigation.

(ECF Nos. 43-22, 43-23, 43-24, and 43-25.) Although there is

undoubtedly evidence to support Shelby County’s position,

summary judgment is not in order. Therefore, the court DENIES

Shelby County’s motion as to Edwards’s wrongful termination

claim.

D. Edwards’s Retaliation Claim

Edwards’s final claim under the ADA is retaliation. The

court notes that Shelby County did not move for summary judgment

on the retaliation claim in its opening brief. The retaliation

claim is only briefly discussed in Shelby County’s reply, and

even there the argument is limited to generally asserting that

“these issues have been discussed at length[.]” (ECF No. 44 at

PageID 833.) Under these circumstances, the court is not

inclined to grant summary judgment on the retaliation claim. In

any event, even on the merits, summary judgment is not warranted

on this claim.

In order to present a prima facie case of retaliation,

Edwards must establish that (1) she engaged in a protected

activity under the ADA; (2) Shelby County knew of this activity;

(3) Shelby County took adverse action against Edwards; and (4)

there was a causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse action. A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of

Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 2013). Similar to an ADA

discrimination claim, “to prevail on a retaliation claim, a

plaintiff must ‘establish that his or her protected activity was

a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.’”

Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 770 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.

Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013)).

First, the court finds that Edwards has presented

sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that she

engaged in a protected activity. Under the ADA, requests for

accommodation are protected acts. Anderson v. Detroit Transp.

Corp., 435 F. Supp. 3d 783, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing A.C.,

711 F.3d at 698). As discussed above, a reasonable jury could

find that Edwards’s requests for a day off for her asthma and to

be scheduled to work during the day because of her night

blindness were requests for accommodations. Also, as discussed

above, there is sufficient evidence for purposes of summary

judgment to conclude that Shelby County was aware of Edwards’s

requests.

As to the fourth element, the court finds that Edwards has

made a prima facie case that there was a causal connection

between Edwards’s request for accommodation and her termination.

Although the court has found that Shelby County did accommodate

Edwards’s request for a different shift, Edwards has nonetheless

provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude

that she was retaliated against. As discussed in the previous

section, the short timeline between Edwards’s request and her

termination, and the even shorter timeline between Edwards’s

request and Suttle’s first report, creates a genuine issue as to

whether Edwards’s request to be accommodated was the but-for

cause for her termination. Therefore, the court DENIES Shelby

County’s motion as to Edwards’s retaliation claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Shelby County’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Tu M. Pham

TU M. PHAM

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

June 12, 2024

Date