“[W]e hold, like every other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]e hold, like every other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts”
- “This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
KEITH BAGGETT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 1:21-cv-01175-SHM-tmp
)
JOHN MEHR, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER MODIFYING THE DOCKET;
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On November 3, 2021, Plaintiff Keith Baggett filed (1) a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and (2) a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2).
When Baggett filed the complaint, he was confined at the Madison County Jail (the “MCJ”), in
Jackson, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) On March 1, 2022, the Court granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the three hundred and fifty dollar ($350.00) civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the “PLRA”). (ECF No.
8 (the “IFP Order”).) On December 22, 2022, Baggett informed the Court that he is incarcerated
at the Bledsoe County Correctional Facility (BCCF). (ECF No. 9.)
The complaint (ECF No. 1) is before the Court.
Baggett alleges claims of: (1) unconstitutional conditions of confinement arising from
double celling inmates, deprivation of hot water for more than one (1) week, a building unfit for
human habitation, sleeping on a mat on the floor with black mold, and “no mask or social
distancing;” (2) failure to protect; (3) deprivation of medical care; and (4) deprivation of recreation.
(Id. at PageID 2.) Baggett does not identify the dates of the events and conditions alleged in the
complaint. (See id.) Baggett sues two (2) defendants as “Madison County government official[s]”:
(1) Sheriff John Mehr; and (2) Mayor Scott Conger. (Id. at PageID 2.) Baggett seeks: (1) sixty
thousand dollars ($60,000) as compensation; and (2) injunctive relief to effect unspecified
“changes [] for other inmates”. (Id. at PageID 3.)
The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket to: (1) add Madison County, Tennessee (the
“County”) as a Defendant; and (2) add the City of Jackson, Tennessee (the “City”) as a Defendant.
For the reasons explained below: (1) the complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and (2) leave to amend is GRANTED.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of
it, if the complaint —
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court
applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007).
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts
the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the
allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations
are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported
by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides
guidance on this issue. Although Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it also requires factual
allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted
by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”
and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
II. ANALYSIS
Baggett does not allege whether he sues Mehr and Conger in their official or individual
capacities. (See ECF No. 1.) The Sixth Circuit requires plaintiffs to “set forth clearly in their
pleading that they are suing the state defendants in their individual capacity for damages, not
simply in their capacity as state officials.” Wells, 891 F.2d at 592. “Absent a specification of
capacity, it is presumed that a state official is sued in his official capacity.” Northcott v. Plunkett,
42 F. App'x 795, 796 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Wells, 891 F.2d at 593). The Court construes
Baggett’s claims against Mehr and Conger as official capacity claims.
Baggett’s official capacity claims against Mehr are treated as claims against Mehr’s
employer at the time the complaint was filed — i.e., the County. See Jones v. Union Cnty.,
Tennessee, 296 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049
(6th Cir. 1994)). Baggett’s official capacity claims against Conger are treated as claims against
Conger’s employer at the time the complaint was filed – i.e., the City.
The County may be held liable only if Baggett’s injuries were sustained pursuant to an
unconstitutional custom or policy of the County. The City may be held liable only if Baggett’s
injuries were sustained pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy of the City. See Monell
v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff
“must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and
(3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving,
330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th
Cir. 1993)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of
the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal
liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80
(1986) (emphasis in original)).
Baggett does not allege that he has been deprived of a constitutional right because of a
policy or custom of the County or the City. Baggett’s allegations are based on his particular
experience of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, failure to protect, deprivation of medical
care, and deprivation of recreation at the MCJ. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Baggett does not state
a claim to relief against the County, the City, or Mehr and Conger in their official capacities
because Baggett fails to allege facts demonstrating any official policy or custom of the County or
the City, much less an unconstitutional policy that injured Baggett.
Baggett’s claims against the County, the City, and Mehr and Conger in their official
capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts stating claims to
relief.
III. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.
2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every other
circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to
amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see also
Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for
failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies
in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be
cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean,
of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua
sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged
by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).
The Court grants leave to amend the complaint under the conditions set forth below.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
A. The complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety
for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and
1915A(b)(1)-(2); and
B. Leave to amend the complaint is GRANTED. Amended claims must be filed
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. An amended pleading must comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short
and plain statement of Baggett’s claims. An amended complaint supersedes the complaint and
must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. Baggett or his counsel must
sign the amended complaint, and the text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to
support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified
by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims
alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the complaint. Each claim
for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued on that count.
If Baggett fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will
dismiss the complaint with prejudice and enter judgment. For § 1915(g) analysis, the Court
recommends that any such dismissal should be treated as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021). The “three strikes” provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has,
on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of February, 2024.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE