The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
)
CHARLES BROWN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
)
v. ) No. 02-cv-2376
)
JOE P. YOUNG, )
)
Respondent. )
)
ORDER DENYING MISCELLANEOUS RELIEF
Before the Court is Petitioner Dymond Charles Brown, Sr.’s
March 1, 2022 pro se Motion, which is styled a “Motion for
Exception to Exhaustion Requirement under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act and Request to Order the Respondent to Act in
Conformity with the First Step Act under § 2241.” (ECF No. 15.)
Petitioner initiated this case on December 5, 2001, by filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. (ECF No.
11 at 1.) Because Petitioner was incarcerated in the Western
District of Tennessee, the case was transferred to this Court.
(Id.) Pursuant to Petitioner’s motion, the Court dismissed the
case on October 17, 2002, because Petitioner had been transferred
to the Eastern District of Virginia. (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) Although
Petitioner evidently completed the original sentence from which
he sought relief in 2001, he was sentenced to prison in 2006 by
the Eastern District of Oklahoma for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. (See Dkt. No. 6:06cr69, E.D. Okla.) After
serving that term of imprisonment, Petitioner violated the
conditions of his supervised release and was again incarcerated.
(ECF No. 15 at 3.) Petitioner filed the instant Motion -- the
first filing made in this case in nearly twenty years -- while
at the Federal Correctional Institution in Memphis, Tennessee,
pursuant to the revocation of his supervised release. (Id.)
In essence, the Motion seeks relief from the government’s
alleged failure to provide Petitioner access to drug treatment
programs that would entitle him to a reduced sentence. According
to the Motion, Petitioner completed the residential portion of
a Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) while serving the 2006
sentence imposed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. (Id. at
2.) Because of a successful appeal, Petitioner’s sentence was
significantly reduced, and he was released before completing the
residential reentry center (RRC) phase of RDAP. (Id. at 2–4.)
Now that Petitioner has been reincarcerated pursuant to the
revocation of his supervised release, he “requests RRC placement
to finish RDAP” so that he can earn credit toward his release.
Id. at 4; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) (granting credit toward
sentence for participation in qualifying recidivism reduction
programs).
Petitioner was released from his term of revocation on
October 17, 2022. Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Locator Utility,
“Dymond Brown,” www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last accessed Nov. 21,
2022). The Court therefore cannot order Petitioner’s placement
in a Bureau of Prisons program. Although Petitioner invokes the
Court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Sixth
Circuit has ruled that § 2241 habeas petitions must “be filed in
the court having jurisdiction over the prisoner’s custodian.”
Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam)). Because Petitioner is no longer imprisoned or
held to a term of supervised release in the Western District of
Tennessee, Petitioner’s filing is not properly addressed to this
Court.1 In any event, the Court is unable to grant the requested
relief. Petitioner’s Motion, ECF No. 15, is therefore DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 21st day of November, 2022.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 Even if Petitioner’s Motion were construed as a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 or a motion for early termination of supervised release,
the Motion would be denied, because such filings must be addressed to
the sentencing court. Terrell, 564 F.3d at 447; United States v. Depew,
No. 97-1181, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32149, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 17,
1997) (unpublished). Petitioner was most recently sentenced in the
Eastern District of Oklahoma. (See Dkt. No. 6:06cr69, E.D. Okla.)