The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JERRY LAWLER, as father, next friend and )
Personal Representative/Administrator of the )
Estate of BRIAN CHRISTOPHER LAWLER, )
deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:19-cv-01174-STA-tmp
)
HARDEMAN COUNTY, TENNESSEE; JOHN )
DOOLEN; LEONARD BROWN; ELLEN )
FUTRELL; WILLIAM GONZALEZ; AND )
JUDY WIGGINS )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY THE ENTIRETY OF THE
COURT’S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Certify the Entirety of the Court’s Order
Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment for Interlocutory Appeal (ECF No. 118)
filed on October 5, 2018. For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On July 7, 2018, a Hardeman County Sheriff’s Deputy arrested Brian Christopher Lawler
(“Decedent”) for driving under the influence and other related charges. The deputy took Decedent
to the Hardeman County Jail (the “Jail”). On July 28, 2018, while incarcerated at the Jail, Decedent
committed suicide. Plaintiff alleges Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Decedent’s
serious medical needs by failing to provide adequate medical/mental health care to Decedent.
On June 20, 2022, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff cannot
show a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they were deliberately indifferent to
Decedent’s serious medical needs and that even if he could, the individual defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity (ECF No. 75). On September 29, 2022, this Court denied summary
judgment to Defendants Ellen Futrell, Judy Wiggins, William Gonzalez, and Hardeman County
(ECF No. 112). On October 4, 2022, Defendants notified this Court that they had filed an
interlocutory appeal of this Court’s denial of qualified immunity to Futrell, Wiggins, and
Gonzalez, which they may do as of right (ECF No. 114). The next day, Defendants moved this
Court to certify the lone remaining claim against Hardeman County for interlocutory appeal (ECF
No. 118).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, the United States Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction only over final judgments
of the United States District Courts. In re Somberg, 31 F.4th 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 2022). An
exception is where a District Court authorizes an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. To
do so, the Court must find: (1) the order appealed concerns a question of law, (2) the question is
controlling, (3) there is a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” about the answer, and (4)
“an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
ANALYSIS
Defendants move this Court to certify Plaintiff’s claim against Hardeman County, the lone
remaining claim following the individual Defendants’ appeals, for interlocutory appeal. For the
following reasons, the Court declines to do so.
Defendants focus the bulk of their Motion on the “substantial ground for difference of
opinion” requirement of § 1292. Their arguments on this point are unpersuasive. A substantial
ground for difference of opinion exists when: (1) the question is difficult, novel, and either a
question on which there is little precedent or one whose correct resolution is not substantially
guided by previous decisions; (2) the question is difficult and of first impression; (3) a difference
of opinion exists within the controlling circuit; or (4) the circuits are split on the question. In re
Buccina, 657 F. App’x 350, 351-52 (6th Cir. 2016).
Defendants first argue that “[t]he question concerning what standard applies is novel and
there is no specific precedent to guide the court.” However, that question will be before the Sixth
Circuit regardless of whether this Court certifies the claim against the County for interlocutory
appeal, as that standard applies to the individual Defendants who have already appealed.
Defendants next argue that there is a difference of opinion in the Sixth Circuit as to whether
the facts as articulated in this Court’s order denying the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
can give rise to Monell liability. Specifically, Defendants argue that “a plaintiff cannot succeed
under the single violation theory [of showing a failure-to-train claim] when the municipality has
offered some training to its officers.” In essence, Defendants’ argument is that in order to succeed
on a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must show that a municipality offered absolutely no training
whatsoever, and that a municipality may escape liability by providing the tiniest amount of grossly
inadequate training. To support this argument, Defendants quote the Sixth Circuit as saying that
In City of Canton, the [Supreme] Court hypothesized that a history or pattern of
prior violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference if the need
for more or different training were “obvious.” However, the Court’s hypothesis was
premised on the assumption that the municipality had decided not to train its
officers about the constitutional limits of the use of force.
Defs.’ Mot. to Certify the Entirety of the Court’s Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 8
(quoting Harvey v. Campbell County, 453 F. App’x 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis on the
word “not” added by Defendants)). However, further down in the very paragraph from which
Defendants quote, the Sixth Circuit explained that because the individual defendant in Harvey had
received some training, “Plaintiffs therefore had to show that the County, through its
policymaker(s), was on notice that, absent additional training, it was so highly predictable that
sheriff’s deputies would misuse deadly force as to amount to conscious disregard for citizens’
rights.” Harvey, 453 F. App’x at 567 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit has
thus recognized that there are situations in which a municipality may be held liable for failure to
adequately train its employees to avoid constitutional violations where it provided some training.
Defendants also argue that there is a difference of opinion in the Sixth Circuit as to whether
the facts as articulated in this Court’s order denying summary judgment to the County can give
rise to Monell liability because “the inquiry into whether a training program could be deemed
‘deliberately indifferent’ must extend beyond the question of whether the individual officers
involved in the incident at issue were poorly trained.” Defs.’ Mot. to Certify the Entirety of the
Court’s Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 8 (citing Cooper v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 222 F.
App’x 459, 473 (6th Cir. 2007)). Defendants are incorrect in their assertion that this Court merely
inquired whether the individual Defendants were unsatisfactorily trained. The Sixth Circuit has
explained that to find Monell liability on a failure-to-train theory, the inadequacy in training must
be caused by the municipality’s deliberate indifference and the inadequacy must be closely related
to or cause the injury. Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, Mich., 969 F.3d 265, 286-87 (6th Cir.
2020).1 This Court made plain in its Order denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
as to the County that it found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Decedent’s alleged
1 Defendants did not dispute that Plaintiff showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the alleged inadequacy in this case was closely related to or caused Decedent’s injury,
and this Court therefore did not analyze that element.
constitutional deprivation was caused by the County’s deliberate indifference based on the fact
that the County allegedly knew there were bolts in the walls of the Jail cells for eight years and
allegedly had a policy of allowing inmates to keep their shoelaces unless they were put on suicide
watch, which the county allegedly had a policy of only putting inmates on if they explicitly said
“I’m going to kill myself,” regardless of any other suicide risk factors the inmate displayed. (ECF
No. 112 at 16-17). As this Court explained in its Order denying summary judgment to the County,
it is obvious in such a situation that an inmate may attempt suicide, and a reasonable jury could
thus find the County was deliberately indifferent to a risk that Decedent would commit suicide.
The Court also finds that immediate appeal of the claim against the County would not
materially advance the ultimate termination of this case. Local Rule 7.3 allows a party to move
for revision of an interlocutory order for several reasons, including a material change of law
occurring after the entry of the order. If the Sixth Circuit addresses the standard for deliberate
indifference in suicide cases in the individual Defendants’ claims, the County may move the Court
to revise its order on the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the County on that basis.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: October 18, 2022.