Anderson v. Parker

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

CASEY LEE ANDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 21-2378-SHM-tmp

)

TONY PARKER and JOHNNY FITZ, )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND;

AND DENYING PENDING MOTIONS (ECF NOS. 12, 13 & 14)

On June 4, 2021, Plaintiff Casey Lee Anderson, who is incarcerated at the West Tennessee

State Penitentiary (the “WTSP”) in Henning, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and a motion for appointment of counsel.

(ECF Nos. 1, 2 & 3.) On September 1, 2021, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915,

et seq. (the “PLRA”). (ECF No. 10.) On February 10, 2022, the Court denied the motion for

appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 11 (“the February 10 Order”).) On March 7, 2022, Anderson

filed a motion for substitution of parties. (ECF No. 12 (the “Substitution Motion”).) On March 9,

2022, Anderson filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 10 Order. (ECF No. 13 (the

“Reconsideration Motion”).) On May 23, 2022, Anderson filed a motion for transfer pursuant to

the Interstate Correction Compact. (ECF No. 14 (the “Transfer Motion”) (the Substitution Motion,

the Reconsideration Motion, and the Transfer Motion are referred to as the “Pending Motions”).)

The complaint asserts claims of: (1) failure to protect; (2) inadequate prison grievance

Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (the “TDOC”) and (2) Johnny Fitz,

Warden of the WTSP, as Defendants in their individual capacities.1 (Id. at PageID 4.) Anderson

seeks a transfer to a prison outside the State of Tennessee for the remainder of Anderson’s term of

incarceration pursuant to the Interstate Correction Compact (the “Proposed Transfer”). (Id. at

PageID 8.) Anderson seeks to “return to general population” so that he can participate in a prison

rehabilitation program. (Id.)

The complaint and the Pending Motions are before the Court.

For the reasons explained below, the complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE in its entirety, and the Pending Motions (ECF Nos. 12, 13 & 14) are DENIED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint —

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 .S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007).

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts

the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the

1 The complaint does not assert § 1983 claims against the State of Tennessee. Anderson

does not name the State of Tennessee as a Defendant, and he sues Parker and Fitz in their

individual, not their official, capacities. See Jones v. Union Cnty., Tenn., 296 F.3d 417, 421 (6th

Cir. 2002) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)).

Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations

are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported

by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides

guidance on this issue. Although Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it also requires factual

allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted

by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383

(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)

(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”

and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”

(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

II. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983

Anderson sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the

“Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). As explained

below, Anderson fails to sufficiently plead a claim to relief under § 1983.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claim Of Failure To Protect

Anderson has “work[ed] with security to prevent assaults and drug overdoses, or possible escape

attempts.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6. Anderson alleges that “gang hits were put on Plaintiff for

helping security recover cuff key [and] narcotics” (the “Gang Threats”). (Id. at PageID 5.) At the

time Anderson filed the complaint, he was confined in administrative segregation at the WTSP “in

connection with the gangs.” (Id. at PageID 7.) Anderson “is in constant fear for his life,” even in

segregated housing. (Id. at PageID 6.) It is unclear from the complaint whether the conduct

underlying the Gang Threats occurred at the WTSP or at the Northwest Correctional Complex (the

“NWCX”) in Tiptonville, Tennessee. (See id. at PageID 7.)

The Court construes Anderson’s allegations about the Gang Threats as a claim of failure

to protect.

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Rhodes v. Michigan, 10 F.4th 665,

673 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). The Eighth

Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of ...

inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). A prison official is liable under the

Eighth Amendment for failure to protect an inmate when: (1) the deprivation alleged is,

objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to

the inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. For the objective prong, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).

For the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show that a prison official “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed]”

that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). See also Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (a

plaintiff seeking to assert an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect that plaintiff from

substantial risk [of] serious harm”).

Anderson’s complaint does not satisfy either prong of an Eighth Amendment claim of

failure to protect.

Anderson vaguely alleges that the “security file shows and reflects numerous gang hits.”

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.) Anderson does not provide the dates the “hits” occurred, the persons

who carried out the “hits,” the conduct by which the “hits” occurred, or Anderson’s injuries from

the “hits,” if any. Anderson’s generalized allegation about being in “constant fear for [my] life,”

see ECF No. 1 at PageID 6, does not adequately allege facts demonstrating a “sufficiently serious”

condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Anderson does not allege facts demonstrating Parker’s or Fitz’s: (1) subjective knowledge

of a substantial risk that gangs threatened, harassed, or assaulted Anderson; or (2) disregard of that

alleged risk. Anderson’s allegation that he “wrote numerous request[s] to Fitz and Parker

requesting transfer due to these gang hits,” see ECF No. 1 at PageID 5, does not, without more,

establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The complaint does not describe the contents of the

vaguely-referenced “requests,” and Anderson does not allege that Parker and Fitz received the

“requests.”

Anderson’s failure-to-protect claim against Parker and Fitz in their individual capacities is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

B. Claim Of Inadequate Prison Grievance Process

Anderson alleges that he grieved the Gang Threats to Parker and Fitz, without any

response. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.)

“There is no inherent constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure.”

LaFlame v. Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996)). Prisoners have a First Amendment

of their allegations. See Carlton v. Jondreau, 76 F. App’x 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming that

inmate did not state a claim that deputy warden “had failed to properly investigate his grievance”);

Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of inmate’s claim that prison

officials failed to investigate his grievances properly because there is no “federally protected

liberty interest” in a certain resolution or investigation of grievances). Anderson does not have a

constitutional right to an investigation of the alleged Gang Threats. Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d

374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)) (“There is no

statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an investigation”). A § 1983

claim cannot be premised on contentions that a prison’s grievance procedure was inadequate. Id.

The complaint’s claim of inadequate prison grievance process is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

C. Claim Of Denial Of Participation In Prison Rehabilitation Program

Anderson alleges that gangs paid another inmate to “sabotage” Anderson’s completion of

the Residential Therapeutic Community Drug And Behavior Treatment Program (the “Program”).

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) It is not clear from the complaint how the allege “sabotage” occurred.

Anderson alleges that his exclusion from the Program compromised his ability to “become fit to

return to society and with the skills and mental development to be productive upon release.” (Id.)

The complaint suggests that Anderson is ineligible to participate in the Program while he is

confined in segregated housing. (Id. at PageID 6 & 8.)

The deprivation of an ability to participate in prison rehabilitative programs does not

violate the Constitution. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (“Although job and

educational opportunities diminished marginally, . . . deprivations of this kind simply are not

punishments. We would have to wrench the Eighth Amendment from its language and history to

hold that delay of these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the Constitution”); Argue v.

Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Prisoners have no constitutional right to

rehabilitation, education, or jobs”).

Anderson’s claim of denial of participation in the rehabilitation Program while incarcerated

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

D. Claim For Transfer To A Different Prison

Anderson seeks “transfer to a prison outside the State of Tennessee.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID

8.) He does not allege that he suffered physical injury from the Gang Threats, but he alleges that

there will be “eventual attempts to attempt to murder Plaintiff.” (Id. at PageID 5.) Anderson

alleges that he “is not safe anywhere inside the Tennessee Department of Correction.” (Id.)

Anderson does not allege facts that support his conclusory allegation of imminent danger.

“[A] federal court only has the authority to order a state to transfer a prisoner in the rare

and extreme situation where an inmate’s life is in imminent or grave danger.” Neal v. Woosley,

No. 4:20-cv-P167-JHM, 2020 WL 7327313, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2020). Anderson’s bare

allegation that he “will be eventually murdered, or if lucky, just assaulted,” see ECF No. 1 at

PageID 8, does not suggest that he is in the imminent or grave danger that would permit

the Court to order his transfer to a different facility.

Anderson’s claim for transfer to a correctional facility that is not operated by the TDOC is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

E. Claims That Arose Before June 4, 2020

Anderson does not allege the dates on which the conduct underlying the complaint

occurred. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 5-8.)

claims are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in

Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B); Edison v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs.,

510 F.3d 631, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2007); ECF No. 1 at PageID 9 (deemed filed on May 23, 2021);

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270, 276 (1988) (adopting the mailbox rule for federal pro se

prisoner filings).)

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every other

circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to

amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see also

Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for

failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies

in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be

cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean,

of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically

must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua

sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree

with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged

by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).

The Court grants leave for Anderson to amend his complaint under the conditions set forth

below. See Section VI, infra.

A. The Substitution Motion

The Substitution Motion seeks to replace Parker as a named Defendant with TDOC Interim

Commissioner Lisa Helton. (ECF No. 12 at PageID 58 (alleging that “former Commissioner Tony

Parker has retired from office. Our new Commissioner is now Ms. Lisa Helton”); see also

https://www.tn.gov/correction/about-us/interim-commissioner-lisa-helton.html (“News Release

- Gov. Lee Appoints Lisa Helton As Tennessee Department Of Correction Interim Commissioner …”)

Anderson sues Parker in his individual, not his official, capacity. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.)

The complaint asserts factual allegations particular to Parker. (See id. at PageID 5.) The complaint

alleges no facts about Helton. For these reasons, the Substitution Motion (ECF No. 12) is DENIED.

B. The Reconsideration Motion

The Reconsideration Motion asks the Court to “reconsider appointment of counsel”

because Anderson contends that he “ha[s] no idea what I’m doing.” (ECF No. 13 at PageID 60;

see also ECF No. 11 (February 10, 2022 Order Denying Motion To Appoint Counsel)). The Court

construes the Reconsideration Motion as an application under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (b)(6)

for relief from an order.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may grant a party relief from a final

judgment for one of several defined reasons, including mistake or inadvertence, newly discovered

evidence, fraud, a defect in the judgment, or any other reason justifying relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(1)–(6). “A Rule 60(b) motion is neither a substitute for, nor a supplement to, an appeal.”

GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 477 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2007). “Rule 60(b) does not allow a

defeated litigant a second chance to convince the court to rule in his or her favor by presenting

by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.” Tyler v. Anderson,

749 F.3d. 499, 509 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rule 60(b)(1)

is “intended to provide relief to a party in only two instances: (1) when the party has made an

excusable litigation mistake or an attorney in the litigation has acted without authority; or (2) when

the judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order.” Cacevic

v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Rule 60(b)(6) “provides

for relief from a final judgment for any reason justifying relief not captured in the other provisions

of Rule 60(b).” Henness v. Bagley, 766 F.3d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2014). “A movant seeking relief

under Rule 60(b)(6) must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final

judgment.” Abdur’Rahman v. Carpenter, 805 F.3d 710, 713 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gonzalez v.

Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)). “Motions to reconsider ... are used sparingly and in rare

circumstances.” In re Regions Morgan Keenan Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. 2:09-MD-

2009-SHM, 12-2341, 2013 WL 2319271, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 28, 2013) (quoting In re

Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2011 WL 3793777, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug.

25, 2011)). A court should not grant a motion to revise its prior ruling “in the vast majority of

instances ....” Id. (quoting White v. Hitachi Ltd., No. 3:04-CV-20, 2008 WL 782565, at *1 (E.D.

Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008)).

Anderson alleges no facts and makes no arguments in the Reconsideration Motion that

persuade the Court to reconsider the February 10 Order. The Reconsideration Motion does not

demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to warrant appointment of counsel. See Lavado v.

Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 1993). The Reconsideration Motion offers instead

Anderson’s opinions about: inmate violence (ECF No. 13 at PageID 61); public policy to reduce

nature of “our penal system” (id.); gangs in prisons (id. at PageID 62-63); “the system fail[ing] me

my entire life” (id. at PageID 63); and the benefits of inmate rehabilitation programs (id. at PageID

63-64). Anderson’s unspecified “disabilities” and his lack of legal training do not constitute

exceptional circumstances for purposes of appointment of counsel. (Id. at PageID 60 & 64). See

Howard v. Dougan, No. 99-2232, 2000 WL 876770, at *2 (6th Cir. June 23, 2000) (“The district

court had no duty to remedy Howard’s lack of legal training by appointing counsel as no

constitutional right to counsel exists in a civil case”) (citing Lavado, 992 F.2d at 605-06).

The Reconsideration Motion does not allege facts or make arguments demonstrating that

the February 10 Order was erroneous. The February 10 Order’s denial of appointment of counsel

was not based on an error of law. The Reconsideration Motion (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.

C. The Transfer Motion

The Transfer Motion asks the Court to “order [ICC] transfer [of Anderson] for

safekeeping.” (ECF No. 14 at PageID 70.) The relief Anderson seeks is not available.

1. Anderson alleges that gangs have tampered with his food trays, poisoned Anderson

twice “with [an] unknown substance, possibly fentanyl,” and may poison Anderson “in the future.”

(Id.) Anderson’s vague statements do not allege sufficient facts demonstrating a “rare and extreme

situation where an inmate’s life is in imminent or grave danger.” See Neal, 2020 WL 7327313, at

*4; see also Section III.D., supra. A federal court cannot order the transfer of a state prisoner to a

different correctional facility without a demonstration of extreme circumstances that place an

inmate in danger of serious harm or death.

2. Anderson’s reliance on the Interstate Corrections Compact (the “ICC”) does not

alter this result. The Court cannot order Anderson’s transfer to a different prison under the ICC.

confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, … thereby serving the best

interests of such offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and

operational costs ...” Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-23-102, Art. 1. Before transferring an inmate pursuant

to the ICC, the TDOC Commissioner “shall give notice of the proposed transfer to the district

attorney general of the judicial district in which the inmate was convicted.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

41-23-104. Nothing in the record suggests that Parker gave notice of a proposed transfer of

Anderson to the attorney general for the Western District of Tennessee (the “D.A.”). In the

absence of notice to the D.A., “[t]he commissioner … shall not proceed with [a] proposed [inmate]

transfer.” See id. Nothing in the ICC allows a Federal Court to override the ICC’s provisions to

effect an inmate transfer.

For these reasons, the Transfer Motion (ECF No. 14) is DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) The complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety

for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2);

(2) Leave to amend is GRANTED. An amended pleading must comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and

plain statement of Anderson’s claims. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint

and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. Anderson must sign the

amended complaint, and the text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to support

each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by

number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims

alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each

claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued on that

count; and

(3) The Pending Motions (ECF Nos. 12, 13 & 14) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of August, 2022.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE