Atkins v. CoreCivic, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

RICK ATKINS and KAROLE ATKINS,

Individually and as Next of Kin to Decedent,

Thomas Atkins,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 1:21-cv-01154-JDB-jay

CORECIVIC, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HARDEMAN COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS,

DENYING REQUEST TO AMEND COMPLAINT, AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS

ENTIRETY

______________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter was initially brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Tennessee by the Plaintiffs, Rick Atkins and Karole Atkins, individually and as next of kin to

decedent Thomas Atkins, against the named Defendants, CoreCivic, Inc. (“CoreCivic”), a private

prison operator; Sam Rogers, individually and in his official capacity as warden of Whiteville

Correctional Facility (“WCF”); and Hardeman County, Tennessee (the “County”), in which WCF

is located. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1.) The complaint, which arose from the death of Thomas

Atkins, Rick and Karole Atkins’ adopted son, during his incarceration at WCF, alleged violation

of the Eighth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state claims for wrongful death,

premises liability, negligence, gross negligence, and assault. An amended complaint filed

February 10, 2021, named Atkins’ killer, Randy Chapman, as an additional Defendant. (D.E. 9.)

The suit also included a John Doe Defendant identified as a WCF inmate called “Hunt.”

On April 19, 2021, CoreCivic and Rogers moved to dismiss the Atkins’ claims or, in the

alternative, to transfer venue to this district. (D.E. 21.) In a memorandum opinion issued October

12, 2021, United States District Judge Aleta A. Trauger granted the motion as to the federal claims

against the movants and transferred the case to this district. (D.E. 28.) At the time of transfer, the

claims remaining in this matter included a federal § 1983 claim against the County and the

supplemental state claims. On October 19, 2021, the County filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this Court. (D.E. 35.) As the briefing has

closed, the motion is ripe for disposition.1

FACTS ALLEGED

According to the complaint, as amended, Thomas Atkins entered the custody of WCF in

late 2019. On February 9, 2020, Hunt entered his cell, threatened him with a knife, and instructed

his cellmate to leave. Hunt then proceeded to rape Atkins in his cell. Atkins was transferred to a

holding cell, where his new cellmate began “roughing him up and fighting” him. (D.E. 9 ¶ 50.)

Although Atkins requested transfer to protective custody, the request was either ignored or denied.

In the early morning hours of February 19, 2020, he was found dead in his cell with cloth ligatures

tied around his hands, feet, and neck, and broken bones, blunt force injuries, and lacerations to his

body, head, and extremities. The cause of death was determined to be strangulation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on such a motion, a court is to “view the complaint

1In their response to the instant motion, Plaintiffs request a hearing. Under the local rules

of this district, if counsel desires a hearing on a motion pending before the Court, he must so

request and “explain why a hearing would be helpful or necessary.” LR 7.2(d) (emphasis added).

As Plaintiffs’ counsel has offered no reason whatever why a hearing would be either helpful or

necessary, the request is DENIED.

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and

look to see whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ammex, Inc. v. McDowell, 24 F.4th 1072, 1079 (6th

Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES AND ANALYSIS

Section 1983 Claim.

As previously noted, Plaintiffs have brought an Eighth Amendment claim against the

County pursuant to § 1983. The statute imposes liability upon persons who, under color of state

law, “subject[], or cause[] to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It “does

not confer substantive rights; rather, it is only a means to vindicate rights already conferred by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013).

In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must “identify a right secured by the United States

Constitution and the deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of law.” AirTrans,

Inc. v. Mead, 389 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Watkins v. City of Southfield,

221 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2000)) (ellipses omitted).

A municipality such as the County is a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and, therefore, “can

be held liable for constitutional injuries for which it is responsible.” See Greene v. Crawford Cty.,

Mich., 22 F.4th 593, 616 (6th Cir. 2022). Liability imposed upon such an entity may not rest on a

theory of respondeat superior, id., but must stem from a “policy” or “custom” that led to a violation

of an individual’s rights, Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, Tenn., 984 F.3d 1156, 1165 (6th Cir. 2021).

The required policy or custom may take various forms. See Gambrel v. Knox Cty., Ky., 25 F.4th

391, 408 (6th Cir. 2022). One method for establishing a policy or custom, and the one upon which

Plaintiffs rely, is based on a theory of inaction. The theory requires a plaintiff to prove

(1) a clear and persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct by [the municipality];

(2) the municipality’s notice or constructive notice of the unconstitutional conduct;

(3) the municipality’s tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that its

deliberate indifference in its failure to act can be said to amount to an official policy

of inaction; and (4) that the policy of inaction was the moving force of the

constitutional deprivation.

Griffith V. Franklin Cty., Ky., 975 F.3d 554, 582-83 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Winkler v. Madison

Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), reh’g en

banc denied (Jan. 15, 2021). It is the position of the County that Plaintiffs have failed to

sufficiently allege the elements of a municipal liability claim based upon inaction.2

In so arguing, the County focuses on the fourth element, which requires the plaintiff to

“demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal

rights.” Ford v. Cty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 497 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). Stated differently, municipal

liability will not lie unless the plaintiff “identif[ies] the policy, connect[s] the policy to the

[municipality] itself and show[s] that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution

of that policy.” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 829 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Garner

v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 855 (2020).

The amended complaint averred that the County continued to renew CoreCivic’s contract

to operate WCF despite 2017 and 2019 reports from state auditors of poor recordkeeping,

understaffing, high correctional officer turnover, and failure to timely report sexual abuse

2The County does not assert that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim as to the

constitutional violation element of the § 1983 claim.

allegations at the prison. Plaintiffs complained that the policy or custom of contract renewal in

the face of these problems, which were not unique throughout the web of CoreCivic locations

nationwide, along with statistics reflecting that CoreCivic facilities were more violent that state-

run prisons, violated inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment and was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivations suffered by Thomas

Atkins.

In her order dismissing the § 1983 municipal liability claim against CoreCivic, Judge

Trauger found that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts suggesting that any deliberate indifference on

its part with respect to understaffing and increased violence at its facilities that might have arisen

therefrom caused or contributed to Thomas Atkins’ death. Thus, she concluded, “even if the court

assumes as a factual matter that CoreCivic has adopted a policy of understaffing its facilities, the

plaintiffs have not alleged facts that, if true, would establish that the injuries in this case were

caused by that or any other purported policy.” (D.E. 28 at PageID 120.)

The same can be said here. That is, even assuming the County had a policy or custom of

renewing CoreCivic’s contract despite its operational shortcomings, Plaintiffs have alleged no

facts that, if true, would demonstrate that Thomas Atkins’ injuries and death were caused by the

policy. Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ Alternative Request to Amend Their Complaint.

In their response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs request that, if the Court grants the

County’s motion to dismiss, they be permitted leave to amend the complaint. However, a party’s

request to amend its complaint contained in its response to the opposing party’s motion to dismiss

does not constitute a proper motion to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Kale v. Procollect,

Inc., 547 F. Supp. 3d 793, 798 (W.D. Tenn. 2021). Plaintiffs’ request to file an amended complaint

is DENIED.

Supplemental State Claims.

The decisions of Judge Trauger and the undersigned leave pending only those claims

brought under state law, over which this Court has supplemental jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c), “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . .

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Courts in this

circuit have noted that, “when a federal court dismisses all pending federal claims before trial, . . .

it is usually best to allow the state courts to decide state issues.” Kowall v. Benson, 18 F.4th 542,

549 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. docketed (U.S. Feb. 1, 2022) (No. 21A382); see also Southard

v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC, 7 F.4th 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Once a federal court no longer has

federal claims to resolve, it should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims.”); Royal

Truck & Trailer Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Kraft, 974 F.3d 756, 763 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting the “settled

rule that when a district court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . ., it

may also dismiss any state-law claims before it based on supplemental jurisdiction”), cert. denied,

141 S. Ct. 2753 (2021). As the federal claims in this matter have been resolved, the Plaintiffs’

state law claims are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to their ability to bring those claims in

the state courts.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated herein, the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint is

GRANTED and this matter is DISMISSED. Dismissal of the state law claims is without prejudice.

The Plaintiffs’ request for permission to amend the complaint is DENIED. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to enter judgment for the County.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of March 2022.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE