“Napier applies where the plaintiff’s ‘deliberate indifference’ claim is based on the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious.”
How later courts described this case
- “Napier applies where the plaintiff’s ‘deliberate indifference’ claim is based on the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
)
OMOWALE ASHANTI SHABAZZ, )
a/k/a FRED DEAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) No. 17-cv-1051
)
CENTURION OF TENNESSEE, LLC, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER
This is a prisoner’s rights case brought by pro se
Plaintiff Omowale Ashanti Shabazz pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
At the time of filing, Shabazz was incarcerated at the
Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCX”) in Tiptonville,
Tennessee. Defendants Centurion of Tennessee, LLC
(“Centurion”) and Cortez Tucker (collectively, “Defendants”)
are the two remaining Defendants. Before the Court is
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). (ECF
Nos. 157, 158.) For the following reasons, the Motion is
GRANTED.
I. Background
In 1995, Shabazz entered the custody of the Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On September 23, 2019, he
filed the operative complaint, alleging Defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by inadequately diagnosing, assessing,
and treating his hepatitis. (ECF No. 96.) Centurion is the
private health care provider for TDOC. (Id.) Tucker was the
Medical Director at NWCX from August 2014 to January 2019.
(ECF No. 158-1.) On February 23, 2022, Defendants filed the
Motion. (ECF Nos. 157, 158.) Shabazz opposed the Motion on
March 3, 2022. (ECF No. 163.)
II. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court shall
grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact first rests with the moving
party.” George v. Youngstown St. Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 458 (6th
Cir. 2020) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)). The moving party can meet this burden by showing the
Court that the nonmoving party, having had sufficient opportunity
for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element
of his case. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).
When confronted with a properly-supported motion for
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A genuine dispute exists when the
plaintiff presents significant probative evidence on which a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for her.” EEOC v. Ford
Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks
omitted). The nonmoving party must do more than simply “show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Adcor Indus., Inc. v. Bevcorp, LLC, 252 F. App’x 55, 61 (6th
Cir. 2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). When evaluating a motion for
summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. George, 966
F.3d at 458 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587).
A party may not oppose a properly supported summary judgment
motion by mere reliance on the pleadings. See Beckett v. Ford,
384 F. App’x 435, 443 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 324). Instead, the nonmoving party must adduce concrete
evidence on which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in
his favor. Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.
2000); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Court does not have
the duty to search the record for such evidence. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(3); InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108,
111 (6th Cir. 1989).
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action[,] rather than a disfavored procedural shortcut.”
FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. Analysis
Shabazz argues that Tucker and Centurion inadequately
treated his hepatitis B and C, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. “The Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials from
‘unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain’ on an inmate by
acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ toward the inmate’s
serious medical needs.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d
890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976)). Deliberate indifference to a convicted
prisoner’s need for medical attention suffices for a claim under
§ 1983. Id. (citing Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723
(6th Cir. 1985)). Deliberate indifference can occur when a
prison official intentionally denies or delays access to a
serious medical need. Id.
An Eighth Amendment denial-of-medical-care claim has an
objective and a subjective component. The objective component
requires the existence of a “sufficiently serious” medical need.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The “inmate must show that he
is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
“The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison
officials have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying
medical care.’” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (quoting Brown v.
Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Objective Component
A sufficiently serious medical need is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d
510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). If
a prisoner’s claim is based on the failure to treat a condition
adequately, he “must place verifying medical evidence in the
record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in
medical treatment.” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742
(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40
F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994)); see Blackmore, 390 F.3d at
898-99 (“Napier applies where the plaintiff’s ‘deliberate
indifference’ claim is based on the prison’s failure to treat a
condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is
seemingly minor or non-obvious.”).
Shabazz was diagnosed with hepatitis B in 1995 and hepatitis
C in 2005. Hepatitis B is a vaccine-preventable liver infection
caused by the hepatitis B virus (“HBV”). Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”), Hepatitis B,
https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hbv/index.htm (last accessed Mar.
15, 2022). Although often a short-term illness, hepatitis B can
become a long-term chronic infection. Id. Two to six percent
of people who get hepatitis B as adults become chronically
infected. Id. Hepatitis C is a liver infection caused by the
hepatitis C virus (“HCV”). CDC, Hepatitis C,
https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hcv/index.htm (last accessed Mar.
15, 2022). For more than half of those infected with HCV,
hepatitis C becomes a long-term, chronic infection. Id. There
is no vaccine for hepatitis C, but treatments can cure most
people in 8 to 12 weeks. Id.
The TDOC Advisory Committee on HIV and Viral Hepatitis
Prevention and Treatment (“TACHH”) guides treatment of hepatitis
C for NWCX inmates. Tucker, as medical director at NWCX, was
responsible for monitoring Shabazz, ensuring he received chronic
care, making referrals to TACHH, and following TACHH’s treatment
recommendations.
To treat his hepatitis C, Shabazz was given abdominal
ultrasounds and a liver biopsy, prescribed the hepatitis C
medication Harvoni, and referred to TACHH multiple times. (See
ECF No. 163-3.) He had telemedicine visits with infectious
disease experts and had laboratory work done as part of chronic
care treatment. (Id.) To treat his hepatitis B, infectious
disease experts recommended Shabazz repeat his hepatitis B
vaccinations. (Id.)
Shabazz has provided no evidence to dispute that he received
treatment. He argues that the treatment was inadequate, but he
has offered no verified medical evidence to support his claim.
(Id.) See Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898-99. A mere disagreement
about the sufficiency of medical treatment, without more, does
not constitute an Eight Amendment violation. See Lyons v.
Brandly, 430 F. App’x 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Estelle,
429 U.S. at 107).
Shabazz has not provided sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude that he experienced a serious medical
need. He has not satisfied the objective component of his Eight
Amendment claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this 15th day of March, 2022.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE