Benoist v. Titan Medical Manufacturing, LLC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

TAYLOR BENOIST, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:19-cv-02704-SHM

)

TITAN MEDICAL MANUFACTURING, )

LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff Taylor Benoist filed

Plaintiff’s Motion for Payment of Attorney’s Fees (the “Motion”).

(D.E. No. 113.) On August 13, 2021, Defendant Titan Medical

Manufacturing, LLC responded. (D.E. No. 118.) The Motion is

GRANTED IN PART.

I. Background

Both Plaintiff and Defendant vigorously litigated this

case. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 16, 2019, alleging

“Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII,”

“Retaliation in Violation of Title VII,” and constructive

discharge. (D.E. No. 1 at 5-6.) Defendant filed an Answer denying

liability and raising affirmative defenses. (D.E. No. 8.)

Both parties served and answered interrogatories and

document requests. Defendant took three depositions. Plaintiff

took eight. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E.

No. 33.) Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim. (D.E. No. 34.) The Court

entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment. (D.E. No. 66.) The Court dismissed

Plaintiff’s claims of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and

constructive discharge. (Id. at 10-19.) The Court denied

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim. (Id. at 19-24.) Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Reconsideration (D.E. No. 67), which the Court denied. (D.E. No.

76.)

Trial commenced on July 12, 2021, and concluded on July 16,

2021. Before trial, Plaintiff had received settlement offers of

up to $15,000. Plaintiff’s counsel, Brian C. Winfrey, asked the

jury to award a total of $1,000,000 in compensatory and punitive

damages. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and

awarded a total of $500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.

(D.E. No. 105.) Defendant filed a Motion to Impose Statutory

Cap. (D.E. No. 107.) The Court granted Defendant’s Motion to

Impose Statutory Cap and reduced the jury’s verdict to $50,000.

(D.E. No. 115.)

Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (D.E.

No. 113.) The Motion includes a Memorandum of Law, Winfrey’s

Declaration, a Billing Statement, declarations from two Memphis

attorneys, and two prior fee awards. Plaintiff requests

$285,237.50 in fees for Winfrey based on an hourly rate of $475

and 612.5 billed hours. (D.E. No. 113-2.) The billed hours

include 24.0 travel hours. Winfrey billed $237.50 an hour for

travel hours, half the rate he billed for work hours. Defendant

responds that Winfrey’s hourly rate is too high and that the

time billed should be reduced because Winfrey used block billing

and made impermissible billing entries. (D.E. No. 118.)

II. Standards

The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a party

that prevails in a Title VII action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the court calculates

“the fee applicant’s lodestar, which is the proven number of

hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney, multiplied

by his court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.” Hubbell v.

FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir. 2019). “There

is a ‘strong presumption that the lodestar figure—the product of

reasonable hours times a reasonable rate—represents a reasonable

fee.’” Barrow v. City of Cleveland, 773 F. App’x 254, 268 (6th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)). Upward

adjustments to the lodestar are permissible in certain rare and

exceptional cases. See Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 564; Blum

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984); Geier v. Sundquist,

372 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2004).

To determine the “reasonable hourly rate” component of the

lodestar calculation, the court assesses the “prevailing market

rate in the relevant community.” See Waldo v. Consumers Energy

Co., 726 F.3d 802, 822 (6th Cir. 2013)(emphasis omitted). “The

prevailing market rate is that rate which lawyers of comparable

skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the

venue of the court of record.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). The court is “permitted to rely on a party’s

submissions, awards in analogous cases, state bar association

guidelines, and its own knowledge and experience in handling

similar fee requests.” Id. at 821-22 (internal quotations

omitted).

To determine the number of reasonable hours for the lodestar

calculation, “the standard is whether a reasonable attorney would

have believed the work to be reasonably expended in pursuit of

success at the point in time when the work was performed.”

Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th

Cir. 1990) (abrogated on other grounds Buckhannon Bd. & Care

Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S.

598 (2001)). The court excludes hours that were “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “Hours that are not properly billed to

one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary

pursuant to statutory authority.” Id. Time entries must be

detailed enough to allow the court to evaluate their

reasonableness. See id. at 437 & n.12; Moore v. Freeman, 355

F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2004). If the fee applicant presents an

inadequate documentation of hours, the court “may reduce the

award accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Imwalle v. Reliance

Med. Prod., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 552 (6th Cir. 2008).

III. Analysis

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiff’s Motion is supported by declarations from

William B. Ryan and Robert L. J. Spence, Jr., two respected

Memphis attorneys. Ryan states that a $475 hourly rate was

reasonable for “top flight trial attorneys in the Western

District of Tennessee” and that his own hourly rate in employment

cases “ranges from $350-450 per hour depending on the complexity

of the matter/case.” (D.E. No. 113-6 at 3.) Ryan has been

licensed to practice in Tennessee for twenty-two (22) years.

(Id. at 1.) Spence states that Winfrey’s hourly rate was

reasonable and that “rates for this type of work for experienced

lawyers range from $350 to $550 depending on the complexity of

the matter and the skill involved.” (D.E. No. 113-5 at 4, 5.)

Spence has been licensed to practice in Tennessee for thirty-

five (35) years. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff has also provided two

recent cases in which the awarding courts found Winfrey’s $475

hourly rate reasonable. (D.E. No. 113-7; 113-8); see Peterson v.

W. TN Expediting, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01164, (W.D. Tenn. June 16,

2021); Hanson v. McBride, No. 3:18-cv-00524 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 2,

2020).

Defendant argues that $375 is a reasonable hourly rate for

Winfrey’s work. (D.E. No. 118 at 8.) Defendant argues that

Winfrey has been licensed for fifteen (15) years and cannot

command the upper end of the rates quoted by Ryan and Spence.

(Id. at 6-7.) Defendant cites recent cases in which the awarding

court approved hourly rates for Ryan and Spence on the low end

of their quoted ranges. (Id.) Defendant argues that the Peterson

award Plaintiff submitted covers Winfrey’s appellate work. (Id.

at 7-8.) The same court found $400 was a reasonable hourly rate

for Winfrey’s work through trial. See Peterson v. W. TN

Expediting, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01164 (W.D. Tenn. June 26, 2020).

Defendant argues that the Hanson award is from the Middle

District of Tennessee, where attorneys charge higher hourly

rates. (D.E. No. 118 at 7.) Defendant contends that the present

case involved straightforward discrimination and retaliation

claims that do not warrant a $475 hourly rate. (Id. at 15.)

The Court finds that $400 is a reasonable hourly rate for

Winfrey’s work in this case. The ranges that Ryan and Spence

quoted for experienced attorneys are appropriate guideposts.

Although Winfrey has only practiced for fifteen (15) years, his

Declaration demonstrates specialized experience and training.

Winfrey has clerked for the National Labor Relations Board and

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, served as Trial

Counsel for the United States Department of Labor, and practiced

continually in the employment litigation field. (D.E. No. 113-

4.) The Court selects the approximate midpoint within the quoted

ranges. The present case involved straightforward claims, but

was complicated by parties and witnesses with close personal and

family ties. A $400 hourly rate matches the rate Winfrey received

for his trial work in the first Peterson award. The Hanson award

is not evidence of the prevailing market rate in this venue.

Winfrey argues that his $475 hourly rate is reasonable

because he “handled all attorney work for Ms. Benoist alone and

without the assistance of co-counsel,” although noting that “[a]s

a Member at a large national law firm, [he] certainly could have

retained co-counsel.” (D.E. No. 113-4 at 5.) That argument is

not persuasive. Work that could be performed by an associate or

paralegal does not command partner-level rates. See Hubbell v.

FedEx Smartpost, Inc., No. 14-13897, 2018 WL 1392668, at *3 (E.D.

Mich. Mar. 20, 2018), aff’d, 933 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019); Mendez

v. FedEx Express, No. 15-CV-12301, 2017 WL 168168, at *3 (E.D.

Mich. Jan. 17, 2017). Winfrey billed for tasks that an associate

or paralegal could have performed. For example, his Billing

Statement contains entries such as “create preliminary timeline

of events,” “organizing exhibits for deposition discussions,”

and “[r]esearch Burlington and other case law on issues and

elements of retaliation claim.” (D.E. No. 113-2.) Rather than

exclude those entries and similar entries from Winfrey’s billed

hours, the Court has considered the nature of Winfrey’s work in

its selection of a reasonable hourly rate.

B. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Defendant requests an across-the-board reduction in the

requested fees because Winfrey’s use of block billing “makes it

difficult to determine with a high degree of certainty exactly

how much time was spent performing many tasks, whether the tasks

were necessary for the litigation, and whether the hours billed

were expended in a reasonable fashion.” (D.E. No. 118 at 8.)

Defendant also identifies specific entries and contends that

they were “excessive/unreasonable” or represent “paralegal,

clerical or non-billable work.” (Id. at 11-14.) Plaintiff argues

that Winfrey’s Billing Statement is “specific and detailed [and]

largely avoids block billing . . . . “(D.E. No. 113-1 at 9.) In

his Declaration, Winfrey says that he “cut from billing entries

for all tasks performed that were even arguably unnecessary,

clerical, or unnecessarily duplicative before submitting [his

fees] to the Court.” (D.E. No. 113-4 at 5).

Block billing refers to a time-keeping method where a lawyer

“enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather

than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.” Oakley v.

City of Memphis, No. 06-2276, 2012 WL 2682755, at *3 (W.D. Tenn.

June 14, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 06-2276,

2012 WL 2681822 (W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2012), aff’d, 566 F. App’x

425 (6th Cir. 2014). Block billing alone does not require the

court to reduce a fee award, although the practice is generally

discouraged. See id. A court may reduce fees where block-billed

entries include non-compensable tasks. See Miller v. Davis, 267

F. Supp. 3d 961, 996–97 (E.D. Ky. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Miller

v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Hensley, 461

U.S. at 433-34 (finding that the district court may reduce fees

where documentation was inadequate and where hours were not

reasonably expended). Clerical tasks are non-compensable. See

Miller, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins by

Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989)). Clerical tasks include

converting documents, circulating documents, calendaring

matters, and filing motions. See Adkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

393 F. Supp. 3d 713, 720 (N.D. Ohio 2019); Miller, 267 F. Supp.

3d at 996-97.

Winfrey’s block billing warrants a five percent (5%)

reduction to his work hours. Winfrey did not enter total daily

time entries. He did group related tasks into single entries

instead of itemizing. For example, Winfrey’s Billing Statement

contains five entries listed for July 27, 2021, two of which are

reproduced below:

7.27.2021 Conferral with William Ryan and Robert 0.5

Spence Re: Gather and email items for

Declaration for fee award; submission

of billing entries, memorandum, and

declaration for review

7.27.2021 Review hundreds of pages of documents 4.5

submitted by Titan in support of

Statutory Damages Cap Motion; indexing

documents for reference; and

evaluating claims of Titan (3.5);

Research cases Re: Evidence for

statutory caps and burden of proof on

issue

(D.E. No. 113-2 at 17). The first entry shows no itemization. It

is not clear how much time Winfrey spent conferring with Ryan

and Spence and how much time he spent on the “submission” of fee

award materials. The second entry shows some itemization,

represented by time within parentheses, but tasks are grouped.

It is not clear how much time Winfrey spent reviewing, indexing,

or evaluating Titan documents. Both entries include clerical

tasks, specifically “submission of billing entries, memorandum,

and declaration” and “indexing documents.” The entries are

representative of other entries that are block-billed and that

also include non-compensable tasks. Because the Court cannot

determine how much time was spent on these non-compensable tasks

it imposes a 5% reduction in Winfrey’s work hours.1

The Court finds that the entries identified by Defendant

were not clearly excessive or unreasonable. It agrees that some

of the identified entries represent work that should have been

done by an associate or paralegal. The Court will not strike

those hours because the reasonable hourly rate reflects the

nature of Winfrey’s work.

C. Upward Adjustment

Plaintiff asks the Court to consider an upward adjustment

to the fee award based on the “excellent” results obtained at

trial, the quality of representation, and the “complicated” facts

of the case. That request is not well taken. This case is not

rare or exceptional. See Geier, 372 F.3d at 793. Plaintiff’s

reasons for an upward adjustment are presumptively reflected in

the lodestar calculation. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-900 (finding

that novelty/complexity, quality of representation, and results

obtained are generally subsumed in other factors used to

calculate a reasonable fee); Geier, 372 F.3d at 793-95. The

results obtained were good given the legal limit for damages.

Plaintiff asked for $1,000,000 in damages and received $50,000

1 Defendant has not asked the Court to reduce Winfrey’s travel hours.

Winfrey billed three (3) hours for trips to and from Memphis even when

he performed no work during the trip. The Court will not apply the

5% reduction to Winfrey’s travel hours.

after the Court imposed the statutory cap. 2 Winfrey’s

representation was effective, but does not merit an upward

adjustment. The claims and facts of the case were not overly

complicated. The request for an upward adjustment is denied.

D. Calculation of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees

The Court applies a $400 reasonable hourly rate to Winfrey’s

work hours and a $200 hourly rate to Winfrey’s travel hours.3 It

applies a 5% reduction to Winfrey’s work hours, resulting in a

total of 559.1 work hours and 24.0 travel hours. The Court awards

$228,430 in reasonable attorney’s fees.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN

PART.

So ordered this 29th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Samuel H. May, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2 The Court has considered whether a downward adjustment would be

appropriate based on the disparity between the requested fees and the

results obtained. Other courts have approved requested fees where the

ratio between fees and damages obtained was similar to or greater than

the ratio in the current case. See Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126,

1130 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding fee award that represented a 5:1 ratio

to damages, but reversing and remanding for consideration of additional

damages and attorney’s fees); Wheat v. Benton Cty., No. 1:08-CV-01171,

2010 WL 908653 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2010)(approving fees that

represented a 12:1 ratio to damages). A downward adjustment based on

damages obtained would not be appropriate on this record.

3 Winfrey billed travel hours at half his normal rate. The Court

applies the same rule to the reasonable hourly rate.