Madlock v. State of Tennessee Thirtieth Judicial Court Memphis, Ten 38103 Division 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

RANDY MADLOCK, a/k/a RANDY )

MEDLOCK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 2:20-cv-02382-TLP-tmp

v. )

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE THIRTIETH )

JUDICIAL COURT OF MEMPHIS, TEN )

38103 DIVISION 2, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER MODIFYING THE DOCKET, DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH

PREJUDICE, DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND, CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL

WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN

FORMA PAUPERIS, AND DISMISSING CASE

Plaintiff Randy Madlock, a/k/a Randy Medlock,1 sued pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(ECF No 1), and in February 2021, the Court screened his claims under the Prison Litigation and

Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b) (“Screening Order”). (ECF No. 11.) In that Screening Order,

the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. (Id. at

PageID 77.) The Court also gave Plaintiff thirty days to amend his claims. (Id.) As a result,

Plaintiff amended his complaint now here for rescreening under the PLRA. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b); see also § 1915(e)(2)(B).

1 The State of Tennessee is housing Plaintiff at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center in

Memphis, Tennessee. His booking number is 19124670.

Like Plaintiff’s initial pleadings here, this Court has a hard time deciphering the

allegations in his Amended Complaint. The Court will try to characterize his claims accurately.

Based on Plaintiff’s amended filings, the Court respectfully directs the Clerk to modify the

docket to add Judge Glenn Wright and Judge J. Robert Carter as Defendants.

The Court now turns to its analysis of Plaintiff’s amended claims.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint merely repeats the claims in his original complaint.2

In his original pleadings, Plaintiff alleged that the State of Tennessee Thirtieth Judicial Court

(“State Court”) deprived him of his speedy trial rights and that the state of Tennessee (“State”)

“recycle[ed] his property” without jurisdiction in violation of his equal protection rights. (ECF

No. at PageID 2–10.) He also asked the Court to dismiss the charges against him because the

indictment was deficient. (Id. at PageID 3.) Finally he complained about the “spread of

COVID-19” at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center (“Jail”). (Id. at PageID 1; ECF No. 1-

1 at PageID 15–18.)

Here Plaintiff repeats these allegations in his Amended Complaint, but he fails to remedy

the pleading deficiencies that the Court identified in the Screening Order. And so, for the

reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted.

First, Plaintiff sues the State because he claims that the State Court lacked jurisdiction

over him. (ECF No. 12 at PageID 79, 81, 83–86 & 88.) He alleges that “the [state] court lacks

standing in the claim of action under the merit of jurisdiction rights [sic]” and that the “court

2 Plaintiff seeks $1.3 million in damages for his alleged injuries. (ECF No. 12 at PageID 86 &

92.)

rendered judgment without jurisdiction. (Id. at PageID 91–92.) But as the Screening Order

explained, Plaintiff cannot sue the State because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars his

claim. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 68–69.)

Second, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint repeats his claims that Judge Glenn Wright (the

judge in his state court criminal action) deprived him of his due process rights by confining him

in the Jail during the COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF No. 12 at PageID 82, 85–86 & 92.) But as the

Court explained in the first Screening Order, Judge Wright is immune from suit under the

doctrine of judicial immunity. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 71–73.)

If Plaintiff seeks to add Tennessee state court Judge Robert Carter to this action, it does

not change the Court’s judicial immunity analysis. Judge Carter is a state criminal court judge.

(See ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff alleges that the court transferred his case to Judge Carter’s division.

(Id. at PageID 84-90). He claims that Judge Carter “has negligently denied Plaintiff

jurisdictional review of the court trying the case pursuant to Tenn. Rule 12(b)” and that “[p]rior

law required territorial jurisdiction to be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the court

lacks standing in the cause of action, states a claim on which relief may be granted [sic].” (Id.)

But Judge Carter is immune from suit here too. Because (1) presiding over criminal

proceedings falls under a state judge’s jurisdiction, and (2) Judge Carter was acting within the

scope of his judicial function during Plaintiff’s state case, Judge Carter is entitled to judicial

immunity. See Lucas v. Holland, No. 16-2309-JDT-cgc, 2017 WL 1088300, at *5 (W.D. Tenn.

Mar. 22, 2017). As a result, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against both Judge

Wright and Judge Carter.

Finally, Plaintiff references the COVID-19 pandemic again, but still fails to explain his

COVID-19 claims. He argues that he is entitled to relief because his confinement exposed him

to “health risk[s]” from the “COVID-19 outbreak.” (ECF No. 12 at PageID 82, 86.) He claims

also that Judge Wright failed “to take action in safe-guard[ing] against the mitigate risk of

infection of coronavirus to plaintiff afterward, the court became aware [that] the virus had spread

in the facility [sic]”. (Id. at PageID 85.) He thus asks the Court for $350,000 due to his exposure

to COVID-19. (Id. at PageID 92.)

All in all, his claims about the spread of COVID-19 fail. This is because Plaintiff does

not explain how the “spread of COVID-19” violates his constitutional rights. (See ECF No. 11 at

PageID 71.) And other than naming Judge Wright (who, as explained above, is immune from

suit), he also fails to allege who violated his rights, or when.

In sum, the Amended Complaint has the same insufficiencies as Plaintiff’s initial

pleadings. Simply repeating the allegations does not remedy their pleading defects. In the end,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted under § 1983. For these reasons,

the Court DISMISSES the Amended Complaint WITH PREJUDICE. (ECF No. 12.)

AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Court also DENIES leave to amend under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) and

1915A(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his

complaint to avoid dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir.

2013). In fact, the Sixth Circuit prefers “liberality” in allowing amendment at the screening

stage under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 292 (6th Cir. 2019). And the Court

has also stated “[i]f it is at all possible that the party . . . can . . . state a claim for relief, the court

should dismiss with leave to amend.” Id. (quoting Brown, 415 F. App’x at 614).

Even so, the Court finds that this is the rare case when it would not be possible for

Plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim for relief. The named defendants here—the

state of Tennessee, Judge Wright, and Judge Carter—are all immune from Plaintiff’s claims.

What is more, Plaintiff has twice failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983. So here, further

amendment would be futile. See Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.

2001) (“If it is crystal clear that . . . amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte

dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 2001). The Court

therefore finds that it should not give Plaintiff another opportunity to amend his complaint.

APPELLATE ISSUES

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court

also has to consider whether an appeal by Plaintiff here would be taken in good faith. The good

faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). “It

would be inconsistent for a court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior to

service on Defendants, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis.”

DePriest v. Prestress Servs., Inc., No. 13-2768-JDT-cgc, 2014 WL 1269933, at *1 (W.D. Tenn.

Mar. 27, 2014) (citing Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983)). For the

same reasons this Court dismisses this case for failure to state a claim, the Court finds that an

appeal would not be taken in good faith.

The Court therefore CERTIFIES, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), that

if Plaintiff appeals, it would not be taken in good faith. The Court thus DENIES leave to

proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. And so if Plaintiff appeals, he must pay the full $505

appellate filing fee or move for leave to appeal in forma pauperis with a supporting affidavit in

the Sixth Circuit. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).

NOTICE OF STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

The “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from affording in

forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated

. . . brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .”

For the § 1915(g) analysis of Plaintiff’s future filings, the Court recommends that dismissal of

this case be treated as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d

350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021).

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint WITH PREJUDICE for

failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and for seeking monetary relief from

Defendants that are immune from that relief, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii) and

1915A(b)(1)–(2). The Court further DENIES leave to amend. The Court also CERTIFIES

that any appeal here would not be taken in good faith and DENIES Plaintiff leave to proceed in

forma pauperis on appeal.

SO ORDERED, this 24th day of August, 2021.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE