Hall v. Shelby County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

JARVIS R. HALL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 2:20-cv-2710-JTF-atc

)

v. )

)

SHELBY COUNTY, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF NO. 1);

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND;

DENYING MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (ECF NOS. 5, 9 & 19);

DENYING MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY (ECF NOS. 8, 13, 16 & 21);

DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DISCLOSURE (ECF NO. 14);

DENYING MOTION ORDERING SUBPOENA (ECF NO. 20);

AND DENYING OMNIBUS MOTIONS (ECF NOS. 10 & 17)

On September 17, 2020, Jarvis R. Hall, booking number 20105816, who is incarcerated at

the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil

complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) On September 22, 2020,

the Court granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.)

Hall’s complaint alleges use of excessive force, “theft by a gov[ernment] official,” and

“countless assaults while in custody” on unspecified dates at the Jail. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)

He further contends that he was “charged with several nonrelated offenses” in retaliation for his

attempt to sue officers of the Memphis Police Department and of the Jail. (Id.) Hall sues as

Defendants: (1) Memphis Police Department (MPD): and (2) the City of Memphis. (Id. at PageID

1 & 2.) He seeks: (1) monetary damages; (2) removal of assault charges from his criminal record;

and (3) provision of psychiatric counseling services. (Id. at PageID 3.)

I. BACKGROUND

Following a dispute concerning proof of ownership for Hall’s car, the MPD’s impound lot

refused to release the vehicle to him. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Hall inexplicably contends that

he was “provoked to defend” himself over “losing $480 to a bad cop.” (Id.) He was detained at

the Jail, where he was “beaten for days by MPD and [the Jail’s] staff.” (Id.) He further states that

he was “jumped and stabbed in the head” while confined, but he does not identify the assailants.

(Id.) Although the chronology of events is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint, he suggests that

after he initiated suit against the assailants, he was charged with other crimes in retaliation. (Id.)

Hall has also filed eleven motions in this case, which are addressed below.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Screening Requirements

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint —

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be

granted, the Court applies the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

(2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts a plaintiff’s

“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “‘plausibly

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suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of

truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Although a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations

to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 n.3.

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at

383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are

not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir.

Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading

requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in

his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.

1975))).

B. Requirements To State A Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff filed his complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of

rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant

acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claims Against The Memphis Police Department

Hall names the MPD as a Defendant. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Police departments are

properly characterized as “sub-units of the municipalities they serve.” Sargent v. City of Toledo

Police Dep’t, 150 F. App’x 470, 475 (6th Cir. 2005). As such, police departments are not proper

defendants in a § 1983 action. See Mathews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); Mathes

v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:10-CV-0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at *2

(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (“[F]ederal district courts in Tennessee have frequently and uniformly

held that police departments and sheriff’s departments are not proper parties to a § 1983 suit”).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the MPD are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim to relief.

Liberally construing Hall’s complaint, the Court will consider his allegations against the

MPD as claims against the City of Memphis. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 1 & 2.) The Supreme

Court in Monell v. New York Social Service, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), outlined the standard for

municipal liability under § 1983. Pursuant to Monell, liability must be based on the existence of

some policy, procedure, or custom which results in constitutional harm to the plaintiff and may

not be predicated solely on the basis of a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.

Furthermore, a municipality is only liable under § 1983 if an “officially executed policy, or the

toleration of a custom within [it] leads to, causes, or results in the deprivation of a constitutionally

protected right.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., Tenn. By & Through Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 103

F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). Additionally, the policy must

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be connected to the municipality in such a way as to show that the injury was caused by the

execution of that policy. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003); Searcy v. City of

Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).

Here, Hall does not allege that the City of Memphis engages in any policy, practice, or

custom which results in the deprivation of his federally protected rights. Accordingly, his claims

against the City of Memphis are DISMISSED for failure to state a basis to relief.

B. Claims Alleging Excessive Force

Hall states that he was a “victim of excessive force.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He fails

to state a claim for relief because he insufficiently pleads constitutional deprivation.

Pretrial detainees’ protection against excessive force is provided by the Fourteenth

Amendment’s standard of objective reasonableness. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466,

2473 (2015). That standard “turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular

case.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The Court must judge the

reasonableness of a particular use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.

Under an objective reasonableness inquiry, “the question is whether the officers’ actions are

objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to

their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted). The proper

application of this standard requires consideration of the following factors:

the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;

the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to

limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.

Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. This list is not exhaustive but illustrates some of the “objective

circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force.” Id.

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As noted supra, Hall’s claims against the City of Memphis and the MPD fail to state a basis

for relief. And to the extent Hall seeks to hold the Jail liable, his claims are liberally construed as

claims against Shelby County government since a jail is not a “person” subject to suit

under § 1983. See Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir.

Nov. 6, 2000).

The complaint, however, does not state a valid § 1983 claim against the County. A

municipality may be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation only if there is a direct causal

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-

92; Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff “must (1)

identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show

that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d

802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Hall does not describe any

Shelby County policy or custom, let alone one that is unconstitutional or pursuant to which force

was exercised upon him. Therefore, he does not state a claim against Shelby County.

Accordingly, Hall’s excessive force claim is insufficiently alleged and is DISMISSED.

C. Claims Of False Arrest And/Or Malicious Prosecution

Hall states that he was charged with “nonrelated offenses” bearing no connection to his

provocation incident with the MPD’s impound lot. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Since Plaintiff

provides no details, the Court will liberally consider his allegation as both a claim for malicious

prosecution and a claim for false arrest.

A claim for malicious prosecution can be brought under either federal or state

law. See Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 2005). A claim

for malicious prosecution requires the party to show “that a criminal prosecution was initiated

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against the plaintiff and that the defendant ‘ma[d]e, influence[d], or participate[d] in the decision

to prosecute,’” and that the proceedings against them were brought without probable

cause. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010); Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 675 (“In

order to prove malicious prosecution under federal law, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that

there is no probable cause to justify an arrest or a prosecution”). Further, “in order to

prove malicious prosecution under federal law, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that there is

no probable cause to justify an arrest or a prosecution.” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 675.

Like a claim for malicious prosecution, a claim for false arrest can be brought under either

federal or state law. See Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677. To present a prima facie case of false arrest

under federal law, plaintiffs must show that the arresting officer lacked probable cause. Id. An

arrest made pursuant to a facially valid warrant usually acts as a complete defense to a false arrest

claim. Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1979)). Under state law, the party

must show “(1) the detention or restraint of one against his will and (2) the unlawfulness of such

detention or restraint.” Brown v. Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2013) (citing Coffee v. Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tenn. 1990)). Much like

under federal law, the party must show that the officer acted without probable cause. Id.

Here, Hall does not allege any of these elements for a prima facie case of either malicious

prosecution or false arrest. To the extent his complaint asserts such causes of action, those claims

are DISMISSED.

D. Claims Of Assault & Theft

Hall contends that he was the victim of “theft by a gov[ernment] official [and] countless

assaults while in custody.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He again provides no details.

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “[i]f there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the default

assumption is that the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related

claims.” Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir.

2012) (quoting Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir. 1998)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Section 1367 grants district courts broad discretion on whether to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. See Gamel v. City of Cincinnati,

625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010). Courts should “weigh several factors, including ‘values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. at 951–52 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because all of the complaint’s federal claims are being dismissed, the Court DECLINES

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any claims arising under state law. The complaint’s

state law claims for theft, assault, malicious prosecution, and false arrest are DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

E. Pending Motions

(1) Appointment Of Counsel: On October 9, 2020, Hall moved for appointment of

counsel because he “lacks resources to provide substantial discovery.” (ECF No. 5 at PageID 13.)

On October 29, 2020, he filed another motion seeking similar relief because he “lack[s] a paralegal

at the [Jail] [and] sufficient resources for legal research.” (ECF No. 9 at PageID 37.) Hall’s

January 15, 2021 “request for an alter in conduct of actions [sic]” finds it “preposterous [for] a

mere inmate in the State’s custody to represent oneself.” (ECF No. 19). Though that motion is

largely incoherent, the Court liberally construes it as another request for appointment of counsel.

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Given that the Court is dismissing Hall’s complaint for failure to state a claim to relief, his

motions for appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 5, 9 & 19) are DENIED as moot, subject to his

right to re-submit them in the event this case proceeds.

(2) Discovery: Hall has submitted four applications for discovery directly to this Court.

On October 29, 2020, he “move[d] this Court” for “any and all documents and electronic

documents” as to his “underlying arrest, incidents, and files associated with arrest #19030962.”

(ECF No. 8 and PageID 21.) On December 1, 2020, he “move[d] this Honorable Court to release

… any and all forms of illicit behaviorisms, complaints, disciplinary infractions, incident reports,

or any other form of grievance … done by the [MPD].” (ECF No. 13 at PageID 121.) On

December 21, 2020, he filed a “motion to disclosure [sic] and produce documents or electronically

stored information and submit” the “above-referenced forms of evidence,” which he neither

identifies nor otherwise describes. (ECF No. 16 at PageID 139.) On January 15, 2021, Hall filed

a “motion to examine police officers’ personnel files” as to “all officers related to the arrest.” (ECF

No. 21 at PageID 164.) None of his applications warrant relief. Plaintiff must pursue his discovery

requests from Defendants, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -- and not via

a Court order. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Pro se litigants may use any of the discovery methods

prescribed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There is nothing in the record suggesting that

Plaintiff has ever served any discovery requests upon Defendants. There is, therefore, no discovery

response that can be compelled from Defendants at this time. Furthermore, this Court has no

authority to finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses even though the party has been granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Maher v. Tennessee, No. ,

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2019 WL 1339602, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2019) (internal citations omitted). Hall’s motions

for discovery (ECF Nos. 8, 13, 16 & 211) are DENIED.

(3) Subpoena: On January 15, 2021, Hall filed a motion “ordering the subpoena of the

names of the officers in which were present [sic] in intake during arrest also accepting trust funds

[sic].” (ECF No. 20 at PageID 161.)

Given that Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (see ECF No.

4), he may have subpoenas issued by the Clerk of the Court and served by the Marshal Service.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). While § 1915(d) requires the USMS to serve an indigent party’s

subpoena duces tecum, a district court in its discretion may screen an indigent’s subpoena requests

and, when appropriate, relieve the USMS of its statutory duty to make service. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 45(B) (“the court . . . may quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive”).

Here, the Court finds it appropriate to relieve the USMS of its duty to serve Hall’s putative

subpoena requests. While entitled to USMS subpoena service under § 1915(d) as a pro se litigant,

Hall must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 45. See Pratcher

v. McCollum, No. , 2017 WL 2455179, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 6, 2017) (internal citations

omitted). He has not done so.

Rule 45 provides that a subpoena “may command the person to whom it is directed to

produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

45(B) (emphasis added). It is not clear on the face of Hall’s putative subpoena to whom it is

directed. Moreover, Plaintiff’s request for “the names of officers in the Intake Area on December

1 The Court makes no determination at this juncture on the discoverability of the material

sought in Hall’s requests, such as his motion to examine MPD officers’ personnel files. See, e.g.,

Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1065 (6th Cir. 1998) (police officers’ privacy

interests implicate an important liberty interest).

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19, 2019 … [to] allow investigation of the[ir] work ethics and behaviorisms,” ECF No. 20 at

PageID 161, strikes the Court as overbroad and ambiguous. Hall also does not explain the

relevance of the requested documents to any degree. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

motion ordering a subpoena. (ECF No. 20.)

(4) Omnibus motions: On November 24, 2020, Hall filed an omnibus motion that:

seeks disclosure of various discovery (ECF No. 10 at PageID 41); repeats his request for

appointment of counsel (id. at PageID 42); moves to subpoena and to preserve unspecified

evidence (id. at PageID 43-44); seeks to reserve his “right to file additional motions while this case

is pending” (id. at PageID 42); and requests extension of his time to serve Defendants. (Id. at

PageID 45.) To the extent this omnibus motion repeats various requests for relief that he

previously filed, see supra, it is denied for the reasons explained above. To the extent this motion

seeks to modify his obligations as a litigant under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he has not

shown good cause for such relief. Moreover, those requests are moot since the complaint is being

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

On December 21, 2020, Hall filed another omnibus motion that: seeks “extension to object”

ECF No. 17 at PageID 140 & 141); moves to compel unspecified discovery responses (id.); seeks

to “subpoena witness’ prior statement” (id.); seeks extension “to respond to an order or motion”

(id.); and seeks exclusion of “relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, waste of time or other

reasons.” (Id.) To the extent this omnibus motion repeats various requests for relief that he

previously filed, see supra, it is denied for the reasons explained above. To the extent this omnibus

motion seeks to alter his duties under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he has not shown good

cause for such relief. Moreover, those requests are moot since the complaint is being dismissed

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for failure to state a claim. Finally, this motion does not plausibly set forth a basis to relief. It

generally appears to be a recitation of extracts from various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s omnibus motions. (ECF Nos. 10 & 17.)

(5) Motion For Nondisclosure: On December 21, 2020, Hall moved “for protection

against disclosure.” (ECF No. 14.) His motion does not coherently describe the relief it seeks.

That is, he asks for both “protect[ion] against the disclosure of mental impressions … of a party’s

attorney” as well as a “protective order against the disclosure or discovery … of any evidence

subject to Rule 26.” (Id. at PageID 134.) His motion (ECF No. 14) is DENIED because: (1) the

motion is moot since his complaint is being dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (2) there are

presently no (a) discovery responses or (b) work product of counsel in the record to form the basis

for relief on Hall’s motion.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th

Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily,

before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to

cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where

a deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to

the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint

would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284

(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless

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complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe

the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend.

V. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons explained above:

(1) The complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety for failure to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1);

(2) Leave to amend is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within twenty-one (21)

days after the date of this order. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the

original complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The

amended complaint must be signed, and the text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient

facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be

identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint.

All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original

complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each

Defendant sued in that count. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time

specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment; and

(3) Hall’s motions for appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 5, 9 & 19), his motions for

discovery (ECF Nos. 8, 13, 16 & 21), his motion for protection against disclosure (ECF No. 14),

his motion for disclosure and production (ECF No. 16), his motion ordering a subpoena (ECF No.

20), and his omnibus motions (ECF Nos. 10 & 17) are DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 14th day of April 2021.

s/John T. Fowlkes, Jr.

JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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