The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHLYNN JONATHAN WHITE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 21-1015-JDT-cgc
)
JACKSON-MADISON COUNTY )
GENERAL HOSPITAL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER DISMISSING CASE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff Joshlynn Jonathan White, a prisoner acting pro se,
filed a civil complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 3.) The
Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the $350 civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). White sues the
Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District (Hospital).
White, who is incarcerated at the Madison County Criminal Justice Complex (CJC)
in Jackson, Tennessee, alleges he was taken to the Emergency Room (ER) of the Hospital
on October 30, 2020, after being injured in a slip-and-fall incident at the CJC. (ECF No. 1
at PageID 3.) He underwent a CT scan and “other procedures dealing with a slip and fall
matter” and was returned to the ER area. (Id.) White alleges the neck brace the paramedics
had placed on him was then “snatched” from his neck and he was “raised up on the
Hospital’s bed in a very painful and uncomfortable position for over an hour which caused
me to urinate on my person immediately.” (Id.) White asserts he was left in the urine for
over four hours, until he was able to shower on his return to the CJC. (Id.)
White alleges the Hospital staff’s actions in leaving him in a painful and
uncomfortable position for over an hour amounted to cruel and unusual treatment and
negligently breached the duty of care the Hospital owed to him. (Id. at PageID 4.) White
further alleges he overheard some of the medical staff talking in the next room and someone
said, “what if there’s something really wrong? Let’s do an MRI because it’s better to be
safe than sorry.” (Id.) An MRI was done, and he was discharged back to the CJC. (Id.)
White seeks compensatory damages. (Id. at PageID 5-6.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court
accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,
however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.
App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for
failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create
a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
White has designated his hand-written complaint as an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
White’s claim for lack of adequate medical care must be analyzed under the Eighth
Amendment.1 Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner
that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. at 105. To state a cognizable claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs. It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 106.
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim based
on a lack of medical care requires that a prisoner have a serious medical need. Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004); Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125,
1 White is, presumably, a pretrial detainee whose rights actually stem from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process rather than the Eighth Amendment, which applies to
convicted prisoners. However, except in the excessive force context, constitutional claims
brought by detainees are analyzed in the same manner as those brought by convicted prisoners.
128 (6th Cir. 1994). “[A] medical need is objectively serious if it is ‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would readily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Blackmore,
390 F.3d at 897; see also Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court
will assume, for purposes of this order, that White’s injuries were a serious medical need.
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation,
a prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant acted with the requisite intent, that is, that
he had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson,
501 U.S. at 302-03. The plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate
indifference” to a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543,
550 (6th Cir. 2009); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,1222 (6th Cir. 1997). “[D]eliberate
indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 835. A defendant cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment unless
he subjectively knows of an excessive risk of harm to an inmate’s health or safety and
disregards that risk. Id. at 837.
White has not sufficiently alleged the subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment violation because he does not identify any person who was responsible for
denying him adequate medical care; the sole Defendant named is the Hospital itself. Even
if White had named a proper Defendant, however, his allegations do not state an Eighth
Amendment claim. Though he alleges Hospital personnel subjected him to cruel and
unusual treatment by leaving him in a painful position for more than an hour,2 he does not
allege he informed any of the Hospital staff the position of the bed was causing him pain.
White also does not actually allege his injuries were improperly treated or exacerbated by
the Hospital staff’s actions.3 Thus he has failed to allege that any Hospital personnel knew
of a substantial risk of serious harm to White’s health or safety and deliberately disregarded
that risk.4
For these reasons, White’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted and is subject to dismissal.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form
of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246
F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte
dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with
2 The fact that White urinated on himself and was not cleaned up undoubtedly was
uncomfortable and embarrassing, but does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. He does not contend it caused him any actual harm.
3 White does not state what the CT and MRI showed, if anything.
4 As noted, White’s allegations of negligence do not suffice to establish the subjective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court
concludes that White should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES White’s complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed
within twenty-one days after the date of this order, on or before February 15, 2021.
White is advised that an amended complaint will replace the original complaint and
must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the amended
complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the
facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate
count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If White fails to file an amended
complaint within the time specified, the Court will dismiss the case with prejudice in its
entirety, assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE