Jenkins v. Obion County Sheriff's Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

JENNIFER LOUISE JENKINS, )

Administrator Ad Litem of the )

ESTATE OF STERLING L. HIGGINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 20-cv-01056-STA-atc

)

OBION COUNTY, TENNESSEE; )

UNION CITY, TENNESSEE; )

ROBERT THOMAS ORSBORNE, Individually; )

MARY BROGLIN, Individually; )

WAYLON SPAULDING, Individually; and, )

BRENDON SANFORD, Individually, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMSS

Plaintiff Jennifer Louise Jenkins filed this action as the administrator ad litem of the Estate

of Sterling L. Higgins (“the Decedent”), alleging that Defendants Obion County, Tennessee, Union

City, Tennessee, and their employees Robert Thomas Orsborne, Mary Broglin, Waylon Spaulding,

and Brendon Sanford, in their individual capacities, violated the civil rights of the Decedent during

his arrest, pretrial detention, and subsequent death on March 24, 2019. Plaintiff has asserted, inter

alia, “all claims on [the Estate’s] behalf and all claims actionable by it on behalf of Mr. Higgins’s

two minor daughters ….” (Amd. Cmplt. at ¶ 6, ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff brings her claims pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee state law.1

1 On September 28, 2020, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for loss of consortium under §

1983, as well as all claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.,

and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. (Ord., ECF No. 59.)

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and standing. (ECF No.

61.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff, as administrator ad litem, lacks standing under Tennessee

law to prosecute the claims brought in this action and that the Decedent’s Estate does not have a

cause of action against Defendants. They also contend that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to

Tennessee’s circuit courts set out in the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”),

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–20–307, deprives this Court of jurisdiction over the state law claims or, in

the alternative, the exclusivity provision of the TGTLA provides a compelling reason for this Court

to decline supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Plaintiff has filed a response to the motion

(ECF No. 64), and Defendants have filed a reply to the response. (ECF No. 65.) For the reasons

set forth below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

Although Defendants have styled their motion as a “motion to dismiss,” they reference

Rule 12(c) which provides for motions for judgment on the pleadings. It is well-settled that a

Court uses the same standard in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion that applies to a review of a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publishing, LLC, 477

F.3d 383, 389 (6th Cir. 2007). Under either Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), the Court must “construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint’s factual

allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in

support of the claims that would entitle relief.” Id. (citations omitted). The factual allegations in

the complaint must be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and

the plaintiff must plead “sufficient factual matter” to render the legal claim plausible, that is, more

than merely possible. Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

The following facts are relevant in deciding this motion.2 On March 24, 2019, the Decedent

suffered a mental health episode and was taken to the Obion County Jail. After an altercation with

law enforcement officers, the Decedent became unresponsive and ultimately died. Jennifer Louise

Jenkins is the mother of the Decedent’s two children and has been appointed administrator ad litem

of his estate. Nicole Higgins was married to the Decedent at the time of his death, although there

is evidence that they were estranged. 3

Defendants’ motion brings three issues before the Court: (1) whether Plaintiff Jennifer

Louise Jenkins has standing to bring this lawsuit, (2) whether the Decedent’s Estate has a claim

against Defendants, and (3) whether the Court has jurisdiction over the state law claims. The Court

finds that Plaintiff does have standing to bring the lawsuit, any recovery will belong to the statutory

heirs, and the Court will accept jurisdiction over the state law claims.

The Decedent’s Estate

Plaintiff has filed this action as the administrator ad litem of the Estate of the Decedent on

behalf of their two minor children. Defendants correctly set out the relevant law that a civil-rights

claim is “a personal action cognizable only by . . . the person whose civil rights have been

violated,” although the claim “may be pursued in the name of a personal representative.” Davis v.

2 The facts are stated for the purpose of deciding this motion only.

3 Plaintiff suggests that the Court should either not consider the evidence filed by Defendants in

support of their contention that Nicole and Sterling Higgins were married at the time of his death

or should convert the motion to one for summary judgment. The Petition for Appointment as

Administrator Ad Litem that Plaintiff Jenkins filed in Gibson County Chancery Court shows that

the Decedent was married to Nicole Higgins at the time of his death. (ECF No. 66-1.) A

document from another court proceeding is a public record that this Court can consider without

converting the motion into a summary judgment motion. See Watermark Senior Living

Retirement Community, Inc. v. Morrison Management Specialist, Inc., 905 F.3d 421, 426 (6th

Cir. 2018). Moreover, it appears to be undisputed that the couple was, in fact, married at the

time of the Decedent’s death. Any evidence to the contrary may be presented at a later time.

Memphis Police Department, 2013 WL 4446240 at *5 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). Defendants argue that,

because the Decedent had a surviving spouse, the right to file a lawsuit belongs to Nicole Higgins,

and Jennifer Louise Jenkins lacks standing to bring the lawsuit.

Under Tennessee law, a cause of action that survives death passes to the “surviving spouse

and, in case there is no surviving spouse, to the person’s children or next of kin” or to “the person’s

personal representative, for the benefit of the person’s surviving spouse or next of kin.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a)). Section § 20-5-107(a) also provides that “[t]he action may be instituted

by the personal representative of the deceased or by the surviving spouse in the surviving spouse’s

own name, or, if there is no surviving spouse, by the children of the deceased or by the next of

kin.” See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-110(a) (explaining that a wrongful death suit “may be

brought” “in the name of the surviving spouse for the benefit of the surviving spouse and the

children of the deceased” or “in the name of the administrator of the deceased spouse.”); Foster v.

Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (setting out the priority for filing a lawsuit

under Tennessee’s wrongful death statute).

Plaintiff correctly points out that Defendants’ argument is not a question of standing but of

superior rights or priorities among beneficiaries. As the surviving spouse of the Decedent, Nicole

Higgins had the “prior and superior right above all others” to file this action asserting both the §

1983 claim and the state-law wrongful death claim. Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 499 (Tenn.

2017) (quoting Foster, 813 S.W.2d at 451). But she did not do so, and the fact that Nicole Higgins

had priority in filing this lawsuit does not mean that she was the only one with that right. Clearly,

Jennifer Louise Jenkins, as administrator ad litem (personal representative) had standing to file the

lawsuit pursuant to Tennessee’s statute cited above.4

Defendants contend that there is no evidence that Nicole Higgins waived her right to file

the lawsuit. To the contrary, Plaintiff has presented such evidence. First, Nicole Higgins took no

action to file a lawsuit, and the applicable statute of limitations has now run.5 If Plaintiff had not

filed this action, any right to recovery would have been barred. Additionally, Higgins could have

filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit but has not done so.

Plaintiff’s attorney, David Cooper, has filed his own declaration (ECF No. 64-1) stating

the attempts he made to contact Nicole Higgins. Higgins was notified of the proceedings to appoint

Jenkins as administrator ad litem of the Estate of the Decedent but did not appear at the hearing,

nor did she file any objections to the appointment. Attorney Cooper states that he discussed the

lawsuit with Higgins on at least two occasions. (Id. at para. 10.) According to Attorney Cooper,

Higgins did not object to the filing of the lawsuit or indicate a desire to have herself substituted as

the plaintiff. (Id.)

Defendants appear to suggest that the Court should discount the statements made by

Attorney Cooper in his declaration. (Reply pp. 3-4, ECF No. 66 (“The Court should be leery of

accepting Jenkins’s claim that Nicole Higgins waived her right to file this lawsuit.” And, “The

question arises: What did Mr. Cooper and Nicole Higgins talk about regarding the suit?”) Attorney

Cooper is an officer of the Court, and the Court accepts the statements in his declaration as being

4 Defendants have clarified their position as to the standing issue in their reply. (Reply p. 3, ECF

No. 66 (“Defendants do not dispute that a court-appointed administrator can file a wrongful-

death case. Rather, Defendants’ position is that Nicole and Sterling Higgins were married when

he died. This gives Nicole Higgins priority in filing this case.”)).

5 Higgins learned of the death of the Decedent when the Tennessee Bureau of Investigations

interviewed her on the day of the death. (Cooper Decl. Exh., ECF No. 64-2.)

truthful and made in good faith. If there is some evidence to the contrary that Defendants are privy

to of which the Court is unaware, Defendants should present that evidence. If not, they should

refrain from disparaging Attorney Cooper’s statements.

Accordingly, the Court finds that, while Nicole Higgins may have had priority in filing a

lawsuit, she did not do so, and the record shows that she has waived that right. See Epperson v.

City of Humboldt, 140 F.Supp.3d 676, 682 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (“An inferior beneficiary may not

sue until the person with the prior and superior right waives [her] right of action.” Waiver may be

effected “by permitting the plaintiffs’ suit to stand without objection[.]” (citations omitted)). Thus,

Defendants’ argument that Jennifer Louise Jenkins as administrator ad litem lacks standing to file

this action is not persuasive.

Next, Defendants argue that Jenkins cannot recover on behalf of the Estate and, instead,

any recovery would benefit the statutory heirs, including Higgins. See id. (“The statutory

beneficiary is the real party in interest, and neither the claim nor the recovery becomes a part of

the estate of the deceased.”) Plaintiff agrees that this action is being prosecuted for the benefit of

the eligible statutory beneficiaries and that no part of the recovery will pass through the Estate.

(Resp. at p. 8 n. 1, ECF No. 64, relying on Beard, 528 S.W.3d at 498 (“The personal representative

may institute the wrongful death action, but [she] does so for the benefit of [the statutory

beneficiaries], not the decedent’s estate.”)).6

Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Plaintiff has brought claims against Defendants Orsborne, Spaulding, Brogglin, and

Sanford under the Tennessee Wrongful Death and Survival laws, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-5-106,

6 Whether Higgins is entitled to any potential proceeds from the claim is an issue to be decided

at a later date.

107, for allegedly intentionally, recklessly, or otherwise unlawfully causing the death and pre-

death pain and suffering of the Decedent. It is undisputed that this Court has original jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s federal claims under the general federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28

U.S.C. § 1331. However, as noted by Defendants, because the individual Defendants are

governmental employees, any claims for damages against them under state law “must pass through

the provisions” of the TGTLA. See Albea v. Bunn, 281 F. Supp. 3d 670, 688 (W.D. Tenn. 2017)

(finding that “all suits for damages against governmental entities and their employees under state

law must pass through the provisions of the” TGTLA).

Defendants correctly point out that Courts in the Western District of Tennessee, including

this Court, have often declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against

law enforcement officer defendants based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–20–307 (“The circuit courts

shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any action brought” under the TGTLA); see, e.g., Tillman v.

Decatur County, 2015 WL 5675843 at *5 (W.D. Tenn. 2015); Dotson v. Correctional Medical

Services, 584 F. Supp.2d 1063, 1069 (W.D. Tenn. 2008), aff’d sub nom, Dotson v. Smith, 385 F.

App’x 468 (6th Cir. 2010); Cunningham v. Reid, 337 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1069-1070 (W.D. Tenn.

2004), and they ask the Court to now follow that practice.

However, not all of this District’s Courts have followed suit in declining jurisdiction over

state law claims brought against a governmental entity or its employees. Peatross v. City of

Memphis, 2015 WL 13021901 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2015), aff’d, 818 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 2016),

acknowledged support for the argument that “the Sixth Circuit and district courts within Tennessee

confronted with state-law claims under the TGTLA have, on occasion, refused to exercise their

supplemental jurisdiction powers.”7 Id. at *3–5 (citing Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 220 F.3d

433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Tennessee legislature’s unequivocal preference for

TGTLA claims be handled by its own state courts qualifies as an exceptional circumstance for

declining jurisdiction); Hullett v. DeKalb Cnty., Tenn., 2012 WL 398288 at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb.

7, 2012) (finding that the Sixth Circuit, as well as the Middle District of Tennessee, have repeatedly

held that the “unequivocal preference” that TGTLA claims be adjudicated in the state’s circuit

courts presented an exceptional circumstance justifying the district court’s decision to decline

supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to § 1367(c)(4)); Moore v. City of Memphis, No. 2:14-cv-

02089 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) (finding that the comity factor strongly weighed in favor of declining

jurisdiction, and that remanding the case at an early stage of the proceedings would not thwart

judicial economy or result in any unfairness or inconvenience to the defendants)).

Peatross then explained that some courts

have questioned the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Gregory that undergirded many of

the subsequent decisions. For example, in Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F. Supp.

2d 868 (W.D. Tenn. 2006), the court found that “[i]t is far from apparent that the

Tennessee legislature intended any such preemptive effective on the federal courts”

with the language employed in the TGTLA. Id., 440 F. Supp. 2d at 878 n. 5.

Furthermore, the court declared that “[w]hatever the intent of the Tennessee

legislature may have been in enacting the Governmental Tort Liability Act, the

authority of the federal courts to appropriately exercise jurisdiction over

supplemental state law matters remains undiminished.” Id. at 878. In Dillingham v.

Millsaps, 809 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Tenn. 2011), the Eastern District of Tennessee

court noted the split among the district courts in their decisions to exercise

jurisdiction over TGTLA claims, but ultimately embraced the Brown court’s

analysis and exercised supplemental jurisdiction. In Birgs v. City of Memphis, 686

F. Supp. 2d 776 (W.D. Tenn. 2010), the court relied in part on the decision in Brown

in deciding to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the TGTLA claim. The

court found that “where invoking the exceptional circumstance objection would

7 Congress granted the federal courts the authority to hear “all ... claims that are so related to

claims in [an] action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, a

district court’s exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)

(noting that district courts “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”)

‘necessitate duplicative litigation which would be wasteful of judicial and litigant

resources,’ federal courts have declined to dismiss TGTLA claims.” Birgs, 686 F.

Supp. 2d at 778-79 (citing Brown, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 878).

Peatross, 2015 WL 13021901 at *3–5. 8

In refusing to decline jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Peatross Court looked at

the fact that both state and federal law claims were “based on the alleged actions of the police

officers and the failure of the City of Memphis to properly train them, which ultimately resulted

in the shooting death” of the decedent. “Thus, the state law claims form part of the same case or

controversy and are ‘derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact’ as the federal claims,

making them so closely related that it justifies this Court exercising its supplemental jurisdiction

over the state law claims.” Id. at *4 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

725 (1966)). Accord Williams v. Town of Smyrna, Tennessee, 2017 WL 1364715 at *8 (M.D.

Tenn. Apr. 14, 2017), aff’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Godby, 732 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2018)

(“[T]he facts underlying Williams’ constitutional claim against Officer Godby in this situation are

the same facts underlying her false imprisonment claim against Officer Godby. The Court finds

that it is most efficient for Williams’ false imprisonment claim against Officer Godby to remain in

federal court; it would make little sense for the parties to litigate the same facts, with the same

witnesses, and overlapping discovery in two separate courts.”)

8 The Court in Warren v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 2015 WL 3417844 (M.D. Tenn. May 27,

2015), also discounted the rationale of courts’ relying on Gregory v. Shelby Cty., Tenn., 220 F.3d

433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000).

[N]either Gregory nor the Tennessee legislature’s preference that TGTLA claims

be handled in state courts requires dismissal of supplemental TGTLA claims. Id.

at 446. To the contrary, the grant of original jurisdiction over TGTLA claims to

state circuit courts does not defeat federal jurisdiction. Dillingham v. Millsaps,

809 F.Supp.2d 820, 850–51 (E.D. Tenn. 2011).

Likewise, in this case, the facts underlying the federal claims and the state law claims are

not only the same but are inextricably intertwined and declining to accept jurisdiction over the

state law claims would not be the best use of judicial or litigant resources. See Lopez v.

Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, 646 F.Supp.2d 891, 921 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)

(observing that, when declining supplemental jurisdiction would necessitate duplicative litigation

which would be wasteful of judicial and litigant resources, federal courts have declined to dismiss

TGTLA claims). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claims is denied, and

Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ S. Thomas Anderson

S. THOMAS ANDERSON

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: January 14, 2021.