Henderson v. City of Memphis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

MARC JOSEPH HENDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

)

v. ) No. 2:19-cv-2776-SHM-tmp

)

CITY OF MEMPHIS; COLONEL ) Jury Demanded

DARRELL SHEFFIELD (in his )

individual capacity), )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING

IN PART CITY OF MEMPHIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DENYING

COLONEL DARRELL SHEFFIELD’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Marc Joseph Henderson (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief for

violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.E. No. 43.) Before the Court are three

motions. The first is Plaintiff’s second motion to amend (the

“Motion to Amend”). (D.E. No. 62.) The second is Defendant City

of Memphis’s (the “City”) motion to dismiss. (D.E. No. 45.) The

third is Defendant Colonel Darrell Sheffield’s (“Sheffield”)

motion to dismiss. (D.E. No. 48.) The motions are ripe for

consideration. (See D.E. Nos. 55, 56, 57, 60, 63.) For the

following reasons, the Motion to Amend is DENIED, the City’s

motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, and

Sheffield’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

I. Background

On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against

Defendants the City, Sheffield, Lieutenant Cecil Davis, and

Lieutenant Glenn Barber seeking relief under § 1983 for

violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (D.E.

No. 1.) The Amended Complaint was filed on March 25, 2020. (D.E.

No. 43.) The Amended Complaint asserts a failure to train or

supervise claim against the City. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 19, 24, 33.) The

Amended Complaint asserts a claim for unconstitutional detention

of Plaintiff for a mental health assessment against Sheffield.

(Id. ¶¶ 9, 14, 16-18, 23-24, 26-28, 32-33.) The Amended Complaint

makes other factual allegations that do not clearly state claims

against either Defendant. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 12-13, 25.) On

August 7, 2020, the Court entered an Order granting a stipulation

of dismissal dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

Davis and Barber. (D.E. No. 71.) For purposes of the motions to

dismiss, the facts are taken from the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff has been employed by the City as a police officer

since 2011. (Id. ¶ 7.) At all relevant times, Sheffield was

Plaintiff’s commanding officer at the Appling Farms Precinct.

(Id. ¶ 3.)

Between May and November 2018, Plaintiff was experiencing

marital problems. (Id. ¶ 9.) Sheffield became interested in

Plaintiff’s marriage and ordered Plaintiff to do what his wife

wanted in their divorce. (Id.) Sheffield had officers check on

Plaintiff on several occasions because Sheffield had “baseless”

concerns that Plaintiff was depressed or suicidal. (Id.)

On November 13, 2018, Sheffield relieved Plaintiff from

duty “for his own good.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff was coerced into

going to Lakeside Hospital, also “for his own good.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

After three hours without attention at Lakeside Hospital,

Plaintiff requested a patrol car to take him back to the

precinct. (Id. ¶ 15.) Once the patrol car with Plaintiff had

arrived at the precinct, Plaintiff was not allowed out of the

vehicle. (Id. ¶ 16.)

At about 6:00 PM, Plaintiff was instructed to get out of

the car, turn around, and put his hands behind his back. (Id. ¶

17.) Plaintiff was handcuffed. (Id.) After Plaintiff asked to

speak with Sheffield, Sheffield informed Plaintiff that

Sheffield had decided to have Plaintiff committed. (Id. ¶ 18.)

At about 7:30 PM, Plaintiff was transported to Memphis

Mental Health Institute (“MMHI”). (Id. ¶ 28.) After an

assessment, Plaintiff was released some time after midnight on

November 14, 2018, because the doctors at MMHI had found no

reason for an involuntary committal. (Id. ¶ 29.)

The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheffield has a history

of similar conduct and that the City knew or should have known

about that conduct. (Id. ¶ 24.)

On April 7, 2020, the City filed its motion to dismiss

arguing that the Amended Complaint did not contain sufficient

factual allegations to state a § 1983 claim against the City.

(D.E. No. 45.)

On April 8, 2020, Sheffield filed his motion to dismiss

arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (D.E. No.

48.)

On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend

seeking to sue Sheffield in his official capacity as well as his

individual capacity. (D.E. No. 62.)

II. Jurisdiction

The Court has federal question jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff’s §

1983 claims arise under the laws of the United States.

III. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint that

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion permits the

“defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is

entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the

complaint is true.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.

1993) (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson Cty., 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th

Cir. 1987)). A motion to dismiss tests only whether the plaintiff

has pled a cognizable claim and allows the court to dismiss

meritless cases that would waste judicial resources and result

in unnecessary discovery. See Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F.

Supp. 2d 868, 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege

facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cooper Butt ex rel.

Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). A claim is plausible

on its face if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court

considers the plaintiff’s complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Ryan v. Blackwell, 979 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir.

2020) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512

(6th Cir. 2001)). The court accepts as true all factual

allegations but does not accept legal conclusions or unwarranted

factual inferences as true. Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 240,

243 (6th Cir. 2018). “The plaintiff must present a facially

plausible complaint asserting more than bare legal conclusions.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-

678).

IV. Analysis

A. The Motion to Amend

On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend. (D.E.

No. 62.) The proposed second amendment would name Sheffield in

his official capacity as well as his individual capacity. (Id.

at 274.)

Motions to amend are to be granted “freely” “when justice

so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). There is an exception to

this liberal standard when the amendment would be futile.

Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728, 737-38 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A

proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).

The proposed amendment to name Sheffield in his official

capacity would be redundant and therefore futile. The City is

already a Defendant. Suit against an individual defendant in

that defendant’s official capacity is identical to suit against

the governmental entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

166 (1985) (“[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects

other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”).

Where the governmental entity is already a defendant, suit

against a government officer in that officer’s official capacity

is redundant. Courts routinely dismiss claims against government

officers in their official capacity in those circumstances. See

Doe v. Claiborne Cty., Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996)

(affirming district court’s dismissal of official-capacity

suits); Brooks v. Skinner, 139 F. Supp. 3d 869, 890 (S.D. Ohio

2015) (“[W]hen a § 1983 complaint asserts a claim against a

government entity and a government official in her official

capacity, federal courts will dismiss the official-capacity

claim.”).

Amendment would be futile. The Motion to Amend is DENIED.

B. The City’s Motion to Dismiss

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional

violations caused by the municipality’s “policy or custom,” where

that “official policy” is the “moving force” behind the

constitutional injury. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To set forth a cognizable §

1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that

(1) agents of the municipality, while acting under color of state

law, (2) violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and (3)

that a municipal policy or policy of inaction was the moving

force behind the violation.” Memphis, Tenn. Area Local, Am.

Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898,

902 (6th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff alleges that the City failed to train or supervise

Sheffield to avoid violating his subordinates’ constitutional

rights. A failure to train or supervise employees adequately can

be an offending policy or custom if the failure to train or

supervise amounts to “‘deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’”

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). “To succeed

on a failure to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must

prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was

inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the

result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3)

the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the

injury.” Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. School

Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006)). “Only where a failure

to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a

municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our prior cases—can a city

be liable for such a failure under § 1983.” Canton, 489 U.S. at

389; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-

84 (1986) (“We hold that municipal liability under § 1983

attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a

course of action is made from among various alternatives by the

official or officials responsible for establishing final

policy”). “[W]hen city policymakers are on actual or constructive

notice that a particular omission in their training program

causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional

rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the

policymakers choose to retain that program.” Connick, 563 U.S.

at 61 (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)).

The City contends that the Amended Complaint does not allege

sufficient facts to support a conclusion that the training

Sheffield received was inadequate. (D.E. No. 45-1 at 185.) The

factual allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to support

Plaintiff’s allegation that “[t]he City had inadequate policies

and inadequate training . . . particularly of persons in high

rank of command.” (D.E. No. 43 ¶ 33.) The Amended Complaint

alleges that the City of Memphis and/or the Memphis Police

Department trained Sheffield in “how and when to make an arrest,

why and when arrests are not appropriate, how to supervise his

subordinates, including how and when (if ever) to intervene in

a subordinate’s personal life.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The Amended Complaint

does not list deficiencies in Sheffield’s training. (See D.E.

No. 45-1 at 184-85.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheffield

“felt empowered” to or had previously: interfered in the

marriages of subordinates, ordered officers to enter

subordinates’ homes, relieved officers from duty without cause,

determined that subordinates needed to receive mental health

treatment, and seized and held subordinates without probable

cause for an indefinite period. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) Those allegations

state that Sheffield may have acted outside the confines of his

training, but the allegations fail to state that the training he

allegedly received was inadequate. See Birgs v. City of Memphis,

686 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780-81 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555) (dismissing failure to train claim because,

where the complaint stated that “Defendant . . . failed to

properly train and instruct the individual Defendants in the

proper use of force,” “the allegations [were] nothing more than

‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’”).

The City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to train claim

is GRANTED.

The Amended Complaint states sufficient allegations to

support Plaintiff’s “inadequate . . . supervision” claim. (Id.

¶ 33.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheffield had a history

of conduct like the allegedly unconstitutional mental health

detention of Plaintiff and the surrounding conduct, and that the

City knew or should have known about Sheffield’s pattern of

conduct. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Amended Complaint alleges that the City

knew about Sheffield’s actions on November 13-14, 2018, did

nothing to stop Sheffield at that time, and has taken no action

to “investigate and/or correct” Sheffield for the alleged

incidents on those dates. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 33); see Taylor v. Michigan

Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant’s]

own deposition showed that he was aware of and at least

acquiesced in the conduct of his subordinates”); cf. Hershberger

v. Town of Collierville, No. 14-2153, 2014 WL 6815189, at *9

(W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2014) (dismissing failure to supervise claim

where supervisor was not involved in unconstitutional conduct

and there were no facts alleged that demonstrated supervisor

“knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional acts”).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support a claim that

the City failed to supervise Sheffield.

The City argues that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lacks

sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the deliberate

indifference element of his failure to supervise claim. The Sixth

Circuit recognizes two ways to establish deliberate

indifference. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 700. “‘One

is failure to provide adequate training in light of foreseeable

consequences that could result from a lack of instruction.’” Id.

at 700-01. (quoting Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir.

1999)) (“In City of Canton, for example, the Supreme Court

indicated that a city could be deliberately indifferent by

failing to train its police officers in the use of deadly force

because it is obvious that the officers will need to use such

force when they are armed with guns and required to arrest

fleeing felons.”) “‘A second type of . . . deliberate

indifference is where the city fails to act in response to

repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its

officers.’” Id. at 701 (quoting Brown, 172 F.3d at 931).

Plaintiff argues that, because “[i]t is particularly

abhorrent for the City to allow a commanding officer to intrude

on the marital issues of those officers under his command,” the

City must have displayed deliberate indifference. (Id.) That

conclusion, even if accepted, does not establish either of the

ways to make out deliberate indifference. It does not demonstrate

that a commanding officer’s interfering in a subordinate’s

marriage is a “foreseeable consequence” that must be addressed

by supervision. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 700. It

does not demonstrate that the City ignored complaints of

commanding officers’ interfering in subordinates’ marriages. See

id. at 701.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, however, does contain

sufficient factual allegations to state the deliberate

indifference element of his claim that the City failed to

supervise Sheffield. Plaintiff alleges that the City was

deliberately indifferent because “it is clear that [Sheffield]

had conducted himself similarly on other occasions.” (D.E. No.

55-1 at 238.) Plaintiff alleges that the City knew or should

have known that Sheffield had conducted himself similarly on

other occasions. (D.E. No. 43 ¶ 24.) That allegation is analogous

to a municipality’s ignoring complaints of unconstitutional

behavior because it states that the City was or should have been

on notice of the unconstitutional conduct. See Ellis ex rel.

Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 701.

In the Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges facts that

support his claim. Plaintiff alleges that “Sheffield had a

history of similar conduct” to the conduct surrounding his

allegedly illegal arrest of Plaintiff. (D.E. No. 43 ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff alleges that the “City knew or should have known of

Sheffield’s actions to deprive his subordinates, including

Henderson, of their federal rights under the Fourth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution.” (Id.) Those allegations do not merely

state legal conclusions. They state that Sheffield engaged in a

pattern of behavior that violated his subordinates’

constitutional rights and that the City knew or should have known

about that behavior. Although the allegations lack additional

detail, detailed factual allegations are not required to

withstand a motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A]

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations”).

The Amended Complaint adequately states a failure to

supervise claim against the City. The City’s motion to dismiss

that claim is DENIED. To the extent the Amended Complaint

attempts to state any other claims against the City based on a

Monell theory of liability, the City’s argument that those claims

are based on “broad assertions” is well-taken. (see D.E. No. 45-

1 at 186.) The City’s motion to dismiss any claims other than

the failure to supervise claim, including the inadequately pled

failure to train claim, is GRANTED. Those claims are DISMISSED.

C. Sheffield’s Motion to Dismiss

Sheffield argues that the claim for an unconstitutional

mental health detention of Plaintiff should be dismissed because

Sheffield is entitled to qualified immunity. (D.E. No. 48-1 at

213.) “[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under §

1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct

was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Dist. of Columbia v.

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards,

566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). The right in question must be

specifically defined, particularly in the Fourth Amendment

context. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). Although

the Supreme Court’s “‘caselaw does not require a case directly

on point for a right to be clearly established, existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S.

Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam)).

Plaintiff alleges facts in the Amended Complaint

establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

Plaintiff alleges that he was handcuffed and placed in the back

of a patrol car without probable cause or a warrant and taken

for a mental health evaluation. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 22, 24, 26, 28.) The

Fourth Amendment provides protections against such mental health

seizures or arrests without probable cause that “the person

seized poses a danger to himself or others.” See Fisher v.

Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 842-43 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Monday v.

Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Sheffield does not contest that an arrest was made, but

argues that such a warrantless arrest was permitted under

Tennessee law. (D.E. No. 48-1 at 214.) Sheffield cites Tenn.

Code Ann. § 33-6-401, which permits a mental health seizure or

arrest if the “person has a mental illness or serious emotional

disturbance” and “the person poses an immediate substantial

likelihood of serious harm under § 33-6-501 because of the mental

illness or serious emotional disturbance . . . .” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 33-6-401. Section 33-6-501 provides:

IF AND ONLY IF

(1)(A) a person has threatened or attempted suicide or

to inflict serious bodily harm on the person, OR

(B) the person has threatened or attempted homicide or

other violent behavior, OR

(C) the person has placed others in reasonable fear of

violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, OR

(D) the person is unable to avoid severe impairment or

injury from specific risks, AND

(2) there is a substantial likelihood that the harm

will occur unless the person is placed under

involuntary treatment,

THEN

(3) the person poses a “substantial likelihood of

serious harm” for purposes of this title.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-501.

Tennessee’s statutory scheme governing warrantless mental

health detentions “appears to be at least as stringent as federal

law.” Reeners v. Troup, No. 3:15-cv-00625, 2020 WL 409746, at

*16 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2020). In Reeners, the court concluded

that, even given Tennessee’s statutory scheme, the officers

involved in a mental health seizure or arrest required probable

cause that the persons seized posed a danger to themselves or

others. Id. at *20-*21.

The Amended Complaint adequately alleges that Sheffield

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Reliance on

Tennessee’s warrantless detention statute requires probable

cause that Plaintiff was a danger to himself or others. Sheffield

argues that the Amended Complaint establishes that Plaintiff was

having marital problems that were leading to a divorce. (D.E.

No. 48-1 at 214.) That fact does not establish that Plaintiff

posed a danger to himself or others or that Plaintiff was

mentally ill or having a serious mental disturbance. Cf. Reeners,

2020 WL 409746, at *17-*21 (detailing the facts of case where

even combination of delusions by the person in question and his

harassment of the police did not create probable cause). The

allegations in the Amended Complaint demonstrate that Sheffield

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

The right to be free from a mental health seizure or arrest

absent probable cause to believe the person is a danger to

himself or others was clearly established at the time of

Plaintiff’s arrest. Monday, 118 F.3d at 1102 (“The Fourth

Amendment requires an official seizing and detaining a person

for a psychiatric evaluation to have probable cause to believe

that the person is dangerous to himself or others.”); Fisher,

398 F.3d at 843-49 (applying the Monday standard to facts of

case and holding that “[i]t is clearly established that an

officer may not [e]ffect a mental health seizure without probable

cause”); Reeners, 2020 WL 409746, at *21 (“[T]he plaintiff had

a clearly established right not to be subjected to a mental

health detention in the absence of probable cause to believe he

posed a substantial risk of imminent harm to himself or others”);

Goodwin v. Hamilton Cty., Tenn., No. 1:05-cv-71, 2008 WL

11452106, at *13 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2008) (“[T]he right to be

free from seizure in the context of a mental health seizure on

less than probable cause was clearly established at the time of

this incident as reflected in the 1997 case of Monday v.

[O]ullette, 118 F.3d at 1102.”). The caselaw in this circuit

requiring probable cause prior to a mental health detention dates

from 1997. Plaintiff’s right to be free from seizure was clearly

established at the time of the events alleged in the Amended

Complaint.

Sheffield is not entitled to qualified immunity on the §

1983 claim against him. His motion to dismiss is DENIED.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Amend is DENIED.

The City’s motion to dismiss is DENIED to the extent that it

seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s failure to supervise claim and

GRANTED as to all other § 1983 claims against the City.

Sheffield’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this _23d__ day of March, 2021.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE