“In rare circumstances . . . a district court may use its inherent power to dismiss with prejudice (as a sanction for misconduct) even a case over which it lacks jurisdiction.” (quoting Mitan v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 23 F. App’x 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2001))
How later courts described this case
- “In rare circumstances . . . a district court may use its inherent power to dismiss with prejudice (as a sanction for misconduct) even a case over which it lacks jurisdiction.” (quoting Mitan v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 23 F. App’x 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2001))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
WALLACE JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:20-cv-02331-JTF-tmp
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS, AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
Before the Court are Defendants Keith A. Stutes, District Attorney, 15th Judicial District
for Lafayette Parish, Louisiana and Michelle Breaux’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on June 25, 2020
(ECF No. 27); Defendant Maria West’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on August 26, 2020 (ECF No.
94); and Defendants State of Louisiana, Louisiana Department of Justice, Louisiana Attorney
General Jeff Landry, former Louisiana Attorney General James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, former
Assistant Attorney General Michael Landry, retired Judge Herman Clause, and the Louisiana
Department of Children & Family Services’ Motion to Dismiss, filed on December 30, 2020 (ECF
No. 135). Plaintiff Wallace Jones filed Responses to the Motions to Dismiss on July 9, 2020,
September 14, 2020, and January 19, 2021, respectively. (ECF Nos. 28 & 120 & 161.) Defendants
Stutes and Breaux filed a Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss on July 23, 2020. (ECF No.
50.) On January 26, 2021, the Chief Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation to
grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with prejudice.
(ECF No. 162.) Plaintiff did not file any objections. For the reasons provided below, the Court
ADOPTS the Chief Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the Report and Recommendation, the Chief Magistrate Judge sets forth proposed
findings of fact. The Court adopts and incorporates the Chief Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings of fact.
LEGAL STANDARD
Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) “to relieve some of the burden on the federal courts
by permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrates.” United States v.
Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the provision, magistrate judges may hear
and determine any pretrial matter pending before the Court, except various dispositive motions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Upon hearing a pending matter, “the magistrate judge must enter a
recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(1); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). Any party who
disagrees with a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendation may file written objections
to the report and recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
The district court reviews a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendation.
The standard of review that is applied depends on the nature of the matter considered by the
magistrate judge. See Baker, 67 F. App’x at 310 (citations omitted) (“A district court normally
applies a ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law’ standard of review for nondispositive preliminary
measures. A district court must review dispositive motions under the de novo standard.”). Upon
review of the evidence, the district court may accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings or
recommendations of the magistrate judge. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (W.D.
Tenn. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court “may also receive further evidence or
recommit the matter to the [m]agistrate [j]udge with instructions.” Moses v. Gardner, No. 2:14-
cv-2706-SHL-dkv, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29701, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2015). “Within 14
days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file
specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). “When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear
error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)
advisory committee notes. A district judge should adopt the findings and rulings of the magistrate
judge to which no specific objection is filed. Brown, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 674. This is consistent
with 28 U.S.C. § 636’s purposes of preserving judicial economy and avoiding “duplication of time
and effort” caused when “both the magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks.”
Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
ANALYSIS
In the Report and Recommendation, the Chief Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, on multiple grounds. The Chief Magistrate Judge concluded (1)
the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants; and (2) the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, preclusion from
reviewing orders from other district courts, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Apple v. Glenn,
183 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1999). (ECF No. 162, 7, 15, 18–20, 23.) This Court agrees.
I. Personal Jurisdiction
The Report and Recommendation found that Plaintiff had not met his burden to establish
personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this matter. (ECF No. 162, 7.) This Court lacks the
general form of personal jurisdiction over all Defendants in this matter because each Defendant is
either an individual Louisiana resident or a subdivision of the Louisiana state government. (ECF
No. 162, 10–11) (citing Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 502 (6th Cir.
2020)). The Report and Recommendation also found that, because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
fails to establish that Defendants have any contact with Tennessee or that Plaintiff’s suit arises
from any such contact, specific personal jurisdiction is absent.1 (Id. at 11–12) (citing Calphalon
Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2020)). Because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
establishes no activity undertaken by Defendants in Tennessee, and thus no purposeful availment
of or presence within Tennessee, the Court agrees with the Chief Magistrate Judge that personal
jurisdiction over Defendants is lacking in this case and that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.2
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Chief Magistrate Judge found that in addition to personal jurisdiction being absent,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 162, 12.) The Report
and Recommendation explained that, while not all Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may raise the issue sua sponte. (Id. at 14) (citing United
States v. McDougal, 368 F. App’x 648, 653 (6th Cir. 2010)). The Chief Magistrate Judge found
several bars to subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims and recommends dismissal. (Id.
at 15–24.)
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
1 The Report and Recommendation notes that the Western District of Tennessee is an improper venue for Plaintiff’s
claims. (ECF No. 162, 12 n.7.)
2 The Report and Recommendation notes that all Defendants remaining in this litigation have moved to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims, with the exception of Cheryl Bethea and “Unknown District Court Clerk Louisiana Western
Division.” (ECF No. 162, 6 n.5.) Ultimately, regardless of any personal jurisdiction issues involving these
Defendants, dismissal of the entirety of this case is also appropriate due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Report and Recommendation finds that pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
which holds that federal district courts may not review state court proceedings, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 162, 15) (citing Gottfried v. Med.
Planning Servs., Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998)). The Chief Magistrate Judge found, and
this Court agrees, that instead of asserting an independent claim, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
asserts that the injury Plaintiff suffered was the state court judgment itself. (Id. at 16) (citing
Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2008)). This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that Plaintiff requests the Court set aside the Louisiana state court judgment as part of the relief.
(Id.) (citing VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020)). Thus,
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims.
B. Jurisdiction to Review Federal Court Orders
The Chief Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint seeks this Court’s
review of judgments entered in Plaintiff’s prior cases in the Western District of Louisiana and Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 162, 19–20.) Because federal district courts generally lack
jurisdiction to engage in such review, the Report and Recommendation finds preclusion of subject
matter jurisdiction on this ground as well. (Id. at 19) (citing Laues v. Roberts, No. 2:14-CV-12313,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38726, at *12–13 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2015)). Finding no clear error on
the face of the record, this Court agrees.
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Chief Magistrate Judge found that, in addition to the above jurisdictional issues, some
Defendants in this matter are immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution—an issue that the Court may raise sua sponte. (ECF No. 162, 21) (citing Russell v.
Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015)). Specifically, the Louisiana State Court,
Louisiana Office of Attorney General, and Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services
are immune because they are part of the State of Louisiana. (Id. at 22.) (citing Holliday v. Bd. of
Supervisors of LSU Agric. & Mech. College, 2014-CC-0585, 149 So.3d 227, 229 (La. 2014)).
Additionally, Defendants Clause, Caldwell, M. Landry, J. Landry, and Bethea are immune because
Plaintiff’s suit involves actions they undertook in their official capacity. (Id.) (citing Thiokol Corp.
v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993)).
D. Apple v. Glenn Standard
Finally, the Chief Magistrate Judge found the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because Plaintiff’s claims fall within the category of claims precluded by the standard pronounced
in Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). The Report and Recommendation
concluded—and this Court agrees—that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is “wholly
unsubstantiated” and is within a category of complaints that are “totally implausible, attenuated,
unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion[.]” (ECF No. 162, 23)
(quoting Apple, 183 F.3d at 479). While normally dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is without prejudice, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is frivolous. See Meitzner v. Young, No. 16-1479, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 24486, at *6
(6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2016); see also Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 367 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In rare
circumstances . . . a district court may use its inherent power to dismiss with prejudice (as a
sanction for misconduct) even a case over which it lacks jurisdiction.” (quoting Mitan v. Int’l Fid.
Ins. Co., 23 F. App’x 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2001))). Plaintiff has engaged in a course of frivolous
litigation and duplicative filing in this Court, and Plaintiff’s previous cases in other courts appear
to differ little. The Court exercises its discretion and dismisses Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.
III. Restrictions on Plaintiff’s Filings
The Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter, and the case will be dismissed pursuant to
this Order. Thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing to address any motion Plaintiff
may file. The Clerk is directed not to file any further documents submitted in this case except for
a notice of appeal. Any documents submitted by Plaintiff other than a notice of appeal shall be
returned to him without filing. Continued abuse of the litigation process by Plaintiff may result in
sanctions.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of any party objections and having satisfied itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and GRANTS
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 27 & 94 & 135). Plaintiff’s Complaint is
DISMISSED with prejudice.3 Because Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed, any objections Plaintiff
may have to the Chief Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Fix Clerical Errors
(ECF No. 171) and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence
(ECF No. 172) are moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of March, 2021.
s/John T. Fowlkes, Jr.___
JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR.
United States District Judge
3 Due to his pro se status, the Court notifies Plaintiff of his right to appeal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which provides: “In a civil case, except as provided in Rules 4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(4), and 4(c), the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgment or
order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).