“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
How later courts described this case
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
DEANTHONY HART, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 21-1030-JDT-cgc
)
LEONARD BROWN, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff Deanthony Hart, who is incarcerated at the Henderson County Justice
Center (Jail) in Lexington, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The
Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) Hart sues
Captain Leonard Brown, Sergeant (Sgt.) Gina Pittman, Sgt. Emily Gronberg, Lieutenant
Trina Smith, and Sgt. Judy Wiggins, all of whom are employed at the Jail.
In his complaint, Hart alleges he was “sitting down at the top of the upper deck on
the [stairs]” requesting medical treatment. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Instead of providing
medical treatment, Defendants allegedly subjected Hart to excessive force when they
“rushed in & tased” him in his side, causing him to fall “face forward down the entire
flight” of stairs and suffer injury. (Id.) Hart states he was transported to the Bolivar
General Hospital and from there to the Memphis Trauma Center. (Id.) He seeks
compensatory damages. (Id. at PageID 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court
accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,
however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.
App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for
failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create
a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Hart filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
If Hart intends to sue the Defendants in their official capacities, such claims are
treated as claims against Henderson County. Henderson County, however, may be held
liable under § 1983 only if Hart’s injuries were sustained pursuant to an unconstitutional
custom or policy. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). To
demonstrate municipal or county liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal
policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular
injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality
from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability
is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
479-80 (1986) (emphasis in original)). Hart does not allege he was injured due to an
unconstitutional policy or custom of Henderson County; he therefore fails to state a claim
against the Defendants in their official capacities.
Hart is, presumably, a pretrial detainee at the Jail; his claims of excessive against
the Defendants in their individual capacities therefore must be analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective reasonableness, which “turns on the ‘facts
and circumstances of each particular case.’” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466,
2473 (2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The Court must
judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight.” Id.
Under an objective reasonableness inquiry, “the question is whether the officers’
actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397
(citations omitted). The proper application of this standard requires consideration of the
following factors:
the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force
used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to
temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem
at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. This list is not exhaustive but illustrates some of the
“objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force.” Id.
Hart’s complaint does not provide sufficiently detailed allegations for the Court to
determine whether he can state a Fourteenth Amendment claim of excessive force. He
alleges that he was sitting at the top of the stairs asking for medical treatment when the
Defendants rushed in and tased him. He does not, however, explain the accompanying
circumstances, such as what else was occurring at the time, why he needed medical
treatment, whether the Defendants had given him any orders and, if so, whether he obeyed
those orders, or how the Defendants could have perceived him as a threat. He also does
not allege whether all five Defendants actually tased him or whether one or more were
directing or merely observing the incident. Hart’s complaint is therefore subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of
notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246
F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte
dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with
due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court
concludes that Hart should be given the opportunity to amend his complaint.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Hart’s complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed
within twenty-one (21) days after the date of this order, on or before March 31, 2021.
Hart is advised that an amended complaint will replace the original complaint and
must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the
complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the
facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate
count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Hart fails to file an amended
complaint within the time specified, the Court will dismiss the case with prejudice in its
entirety, assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE