Lee v. State of TN Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

JASON EDWARD LEE, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

VS. ) No. 20-1217-JDT-cgc

)

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTION, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On September 24, 2020, Plaintiff Jason Edward Lee, Sr., who is incarcerated at the Morgan

County Correctional Complex in Wartburg, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued

an order on September 28, 2020, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the

civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).

(ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the Defendant as the Tennessee Department of Correction

(TDOC). Lee also attempts to sue unidentified employees (designated only as “C/O, Cpl’s, Sgt’s,

Lt’s & Cpts” and “Security & I.A”) at the Northwest Correctional Complex (NWCX) in

Tiptonville, Tennessee, where he was formerly incarcerated. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)

In his complaint, Lee alleges:

In Sept 2016 I.A. at N.W.C.C. placed me on Protective Custody. I was placed in

the mental health program. I never signed, agreed to, or was even informed I was

taken off P.C. in Sept 2019[.] I was placed in general population. I begged I.A. &

several security official[s] to be back on P.C. They wouldn’t even talk to me even

though its [sic] all on file. I had a break down & was harassed, got in trouble &

placed on max because I wasn’t on P.C.

(Id.) Lee seeks unspecified monetary damages and wants the staff held accountable and for them

to be fired or properly trained. He states “[t]he whole system needs to be evaluated & procedures

made easier to be placed on P.C.” and asks to “be kept safe for the rest of my remaining

incarseration [sic].” (Id. at PageID 3.) The Court construes the request to evaluate and change the

TDOC procedures pertaining to protective custody as a request for injunctive relief.

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaintC

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be

granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint’s “well-

pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest

an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal

conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a

complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make

a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

n.3.

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011)

(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”

and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”

(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

Lee filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights

secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

Lee’s claims against the TDOC and any claims against TDOC employees in their official

capacities must be treated as claims against the State of Tennessee itself. However, Lee cannot

state a valid claim against the State of Tennessee. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend.

XI. The Eleventh Amendment has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states

in federal court. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472

(1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Va. Office

for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2011) (“A State may waive its

sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by

appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a

private person’s suit against a State.” (citations omitted)). Tennessee has not waived its sovereign

immunity and therefore may not be sued for damages. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a).

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of

Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that “a state official in his or her official

capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because

‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’” Will,

491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985), and Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich.,

Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he [eleventh] amendment does not preclude

actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory

relief.” (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123)).

To proceed with official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against any

TDOC employee, Lee must allege that the State of Tennessee was responsible for the violation of

his constitutional rights because of a practiced custom or policy. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 16-67 (1985); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The Sixth Circuit

has held that to establish the requisite causal link between constitutional violation and policy, a

plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [entity] itself and show that the

particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police

Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993). The custom or policy must be “the moving force” behind

the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501

F.3d 592, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Even if Lee had identified any

particular TDOC employee, his bare request for evaluation and changes to the procedures

regarding the granting of protective custody is inadequate to allege that a State policy was the

“moving force” behind the alleged violation of his rights.

With regard to Lee’s individual-capacity claims against unidentified employees at the

NWCX, his claims that they failed to protect him arise under the Eighth Amendment, which

prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).

An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner

must show that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.;

see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005). The subjective component

of an Eighth Amendment violation requires a prisoner to demonstrate that the official acted with

the requisite intent, that is, that he had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03. “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind

more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus, “the prison official must

know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837-38.

Lee alleges that he was returned to the general population after being taken out of protective

custody and the mental health program. Though he “begged” unidentified individuals to put him

back in protective custody, they allegedly refused to talk to him. Thereafter, he had a breakdown,

was harassed, and got in trouble, which resulted in his being “placed on max.” (ECF No. 1 at

PageID 2.) Lee does not state what he actually told these individuals or explain how they otherwise

would have known that not letting him go back into protective custody would put his health or

safety at substantial risk.1 His allegations, therefore, are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment

claim for failure to protect.

Moreover, as stated, Lee has not identified any specific individual who allegedly failed to

protect him. Even if Lee’s allegations stated a claim, service of process cannot be made on

unidentified parties, and the filing of a complaint against such unknown defendants does not toll

the running of the statute of limitation. See Wiggins v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 641 F. App’x 545,

548-49 (6th Cir. 2016) (“The Sixth Circuit treats naming a specific individual in place of a John

Doe as joinder of a new party.” (citing Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996))). In

order to proceed against these unnamed individuals, Lee must identify them and file an amended

complaint within the one-year limitations period set out in Tennessee Code Annotated 28-3-

104(a)(1)(B).

For the foregoing reasons, Lee’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted and is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)-(2).

However, leave to file an amended complaint is GRANTED.

Any amended complaint must be filed within twenty-one days after the date of this

order. Lee is advised that an amended complaint will replace the original complaint and must be

complete in itself without reference to the prior pleading. The amended complaint must be signed,

and the text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without

1 The fact that Lee contends it was “all on file” is not a sufficient allegation that any

specific person actually knew what was in his file.

reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of

the amended complaint and must be attached to the amendment. Each claim for relief must be

stated in a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued in that count. If Lee fails to file

an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will dismiss this case with prejudice in

its entirety, assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and enter judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James D. Todd

JAMES D. TODD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE