“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
How later courts described this case
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
STEVIE N. WEATHERSPOON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-1290-JDT-cgc
)
MIKE FELDER, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff Stevie N. Weatherspoon, who is incarcerated at the
Hardin County Correctional Facility (HCCF) in Savannah, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) After
Weatherspoon filed the necessary documents, the Court issued an order granting leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 6.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as HCCF
Chief Deputy Mike Felder, Hardin County Sheriff Johnny Alexander, and Hardin County.
Weatherspoon’s complaint is devoid of factual allegations. He states only the following:
Mike Felder – violation of my civil rights “unlawful transport of inmate.[”]
Johnny Alexander Sheriff – supervisor of defendant Mike Felder
County of HARDIN County [sic] – employer of defendant Mike Felder
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Weatherspoon asks that the Court “bring this person to trial” and seeks
“damages for what was done to me.” (Id. at PageID 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint’s “well-
pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal
conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a
complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make
a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”
and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Weatherspoon filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Weatherspoon’s complaint does not contain sufficient information to state a claim against
Felder. He states only that Felder violated his rights by unlawfully transporting an inmate (without
actually specifying that the inmate in question was Weatherspoon) and seeks relief “for what was
done to me.” These bald allegations and unsupported conclusions do not demonstrate
Weatherspoon’s entitlement to relief sufficient to satisfy Iqbal or Rule 8. See Marcilis v. Twp. of
Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th
Cir. 2008)) (affirming district court’s dismissal of complaint that failed to “‘allege, with
particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional
right’”).
Nor does Weatherspoon state a claim against the other Defendants. Sheriff Alexander may
be held liable under § 1983 only for his own conduct and not for the conduct of his subordinate.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
Weatherspoon does not allege any action by Alexander and, therefore, does not state a claim
against him. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Similarly, Hardin County may be held liable only if Weatherspoon’s injuries were
sustained pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436
U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the
municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his
particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Weatherspoon does not even allege what injury he suffered, much less that it was because of a
Hardin County policy or custom. He therefore does not state a claim against Hardin County, and
his complaint is subject to dismissal.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th
Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily,
before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to
cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where
a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged
by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court concludes that Weatherspoon should be given the opportunity to amend his
complaint.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Weatherspoon’s complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave
to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within twenty-one days after
the date of this order, on or before January 24, 2020.
Weatherspoon is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original complaint
and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the complaint
must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document.
Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be
attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts
alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must
identify each defendant sued in that count. If Weatherspoon fails to file an amended complaint
within the time specified, the Court will dismiss the case in its entirety, assess a strike pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE