“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
How later courts described this case
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
KENNITH A. HARRIS a/k/a )
KENNETH ADAM HARRIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-1284-JDT-cgc
)
MADISON COUNTY, )
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On December 5, 2019, Plaintiff Kennith A. Harris a/k/a Kenneth Adam Harris, who
is incarcerated at the Madison County Criminal Justice Complex (CJC) in Jackson,
Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order on December 6, 2019,
granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) Harris
sues Madison County.
Harris alleges various problems with the conditions at the CJC, including black
mold; overcrowding of inmates; and leaking cells, ceilings, and toilets. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 2.) He alleges that some inmates sleep on the floor on plastic mats, and others
without mats, in the water leaked from the toilet. (Id.) Harris further asserts that some
inmates are confined in segregation for a week or longer without recreation time and that
the CJC in general falls below “minimum sanitary conditions.” (Id.) He alleges that the
“food area” and food flaps in the cells are not cleaned, yet unwrapped food is pushed
through the flaps. (Id.) He concludes that the CJC “is an unfit Building.” (Id.)
Harris asks the Court to “correct the living conditions of the [CJC]” and to
compensate him $5 million. (Id. at PageID 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court
accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,
however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.
App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for
failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create
a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Harris filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Harris sues Madison County, which may be held liable only if Harris’s injuries were
sustained pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc.
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must
(1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and
(3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v.
Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d
358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish
acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear
that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur
v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986) (emphasis in original)).
Harris does not allege that a Madison County policy is responsible for the conditions
of the CJC. He merely alleges that the unpleasant conditions exist. Harris therefore fails
to state a claim against Madison County.
Moreover, the allegations in the complaint in this case are stated only generally,
asserting that the conditions at the CJC affect most or all of the inmates. Harris, however,
does not have standing to assert claims on behalf of any inmate other than himself, see
Newsom v Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989), and there are no factual allegations
in the complaint setting out how he was personally affected or harmed by the conditions of
which he complains. One of the three elements of standing is that “the plaintiff must have
suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks, footnote and
citations omitted). “In requiring a particular injury, the Court meant that the injury must
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org.
v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Unless
Harris suffered an actual injury, he “was not the aggrieved party, [and] he lacks standing”
to sue. Percival v. McGinnis, 24 F. App’x 243, 246 (6th Cir. 2001).
Because Harris cannot sue on behalf of other CJC inmates and has not alleged that
he suffered any personal injury from the conditions of which he complains, he has not
established that he has standing to pursue this action and has failed to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. Therefore, the complaint is subject to dismissal.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of
notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246
F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte
dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with
due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court
concludes that Harris should be given the opportunity to amend his complaint.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Harris’s complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed
within twenty-one days after the date of this order, on or before January 9, 2020.
Harris is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original complaint
and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the
complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the
amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an
amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim
for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that
count. If Harris fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will
dismiss the case in its entirety, assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter
judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE