The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
DONALD PRESCOTT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-1115-JDT-cgc
)
HARDEMAN COUNTY )
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT
PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON DEFENDANT BEARD
On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff Donald Prescott, who is incarcerated at the Northeast
Correctional Complex in Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Prescott’s complaint addresses events that allegedly occurred
during his previous confinement at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (HCCF) in
Whiteville, Tennessee. (Id. at PageID 3.) After Prescott submitted the required financial
documents, the Court issued an order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing
the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).
(ECF No. 6.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as HCCF Unit Manager Dorothy Robertson;,
former HCCF Warden Grady Perry; HCCF Lieutenant First Name Unknown Beard; the HCCF;
and the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC).
Prescott alleges that, sometime prior to May 28, 2019, he was assaulted by five inmates at
the HCCF and received a disciplinary write-up for fighting. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) On May
28, 2019, the same five inmates again attacked and stabbed Prescott. (Id.) Prescott was assigned
to segregated housing after the incident, where Lieutenant Beard (then Sergeant Beard) was the
officer in charge. (Id.) Prescott asserts that Beard was aware of the earlier altercation yet placed
one of the inmates who had assaulted Prescott in a cell with him while Prescott was still in
handcuffs. (Id.) That inmate, who was not handcuffed, immediately began to attack Prescott
again. (Id.) Prescott alleges that when he and the five inmates were released from segregation, all
six of them were placed back into the same housing pod. (Id.) Prescott alleges he was stabbed
several more times by the same prisoners. (Id.)
Prescott asserts claims of negligence, emotional distress, imminent harm and danger, and
defamation of character. (Id. at PageID 5.) He seeks damages. (Id.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint’s “well-
pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal
conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a
complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make
a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”
and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Prescott filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Prescott has no valid claim against the TDOC. Claims against the TDOC are treated as
claims against the State of Tennessee. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment has been
construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in federal court. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247,
253-54 (2011) (“A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some
circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid
abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State.” (citations
omitted)). Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity and therefore may not be sued for
damages. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a). Moreover, a state is not a person within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613,
617 (2002); Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Prescott’s claims against the HCCF and against the HCCF employees in their official
capacities are considered claims against CoreCivic, a private company which manages the prison.1
However, Prescott does not state a valid claim against CoreCivic. “A private corporation that
performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts under color of state law for
purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit has applied the standards for
assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations that operate prisons or provide
medical care or food services to prisoners. Id. at 748-49; Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18; Johnson v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 26 F. App’x 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Eads v. State of Tenn., No.
1 See https://www.tn.gov/correction/sp/state-prison-list/hardeman-county-correctional-
facility.html (“[The HCCF] is owned by the Hardeman County Correctional Facilities
Corporation, which contracts with CoreCivic for management of the prison.”).
1:18-cv-00042, 2018 WL 4283030, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2018). To prevail on a § 1983 claim
against CoreCivic, a plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was
the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011).
Prescott does not allege that he was assaulted in segregation because of an unconstitutional
policy or custom of CoreCivic. He instead alleges that Beard negligently placed one of Prescott’s
assailants in the cell with him despite knowing about the earlier attack. Prescott’s claim is
therefore against Beard and not CoreCivic.
Prescott’s allegations against Beard amount to a claim under the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials “must take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates” and “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (quotations omitted).
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must show that he “is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.; see also Miller v.
Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005). The subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment violation requires a prisoner to demonstrate that prison officials acted with the
requisite intent, that is, that the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk
that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303;
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,1222 (6th Cir.
1997). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus, “the prison official must know[] of and disregard[] an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837-38. In the context of a failure-to-protect claim, a prison
officer will not be held liable without a showing that he or she “should have been aware of the
reasonable likelihood of a potential attack and intervened earlier.” Carico v. Benton, Ireland, &
Stovall, 68 F. App’x 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2003).
Prescott alleges that Beard knew about the earlier altercation between him and the five
inmates, one of whom she then placed in the cell with Prescott in segregation. That inmate
continued to attack Prescott, who was handcuffed. According to Prescott’s allegations, Beard was
“aware of facts from which the inference of substantial risk of harm could be drawn.” Garretson
v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 2005). The complaint therefore states a
valid Eighth Amendment claim against Beard.
Prescott does not allege any conduct by Warden Perry. To the extent he seeks to hold Perry
liable because he was the warden of HCCF, he does not state a claim. Under § 1983,
“[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Bellamy v.
Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Thus, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983
plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized,
approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending
subordinates.
Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421 (citation omitted). Prescott does not allege that Perry was aware of,
much less authorized or approved of, Beard’s actions that led to Prescott’s injuries. He therefore
does not allege a basis for holding Perry responsible for Beard’s conduct.
Nor does Prescott allege any misconduct whatsoever by Unit Manager Robertson. When
a complaint fails to allege any action by a Defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Prescott’s claims against the TDOC; his claims
against the HCCF and all official-capacity claims against the HCCF employees; and all claims
against Defendants Robertson, and Perry for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Prescott’s Eighth
Amendment claim against Beard for failing to protect him from a substantial risk of harm may
proceed.
It is ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process for Defendant Lt. FNU Beard 2 and
deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal for service. Service shall be made on Defendant Beard
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 4.04(1)
and (10) by registered or certified mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs of
service shall by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Prescott shall serve a copy of every subsequent document he
files in this case on the attorney for Defendant Beard or on Defendant Beard personally if she is
unrepresented. Prescott shall make a certificate of service on every document he files. Prescott
shall familiarize himself with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.3
2 Prescott states in the complaint that Defendant Beard is now employed at the Trousdale
Turner Correctional Center, 140 Macon Way, Hartsville, Tennessee 37074. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 3.)
3 A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk or on the Court’s website at
https://www.tnwd.uscourts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.
Prescott is reminded that he must promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or
extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court, may
result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE