“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
How later courts described this case
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
RAY MCKNUCKLES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-1177-JDT-cgc
)
JOHN MEHR, )
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff Ray McKnuckles, who is incarcerated at the Madison County
Criminal Justice Complex (CJC) in Jackson, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued
an order on August 22, 2019, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil
filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF
No. 4.) McKnuckles sues Madison County Sheriff John Mehr.
McKnuckles alleges various problems with the conditions at the CJC, including black
mold; overcrowding of inmates; and leaking cells, ceilings, and toilets. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)
He alleges that some inmates sleep on the floor on plastic mats, and others without mats, in the
water leaked from the toilet. (Id.) McKnuckles further asserts that some inmates are confined in
segregation for a week or longer without recreation time, and other inmates are not protected from
violent attacks. (Id.) He asserts that the CJC is “unfit [for] human habitation,” the medical care is
inadequate for the inmates, and the inmates are treated inhumanely. (Id.)
McKnuckles asks the Court “to get rid of the Black Mold in the jail” and seeks $5.5 million
in compensatory damages. (Id. at PageID 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint’s “well-
pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal
conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a
complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make
a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”
and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
McKnuckles filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
To the extent McKnuckles seeks to sue Sheriff Mehr in his official capacity, his claim is
construed as a claim against Madison County, which may be held liable only if McKnuckles’s
injuries were sustained pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy. See Monell v. Dep’t. of
Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1)
identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show
that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d
802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts
of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986) (emphasis in
original)).
McKnuckles does not allege that a Madison County policy is responsible for the conditions
of the CJC. He merely alleges that the unpleasant conditions exist. McKnuckles therefore fails to
state a claim against Madison County.
Nor does McKnuckles allege that Sheriff Mehr is responsible, or even aware, of the
conditions at the CJC. To the extent he seeks to hold Sheriff Mehr responsible in his supervisory
capacity, he does not state a claim under § 1983. Under § 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not
be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008).
Thus, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Because McKnuckles
fails to plead what actions Sheriff Mehr has taken, or failed to take, that violated his rights, he does
not state a claim against Sheriff Mehr in his individual capacity.
Moreover, the allegations in the complaint in this case are stated only generally, asserting
that the conditions at the CJC affect most or all of the inmates. McKnuckles, however, does not
have standing to assert claims on behalf of any inmate other than himself, and there are no factual
allegations in the complaint setting out how he was personally affected or harmed by the conditions
of which he complains. One of the three elements of standing is that “the plaintiff must have
suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks, footnote and citations omitted). “In
requiring a particular injury, the Court meant that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way.” Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Unless McKnuckles suffered an actual injury, he
“was not the aggrieved party, [and] he lacks standing” to sue. Percival v. McGinnis, 24 F. App’x
243, 246 (6th Cir. 2001).
Because McKnuckles cannot sue on behalf of other CJC inmates and has not alleged that
he suffered any personal injury from the conditions of which he complains, he has not established
that he has standing to pursue this action and has failed to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Therefore, the complaint is subject to dismissal.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th
Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily,
before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to
cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where
a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged
by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court concludes that McKnuckles should be given the opportunity to amend his
complaint.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES McKnuckles’s complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave
to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within twenty-one days after
the date of this order, on or before December 24, 2019.
McKnuckles is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original complaint
and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the complaint
must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document.
Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be
attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts
alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must
identify each defendant sued in that count. If McKnuckles fails to file an amended complaint
within the time specified, the Court will dismiss the case in its entirety, assess a strike pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE