“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
How later courts described this case
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
- federal defender and a private attorney do not act under color of federal law for purposes of a Bivens action
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY BEARDEN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 20-2047-JDT-cgc
)
SERENA R. GRAY, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER DISMISSING CASE,
DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AS MOOT,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE
On January 21, 2020, Anthony Bearden, who is incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center
in Lexington, Kentucky, filed a pro se complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing
the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).
(ECF No. 5.) Bearden sues Serena R. Gray, an Assistant Federal Defender.
Bearden alleges in his complaint that Gray, his defense attorney, gave a copy of his
Presentence Investigation Report to another inmate, Daview Stokes, who was Bearden’s cellmate
at the time. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Bearden alleges that Stokes “told me all about myself, my
case, SS#[,] address [etc.].” (Id.) He claims Defendant Gray “is in violation of my right” and
committed an ethical violation by giving all of his personal information to Stokes “to do as he
please.” (Id.) Bearden states he also wrote to the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility.
(Id.) He seeks $2.5 million in damages. (Id. at PageID 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint’s “well-
pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal
conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a
complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make
a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”
and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Bearden filed his complaint on the form used for commencing actions pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). The facts alleged
by Bearden, however, do not suggest that Gray acted under color of state law. He therefore has
no claim under § 1983.
In some limited circumstances, a right of action against federal employees who violate an
individual’s rights under the United States Constitution may arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). “Under the Bivens line of cases,
the Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action against federal officials for certain
constitutional violations when there are no alternative processes to protect the interests of the
plaintiff and no special factors counseling against recognizing the cause of action.” Koubriti v.
Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2010).
Bearden alleges only that Gray gave his personal information to another individual; he does
not identify any constitutional right that was violated. Even if he had alleged the violation of a
specific constitutional right, Bearden has no valid Bivens claim. Attorneys do not act under color
of federal law for purposes of Bivens regardless of whether they are court appointed or privately
retained. See Pagani-Gallegov. Escobedo, No. 97-1640, 1998 WL 381562, at *1 (6th Cir. 1998)
(court-appointed attorney representing criminal defendant in federal court does not act under color
of federal law for Bivens purposes); Bradford v. Shankman, No. 85-5150, 1985 WL 13659, at *1
(6th Cir. Aug. 12, 1985) (federal defender and a private attorney do not act under color of federal
law for purposes of a Bivens action).
For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety for failure
to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Bearden’s motion to
appoint counsel is DENIED as moot.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th
Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily,
before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to
cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where
a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree
with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged
by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court finds that leave to amend is not warranted.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by
Bearden in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether an appeal is taken in
good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. It
would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior
to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See
Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead
the Court to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction also compel the conclusion that an appeal
would not be taken in good faith. Therefore, it is CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3),
that any appeal in this matter by Bearden would not be taken in good faith.
The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if Bearden
nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good
faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the installment
procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11. McGore sets out specific
procedures for implementing the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Bearden is instructed
that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee,
he must comply with the procedures set out in the PLRA and McGore by filing an updated in
forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust account for the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Bearden, this is the first
dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This strike shall take effect
when judgment is entered. See Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763-64 (2015).
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE