The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
________________________________________________________________
TIANA M. SANDERS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 19-2831-TLP-tmp
)
FEDEX EXPRESS INC. )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________________________________________
ORDER AUTHORIZING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
________________________________________________________________
Before the court is Tiana Sanders’ pro se complaint against
FedEx Express Inc., Joseph R. Slager, Rachael L. Kirkpatrick,
Christi C. Free, and Patrick H. Whalen. (ECF No. 1.) Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to
the United States magistrate judge for management and for all
pretrial matters for determination or report and recommendation,
as appropriate. For the reasons below, the court sua sponte
authorizes Sanders to amend her complaint to resolve certain
deficiencies.
I. BACKGROUND
Sanders filed this complaint pro se on December 3, 2019. (ECF
No. 1.) The court granted her motion to proceed in forma pauperis
on December 16, 2019. (ECF No. 7.) Sanders, an African-American
woman, brings suit against various defendants under Title VII and
“[d]efamation of character, [u]nlawful termination,
[w]histleblower, [h]umilation and [m]ental [a]nguish.” 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e17. Using a form provided by the Clerk’s office to
assist pro se litigants asserting employment discrimination
claims, Sanders checked boxes alleging termination of her
employment, failure to promote, unequal terms and conditions of
employment, and retaliation. In a box for indicating other adverse
employment actions that may have been taken against a litigant,
Sanders alleged “[d]isparate treatment [and] blacklisting.” Using
a similar set of boxes in another portion of the form, Sanders
marked discrimination based on her race, color, and sex. In the
section of her complaint devoted to the facts of the case, Sanders
wrote nothing. The complaint contains no other allegations related
to purported discrimination by the defendants.
II. RELEVANT LAW
A. Standard of Review
This court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints
and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “‘a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A
claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Center
for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Without factual
allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not entitled to
the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and are thus liberally
construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011).
Even so, pro so litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989),
and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out
in a pleading. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th
Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th
Cir. 2003).
B. Required Form of Pleadings
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race [or] gender . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also prohibits discrimination
against any individual who “has opposed any act or practice made
unlawful” by the statute and prohibits discrimination against any
individual who has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing” under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Plaintiffs suing under federal antidiscrimination law are
obliged to follow the pleading requirements outlined in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Smith v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, 749 F.
App'x 446, 449 (6th Cir. 2018). This means, among other things,
that a complaint consisting of “naked recitations of the elements”
of an antidiscrimination claim “unenhanced by specific facts”
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at
448. Sanders alleges essentially no facts about her employment
discrimination claim. This does not meet the plausibility pleading
standard required by the Federal Rules. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To
state a claim, Sanders needs to allege facts that would plausibly
support the inference that she was discriminated against in
violation of Title VII.
These rules are not a mere technicality. The purpose of notice
pleading is twofold: (1) to allow a person who is being sued to
understand why he or she is being sued and (2) to give that person
an opportunity to respond. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)
(Notice pleading exists “in order to give the defendant fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
(internal citations and modifications omitted)); Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(b) (requiring a party filing an answer to “admit or deny the
allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”). Notice,
followed by a meaningful opportunity to be heard, is the core of
due process. LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998). A
complaint that fundamentally fails to comply with these rules
cannot give adequate notice to a defendant of why the defendant is
being sued. Similarly, it is impracticable for a defendant to
respond to a complaint that does not comply with these rules in a
meaningful fashion.
The court is aware that it can be difficult for non-lawyers
to write documents that comply with the Federal Rules. But the
court is not free to ignore the rules because of a plaintiff’s pro
se status. However, the court is permitted to allow a plaintiff to
file an amended complaint to cure a pleading deficiency. LaFountain
v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013). The court elects to
do so here rather than recommend dismissal.
III. CONCLUSION
The court grants Sanders the opportunity to file an amended
complaint that resolves the pleading issues identified in this
order by the end of the day on January 16, 2019. In the event that
Sanders does not file an amended complaint, the court will consider
the complaint in the form it currently takes under the §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii) screening standard.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
United States Magistrate Judge
December 16, 2019
Date