GIGGERS v. Memphis Housing Authority

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 2, 2011 Session

CHERYL BROWN GIGGERS ET AL.

v.

MEMPHIS HOUSING AUTHORITY ET AL.

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals, Western Section

Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-000896-03 Kay S. Robilio, Judge

No. W2010-00806-SC-R11-CV - Filed April 2, 2012

The plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit

against the defendant housing authority. The plaintiffs alleged the housing authority was

negligent in failing to evict the other tenant at the first instance of violent behavior. The

housing authority filed a motion for summary judgment claiming federal regulations

preempted the plaintiffs’ negligence claim and that it was immune from suit under the

Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). The trial court denied summary

judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. We granted review to determine

whether the plaintiffs’ negligence claim is preempted by federal law or, in the alternative,

whether the housing authority is immune from suit under the discretionary function exception

of the GTLA. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ negligence suit is not preempted by federal

law. We further conclude that the housing authority’s failure to evict is an operational

decision and that the housing authority is not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. We

reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission;

Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed

J ANICE M. H OLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C ORNELIA A. C LARK,

C.J., and G ARY R. W ADE, W ILLIAM C. K OCH, J R., and S HARON G. L EE, JJ., joined.

Archie Sanders, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Angela G. Brown, Charles C.

Brown, Jr., Cheryl Brown Giggers, and JoAnn Fisher

Joe Lee Wyatt and William Joseph Wyatt, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Scruggs

Security and Patrol, LLC

Charles Wesley Fowler, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Memphis Housing Authority

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

On February 26, 2003, Cheryl Brown Giggers, Charles C. Brown, Jr., Angela G.

Brown, and Joann Fisher (“the plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the City of Memphis

(“the City”) and Memphis Housing Authority (“MHA”) for the wrongful death of Charles

Cornelius Brown, Sr. (“the decedent”). The decedent, a resident of a housing project

operated by MHA, was killed by a stray bullet on March 7, 2002, when fellow tenant, L.C.

Miller, fired a gun in the direction of the housing project’s security office.

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the City and MHA were negligent in

failing to properly investigate Mr. Miller’s criminal background and in failing to assess the

risk that Mr. Miller posed to other tenants of the housing project. The plaintiffs also alleged

that the City and MHA breached the decedent’s lease agreement by failing to safely maintain

the housing project.

The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs amended their

complaint, naming MHA as the sole defendant. After receiving MHA’s answer alleging

comparative fault, the plaintiffs again amended their complaint to add MHA’s contracted

security company, Scruggs Security and Patrol, LLC (“Scruggs”), as a defendant. The

plaintiffs alleged that Scruggs failed to properly secure the housing project at the time of the

shooting.

MHA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that MHA owed no duty to the

plaintiffs or to the decedent with respect to Mr. Miller’s criminal actions. The trial court

agreed and granted MHA’s summary judgment motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the

trial court. Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., No. W2006-00304-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL

2216553, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2007). This Court granted permission to appeal and

reversed the summary judgment. Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 371

(Tenn. 2009) (“Giggers I”). We determined that “a special relationship exists between a

landlord and a tenant, placing an obligation on a landlord to take reasonable measures of

protection.” Id.

On remand, MHA moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint because the

plaintiffs had not alleged that MHA had a duty to evict Mr. Miller. The trial court denied

MHA’s motion and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint a third time. See Tenn.

R. Civ. P. 15.01. In the third amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that MHA breached

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the duty of care owed to the decedent by failing to evict Mr. Miller following an aggravated

assault against another tenant in the same MHA housing project in 1998. The plaintiffs also

alleged that MHA had a “one-strike” policy in place during 1998 that should have resulted

in Mr. Miller’s eviction after the aggravated assault.1 Although MHA did not evict Mr.

Miller, it placed Mr. Miller on probation for one year following the 1998 incident. Mr.

Miller was not involved in any other altercations during the probationary period.

In response to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, MHA filed a motion for summary

judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was preempted by federal law

or, in the alternative, that MHA was immune from suit pursuant to the discretionary function

exception to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). Tenn. Code

Ann. § 29-20-205(1) (2000). The trial court denied summary judgment.2 The trial court,

however, permitted MHA to file an application for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9

of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure because it found “merit to [MHA’s]

arguments.”

The Court of Appeals granted MHA’s application for interlocutory appeal and

reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. The Court of Appeals held that

summary judgment in favor of MHA was appropriate because federal law preempted the

plaintiffs’ claim and because MHA was immune from suit under the GTLA. Giggers v.

Memphis Hous. Auth., No. W2010-00806-COA-R9-CV, 2010 WL 5140614, at *14 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2010). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to enter

summary judgment in favor of MHA. Id. We granted permission to appeal.

II. Analysis

At issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that federal law

preempted the plaintiffs’ claim and that MHA was immune from suit pursuant to the GTLA.

By remanding the case to the trial court, the Court of Appeals effectively granted summary

judgment to MHA. The resolution of a motion for summary judgment is a question of law,

which we review de novo. Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 271 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn. 2008). We

first address federal preemption of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim against MHA before

examining MHA’s immunity from suit under the GTLA.

1

In construing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, this Court acknowledged MHA’s

“one-strike” policy in Giggers I. 277 S.W.3d at 362. Following remand, MHA denied the existence of a one-

strike policy.

2

The trial court did not include the legal grounds for its denial of summary judgment as required by

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04.

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A. Federal Preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that federal law

preempt contrary state law. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The United States Supreme Court

has held that state law may not frustrate or stand as an obstacle to the legislative purpose of

a federal statute. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000). Preemption

can arise either in the form of explicit legislation by Congress or when federal legislation

implicitly conflicts with state law. See Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843, 853

(Tenn. 2010) (discussing the difference between “express” preemption and “implied”

preemption). Implied conflict preemption occurs when it would be impossible to comply

with both state law and federal law or when congressional purpose in enacting the federal

law is impeded by state law. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000) (quoting

California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989)).

There is no express federal legislation barring negligence suits against public housing

authorities. MHA contends, however, that permitting the plaintiffs to proceed with their

negligence claim would pose an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1994).3 The question of whether a

state law action is preempted by federal law is reviewed de novo as a question of law.

Leggett, 308 S.W.3d at 851(quoting Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th

Cir. 2001)). To address whether the plaintiff’s negligence claim stands as an obstacle to 42

U.S.C. § 1437d, we must determine the congressional purpose in enacting § 1437d. See

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (noting “‘the purpose of Congress is the

ultimate touch-stone in every pre-emption case’”) (quoting Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S.

96, 103 (1963)).

To determine the purpose of § 1437d we first examine the language of the statute.

Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). Section 1437d dictates the

requirements for public housing authority (“PHA”) tenant leases and puts tenants on notice

that engaging in activity that threatens another tenant’s “health, safety, or right to peaceful

enjoyment of the premises” may result in termination of the tenant’s lease. Criminal conduct

or activity of a public housing tenant, a member of the tenant’s household, or a guest or other

person under the tenant’s control may result in termination of tenancy. 42 U.S.C.

3

The 1994 version of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d and the corresponding 1996 regulations govern this case

because the plaintiffs’ claim arises out MHA’s failure to evict Mr. Miller after an altercation in 1998. The

1994 statute and 1996 regulations also control the lease executed by Mr. Miller and MHA in 1996.

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§ 1437d(l)(5) (1994).4 Because this particular section does not contain its own statement of

purpose, we look to the statute as a whole.

The United States Supreme Court frequently refers to the stated purpose of legislation

to interpret language in the operative sections. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,

588-90 (1981). In this case, § 1437d is contained within the United States Housing Act of

1937 (“the 1937 Act”). Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. § 1437). The stated purpose of the 1937 Act is “to remedy the unsafe and insanitary

housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families

of low income.” Id. Although the original purpose of the 1937 Act was to provide safe

housing for low income families, Congress later amended the Act to address the growing

problem of criminal activity in housing projects. The 1937 Act was amended in part by the

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. It is this amendment that added the statutory language of

§ 1437d to the 1937 Act. Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988); see also Dep’t

of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127-28 (2002). Congress enacted the Anti-

Drug Abuse Act of 1988 with the objective of reducing drug-related crime in public housing

and ensuring “public and other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and

free from illegal drugs.” Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134. We therefore interpret § 1437d within the

broader statutory context of the United States Housing Act of 1937 and in light of the

original purpose of this statute and its 1988 amendment. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston,

459 U.S. 375, 387 n. 23 (1983) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357

(1963)). We conclude that the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d is to promote safe public

housing for PHA tenants.

We next consider whether permitting the plaintiffs’ negligence claim to proceed

would stand as an obstacle to the congressional purpose of promoting safe public housing.

The United States Supreme Court has noted that courts should not assume that Congress

intends to supersede state law. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995). The presumption against preemption is

especially strong in areas that are within the historic police powers of the states. Wyeth v.

Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485). States traditionally

have regulated health and safety matters. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. The Supreme Court

has exercised restraint when considering whether to preempt a state’s authority to regulate

tort litigation. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)

(“State jurisdiction has prevailed in [tort] situations because the compelling state interest, in

4

In 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) was redesignated as 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). Pub. L. No. 105-276

§ 512, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998). For consistency, we will refer to this statute under the redesignation as it

appears today.

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the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the

absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.”).

In determining whether the plaintiffs’ negligence claim would stand as an obstacle to

the stated purpose of the United States Housing Act of 1937, we also consider the federal

housing regulations that implement 42 U.S.C. § 1437d. The Department of Housing and

Urban Development (“HUD”) is the agency empowered to administer the federal statute and

to promulgate regulations interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1437d. See 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) (1996);

see also King v. Hous. Auth. of Huntsville, 670 F.2d 952, 954 (11th Cir. 1982). Although

federal regulations are not legislative enactments, a federal regulation may preempt state law

when the state law directly conflicts with the regulation or when it is impossible to comply

with both the state law and the regulation. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576 (“This Court has

recognized that an agency regulation with the force of law can pre-empt conflicting state

requirements.”).

HUD regulations supplement the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d. See Rucker, 535

U.S. at 128-29. The HUD regulation regarding tenant lease requirements reiterates that

eviction may occur should tenants or their guests engage in criminal activities that threaten

the health or safety of other residents.5 The HUD regulations also provide more specific

instructions to PHAs operating housing projects. PHAs contemplating eviction of a tenant

are instructed to consider the specific circumstances of the tenant’s case, the seriousness of

the offense, family members’ involvement in the criminal activity, and the effect eviction

would have on innocent family members.6

5

24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(A) (1996). The relevant portion of the regulation states:

The lease shall provide that the tenant shall be obligated . . . [t]o assure that

the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under

the tenant’s control, shall not engage in . . . [a]ny criminal activity that

threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA’s

public housing premises by other residents or employees of the PHA . . . .

Id.

6

24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i) (1996). The regulation states in its entirety:

In deciding to evict for criminal activity, the PHA shall have discretion to

consider all of the circumstances of the case, including the seriousness of

the offense, the extent of participation by family members, and the effects

that the eviction would have on family members not involved in the

proscribed activity. In appropriate cases, the PHA may permit continued

(continued...)

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Rather than standing as an obstacle to promoting safe public housing, permitting the

plaintiffs’ negligence claim complements the purpose of § 1437d. The purpose of the United

States Housing Act of 1937 and its 1988 amendment is to promote safe public housing for

PHA tenants. Section 1437d puts tenants on notice that activity that threatens another

tenant’s health or safety may result in termination of the tenant’s lease. HUD regulations

provide public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants to promote public

housing that is safe and free from crime. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l). Allowing the plaintiffs’

negligence claim to proceed does not restrict MHA’s exercise of discretion or obstruct the

purpose of § 1437d or its corresponding regulations. Instead, allowing the negligence claim

to stand promotes safe public housing for tenants by providing a remedy when a public

housing authority exercises its federally vested discretion in a negligent manner. The

plaintiffs’ claim will impose liability on MHA only if the trial court determines that under

the facts in this case MHA was negligent in failing to evict Mr. Miller in 1998. We hold that

the plaintiffs’ negligence suit is not preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d.

B. Sovereign Immunity

Generally, the GTLA forecloses suits against governmental entities that cause injury

when exercising or discharging their duties. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a) (2000). An

exception to this rule permits a suit against a governmental entity when an employee of that

entity acting within the scope of his employment negligently causes injury to another. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-20-205. A governmental entity remains immune from suit, however, if the

injury results from a discretionary act of the governmental entity regardless of whether that

discretion was abused. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(1); see also Limbaugh v. Coffee Med.

Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 84-85 (Tenn. 2001). The rationale behind this “discretionary function

exception” is to prevent courts from questioning decisions of governmental entities that are

primarily legislative or administrative. Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 85.

To determine whether a governmental entity is entitled to immunity for a discretionary

decision, this Court applies the “planning-operational test.” Bowers v. City of Chattanooga,

826 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tenn. 1992). A governmental entity is immune from suit for actions

involving “planning or policy-making.” Helton v. Knox Cnty., 922 S.W.2d 877, 885 (Tenn.

6

(...continued)

occupancy by remaining family members and may impose a condition that

family members who engaged in the proscribed activity will not reside in

the unit. A PHA may require a family member who has engaged in the

illegal use of drugs to present evidence of successful completion of a

treatment program as a condition to being allowed to reside in the unit.

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1996) (quoting Bowers, 826 S.W.2d at 430). When the act is merely “operational,” the entity

is not immune. Id.

In Bowers, we determined that a planning decision usually involves consideration and

debate regarding a particular course of action by those charged with formulating plans or

policies. Bowers, 826 S.W.2d at 431; see also Helton, 922 S.W.2d at 885. A planning

decision frequently requires a governmental entity to create policies or plans, formulate

specifications or schedules, allocate resources, or determine priorities. Bowers, 826 S.W.2d

at 431. Planning or policy-making decisions are not subject to tort liability, and a review of

these decisions requires judicial restraint. Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 85.

Operational decisions, however, implement “preexisting laws, regulations, policies,

or standards” that are designed to guide the actions of the governmental entity. Bowers, 826

S.W.2d at 431. An operational decision requires that the decision-maker act reasonably when

implementing preexisting policy. Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 85. Unlike a planning or policy-

making decision, an operational decision does not involve the formulation of new policy.

Turning to the facts in this case, HUD is the authority charged with the creation of

policies and procedures to promote safe public housing. Although HUD’s formulation of

policy or procedure may be considered a discretionary function, the implementation of that

policy is an operational decision. See Bowers, 826 S.W.2d at 431. Section 1437d and the

corresponding HUD regulations provide MHA with guidance in operating its housing

properties. HUD regulations provide a list of preexisting policy considerations for MHA to

use when contemplating eviction of a tenant. HUD instructs MHA to consider the

seriousness of the offense, the participation by other family members, and the effect that the

eviction would have on innocent family members. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i).

MHA uses its judgment when determining whether eviction of a tenant is appropriate.

See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5). The discretion used to exercise that judgment, however, does

not convert an otherwise operational decision into one that is discretionary. See Bowers, 826

S.W.2d at 431 (“[D]iscretionary function immunity does not automatically attach to all acts

involving choice or judgment.”). In making eviction decisions, MHA must exercise its

discretion within the confines of HUD’s preexisting policies. In that way, MHA’s eviction

decisions are operational in nature. To hold otherwise would be to convert every operational

decision requiring choice into a discretionary function.

The parties have debated the existence of a “one-strike” policy that would have

required MHA to evict Mr. Miller in 1998 following his aggravated assault against another

tenant. We observe that the existence of MHA’s “one-strike” policy is not controlling in our

analysis. Even assuming that MHA discussed and established a policy requiring the eviction

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of a tenant after the first instance of disruptive behavior, MHA did not follow that policy in

Mr. Miller’s case. When a negligent act occurs in contravention of an established policy, that

act is operational in nature and is not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. Chase v. City

of Memphis, 971 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tenn. 1998). In the absence of a one-strike policy,

MHA’s actions still would be guided by the preexisting guidelines issued by HUD and would

therefore be considered operational.

III. Conclusion

We conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d does not preempt the plaintiffs’ suit against

MHA. We further conclude that MHA’s decision not to evict Mr. Miller was an operational

decision and is not entitled to discretionary function immunity under the GTLA. We reverse

the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with

this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellee, Memphis Housing Authority, for

which execution may issue, if necessary.

_________________________________

JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE

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