“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
How later courts described this case
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”
- claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against prison and prison staff moot when inmate transferred to another facility
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN W. TAYLOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-1025-JDT-cgc
)
SERGEANT COLLINS, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On February 11, 2019, Plaintiff John W. Taylor, who is incarcerated at the Morgan
County Correctional Complex in Wartburg, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.)
Taylor’s complaint addresses events that allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at
the Whiteville Correctional Facility (WCF) in Whiteville, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 2.) The Court issued an order on February 12, 2019, granting leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the
Defendants as Sergeant First Name Unknown (FNU) Collins; and Corrections Officers
(C/O) R. Saunders, E. Gonzales and J. Long.
Taylor alleges that in August 2018, he was housed in protective custody at WCF
because of an on-going investigation. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) Sergeant Collins moved
another inmate named Danny Martindale into the cell with Taylor, prompting Taylor to ask
whether he should have a cellmate while in protective custody. (Id.) Collins allegedly
replied, “I need the bed space.” (Id.) Taylor alleges that Martindale “was very aggressive
and confrontational,” and the two began to argue almost immediately. (Id. at PageID 5.)
Later that day, as C/Os Saunders and Gonzalez were escorting Taylor to the shower, Taylor
allegedly told Saunders that he was already arguing with Martindale. (Id.) Saunders
allegedly “snickered at me like it was a joke.” (Id.) Taylor alleges he later told C/O Long
that he “was not going to get along with” Martindale because they were already arguing.
(Id.) Long responded, “Yea he’s a jerk.” (Id.)
Taylor alleges that later that day, after he returned to the cell, Martindale attacked
him and stabbed him with a “wide steel knife.” (Id.) Taylor alleges he tried to fight
Martindale and screamed for help until he fainted from loss of breath. (Id.) He awoke as
officers were transporting him to the infirmary. (Id.) Taylor asked an unspecified officer
how Martindale could have gotten the weapon and if he understood “why I was so cautious
about moving another inmate in the cell with me.” (Id. at PageID 5-6.) The unspecified
officer “shrugged his shoulders and held out his hands.” (Id. at PageID 6.) Taylor alleges
he filed grievances about the incident, but the grievance was denied without a hearing. (Id.)
Taylor seeks a change in housing procedures in the protective custody unit, an
injunction ordering that he be provided with an “honest grievance hearing,” and punitive
and compensatory damages. (Id. at PageID 7.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court
accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,
however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.
App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for
failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create
a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Taylor filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
To the extent Taylor intends to assert official capacity claims against the
Defendants, his claim is against CoreCivic, a private corporation that operates the WCF.1
“A private corporation that performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts
under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)).
The Sixth Circuit has applied the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims
against private corporations that operate prisons or that provide medical care or food
1 See https://www.tn.gov/content/tn/correction/sp/state-prison-list/whiteville-correctional-
facility.html (WCF “is managed by CoreCivic, a private corrections management firm.”).
services to prisoners. Id. at 748-49; Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18; Johnson v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 26 F. App’x 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Eads v. State of Tenn., No. 1:18-cv-
00042, 2018 WL 4283030, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2018). CoreCivic “cannot be held
liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x
622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Taylor “must
show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind
the alleged deprivation” of his rights. Id. Taylor, however, does not allege that he suffered
an injury because of an unconstitutional policy or custom of the City of Whiteville. He
therefore fails to state a claim against any Defendant in his or her official capacity.
Taylor’s allegations that the Defendants failed to protect him from Martindale
amount to a claim of deliberate indifference, which arises under the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (quotations omitted) (noting that
prison officials “must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” and
“to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners”). “[N]ot all injuries
suffered by an inmate at the hands of another prisoner result in constitutional liability for
prison officials under the Eighth Amendment.” Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600
(6th Cir. 1998). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must satisfy an
objective and a subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective
component, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981)). That is, a prisoner must show that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing
a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803,
812 (6th Cir. 2005). The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation requires
a prisoner to demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent; that is, that he had
a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 297, 302-03 (1991). Thus, “the prison official must know[] of and
disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. In
the context of a failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner must allege that the prison official
“should have been aware of the reasonable likelihood of a potential attack and intervened
earlier.” Carico v. Benton, Ireland, & Stovall, 68 F. App’x 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2003).
Taylor fails to satisfy the standard for an Eighth Amendment claim. Taylor alleges
that he told only Defendants Saunders and Long about his problems with Martindale. He
does not allege that he told Defendant Collins or Gonzales about the arguments with
Martindale. Moreover, Taylor does not allege that he told any Defendant that he believed
Martindale would attack him or that he felt threatened by Martindale. He told Saunders
only that he and Martindale were arguing and told Long that he “was not going to get along
with” Martindale. These allegations suggest that the officers knew Taylor did not like
Martindale. However, none of these allegations suggest the Defendants were on notice of
a reasonable likelihood of a potential attack by Martindale and should have intervened.
Nor does Taylor state a claim regarding the grievance procedures. “There is no
inherent constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure.” See LaFlame v.
Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Antonelli v.
Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996)). A § 1983 claim therefore cannot be
premised on contentions that the grievance procedure was inadequate. Id.
Because Taylor is no longer at WCF, his request for an injunction is moot. Moore
v. Curtis, 68 F. App’x 561, 562 (6th Cir. 2003) (claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
against prison and prison staff moot when inmate transferred to another facility); Kensu v.
Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
For the foregoing reasons, Taylor’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety
for failure to state a claim.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of
notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246
F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte
dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with
due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court
concludes that Taylor should be given the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Greer’s complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). However, Taylor is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint. Any
amendment must be filed within twenty-one days after the date of this order.
Taylor is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original complaint
and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the
complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the
amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an
amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim
for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that
count. If Taylor fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court
will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE