The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
JOE GLENN MANLEY, )
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Plaintiff, )
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VS. ) No. 19-2343-JDT-cgc
)
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FAYETTE COUNTY JUSTICE )
CENTER, ET AL., )
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Defendants. )
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On May 29, 2019, Plaintiff Joe Glenn Manley, who at the time was an inmate at the
Fayette County Justice Complex (FCJC) in Somerville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) The Court issued an order on May 30, 2019,
directing Manley to either pay the entire civil filing fee or submit an in forma pauperis
affidavit and a copy of his inmate trust account statement in accordance with the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 3.) However, before
complying with that order, Manley notified the Court he was being released from the FCJC.
(ECF Nos. 4 & 5.) The Court therefore directed Manley to submit either the filing fee or
a non-prisoner in forma pauperis affidavit. (ECF No. 6.) Manley filed the appropriate
affidavit on July 1, 2019, (ECF No. 9), and the Court granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, (ECF No. 10).1 The Clerk shall record the Defendants as Fayette County2 and
Quality Correctional Health Care (QCHC).
Manley alleges that he was incarcerated at the FCJC beginning in December 2018
after being discharged from a hospital against a doctor’s advice. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)
He alleges that he has “severe medical issues and now mental issues also.” (Id.) He alleges
that an unnamed nurse or doctor at the FCJC misdiagnosed him after receiving documents
from the hospital. (Id.) As a result, he allegedly was “mistreated and abused [and] left
with some crippling pains due to negligence of proper medical treatment.” (Id.) He asserts
that unnamed medical staff refused to provide him with “the proper treatment at a hospital.”
(Id.)
Manley attached to his complaint a letter with additional detail about his
confinement at the FCJC. (ECF No. 1-1.) He alleges that he “was constantly begging for
medical assistance” while at the FCJC. (Id. at PageID 5.) He alleges that Nurse Amy
Franks, who is not listed as a Defendant, diagnosed him with osteoarthritis without
touching Manley or checking his vitals. (Id.) She prescribed Manley Mobic (generic
Meloxicam)3 for pain, but Manley alleges he remained in “severe pain.” (Id.)
1 Manley subsequently submitted another application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, (ECF No. 11), which is DENIED as moot.
2 Manley sues the FCJC. However, the FCJC is not an entity subject to suit under
§ 1983. See Jones v. Union Cnty., Tennessee, 296 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)). The claims against the FCJC are
construed as claims against Fayette County.
3 See www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-911/meloxicam-oral/details.
Manley alleges that his fiancée called Fayette County Sheriff Bobby Riles, who is
not listed as a defendant, but “[t]he call did not go well.” (Id.) Manley was then sent to
segregation for “medical observation” by FCJC Chief Deputy Dollahite, Chief Jail
Administrator Francis Turner, Lieutenant Bailey, or Lieutenant White, none of whom are
listed as defendants in the complaint. (Id.)
Manley later saw Nurse Franks for additional treatment, who allegedly told him that
he needed surgery but that she could not refer him to a hospital. (Id.) Instead, Franks
prescribed a high dosage of Meloxicam and a steroid pack and told Manley to apply heat
to his sore areas and to ambulate. (Id. at PageID 6.) Manley says that, despite the high
dose of medication, he remains in severe pain “almost to the point of mental anguish.” (Id.)
Manley asserts that Sheriff Riles placed him in segregation as retaliation.4 (Id. at
PageID 6-7.) He alleges that his phone use, church services, access to the kiosk machine,
bunk, and privacy have been limited or taken from him in segregation. (Id. at PageID 7.)
He alleges in passing that unnamed correctional officers have opened his legal mail. (Id.)
He also alleges that he remained in segregation despite committing no disciplinary
infractions. (Id. at PageID 8.)
Manley seeks “proper medical treatment from proffesional [sic] Hospitals and
doctors for physical and mental issues” and wants FCJC or QCHC to pay for the treatment.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.) He also seeks damages. (Id.)
4 Although Manley does not specify the actions for which Sheriff Riles allegedly
retaliated, the Court presumes that Manley believes Riles retaliated against him because of the
phone call from Manley’s fiancée.
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court
accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,
however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.
App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for
failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create
a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Manley filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Manley does not state a claim against Fayette County. When a § 1983 claim is made
against a municipality or county, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether
the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the
municipality or county is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).
A local government such as a municipality or county “cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286
(6th Cir. 1994). A municipality may be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation
only if there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885,
889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the
municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that
his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330
F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364
(6th Cir. 1993)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of
the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that
municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’”
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986) (emphasis in original)).
Manley does not allege that his inadequate medical treatment or abuse are because
of an unconstitutional policy or custom of Fayette County. He instead attributes his
mistreatment to certain individuals who work at or for the FCJC. He therefore fails to state
a claim against Fayette County.
Manley similarly fails to state a claim against QCHC. “A private corporation that
performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts under color of state law
for purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit has
applied the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations
that operate prisons or provide medical care or food services to prisoners. Id. at 748-49;
Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18; Johnson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 26 F. App’x 386, 388 (6th Cir.
2001); see also Eads v. State of Tenn., No. 1:18-cv-00042, 2018 WL 4283030, at *9 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 7, 2018). To prevail on a § 1983 claim against QCHC, Manley “must show
that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the
alleged deprivation” of his rights. Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627
(6th Cir. 2011). However, Manley has not alleged that a policy or custom of QCHC was
the “moving force” behind the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.
In the letter attached to his complaint, Manley alleges that various FCJC personnel
have violated his constitutional rights by providing inadequate medical treatment, placing
him in segregation without cause, opening his legal mail, and retaliating against him. These
allegations may state a valid claim under § 1983. However, Manley does not list any of
these individuals as defendants or seek relief against them. It is therefore not clear from
his letter which of these individuals he wishes to sue, if any. The Court will therefore allow
Manley to amend his complaint to name the person or persons he wishes to sue, plead facts
describing how they deprived him of a constitutional right, and amend his request for relief.
See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511
F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state
a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the
complaint must be afforded.”).
In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Manley’s complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed
within twenty-one days after the date of this order, on or before November 18, 2019.
Manley is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original complaint
and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the
complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the
amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an
amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim
for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that
count. If Manley fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court
will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE