“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”
How later courts described this case
- “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”
- “a court, including an appellate court, will raise lack of subject- matter jurisdiction on its own motion”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
ERIC GLENN FRANKLIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-1234-JDT-cgc
)
NATHAN PRIDE, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE
On October 4, 2019, Plaintiff Eric Glenn Franklin, who is incarcerated at the
Madison County Criminal Justice Complex (CJC) in Jackson, Tennessee, filed a pro se
civil complaint against Nathan Pride, an attorney. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint was
accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The Court issued
an order on October 7, 2019, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the
civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-
(b). (ECF No. 4.)
Franklin alleges in the complaint that Defendant Pride was hired to represent him in
a civil matter involving real property Franklin inherited from his mother. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 2.) He alleges that during the course of the representation, Pride “took it upon
himself to forge another Deed without doing his research and realizing that the property
was still in the original owners [sic] name.” (Id.) When confronted, Pride allegedly said
there was nothing he could do, which resulted in Franklin and his daughter losing their
home. (Id.) He seeks compensatory damages. (Id. at PageID 3.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court
accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,
however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.
App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for
failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create
a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Franklin’s claims. The United
States Supreme Court has stated:
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded
by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted); see also
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“Federal courts are not
courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of
the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”) A federal court
may address its subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.,
456 U.S. 694. 702 (1982) (“a court, including an appellate court, will raise lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction on its own motion”). Furthermore, under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
Franklin’s complaint does not state any basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction
in this case. Though he filed the complaint on the form used for commencing actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is no allegation that the action arises “under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States,” as required for federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Franklin does not allege that Pride violated his civil rights or that he acted
under color of state law. He contends only that Pride mishandled the legal matter for which
he was hired, causing Franklin and his daughter to lose their home. This is a claim of legal
malpractice arising under Tennessee law.
The complaint also does not allege that Franklin and Pride are citizens of different
states, as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Therefore, the
Court has no jurisdiction to hear Franklin’s Tennessee malpractice claim.
Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a),
it is CERTIFIED that any appeal in this matter by Franklin would not be taken in good
faith.
The Court also must address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if
Franklin nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is
not taken in good faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take
advantage of the installment procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997). McGore sets out specific procedures
for implementing the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Franklin is instructed
that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate
filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in the PLRA and McGore by filing
an updated in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust
account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE