Opinion

Smith v. FedEx

Court
District Court, W.D. Tennessee
Filed
Jul 10, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.7%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

SHEREE SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:18-cv-02666-JTF-tmp

)

FEDEX, )

)

Defendant. )

_____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S RACE AND

COLOR DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

_ _____________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court is Defendant FedEx’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Race and Color

Discrimination Claims and Equal Pay Act Claim; the Motion was filed on April 30, 2019. (ECF

No. 15.) Pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-05, this case, including Defendant’s Motion,

was referred to the Magistrate Judge for management of all pretrial matters. Plaintiff Sheree

Smith did not file a response to the Motion, and accordingly, the Magistrate Judge entered an

Order to Show Cause on May 31, 2019, instructing Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should

not grant Defendant’s Motion based solely on the arguments presented therein. (ECF No. 24.)

Plaintiff did not respond to the Order to Show Cause. As a result, the Magistrate Judge

considered the arguments presented by Defendant’s Motion and entered a June 20, 2019 Report

and Recommendation suggesting that this Court grant Defendant’s Motion and dismiss

Plaintiff’s race and color discrimination claims and Equal Pay Act claim. (ECF No. 27.)

Plaintiff did not file objections to the Report and Recommendation.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation should be ADOPTED and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss GRANTED.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge provides, and this Court adopts

and incorporates, proposed findings of fact in this case. (ECF No. 27, 1–3.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) “to relieve some of the burden on the federal courts

by permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrates.” United States v.

Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the provision, magistrate judges may hear

and determine any pretrial matter pending before the Court, except various dispositive motions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Regarding those excepted dispositive motions, magistrate judges may

still hear and submit to the district court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for

disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Upon hearing a pending matter, “[T]he magistrate judge

must enter a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). Any

party who disagrees with a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendation may file written

objections to the report and recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

The standard of review that is applied by the district court depends on the nature of the

matter considered by the magistrate judge. See Baker, 67 F. App’x at 310 (citations omitted) (“A

district court normally applies a ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law’ standard of review for

nondispositive preliminary measures. A district court must review dispositive motions under the

de novo standard.”). Upon review of the evidence, the district court may accept, reject, or

modify the proposed findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. Brown v. Bd. of

Educ., 47 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court

“may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the [m]agistrate [j]udge with

instructions.” Moses v. Gardner, No. 2:14-cv-2706-SHL-dkv, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29701, at

*3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2015). A district judge should adopt the findings and rulings of the

magistrate judge to which no specific objection is filed. Brown, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 674.

ANALYSIS

The Court finds that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Race and Color

Discrimination Claims and Equal Pay Act Claim should be granted as a result of Plaintiff’s

failure to pursue her race and color discrimination claims in her Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) charge and failure to allege any facts regarding Defendant paying

different wages to male employees, as compared to female employees, for performing equal

work under similar conditions. Plaintiff’s race and color discrimination claims are pursuant to

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17; her age-based

discrimination claim is pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29

U.S.C. §§ 621–634; and her Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”) claim is codified at 29 U.S.C.

§206(d).

The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s race and color

discrimination claims should be dismissed because she did not exhaust her administrative

remedies. A plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to each potential

claim before bringing a Title VII action in federal court. Holmes v. Southwest Human Res.

Agency, No. 1:17-cv-02266-STA-egb, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139742, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug.

30, 2017). Thus, “‘[a]s a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that

were not included in h[er] EEOC charge’ unless those claims are ‘reasonably related to or grow

out of the factual allegations in the EEOC charge.’” Russell v. AAA Limo, No. 2:15-cv-02455-

JPM-tmp, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29329, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2016) (quoting Younis v.

Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 2010)). Here, Plaintiff’s EEOC charge

does not provide sufficient facts regarding race or color discrimination. Although she checked

the box for discrimination, which allows for race or color -based discrimination claims, her

EEOC charge merely states, “I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my sex

(female) . . . and age (50)[.]” (ECF No. 21-1, 1.) Additionally, the factual allegations of

Plaintiff’s charge would not prompt the EEOC to investigate a claim for race or color

discrimination. Green v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, No. 18-cv-02269-JTF-tmp, 2018 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 142736, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. July 24, 2018). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s race and color

discrimination claims should be dismissed.

The Court additionally adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s

Complaint cannot state a plausible EPA claim, as it does not allege any facts regarding

Defendant paying different wages to male employees for performing work equal to that of

Plaintiff under similar conditions. To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “‘a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). As it relates to Plaintiff’s EPA claim, the Court

notes that “[t]he EPA prohibits employers from paying an employee at a rate less than that paid

to an employee of the opposite sex for performing equal work.” Schleicher v. Preferred Sols.,

Inc., 831 F.3d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 359 (6th

Cir. 2006)). Thus, to state an EPA claim here, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to allow the

court to reasonably infer that Defendant paid Plaintiff, as a female, a rate less than that paid to an

employee of the opposite sex for performing equal work. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, fails to

allege any facts regarding Defendant paying different wages to male employees for performing

equal work under similar conditions. Thus, Plaintiff’s EPA claim should be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Upon de novo review, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation to GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Race and Color

Discrimination Claims and Equal Pay Act Claim and, accordingly, DISMISSES said claims

from this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 10th day of July 2019.

s/John T. Fowlkes, Jr.

John T. Fowlkes, Jr.

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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