Gauldin v. Dyersburg City Police Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

TERRELL LEE GAULDIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

VS. ) No. 19-1043-JDT-cgc

)

DYERSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, )

ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT,

CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH

AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

On March 1, 2019, Plaintiff Terrell Lee Gauldin, who is incarcerated at the Dyer

County Jail (Jail) in Dyersburg, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The

Court issued an order on March 6, 2019, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and

assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as the

Dyersburg Police Department (DPD), and Dyersburg Police Officers Mason McDowell

and Chris Clements.

Gauldin alleges that on June 20, 2018, he was at the apartment of a man named

Anthony Taylor when police executed a search warrant. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 23.) The

officers found marijuana in the apartment and charged Gauldin with its possession. (Id.)

Because Gauldin had an active arrest warrant, the officers arrested him and took him to a

different residence allegedly against his will. (Id.) Gauldin alleges that this residence “was

not my parole address or my residence at all.”1 (Id.) Gauldin alleges that he was charged

with possessing the marijuana because he was “in proximity of it.” (Id.) Gauldin also

alleges that Taylor was “in proximity of” seven shotgun shells allegedly found in a

bedroom and should have been charged as a felon in possession of ammunition. (Id.)

Gauldin suggests that it “seems like selective prosecution.” (Id.)

Gauldin further alleges that, at the second apartment, Officer McDowell “try [sic]

and charge me with some kind of drug paraphanelia [sic]” found in Taylor’s apartment.

(Id. at PageID 25.) Gauldin asked to be escorted to the police station, where he was taken

after officers searched the second apartment. (Id.) Gauldin alleges that no officer asked

him what had happened on June 9, 2018, though he does not explain the significance of

that date. (Id.) He alleges that he has lost his job because of his incarceration. (Id.)

Gauldin also details events that allegedly occurred on March 15, 2007. (Id. at

PageID 26.) He alleges that he and two others were in his car at his uncle’s house when

Officers Clements and McDowell “hopped out on me and grabbed me” and tried to force

Gauldin “down in some mud.” (Id.) When Gauldin refused, the officers started to hit him

1 According to a police report of the incident that Gauldin attached to his complaint, the

second apartment was his residence, and he requested to be taken there from Taylor’s apartment.

(ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 24.)

with “slap sticks” or “[b]atons” until Gauldin “ran off the scene because I was scared for

my life.” (Id.) Gauldin alleges that “they didn’t catch with me until another month or

two.” (Id.) Gauldin alleges that Officer Clements signed off on “th[e] warrant with out

even asking me what [sic] going on!”2 (Id.)

Gauldin seeks monetary damages against the officers. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.)

He also wants the officers to be reprimanded “so they don’t feel it is ok to continue this

behavior with other arrestees in the future.” (Id.)

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,

or any portion thereof, if the complaintC

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may

be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court

accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines

whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,

2 Gauldin does not specify whether this refers to the search warrant for Taylor’s

apartment or the arrest warrant for Gauldin.

631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations

“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by

factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’

rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at

383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,

however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.

App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for

failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create

a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l

Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

Gauldin filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of

rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a

defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150

(1970).

Gauldin seeks to sue the DPD, which is not a separate entity subject to suit under

§ 1983 apart from Dyer County itself. The Court liberally construes his claim as against

Dyer County. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). A local

government such as a municipality or county “cannot be held liable solely because it

employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983

on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)

(emphasis in original); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).

A municipality may be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation only if there is a

direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged deprivation.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir.

1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal

policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular

injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815

(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).

“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality

from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability

is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis

v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,

479-80 (1986) (emphasis in original)).

Gauldin does not assert that the alleged violation of his rights was because of a

custom or policy of Dyer County. He instead alleges that the two officers violated his

rights by their own conduct. He therefore fails to state a claim against Dyer County.

Gauldin takes issue with the search of the apartment and his arrest on drug charges

and seems to contend he is being held in the Jail in violation of his rights. However, if the

prosecution of the drug charges is ongoing in state court, this Court cannot intervene in the

proceedings. Under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, “[a] court of the United

States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect

or effectuate its judgments.” The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[t]he Act thereby creates

‘an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction

falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions,’ which are set forth in the statutory

language.” Andreano v. City of Westlake, 136 F. App’x 865, 879-80 (6th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)).

Federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings can be issued only “under

extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and

immediate.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that

[c]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience

of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by

themselves be considered “irreparable” in the special legal sense of that term.

Instead, the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that

cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.

Id. at 46. In this case, Gauldin does not allege the type of extraordinary circumstances that

would permit the Court to become involved in his state-court criminal matter. Any issues

concerning the search, the decision to prosecute, and the evidence against him must be

addressed in his defense against that criminal proceeding.

If Gauldin already has been convicted of the drug offense, his claims of false

imprisonment or kidnapping, which challenge the validity of his continued confinement,

are not cognizable under § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973)) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive

remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even

though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.”). A prisoner may not

raise claims in a civil rights action if a judgment on the merits of those claims would affect

the validity of his conviction or sentence, unless the conviction or sentence has been set

aside. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

The holdings in these cases, “taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983

action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or

equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to

conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

74, 81-82 (2005). Gauldin has not alleged that any conviction on the drug charges has been

invalidated. His claims are thus barred by Heck.

For the foregoing reasons, Gauldin fails to state a claim, and the complaint must be

dismissed.3

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his

complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d

944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013)

(per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form

of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).

Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v.

United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every

sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be

reversed. If it is crystal clear that . . . amending the complaint would be futile, then a

sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001)

(“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that

cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the

right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court concludes that leave to amend is not

warranted.

3 To the extent Gauldin seeks relief for the events that allegedly occurred in March 2007,

his claims are well beyond the one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in

Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1); Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794

(6th Cir. 2005).

In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Gauldin’s complaint for failure to state a

claim on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend is DENIED.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal

by Gauldin in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an

objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). It would be

inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior to

service on the Defendants but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis.

See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations

that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion

that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if

Gauldin nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is

not taken in good faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take

advantage of the installment procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other grounds

by LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951. McGore sets out specific procedures for implementing

the PLRA, §§ 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Gauldin is instructed that if he wishes to take

advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee, he must comply

with the procedures set out in the PLRA and McGore by filing an updated in forma

pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust account for the six

months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.

For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Gauldin, this is

the first dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This strike

shall take effect when judgment is entered. See Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759,

1763-64 (2015).

The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James D. Todd

JAMES D. TODD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE