Winston v. Shelby County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

RYAN WINSTON, JR. )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

VS. ) No. 17-2623-JDT-cgc

)

SHELBY COUNTY, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING COMPLAINT

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On August 24, 2017, Plaintiff Ryan Winston, Jr., who is in custody at the Shelby

County Criminal Justice Center (Jail) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

(ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order on August 28, 2017, granting leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the

Defendants as Shelby County,1 Officer First Name Unknown (FNU) Bradfelid, and Officer

FNU Dickerson.2

1 The Court construes the allegations against the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office as an

attempt to assert a claim against Shelby County. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove the Shelby

County Sheriff’s Office as a Defendant and add Shelby County as the correct party.

2 Winston names “Officer Dickson” as a Defendant but refers in his complaint to “Officer

Winston alleges that he was “abused and violated” by officers at the Jail.

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Winston states he had attempted suicide to get the attention of

an unnamed sergeant, who then ordered Winston moved to J-pod. (Id.) Officer Dickerson

came to transport Winston to J-pod. (Id.) As Winston was being escorted to J-pod, he

“notice[d]” that the cell was unsanitary and had feces in it. (Id.) Winston refused to be

housed in the cell and “was handcuffed and carried and held against my will.” (Id.)3

Winston alleges that on another occasion he again was handcuffed and dragged

against his will toward a classroom. (Id. at PageID 3.) Officers Dickerson and Bradfelid

allegedly threatened Winston and attacked him while he was handcuffed. (Id.) Winston

states that he has lost sleep since the alleged attack and is “afraid that this could happen to

me again.” (Id.) Winston alleges that his “mental state has been shakey [sic],” and though

he is in protective custody, he does not feel safe. (Id.) Winston states he wants “my

confertdental [sic] award for my pains and suffering.” (Id.)

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,

or any portion thereof, if the complaintC

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

Dickerson.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2-3.) The Court presumes these are the same person and will

refer to this Defendant as “Officer Dickerson.” The Clerk also is DIRECTED to correct this

Defendant’s name on the docket.

3 Winston does not specify whether he was forced to stay in the allegedly unsanitary cell.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may

be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

(2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court

accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines

whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,

631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations

“are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by

factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’

rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at

383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,

however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.

App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for

failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create

a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l

Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

Winston filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of

rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a

defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150

(1970).

Winston’s claims against the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office and any official

capacity claims against Officers Bradfelid and Dickerson must be treated as claims against

Shelby County. The complaint, however, does not state a valid § 1983 claim against

Shelby County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality or county, the court

must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a

constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality or county is responsible for

that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).

A local government such as a municipality or county “cannot be held liable solely

because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable

under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286

(6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation

unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged

constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio,

989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must

(1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and

(3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v.

Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d

358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish

acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear

that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually

responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur

v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in original). Winston does not

allege that he suffered an injury because of an unconstitutional policy or custom of Shelby

County.

Winston’s allegations that the officers handcuffed him, dragged him against his will,

threatened him, and attacked him amount to a claim of excessive force. At the time of the

alleged assault, Winston was a pretrial detainee whose protection against excessive force

is provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473

(2015). Excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective reasonableness, which “turns on the ‘facts

and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

396 (1989)). The Court must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force “from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the

time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.

Under an objective reasonableness inquiry, “the question is whether the officers’

actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,

without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397

(citations omitted). The proper application of this standard requires consideration of the

following factors:

the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force

used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to

temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem

at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the

plaintiff was actively resisting.

Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. This list is not exhaustive but illustrates some of the

“objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force.” Id.

Winston provides scant details about the incident and alleges only that he was being

dragged “toward the class room.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.) He does not describe the

circumstances behind his being handcuffed, the reason for his being taken to a classroom,

or in what way the officers “attacked” him. A physical attack on a handcuffed pretrial

detainee causing injury could constitute excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment.

See, e.g., Jimenez v. Fresno Cnty. Super. Ct., No. 1:13-CV-01204-SAB PC, 2013 WL

5315237, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2013) (allegations that deputy pushed handcuffed

pretrial detainee into a door, causing eye, elbow, and neck injuries, stated claim under

Fourteenth Amendment); Brooks v. Austin, 720 F. Supp. 2d 715, 720 (E.D. Pa. 2010)

(pretrial detainee’s allegations that officers slammed him into a wall and stepped on his

neck while he was handcuffed, causing knee and shoulder injuries, stated Fourteenth

Amendment claim). However, Winston does not allege that he was physically attacked or

suffered any physical injury. His failure to allege that he suffered any physical injury

requires dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which provides:

“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a

prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.”

For the foregoing reasons, Winston’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety

for failure to state a claim.

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his

complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d

944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per

curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of

notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).

Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry, 246

F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte

dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with

due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court

finds that Winston should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint.

In conclusion, Winston’s complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b(1).

Leave to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within twenty-

one days after the date of this order.

Winston is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original complaint

and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The amended

complaint must be signed, and the text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient

facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits

must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached

to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts

alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count

and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Winston fails to file an amended

complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g) and enter judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James D. Todd

JAMES D. TODD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE