The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
GREGORY D. VALENTINE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-00204
) Judge Aleta A. Trauger
JUDGE DEE DAVID GAY, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Gregory Valentine, who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendant, Sumner County Criminal Court Judge Dee
David Gay, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
“forc[ing] [him] into a malicious prosecution plea” and then “kidnapping [him] from 9-30-11 until
10-25-12 in the Sumner County Jail.” (Doc. No. 1, at 3.) In his verified Complaint, the plaintiff
explains that he was supposed to have been released from incarceration on September 30, 2011
but, “for some unknown reason,” remained in jail for thirteen months past his release date. (Id. at
4.) The plaintiff clearly checked the box on the form Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights to
indicate that he intended to sue Gay in his official capacity.
The defendant, therefore, reasonably construed the Complaint as asserting a § 1983 claim
against him in his official capacity only and filed a Motion to Dismiss that claim, along with a
supporting Memorandum of Law. (Doc. Nos. 12, 13.) He argues that the lawsuit against him in his
official capacity for money damages is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, under the
11th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, alternatively, that the claim is facially
barred by the one-year statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 actions in Tennessee, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). (Doc. No. 13, 1–2.)
Following the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiff sought an extension of the
deadline for responding and also sought to amend his Complaint specifically for the purpose of
asserting claims against Gay in his individual capacity. (Doc. Nos. 15, 19-1.) The defendant
opposed the motion on the grounds of futility, arguing that (1) any claim against him in his
individual capacity is barred by the one-year statute of limitations that expired no later than
October 25, 2013, nearly a decade before the plaintiff filed this lawsuit; and (2) the plaintiff failed
to establish any basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 19.)
The matter having been referred to her pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the
Magistrate Judge issued a Memorandum Order in June 2023, denying the plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend as futile and directing him to respond to the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 21.)
The plaintiff did not seek this court’s review of that ruling.
In his Response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiff continues to argue that
the statute of limitations should not bar his claims, but the Response does not address the
defendant’s sovereign immunity argument.
The Magistrate Judge thereafter issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) (Doc. No.
23), recommending that the Motion to Dismiss be granted solely on the grounds of sovereign
immunity, without reaching the defendant’s alternative argument that the plaintiff’s claims are also
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely. The R&R further recommends that this case
be dismissed in its entirety.
Now before the court are the plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 24.) He objects
to the finding that Gay is entitled to sovereign immunity, arguing on policy-based grounds (that
were not raised in his original Response) that sovereign immunity should be withheld in this case.
He also insists, as he did in his Motion to Amend, that Gay’s “decision to intentionally keep the
Plaintiff incarcerated” constituted the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and deprived
him of due process and the equal protection of the laws. (Id. at 3.) In other words, he appears to be
suggesting, though somewhat obliquely, that Gay should be liable in his individual capacity for
depriving the plaintiff of his constitutional rights.
For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s Objections will be overruled, and the court
will accept the R&R and dismiss the case in its entirety.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
When a party files timely objections to a magistrate judge’s ruling on a dispositive matter,
such as a motion to dismiss, the district court must review de novo any portion of the report and
recommendation to which objections are “properly” lodged. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (3); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) & (C). An objection is “properly” made if it is sufficiently specific to “enable[ ] the
district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the
parties' dispute.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). “The filing of vague, general, or
conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a
complete failure to object.” Holloway v. Palmer, No. 16-2450, 2017 WL 4844457, at *2 (6th Cir.
Apr. 5, 2017); see also Special Learning, Inc. v. Step by Step Acad., Inc., 751 F. App’x 816, 819
(6th Cir. 2018). The district court is not required to review—under any standard—those aspects of
the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150. In
addition, arguments made in an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that
were not first presented to the magistrate judge for consideration are deemed waived. Murr v.
United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
In conducting its review, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
Although pro se pleadings and filings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted
by lawyers, see, e.g., Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants are not
entirely exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
II. DISCUSSION
The R&R exhaustively considers whether the official-capacity claim against Gay should
be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds of
sovereign immunity and concludes that (1) the Sumner County Criminal Court is an arm of the
state and a state criminal court judge is an officer of the state; and (2) no exception to the state’s
sovereign immunity applies to Valentine’s claims. Valentine’s Objections do not address or attack
these conclusions, nor did he raise any cogent argument against the application of sovereign
immunity in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss. The court, moreover, has reviewed the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusions of law de novo and finds no error. The plaintiff’s Objections to the
dismissal of his claims against Gay in his official capacity on the grounds of sovereign immunity,
therefore, will be overruled.
Insofar as the plaintiff’s Objections may be construed as arguing that he should be
permitted to pursue his individual-capacity claims, the Magistrate Judge already conclusively
determined that the Complaint states an official-capacity claim only and denied the plaintiff’s
Motion to Amend to add an individual-capacity claim on the grounds of futility. The plaintiff did
not file timely objections to that ruling, and the court will not revisit it now.
I. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff's Objections will be overruled, and the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Motion to Dismiss be granted will be accepted in its
entirety. A separate Order to that effect is filed herewith.
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge