Shuler v. Weeks

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

LEWIS CLAY SHULER, JR., #606408, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:23-cv-00458

)

ADAM C. WEEKS, et al., ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Lewis Shuler, a state inmate in custody at the Morgan County Correctional Complex in

Wartburg, Tennessee, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No.

1, “the Complaint”) and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Doc. No. 7.)

The case is before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s IFP application and for an initial

review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP

A prisoner bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing

fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from Plaintiff’s submission that he lacks sufficient

financial resources to pay the full filing fee in advance, his application to proceed IFP in this matter

(Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED and a $350 filing fee1 is ASSESSED.

The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his trust

account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a)

1 While prisoners who are not granted pauper status must pay a total fee of $402––a civil filing fee

of $350 plus a civil administrative fee of $52––prisoners who are granted pauper status are only liable for

the $350 civil filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)–(b) and attached District Court Miscellaneous Fee

Schedule, provision 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2020).

20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average

monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of

the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s

preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when

the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350

filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).

The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which

Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining

to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,

the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of

confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order

must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

II. INITIAL REVIEW

A. Legal Standard

The Court must dismiss the Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). The

review for whether the Complaint states a claim asks whether it contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” such that it would survive a

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,

470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), they must still

“plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488

(6th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which confers a private federal right of

action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right,

privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley,

675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012).

B. Analysis of the Complaint

Plaintiff sues multiple officers of the Nashville Police Department, as well as his trial and

appellate attorneys, the prosecuting attorneys, and the state-court judge who presided over his

criminal proceedings (see Doc. No. 1 at 2–4), claiming that his federal constitutional rights were

violated when he was arrested in his home without a warrant or probable cause on June 16, 2017;

falsely imprisoned thereafter on a homicide charge for which he had a preliminary hearing on June

26, 2017 and, eventually, a jury trial; and otherwise subjected to malicious prosecution because

the case against him relied on “false information” gleaned from a post-arrest interview he gave at

“East Precinct” while intoxicated. (Id. at 3, 5–11.) Noting that his earlier § 1983 lawsuit claiming

false arrest was dismissed because he failed to allege that he was arrested or detained without

probable cause, Plaintiff in the instant Complaint explicitly alleges a lack of probable cause at the

time of arrest. (See id. at 12 (citing Shuler v. Doe, et al., No. 3:18-cv-00854, dismissed on Nov.

20, 2018).) As relief, he asks this Court to enjoin the Davidson County Criminal Court to hold a

probable cause hearing (with Plaintiff in attendance), in addition to seeking compensatory and

punitive damages. (Id. at 13–14.)

The Court must dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Plaintiff properly asserts federal constitutional claims against state and local officials

under § 1983. However, a one-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising in

Tennessee, per Section 28-3-104(a) of the Tennessee Code. Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792,

794 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Ford v. Westbrooks, No. 3:18-cv-01273, 2019 WL 2395527, at *4

(M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2019) (“Sixth Circuit precedent ‘has long made clear that the limitations

period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision found in Tenn.

Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a).’”) (quoting Porter v. Brown, 289 F. App’x 114, 116 (6th Cir. 2008)).

The Complaint in this case was filed in May of 2023, but is wholly concerned with events that

occurred in 2017, when Plaintiff was arrested, jailed, and brought to a preliminary hearing where

the arresting officer first testified about events that occurred at East Precinct following Plaintiff’s

arrest.

Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that typically does not result

in a pre-answer dismissal, when “the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim

is time-barred,” it is appropriate to dismiss for failure to state a claim on that basis. Cataldo v. U.S.

Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (“If

the allegations . . . show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint

is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim[.]”)). Moreover, “in the context of a statutorily-

required initial screen, ‘[w]hen a meritorious affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute

of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint, sua sponte dismissal of the complaint as

frivolous is appropriate.’” Campbell v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:21-cv-4055, 2021 WL 4033162, at

*4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2021) (quoting Castillo v. Grogan, 52 F. App’x 750, 751 (6th Cir. 2002));

see also, e.g., Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding “that

the district court [on initial review under the PLRA] properly dismissed as frivolous Plaintiff’s

claims arising out of his incarceration at HCCF inasmuch as any such claim is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations”) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3)).

Here, the untimeliness of Plaintiff’s claims is obvious from the face of the Complaint. His

cause of action for false arrest/imprisonment accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run,

at the latest, when his detention without a warrant or other legal process (such as an arraignment

or preliminary hearing) ended––in 2017. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388–90 (2007)

(finding that false arrest “is a species of” false imprisonment, and that the petitioner’s longer period

of false imprisonment ended “when legal process was initiated against him, and the statute would

have begun to run from that date”). The one-year period for filing such claims thus expired more

than five years ago.

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim refers to proceedings

that followed Plaintiff’s detention pursuant to legal process and involved the State’s use of falsified

evidence,2 such a claim does not accrue at the time the prosecution is initiated, but only when the

prosecution terminates in the claimant’s favor. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019); see

King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that, because favorable

termination is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, such a claim “is not available before

the favorable termination of criminal proceedings”). Because the criminal proceedings against

Plaintiff resulted in his conviction and have not subsequently been determined favorably to him,

he cannot at this time assert a viable § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution based on falsified

evidence.

2 See Doc. No. 1 at 7 (describing development of “false information” during East Precinct interview

that was “then used within the Affidavit of Complaint” by the arresting officer, who testified at the

preliminary hearing and at trial).

IH. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

This is the final Order denying all relief in this matter. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b). The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this Order would not be taken

in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

It is so ORDERED.

ble X :

Coblfp

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE