Iyebote v. Meharry Medical College

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DISEIYE IYEBOTE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:20-cv-00475

v. Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Alistair E. Newbern

MEHARRY MEDICAL COLLEGE,

Defendant.

To: The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., Chief District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.

§§ 2601–2654, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101 et

seq., arises out of Defendant Meharry Medical College’s termination of Plaintiff Diseiye Iyebote,

M.D.’s employment in Meharry’s psychiatric residency program. (Doc. No. 1.)

After the Court granted in part and denied in part Meharry’s motion for summary judgment

(Doc. No. 43), the parties agreed in mediation to settle Iyebote’s remaining claims. Iyebote

subsequently refused to sign the final settlement agreement. (Doc. No. 91.) Meharry filed a motion

asking the Court to enforce the parties’ mediated agreement and award Meharry attorney’s fees

associated with filing its motion. (Doc. No. 95.) Iyebote opposes Meharry’s motion (Doc. No. 97),

and Meharry filed a reply (Doc. No. 98).

For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court grant

Meharry’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement and deny without prejudice

Meharry’s request for attorney’s fees.

I. Relevant Background

A. Factual Background

The Court set out the facts underlying Iyebote’s FMLA and THRA sexual harassment,

retaliation, and disability claims in its memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying

in part Meharry’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 42, 43.) This Report and

Recommendation summarizes the facts relevant to Meharry’s motion to enforce the parties’

settlement agreement.

Iyebote was a second-year resident in Meharry’s Department of Psychiatry and Behavior

Sciences when she experienced sexual harassment by fellow resident Dr. Mina Ossei and

Associate Chief Resident Dr. Paschal Ike. (Doc. No. 42.) In April 2018, Ossei “falsely spread

rumors that Iyebote was sexually involved with three attending physicians in the Internal Medicine

Department at the Veteran’s Affairs Hospital[,]” which interfered with Iyebote’s ability to

complete a rotation in that department. (Id. at PageID# 927.) Between August 2018 and

March 2019, Ike made “sexually inappropriate statements toward and about Iyebote”; “entered a

room with her, closed the door, exposed his genitals, and suggested that she perform oral sex”;

“touched her in a sexually inappropriate manner”; and “showed up unannounced” while Iyebote

“worked an overnight hospital shift,” “entered the resident call room when Iyebote was alone and

stole her laptop.” (Id.)

Iyebote complained about Ossei’s and Ike’s harassment to Meharry Psychiatry Department

Chair Dr. Lloyda Williamson. (Doc. No. 42.) She also complained about Ike’s harassment “to

Dr. Richmond Akatue, Meharry’s Associate Dean of Graduate Medical Education, fellow resident

Dr. Karlos Parham, and to physician colleagues Dr. Appleton and Dr. Farhan Adam.” (Id. at

PageID# 928.) Williamson discouraged Iyebote from contacting Meharry’s human resources

department (HR) about the harassment, and Iyebote did not contact HR regarding Ossei or Ike.

(Doc. No. 42.) None of the doctors to whom Iyebote complained reported the harassment to HR,

despite a Meharry policy requiring “any supervisory employee who learns about alleged sexual

harassment to report it to [HR].” (Id. at PageID# 928.) After Iyebote complained to Williamson,

“Williamson attempted to discipline and terminate Iyebote.” (Id. at PageID# 929.)

Iyebote was diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder in

March 2019 and requested and received several weeks of FMLA leave from her residency

program. (Doc. No. 42.) On Iyebote’s first day back from FMLA leave, Williamson assigned

Iyebote to a twenty-four-hour shift despite Iyebote’s request for a reduced work schedule,

disciplined Iyebote for tardiness that had occurred two months earlier, and emailed a Meharry

official to complain about Iyebote’s overall work performance. (Id.) Williamson terminated

Iyebote’s residency on April 29, 2019, at the end of Iyebote’s second year of the four-year

program. (Id.) Iyebote appealed the termination to the Meharry Graduate Medical Education

Board, which upheld the termination but recommended that Iyebote be allowed to complete her

internal medicine rotation. (Id.) Williamson rejected the Board’s recommendation and terminated

Iyebote’s residency. (Id.)

B. Procedural History

Iyebote initiated this action by filing a complaint against Meharry asserting claims of

disability discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under the THRA and claims of

interference and retaliation under the FMLA. (Doc. No. 1.) Meharry moved for summary

judgment. (Doc. No. 27.) The Court granted in part and denied in part Meharry’s motion, entering

summary judgment in Meharry’s favor on Iyebote’s THRA disability discrimination claim, but

denying summary judgment on her remaining THRA sexual harassment and retaliation claims and

FMLA interference and retaliation claims. (Doc. Nos. 42, 43.)

In accordance with the Court’s orders, Iyebote and Meharry participated in a private

mediation on May 9, 2022, with mediator Michael Russell. (Doc. Nos. 43, 48, 85.) That day, the

parties signed a handwritten term sheet indicating their agreement to settle Iyebote’s remaining

THRA and FMLA claims and identifying four material terms of their agreement. The handwritten

agreement, which is attached to Meharry’s motion, records the following terms:

1. The parties have agreed to settle this case for [a redacted dollar amount]

inclusive of attorneys fees and costs.

2. Plaintiff will sign a general release of claims and dismiss her pending lawsuit

with prejudice.

3. Plaintiff will be reinstated for her PGY31 year in Colorado. During Plaintiff’s

PGY3 year, Defendant will cooperate with her in her efforts to transfer to

another program for her PGY4 year. Counsel for Plaintiff and counsel for

Defendant will work together in good faith to draft a mutually agreed upon letter

of reference that will be attached to the final settlement agreement. Plaintiff will

be listed as PGY4 at the end of her PGY3 year. Defendant will complete any

form requested by a potential transferring institution in compliance with any

attendance records of the Plaintiff.

4. The final settlement agreement will contain the following provisions:

A. Confidentiality

B. No admission of liability

C. Non-disparagement, mutual with specific language to be finalized in the

final agreement.

The agreement was signed by Iyebote and a representative of Meharry on May 9, 2022.

(Doc. No. 96-1, PageID# 1150.)

Russell filed a mediation report on May 10, 2022, informing the Court that the parties had

settled all of Iyebote’s claims (Doc. No. 85), and the Court ordered the parties to file an agreed

order of dismissal by May 31, 2022 (Doc. No. 86).

1 The abbreviations “PGY3” and “PGY4” stand for “program year three” and “program year

four.” (Doc. No. 98.)

After twice moving to extend the deadline for filing a dismissal order, the parties notified

the Court that “Iyebote [was] not going to enter into the proposed Settlement Agreement and

Release” and wanted to proceed to trial; Meharry took “the position that the parties ha[d] reached

an enforceable settlement agreement and” planned to file a motion asking the Court to enforce the

agreement. (Doc. No. 91, PageID# 1131.) Iyebote stated in the notice that, “[i]n the weeks after

the mediation, [she] learned that all of Meharry’s educational programs are on probation and could

potentially lose their accreditation altogether” and that this information “changes the agreement”

because it “severely inhibits, if not eliminates, Iyebote’s ability to transfer” to another residency

program for her fourth program year. (Id. at PageID# 1133.)

Meharry filed a motion to enforce the parties’ mediated settlement (Doc. No. 95), arguing

that the signed term sheet establishes the parties’ mutual assent to all material terms of the

agreement and that there is no evidence that the agreement is invalid because of fraud, duress, or

mutual mistake (Doc. No. 96). Meharry asks the Court to enforce the settlement, order Iyebote to

sign a final settlement agreement, dismiss this action with prejudice, and award Meharry attorney’s

fees associated with filing its motion. (Id.)

Iyebote responds that Meharry had a duty to disclose its probationary accreditation status

to her before the mediation and that Meharry fraudulently “concealed this fact, causing [her] to

enter into a settlement agreement that was to her detriment” because the probationary status

“inhibits, if not entirely eliminates, her ability to transfer institutions after her third year of

residency with Meharry, which is a material term of the settlement.” (Doc. No. 97, PageID# 1154–

55.) In support of her argument, Iyebote filed a “Probationary Accreditation Status” update from

Meharry stating that, “[o]n January 21st 2022, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical

Education (ACGME) notified Meharry Medical College, School of Medicine that its role as

sponsor of our graduate medical education[ ] was being placed on probationary accreditation status

effective Jan[uary] 18th.” (Doc. No. 97-1, PageID# 1160.) Iyebote also argues that, while she “is

currently working in [Meharry’s] residency program in Colorado[,]” she “has been unable to

participate in the [transfer] application process” because, despite promising to provide her “with

all the required attendance records for transfer” as part of the settlement agreement, Meharry has

not produced sufficient attendance records to establish which medical rotations Iyebote has

completed. (Doc. No. 97, PageID# 1152 n.1, 1157).

Meharry replies that Iyebote’s readmission to its “residency program in Colorado is

conclusive evidence that the [p]arties reached an enforceable agreement.” (Doc. No. 98,

PageID# 1184.) Meharry also argues that Iyebote cannot show that Meharry fraudulently

concealed its probationary accreditation status from her because Meharry publicized the

probationary status on its website well before the mediation. (Doc. No. 98.) To support this

assertion, Meharry filed a declaration from its director of communications and marketing stating

that, “[o]n February 9, 2022, [he] placed a notification . . . on the web page for Meharry’s residency

programs” with a hyperlink to the probationary accreditation status update on which Iyebote relies,

and that the notice and hyperlink “have been maintained on the web page . . . at all times since

February 9, 2022.” (Id. at PageID# 1191–92, ¶¶ 3, 8.) Meharry further argues that its probationary

accreditation status was not material to the parties’ settlement agreement because Iyebote’s

transfer to another program “is not within [Meharry’s] power to grant” and Iyebote has not offered

any support for her claim that “transfer would be ‘nearly impossible—if not impossible’ and that

residents seeking transfer from institutions with probationary accreditation are ‘viewed as deficient

and are limited in their ability [to transfer].’” (Id. at PageID# 1187, 1188 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Doc. No. 97, PageID# 1153, 1155).)

II. Legal Standard

A district court has “broad, inherent authority and equitable power . . . to enforce an

agreement in settlement of litigation pending before it[.]” Bostick Foundry Co. v. Lindberg, 797

F.2d 280, 282–83 (6th Cir. 1986). This power “‘has its basis in the policy favoring the settlement

of disputes and the avoidance of costly and time-consuming litigation . . . .’” Therma-Scan, Inc. v.

Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Kukla v. Nat’l

Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1973)). “Settlement agreements are a type of

contract and are therefore governed by contract law.” Bamerilease Cap. Corp. v. Nearburg, 958

F.2d 150, 152 (6th Cir. 1992). Courts determine the validity of a contractual settlement agreement

“‘by reference to state substantive law governing contracts generally.’” Id. (quoting White Farm

Equip. Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986)).

“Before enforcing settlement, the district court must conclude that agreement has been

reached on all material terms.” Therma-Scan, Inc., 217 F.3d at 419 (alteration omitted) (quoting

Brock v. Scheuner Corp., 841 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also RE/MAX Int’l, Inc. v. Realty

One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 645–46 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). “Summary enforcement of a settlement

agreement for which there is no dispute as to the terms of the agreement is the only appropriate

judicial response, absent proof of fraud or duress.” RE/MAX Int’l, Inc., 271 F.3d at 650; see also

Henley v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 141 F. App’x

437, 443 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the parties reached agreement on all material terms, then existing

precedent ‘dictates that only the existence of fraud or mutual mistake can justify reopening an

otherwise valid settlement agreement.’” (quoting Brown v. Cnty. of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169, 174

(6th Cir. 1989))). The party challenging the settlement “bears the burden of showing that the

settlement . . . was invalid because of fraud or a mutual mistake under which both parties acted[.]”

Nicklin v. Henderson, 352 F.3d 1077, 1081 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Brown, 872 F.2d at 174); see

also Henley, 141 F. App’x at 443 (“[O]nce a settlement is reached, it is the party challenging the

settlement who bears the burden to show that the settlement contract was invalid based on fraud

or mutual mistake.”).

III. Analysis

Iyebote does not argue that she and Meharry failed to reach agreement on all material terms

of the settlement. See Therma-Scan, Inc., 217 F.3d at 419; RE/MAX Int’l, Inc., 271 F.3d at 645–

46. Instead, she argues that the parties’ settlement agreement is invalid because Meharry

fraudulently concealed its probationary accreditation status from her. (Doc. No. 97.) She also

argues that the agreement cannot be enforced because Meharry has failed to provide her with

adequate attendance records as required by the terms of the settlement. (Id.) Neither argument is

persuasive.

Iyebote bears the burden to show invalidity of the settlement agreement based on fraud.

Nicklin, 352 F.3d at 1081; Henley, 141 F. App’x at 443. Under Tennessee law, “fraudulent

concealment is committed when a party who has a duty to disclose a known fact or condition fails

to do so, and another party reasonably relies upon the resulting misrepresentation, thereby

suffering injury.” Chrisman v. Hill Home Dev., Inc., 978 S.W.2d 535, 538–39 (Tenn. 1998); see

also Justice v. Anderson Cnty., 955 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (“It is well-settled that

fraud can be an intentional misrepresentation of a known, material fact or it can be the concealment

or nondisclosure of a known fact when there is a duty to disclose.”). The Tennessee Supreme Court

has long held that fraudulent concealment requires the existence of a duty to disclose:

The equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment is based upon the principle of fair

dealing. Where there is no dealing between the parties, there can be no

concealment. And, even where the parties have had business transactions, it is

universally held that mere silence does not constitute fraudulent concealment.

. . .

There must be a concealment, and the silence must amount to fraud. Concealment

in this sense may consist in withholding information asked for, or in making use of

some device to mislead, thus involving act and intention. The term generally infers

also that the person is in some way called upon to make a disclosure. It may be

said, therefore, that, in addition to a failure to disclose known facts, there must be

some trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry, or else

that there must be a legal or equitable duty resting on the party knowing such facts

to disclose them.

Saltire Indus., Inc. v. Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, PLLC, 491 F.3d 522, 527–28 (6th Cir.

2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Patten v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 55 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tenn.

1933)).

Iyebote argues that Meharry had a duty to notify her of its probationary accreditation status

under ACGME’s policies and procedures (Doc. No. 97), which provide that “[a]ll applicants

invited to interview, and residents/fellows accepted into or enrolled in a program with or sponsored

by a Sponsoring Institution with Probationary Accreditation must be notified in writing of the

probationary status” (Doc. No. 97-4, PageID# 1178). Iyebote has not shown that she was an

applicant invited to interview, resident, or fellow at any time between January 21, 2022, when

ACGME notified Meharry of its probationary accreditation status, and May 9, 2022, when the

parties engaged in mediation. To the contrary, the Court found it undisputed at summary judgment

that Meharry terminated Iyebote’s residency effective April 29, 2019. (Doc. No. 42.) Iyebote cites

a July 21, 2022 letter from Meharry’s Residence Training Director notifying Iyebote “[a]s required

by the [ACGME]” “in writing that our residency training program is on Probationary Accreditation

status.” (Doc. No. 97-2). Meharry states that it provided this notice “in furtherance of [Iyebote’s]

readmittance to [its] residency program” under the terms of the settlement agreement and pursuant

to its duty to “residents/fellows accepted into . . . a program” (Doc. No. 98, PageID# 1187). Iyebote

has offered nothing to dispute this assertion.

Meharry also provides evidence to show that it has not concealed its probationary

accreditation status. Meharry offers a sworn declaration from its director of communications and

marketing stating that Meharry has continuously publicized its probationary accreditation status

on the website for its residency programs since February 9, 2022 (Doc. No. 98), which Iyebote

does not dispute.

Finally, Iyebote has not presented any evidence or authority to support her assertion that

Meharry’s probationary accreditation “status makes it nearly impossible—if not impossible—for

[her] to transfer into another program” and, thus, has not supported her argument that the fact of

Meharry’s probationary accreditation status materially alters the terms of the settlement

agreement. (Doc. No. 97, PageID# 1153.) Iyebote therefore has not carried her burden to show

that the settlement agreement is invalid because Meharry fraudulently concealed its probationary

accreditation status from her.

Iyebote’s alternative argument that Meharry failed to provide her with promised attendance

records is an argument that Meharry violated the parties’ settlement agreement, not that the

agreement is invalid due to fraud or mutual mistake. Further, as Meharry points out, the term sheet

reflects that Meharry agreed to “complete any form requested by a potential transferring institution

in compliance with any attendance records of [Iyebote].” (Doc. No. 96, PageID# 1150, ¶ 3.)

Iyebote has not shown that Meharry agreed to provide attendance records directly to her as part of

the settlement agreement. Consequently, the Court should find that there is no genuine dispute

about the terms of Meharry and Iyebote’s settlement agreement and no proof of fraud, duress, or

mutual mistake to render the agreement invalid.

Meharry makes a passing request for an award of attorney’s fees in its briefs in support of

its motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (Doc. Nos. 96, 98.) “There is no common law right

to attorney’s fees. Under the ‘American Rule,’ the ‘general practice’ is not to award fees to

prevailing parties ‘absent explicit statutory authority.’”” McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 596—

97 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human

Res. 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001)); see also Grinnell Bros., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 655 F.2d 725,

726 (6th Cir. 1981) (“As a general rule, a federal court may not award attorney’s fees to the

prevailing party unless a statute or a binding contract authorizes such a recovery.” (quoting

Baldwin v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 507 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1974))). Because Meharry has not

identified any authority supporting a fee award and makes no argument as to why a fee award is

justified in this case, the Court should deny this request.

IV. Recommendation

For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Meharry’s motion to enforce

the parties’ settlement agreement (Doc. No. 95) be GRANTED and that Meharry’s request for

attorney’s fees be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Any party has fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendation to

file specific written objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen days of receipt

of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of appeal of the matters decided.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).

A party who opposes any objections that are filed may file a response within fourteen days after

being served with the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

Entered this 22nd day of August, 2023.

Abiko noleorr

ALI R E. NEWBERN

United States Magistrate Judge

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