The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
PHILLIP WRIGHT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) NO. 1:21-cv-00008
)
GILES COUNTY BOARD OF ) JUDGE CAMPBELL
EDUCATION, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendant Giles County Board of Education’s (“the County”)
motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 17). Plaintiff Phillip Wright (“Wright”) filed a response
in opposition (Doc. No. 25), and the County filed a reply (Doc. 30). For the reasons discussed
below, the County’s motion will be DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The County hired Wright to be its Director of Schools in May 2015. (Doc. No. 31 ¶ 1).
Wright sustained a disabling spinal cord injury from a fall at work on Monday, March 4, 2019 (the
“Injury”). (Doc. No. 26 ¶ 5). Nevertheless, Wright attended the County’s board meeting later that
week and informed the board members of the severity of his injuries. (Doc. No. 31 ¶ 17). A week
after the Injury, Wright notified the County that he had a “spinal cord contusion” which required
him to use a walker and rendered him unable to drive. (Id. ¶ 18). At that time, Wright notified the
County that he would need to attend physical therapy three times a week and requested to work
from home. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19).
Wright attended the County’s board meeting on April 4, 2019 and requested to work half-
days on Tuesdays and Thursdays and to work from home sometimes. (Doc. No. 27-4 at PageID #
710; Doc. No. 31 ¶ 26). At some point after the Injury, Wright also spoke to a board member about
his need to relocate his office to a floor with a restroom on it. (Doc. No. 31 ¶ 20). Prior to the
Injury, the County scored Wright over a 3 (out of 4) in his yearly evaluations. (Id. ¶ 9). In April
2019, the County scored Wright below a 3 in his evaluation. (Id. ¶ 10).
Wright went on medial leave in May 2019. Between June and September 2019, Wright
verbally requested that the County make its boardroom and bathroom facilities handicap
accessible. (See Doc. No. 27-1 at PageID # 630). On September 18, 2019, through his attorney,
Wright sent the County a letter stating that he believed he could return to work with a “limited
schedule” and requesting a meeting to discuss accommodations. (Doc. No. 27-14 at PageID # 865).
On September 19, 2019, the County terminated Wright’s employment. (Doc. No. 31 ¶¶ 39-40).
Wright was devastated by his termination and his mental health deteriorated thereafter,
such that he had suicidal ideations and lost confidence in his ability to work. (Doc. No. 31 ¶¶ 41,
42; Doc. No. 27-1 at PageID # 627, 645-46). It was during this bleak time for his mental health,
that Wright applied for disability retirement through the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement
System and for Social Security disability benefits. (See id.; see also Doc. No. 26 ¶¶ 20, 30). Wright
was instructed to backdate his application for state disability benefits to the date of his termination.
(Doc. No. 27-1 at PageID # 643-45). In his application for state disability benefits, Wright stated
that, due to health issues including depression, “I can not [sic] perform my job or any other job.”
(Doc. No. 19-9 at PageID # 386-87). In his application for Social Security disability benefits,
Wright certified: “I became unable to work because of my disabling condition on March 4, 2019.
I am still disabled.” (Doc. No. 19-12).
As a continued result of his Injury, Wright continues the use of a catheter, takes medication,
and uses a cane, wheelchair, and walker for assistance depending on the distance he needs to walk.
(Doc. No. 31 ¶ 15). Immediately after his Injury, Wright could not control his left leg or raise his
hands above his head; however, these symptoms have improved since then and Wright is now able
to swim, ride a stationary bike, and lift weights. (Doc. No. 31 ¶ 15). Wright has stabilized his
mental health by talking to a deacon at his church, engaging in physical activities, and taking
medication for depression. (Doc. No. 31 ¶ 45).
On March 2, 2021, Wright filed the present action against the County, alleging violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., as amended by the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008. (Doc. No. 1).1 On May 27, 2022, the County filed the pending motion
for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 17).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the
Court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence
of a genuine dispute over material facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The
moving party may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element
of the non-moving party's claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case. Id.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most
favorable for the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 242 (6th Cir. 2015); Wexler v. White’s
1 “[A]s a general rule, a plaintiff's complaint need not expressly plead legal theories; it is sufficient
to plead factual allegations that can establish a viable theory.” Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co., 32 F.4th
598, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam); Dibrell
v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1160 (6th Cir. 2021)).
Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court does not weigh the evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Rather, the Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to make the issue of material fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to survive summary
judgment; instead, there must be evidence of which the jury could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).
III. ANALYSIS
“Failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to a disabled, but otherwise qualified,
person in the workplace is deemed unlawful discrimination under the ADA.” Williams v. AT&T
Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Kleiber
v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2007)). Because Wright’s claims are
premised on the County’s alleged failure to offer a reasonable accommodation, his claims are
analyzed under the direct-evidence framework, which requires Wright to establish that (1) he is
disabled, and (2) that he is “otherwise qualified” for the position despite his disability. See Blanchet
v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, 27 F.4th 1221, 1227 (6th Cir. 2022); Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999
F.3d 400, 417 (6th Cir. 2021) (same); Fisher v. Nissan North Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 417 (6th
Cir. 2020) (same); Williams, 847 F.3d at 391; Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869 (same).2 The County does
not dispute that Wright is disabled; therefore the sole issue is whether Wright is “otherwise
qualified” for his position despite his disabilities. (See Doc. No. 17).
2 The County then bears the burden of proving that a challenged job criterion is essential, and
therefore a business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an undue hardship upon' the
company. See Blanchet, 27 F.4th at 1228; Wyatt, 999 F.3d at 417-18; Fisher, 951 F.3d at 417; Kleiber, 485
F.3d at 869. Here, the County makes no arguments concerning undue hardship or the essential functions of
Wright’s position. Accordingly, the Court does not address these issues.
Under the ADA, an employee is “otherwise qualified” for their position if they can perform
the essential functions of their job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8). Through the pending motion, the County argues Wright is not a “qualified individual”
because he represented that he was totally disabled in his applications for state and federal
disability benefits and still receives disability benefits. (See Doc. No. 17-1 at 8-20) (citing
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999)). Although application and
receipt of disability benefits is not “by itself conclusive evidence that an individual is completely
incapable of working[,]” Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 429
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797–98), to survive the County’s motion for
summary judgment, Wright must provide an explanation sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror
finding that, despite his statement that he is unable to work, that he could nonetheless perform the
essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodation. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806-07;
Williams v. London Util. Comm'n, 375 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Griffith v. Wal–
Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1998).
Wright has met this burden. There is evidence in the record that Wright performed his job
satisfactorily for several years before the Injury, and that, although he made requests for
accommodation, he continued to work for periods of time following the Injury before his
termination. (Doc. No. 31 ¶¶ 9-10, 19). Additionally, Wright contends that his prior statements in
his applications for disability benefits do not contradict the foregoing proof because those
applications did not contemplate reasonable accommodations. Even if Wright thought at the time
of his disability benefit applications that he was not able to perform the Director of Schools job or
any job, his explanation that he was depressed at that time but has improved mental health now
could allow a reasonable juror to conclude that he is qualified with reasonable accommodations to
make his workspaces handicap accessible. (Doc. No. 31 4] 41, 42; Doc. No. 27-1 at PageID # 627,
645-46). Although a jury may ultimately decide that Wright’s explanation of his prior statements
is not credible, Wright has presented sufficient proof to establish a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether he was “otherwise qualified.” Moreover, there are material disputes of fact as to
when Wright requested certain accommodations and what those requested accommodations were.
Because the County has failed to demonstrate the absence of material disputes of fact, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
An appropriate Order shall enter.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE