Johnson v. Griffin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

SAMUEL JOHNSON, in his individual )

capacity, and JILL JOHNSON, in her )

individual capacity, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) NO. 3:22-cv-000295

)

v. ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES

KATHY GRIFFIN, in her individual )

capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is Defendant Kathy Griffin’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim, and Tennessee Public Participation

Act Petition. (Doc. No. 18). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 29), and Griffin

filed a reply (Doc. No. 30). Griffin also filed a Notice of Supplement Authority in support of her

Motion. (Doc. No. 31). For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 24, 2021, Plaintiff Samuel Johnson (“Johnson”) was at a local hotel restaurant for

dinner. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 46-47, 49).1 An incident occurred at the hotel between Johnson and some

teenagers dressed for prom. (Id. ¶¶ 65-72). One of the teenagers took a video of the incident on

their cell phone and published an edited version (the “Clip”) to their personal TikTok account. (Id.

¶¶ 67, 71, 76). The complaint alleges that the Clip had limited public exposure between April 24

and April 25, 2021. (Id. ¶ 80).

1 Plaintiff Jill Johnson was out of town on April 24, 2021. (Id. ¶ 48).

Kathy Griffin, a comedian who lives in California, tweeted about the incident on April 26,

2021. Her first tweet shared another user’s video of the Clip, with that user’s caption reading:

“Homophobic POS in Tennessee harasses a teenager for wearing a dress to prom.” (Id. ¶ 81).

Griffin’s added commentary to the quoted tweet read:

If this is Sam Johnson in Nashville, Tennessee, the CEO of

@VisuWell, healthcare-tech-growth strategist, married to Jill

Johnson where they may reside in Franklin, Tennessee, it seems like

he’s dying to be online famous. [shrugging emoji, rainbow flag

emoji, shrugging emoji]

(Id.). Later that morning, Griffin tweeted a screen shot of google image search results for “ceo

visuwell” showing two headshots of Johnson along with the caption: “Who is? THIS Sam Johnson

of Franklin Tennessee?” (Id. ¶ 86; Doc. No. 1-5). That evening, VisuWell tweeted four times via

its official Twitter account about the incident:

Post 1/4: We unequivocally condemn the behavior exhibited by Sam

Johnson in a recent video widely circulated on social media.

Post 2/4: After investigating the matter and speaking to the

individuals involved, the VisuWell BOD has chosen to terminate

Mr. Johnson from his position as CEO, effective immediately. Gerry

Andrady, our President and COO, will lead the company through

this important time.

Post 3/4: VisuWell’s culture emphasizes respect, kindness, and

compassion, especially for those from traditionally marginalized

communities, and we maintain a zero-tolerance policy for

intolerance of any kind.

Post 4/4: Mr. Johnson’s actions contradicted the high standards we

set for ourselves in promoting the health of those who use our

platform.

(Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 87-88; Doc. No. 1-6). In response to VisuWell’s second tweet, Griffin tweeted:

Has Sam Johnson has been removed from his position on the Board

of Directors and, if not, what measures is Visuwell taking in this

regard? Leaving Johnson on the Board raises an eyebrow that the

company intends to rehire. Know the nation will remain vigilant.

(Per @NastyProud)

(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 89). VisuWell replied to Griffin minutes later, tweeting: “terminated.” (Id. ¶ 90;

Doc. No. 1-7). The complaint alleges that Griffin’s first tweet about the incident on April 26, 2021,

caused the Clip to go viral. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 81, 83, 95). The teenager who originally posted the Clip

to his TikTok tweeted: “KATHY [two crying emojis] when I posted this I did NOT expect it to go

viral to this extent but THANK YOU SO MUCH.” (Id. ¶ 83). Griffin tweeted in reply:

Jacob, I’m so sorry you had to be anywhere near this thing. I was

very anxious for you while watching, but am grateful you took the

video (as is your right.) I’m proud to be an ally. Let me know if

there’s anything I can do to help. [heart emoji, rainbow flag emoji]

(Id.) Plaintiffs filed the present suit against Griffin on April 25, 2022, based on diversity of

citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00. Plaintiffs bring state law claims

for tortious interference with employment relations, common law and statutory tortious

interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of

privacy – intrusion upon seclusion, prima facie tort, and negligence per se. Griffin filed the pending

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 18).

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction. In considering such a motion, the district court “‘may determine the

motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in aid of the motion; or it may

conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.’” Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker,

Inc., 965 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212,

1214 (6th Cir. 1989)). When the district court rules based on written submissions alone, as in the

present case, the plaintiff need only make out a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction

exists. Malone, 965 F.3d at 504.

“Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) involve burden shifting.” Id. “The plaintiff must

first make a prima facie case, which can be done merely through the complaint.” Id. (citing Am.

Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988)). “The burden then shifts to the

defendant, whose motion to dismiss must be properly supported with evidence.” Id. (citing

Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991)). “Once the defendant has met the

burden, it returns to the plaintiff, who may no longer stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit

or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). “The court must view the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to

the plaintiff and not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal.” Ingram

Barge Co., LLC v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 3 F.4th 275, 278 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal

quotations omitted).

B. Analysis

“A federal court sitting in diversity may not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant unless

courts of the forum state would be authorized to do so by state law—and any such exercise of

jurisdiction must be compatible with the due process requirements of the United States

Constitution.” Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 502 (6th Cir. 2020). “Due

process requires that an out-of-state defendant have ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state

sufficient to comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Blessing v.

Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889, 904 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310, 316 (1945)). Tennessee’s long-arm statute “extends its jurisdiction to due process's limits, so

due process is all [the court] must address.” Parker v. Winwood, 938 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 2019).

Under the applicable burden shifting framework, “the first question is whether the []

complaint makes out a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Malone, 965 F.3d at 504. “Personal

jurisdiction falls into two categories: general and specific.” Id. at 501 (citing Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). In responding to the pending motion,

Plaintiffs argue the Court has specific jurisdiction over Griffin.2 “Specific jurisdiction turns on the

‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.’” Parker, 938 F.3d at 839 (quoting

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). “This requires a plaintiff to

establish, with reasonable particularity, sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum

state.” Malone, 965 F.3d at 504. “Th[is] ‘minimum contacts’ analysis depends on the defendant's

contact with the forum, ‘not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there.’” Blessing,

988 F.3d at 904 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). “That means [Griffin]'s

‘suit-related conduct’ must establish ‘a substantial connection’ with Tennessee.” Parker, 938 F.3d

at 839 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 284). While “[a] defendant may be subject to personal

jurisdiction …if her ‘efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State,”

Blessing, 988 F.3d at 904 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)),

“the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at

285 (“Put simply, however significant the plaintiff's contacts with the forum may be, those contacts

cannot be decisive in determining whether the defendant' s due process rights are violated.”)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). “These same principles apply when intentional torts are

involved.” Id. at 286.

Here, Plaintiffs argue the following factual allegations make the requisite prima facie

showing of specific personal jurisdiction: (1) Griffin’s tweets intentionally targeted them, (2) the

2 As Plaintiffs do not contend the Court has general personal jurisdiction over Griffin, it is

unnecessary to address the requirements for the exercise of such jurisdiction.

injury from Griffin’s tortious conduct was felt in Tennessee, and (3) Griffin has done business in

Tennessee at least twice by personally performing her stage act. (See Doc. No. 29 at 4-8 (citing

Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 43, 78, 80-83, 86, 89, 90, 92, 99-106)). Walden forecloses Plaintiffs’ argument that

Griffin is subject to jurisdiction because her allegedly tortious postings on social media

intentionally targeted and harmed Tennessee residents. 571 U.S. at 289 (“Such reasoning

improperly attributes a plaintiff's forum connections to the defendant[.]”); see also Blessing, 988

F.3d at 905 (“personal jurisdiction is absent when the communication was not specifically directed

at the forum state.”). In Walden, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court in Nevada

lacked jurisdiction over a Georgia defendant who allegedly drafted a false affidavit about the

Nevada plaintiffs knowing it would harm Nevada plaintiffs. 571 U.S. at 279-81, 289. It was not

sufficient that the plaintiffs had “strong forum connections” and suffered “foreseeable harm” in

the forum state because “[t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular

injury or effect but whether the defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful

way.” Id. at 289-90 (“[defendant's] actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with

Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada

connections.”).

Even viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing

all reasonable inferences in their favor, the factual allegations in the complaint do not demonstrate

that Griffin has sufficient minimum contacts with Tennessee such that jurisdiction over her would

be reasonable. While Griffin’s tweets expressly named Tennessee residents, a Tennessee business,

and Tennessee cities, there are no allegations in the complaint that Griffin’s tweets were directed

at Tennessee readers, as opposed to the residents of other states, or that Griffin posted her tweets

hoping to reach Tennessee specifically as opposed to her two million Twitter followers generally.

See Blessing, 988 F.3d. at 906. Nor does the complaint allege that Griffin has any Twitter followers

in Tennessee or that Tennessee was the focal point of Griffin’s tweets. While Plaintiffs allege that

Griffin’s tweets caused third parties to threaten and dox them in Tennessee, (see Doc. No. 1 4

101-102), “the Supreme Court has “consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused

‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between ... third parties[] and the forum

State.” Blessing, 988 F.3d at 906 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 284). Finally, Griffin’s two previous

live performances in Tennessee are insufficient contacts to form the basis for this Court to exercise

personal jurisdiction over Griffin in the present case because Plaintiffs’ causes of action do not

arise from those alleged contacts. See Goodyear, 564 US. at 919.

I. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the exercise of jurisdiction over Griffin would offend due

process. Accordingly, Griffin’s motion to dismiss will be GRANTED for lack of personal

jurisdiction.

An appropriate Order will enter.

hl X. Cody

Hla X Cob

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE