issues raised in a “perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))
How later courts described this case
- issues raised in a “perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))
- finding “Congress was quite serious about limiting our jurisdiction over anything dealing with the provision of veterans’ benefits”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
CALVIA L. HILL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-00246
) Judge Aleta A. Trauger
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN )
AFFAIRS et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Calvia Hill’s “Opposition to Object in Part to the
Amended Report and Recommendation” (Doc. No. 43), which the court construes as objections to
part of the Magistrate Judge’s Amended Report and Recommendation (“Amended R&R”) (Doc.
No. 42), which recommends that the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 23) be granted and
that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that the plaintiff’s motions for
judgment on the pleadings (Doc. Nos. 26, 35) be denied, and that his motions for leave to file new
evidence (Doc. Nos. 33, 37) be granted as unopposed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Within fourteen days after being served with a report and recommendation as to a
dispositive matter, any “party may serve and file specific written objections to [a magistrate
judge’s] proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The district court
must review de novo any portion of the report and recommendation “that has been properly
objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, the district court “may accept,
reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to
the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.
However, the district court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other
standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge’s findings
and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. Id. at 151. “The filing of vague, general, or
conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a
complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Langley
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2007) (issues raised in a “perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck
Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))). Likewise, “[a]
general objection to the entirety” of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation has the same
effect as a complete failure to object. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505,
509 (6th Cir. 1991). Finally, arguments made in an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation that were not first presented to the magistrate judge for consideration are deemed
waived. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
Although pro se pleadings and filings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted
by lawyers, see, e.g., Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants are not
entirely exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
II. DISCUSSION
In his objections, the plaintiff states that he does not object to the Amended R&R’s
recommendation that his benefits-related claim be dismissed. (See Doc. No. 43, at 5.) In making
that concession, however, the plaintiff effectively concedes that the Magistrate Judge did not err
in recommending that his Complaint be dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The plaintiff nonetheless objects on the basis that the Amended R&R overlooked “the fact
that the plaintiff alleged civil rights violation[s], which derived from the defendant’s contract
agency.” (Doc. No. 43, at 1.) The plaintiff references a number of companies with which the VA
allegedly contracted (and that are not identified as defendants in this case), asserting that these
contractors are not entitled to sovereign immunity. He also identifies a number of individual
“medical examiners” (also not identified as defendants) who allegedly ignored the plaintiff’s
evidence and denied his claims. (See id. at 2.) The Magistrate Judge, however, did not overlook
these issues. Rather, the plaintiff did not bring claims against contractors and individual medical
practitioners in the Amended Complaint, and, because such claims would, in any event, relate to
the denial of benefits, it is not clear that bringing claims against additional defendants would have
made a difference to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis.
Otherwise, the plaintiff largely realleges the same facts and asserts similar arguments to
those raised in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, he contends that the VA’s
actions in denying him relief constituted discrimination on the basis of race, and he asks the court
where he is supposed to bring his civil rights claims if the Board of Veterans Appeals (“BVA”)
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving civil rights violations in the claims-benefits
process. The plaintiff, however, does not raise any specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court is sympathetic toward the plaintiff’s situation. As the Magistrate Judge noted:
It is difficult to understand how a veteran’s claim for benefits to address a critical
illness could remain unresolved after nearly twelve years of administrative
consideration and at least seven determinations by the BVA that the Regional
Office erred in denying the claim. It is easy to see why Hill is searching for a
different tribunal to hear his arguments.
(Doc. No. 42, at 16.) At the same time, however, the law is clear that “VA benefits decisions may
not be reviewed outside the process [Congress] created in the [Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113-4122].” Ud. (citing Veterans for Common Sense
v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding “Congress was quite serious about
limiting our jurisdiction over anything dealing with the provision of veterans’ benefits”). The
plaintiff has not provided any basis for rejecting the Magistrate Judge’s determination that this
court has no jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs claims and must dismiss this action in its
entirety.
Il. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The plaintiff's construed objections (Doc. No. 43) are OVERRULED, and the Amended
R&R (Doc. No. 42) is ACCEPTED in its entirety. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.
23) is GRANTED on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. This case is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The plaintiff's motions for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. Nos. 26, 35) are DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and his motions for leave to file new evidence (Doc. Nos. 33, 37) are
GRANTED as unopposed.
All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
It is so ORDERED.
This is the final order in this action.
Leib bag
United States District Judge