The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
STEPHANIE MITCHELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:21-cv-00408
v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )
SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the administrative record
(Doc. No. 23). On July 25, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”), in which the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s motion be denied. (Doc.
No. 26). Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 27). Defendant did not file a response.
When a Magistrate Judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive
pretrial matter, the district court must review de novo any portion of
the report and recommendation to which a proper objection is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The
district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition, review further evidence,
or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) provides
that a party may file “specific written objections” to a report and recommendation, and Local Rule
72.02(a) provides that such objections must be written and must state with particularity the specific
portions of the Magistrate Judge’s report or proposed findings or recommendations to which an
objection is made.1
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), the Court has reviewed
the Report and Recommendation, the Objections, and the file. For the reasons set forth below, the
Objections of the Plaintiff are overruled, and the Report and Recommendation is adopted and
approved.
BACKGROUND2
The allegations and relevant procedural history are adequately stated in the R&R and need
not be repeated in full here. The Court, however, provides below a brief overview of the same here
for the purposes of resolving Plaintiff’s motion.
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial
review of the Social Security Administration’s denial of her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) as provided under Titles II and XVI,
respectively, of the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 26 at 1). Plaintiff alleges that she became unable
to work beginning on August 12, 2016 due to vision problems, irregular hormone levels,
polymyalgia rheumatica, knee pain, diabetes, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”),
bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff filed for DIB on March 16, 2018 and
for SSI on August 7, 2018, but both applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration.
(Id.). Upon her request, the ALJ held a hearing, and thereafter denied her claim. (Id.). The Appeals
1 The Local Rule also provides that any objections must be accompanied by sufficient documentation
including, but not limited to, affidavits, pertinent exhibits, and if necessary, transcripts of the record to
apprise the District Judge of the bases for the objections. Local Rule 72.02(a). Also, a separately filed
supporting memorandum of law must accompany the objections. Id. Plaintiff did not file her objections
separately from a memorandum of law in support of those objections, and instead filed one document
(which the Court has dubbed “[the] Objections”) in response to the R&R.
2 The facts set forth herein are taken primarily from the R&R and are undisputed unless otherwise stated.
Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, rendering the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner and fit for this Court’s review upon Plaintiff’s filing of this
action. (Id.).
As explained by the Magistrate Judge, the Commissioner has a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled:
(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing
substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled. []
(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your impairment(s).
If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a
combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration
requirement, we will find that you are not disabled. []
(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your
impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our
listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration requirement,
we will find that you are disabled. []
(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional
capacity [“RFC”] and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past
relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled. See paragraphs (f) and
(h) of this section and § 404.1560(b).
(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual
functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see if
you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment
to other work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an
adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled.
(Id. at 4 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)).
As explained by the Magistrate Judge, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not presumptively
disabled at step three because she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equals the severity of those listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appendix 1. (Doc. No.
26 at 5). The Magistrate Judge goes on to explain that the ALJ then found that Plaintiff was not
disabled because she is able to perform past relevant work as a receptionist. (Id.).
LEGAL STANDARD
The ultimate questions before a district court in reviewing a decision by an ALJ are whether
the ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards. Shelton v. Saul, No. 2:18-cv-00093, 2020 WL 1284628, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 18, 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). The court conducts its review under a “highly
deferential” substantial-evidence standard. Jones v. Berryhill, 392 F. Supp. 3d 831, 838 (M.D.
Tenn. 2019). The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative
law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,
1154 (2019).
Under the “substantial evidence” standard, a court looks to an existing administrative
record and asks whether it contains “sufficient evidence” to support the agency’s factual
determinations. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. And, whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other
contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Id. Substantial evidence is
“more than a mere scintilla” and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.; Shelton, 2020 WL 1284628, at *2; see also Rottman v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-2205, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. June 19, 2020). The standard amounts to
“less than a preponderance of the evidence,” and is met even if the record could reasonably support
the opposite conclusion. Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 814 F. App’x 92, 95 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154). “Therefore, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that
would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Jones, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 838 (quoting Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009)). Additionally, even if the ALJ makes a
factual error while reaching her conclusion, the reviewing court will deem the error harmless and
uphold the ALJ’s decision “[s]o long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
conclusions” and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion. Ulman v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
Objection 1
Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ’s residual function
capacity (“RFC”) decision was supported by substantial evidence is incorrect. (Doc. No. 27).
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not properly articulate the importance of
supportability and consistency in weighing the medical opinions offered at the hearing. (Doc. No.
27 at 2). Plaintiff further faults the ALJ for finding that the opinion of Dr. Indukuri, Plaintiff’s
treating psychiatrist, was not persuasive.3 (Id.). In Plaintiff’s view, the ALJ selectively read the
administrative record to support his conclusions. (Id.).
As correctly articulated by the Magistrate Judge, C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) states that the
Commission will not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from your
medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). The regulation further states that:
When a medical source provides one or more medical opinions or
prior administrative medical findings, we will consider those
medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings from that
medical source together using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1)
3 The caption of Plaintiff’s first objection suggests that Plaintiff intends also to challenge the Magistrate
Judge’s consideration of how the ALJ evaluated Megan Snider’s opinion. (Doc. No. 27 at 1). However,
Plaintiff provides no argument in her objections as to how the Magistrate Judge improperly evaluated the
ALJ’s consideration of Ms. Snider’s opinion. Therefore, the Court declines to construe Plaintiff’s objection
as raising an issue as to the Magistrate Judge’s consideration of the ALJ’s evaluation of Ms. Snider’s
opinion.
through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate. The most important
factors we consider when we evaluate the persuasiveness of medical
opinions and prior administrative medical findings are
supportability (paragraph (c)(1) of this section) and consistency
(paragraph (c)(2) of this section). We will articulate how we
considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings in your claim according to paragraph (b) of this section.
Id. (emphasis added). In her objection, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ was wrong to focus on the
fact that Dr. Indukuri “wrote that Plaintiff’s symptoms were mild, and she had normal long term
and short-term memory with normal perception.” (Doc. No. 27 at 2). Plaintiff argues that this is
an “overly concise” and “selective reading of the record.” (Id.). Significantly, Plaintiff does not
point the Court to any part of the record that stands in contrast with these observations by Dr.
Indukuri, so as to suggest that the ALJ focused on cherry-picked pro-Defendant observations to
the exclusion of countervailing pro-Plaintiff observations by Dr. Indukuri. In any event, the Court
has reviewed the ALJ’s decision and finds that it is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ carefully reviewed the medical opinions in this case. The decision reflects that
the ALJ agreed with several of the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. (Doc. No. 18 at 27).
Dr. Indukuri, however, had provided an opinion that was inconsistent with his own treatment notes
and with the objective medical evidence on the record. (Id.). Dr. Indukuri determined that Plaintiff
had “poor use of ability to perform activities of daily living, social functioning, concentration,
persistence and pace in adaptation.” (Id. at 26). And he determined that based on these observations
and Plaintiff’s depression, cognitive impairments, inattention, and panic attacks, Plaintiff could
not be expected to work a traditional 40-hour work week. (Id.). The ALJ rejected these
determinations of Dr. Indukuri’s, however, explaining that Dr. Indukuri’s own mental status
examinations demonstrate that Plaintiff was able to “interpret proverbs, perform simple
calculations, respond to serial sevens tests, and recognize similarities and differences.” (Id. at 27–
28 (citing Exhibit 5F)). The ALJ also pointed out that Dr. Indukuri’s notes reflect that Plaintiff’s
inattention was mild. (Id. 28).
As discussed above, the governing regulations require ALJs to consider supportability and
consistency—as the most important factors, no less—in weighing the persuasiveness of medical
opinions. And that is exactly what the ALJ did here with respect to Dr. Indukuri’s opinion. The
Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the factors of supportability and consistency in
considering Dr. Indukuri’s opinion, and that the RFC decision was supported by substantial
evidence. Plaintiff’s objection is therefore overruled.
Objection 2
Plaintiff next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that there was substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her symptoms. (Doc.
No. 27 at 3). Plaintiff contends that ALJs cannot merely provide blanket assertions that a claimant
is not believable to support denial of benefits. (Id.).
As the Magistrate Judge explains, an ALJ is required to consider a claimant’s statements
“about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms” and “evaluate whether the
statements are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” (Doc. No. 26
at 11 (quoting SSR-16 3, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5 (Oct. 25, 2017)). The ALJ relies on seven
factors in its evaluation:
1. Daily activities; 2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or
other symptoms; 3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 4. The
type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual
takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 5. Treatment, other than
medication, an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other
symptoms; 6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used
to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing
for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and 7. Any other
factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to
pain or other symptoms.
See SSR-16 3, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5 (Oct. 25, 2017)). Further, as explained in detail by the
Magistrate Judge, although the regulations no longer contain the word “credibility” to describe
how ALJs should evaluate the claimant’s statements, courts have interpreted this alteration of the
regulation as merely noting that the ALJ’s evaluation of the claimant’s testimony is not meant as
an examination claimant’s character; the alteration does not prevent the ALJ from making a
reasonable determination of the reliability of the claimant’s testimony considering additional
evidence on the record. (Doc. No. 26 at 12). In other words, ALJs are still permitted to make
reliability determinations regarding claimant’s statements regarding their symptoms.
In her second objection, Plaintiff explains that she testified to her knee pain brought on by
arthritis. (Doc. No. 27 at 3). She also discusses the tingling in her hands and arms caused by her
fibromyalgia, and the difficulties that she experiences in moving her extremities on account of the
pain. (Id.). In terms of performing daily functions, Plaintiff explains that she testified that these
issues prevent her from being able to type and climb stairs (Id.). The ALJ, however, found that
Plaintiff’s statements at the hearing were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence in the record . . . .” (Doc. No. 18 at 24). The ALJ pointed out the “overwhelming
imaging and x-rays of the right knee and lumbar spine reveal only mild/minimal findings
throughout the medical evidence of record.” (Id.). Further, as explained by the ALJ, the record
reflects that as recent as February 2019, Plaintiff ranked her pain as low as a 4 to 5 out of 10 and
as “unremarkable on mental status examination.” (Id.). In late February, Plaintiff was evaluated
by a physical therapist for difficulties with her right knee, and it was noted that her “rehab potential
was excellent . . . .” (Id. at 25).
Although Plaintiff attempts to direct the Court to other parts of the record to support her
statements that she suffers from hand and knee pain, the substantial evidence standard requires the
Court to determine whether the ALJ had sufficient evidence to support the conclusion to deny
Plaintiff's DIB request. In other words, even if Plaintiff can identify information in the record that
could lead reasonable minds to disagree as to the ALJ’s conclusion—and indeed even if the
undersigned on balance were to disagree with the ALJ’s conclusion—this 1s insufficient under the
substantial evidence standard to overturn the Magistrate Judge’s, and in turn, the ALJ’s decision.
And as the Magistrate Judge points out, Plaintiff does not challenge “‘any of the evidence cited by
the ALJ, which is fatal to her argument.” (Doc. No. 26 at 14).
The ALJ properly relied on contradicting evidence in the record to discount the reliability
of Plaintiffs statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms.
The Magistrate Judge therefore was correct to find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision. Plaintiff's objection is thus overruled.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff’s objections are overruled, and the Court adopts
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 26). Accordingly, Plaintiff's
motion for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. No. 23) is DENIED.
This is the final order in this case. All relief being denied, the Clerk of the Court is ordered
to enter final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Chi Richardson
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE