recognizing that “a prison policy forcing prisoners . . . to be exposed to regular surveillance by officers of the opposite sex while naked–for example while in the shower or using a toilet in a cell–would provide the basis of a claim on which relief could be granted”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “a prison policy forcing prisoners . . . to be exposed to regular surveillance by officers of the opposite sex while naked–for example while in the shower or using a toilet in a cell–would provide the basis of a claim on which relief could be granted”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JEFFREY SCOTT BROWN, )
#412, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:22-CV-00580
v. )
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
MONTGOMERY COUNTY ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
MANAGEMENT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jeffrey Scott Brown, a pre-trial detainee in the custody of the Montgomery County
Jail in Clarksville, Tennessee, has filed a pro se Motion to Amend Complaint. (Doc. No. 12). Two
motions related to discovery filed by Plaintiff are also pending: Doc. Nos. 3 and 7.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initially filed this pro se action against Montgomery County Management,
Montgomery County Jail Administration, and Montgomery County Legislative Bodies, alleging
violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1).
By Order and accompanying Memorandum Opinion entered on October 4, 2022, the Court
found that the complaint as amended failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted under
Section 1983. (Docs. No. 10 and 11). However, taking into consideration Plaintiff’s pro se status
and his assertion the Montgomery County Jail lacks legal research materials, the Court granted
Plaintiff the opportunity to further amend his complaint for the purposes of (1) identifying the
person, persons, entity, and/or entities responsible for Plaintiff’s alleged inadequate medical
treatment in March 2022 and forward and (2) explaining how those persons and/or entities were
directly involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Id.) Additionally, the Court
granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. No. 5) insofar as the Court permitted
Plaintiff to include in his amended complaint, if he so desired, his shower-related claim. The Court
instructed Plaintiff to identify the specific Defendants to this claim and explain how each
Defendant is responsible for the violation of Plaintiff’s rights. (Doc. Nos. 10 and 11).
Plaintiff now has filed a timely Motion to Amend his complaint in compliance with the
Court’s instructions. (Doc. No. 12). That Motion will be granted, and Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
II. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
III. SECTION 1983 STANDARD
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color
of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . .
. .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that
he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that
the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527,
533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV. FACTS ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF1
The complaint alleges that, while in the custody of the Montgomery County Jail as a
pretrial detainee in March 2022, Plaintiff experienced severe pain when he “pull[ed] [him]self out
of the bed.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3-4). Plaintiff sought medical attention, and it was “days later” before
he was permitted to see an unidentified person for medical treatment. (Id. at 4). According to
Plaintiff, his “muscles and tendons separated from bone and other muscles.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff
“since [has] been told that [his] arm will need surgery to make it where [he] can be able to use it
again”, but “they” refused to arrange for Plaintiff’s surgery. (Id. at 4).
Prior to this incident, Plaintiff had told “them” that he was having problems with his arms,
and “staff of Jail” did not take Plaintiff’s complaints seriously. (Id.)
1Plaintiff did not include in his second amended complaint all of the allegations he made in his initial and first amended
complaints. However, due to Plaintiff’s pro se status and the alleged lack of legal resources available to him at the
Montgomery County Jail, the Court will consider the allegations of the prior complaints when conducting the required
PLRA screening of the second amended complaint.
Plaintiff further alleges that, at the Montgomery County Jail, female inmates have enclosed
showers while male inmates have open showers, leaving the male inmates “exposed” to guards in
the tower; sometimes, Plaintiff notes, the guards laugh at the male inmates while they are
showering. (Doc. No. 5 at 1).
In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Jail Administrator Chief Joe
Thomas “runs the jail” and “is responsible” for Plaintiff’s “medical needs and the sexual
discrimination claims.” (Doc. No. 12 at 1). Plaintiff additionally alleges that jail deputies refuse to
provide him with the names of other individuals involved in the denial of medical care to Plaintiff
and the viewing of Plaintiff while he takes showers. (Doc. No. 12 at 1). Plaintiff states that one of
the jail doctors is male and the other is female but Plaintiff does not know their names. (Id.)
Plaintiff further states that he does not know how to find out the names of other individuals
involved in the violation of his rights because he “ha[s] no contact with anyone on the outside.”
(Id.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks “the max” in punitive, mental, and physical damages “due to the
drama and ongoing anxiety over [his] medical care.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6).
V. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires prison
officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, which includes appropriate medical care
to inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (citations omitted). The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates these protections for pretrial detainees such as
Plaintiff. Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th Cir. 2018). An Eighth Amendment
claim is composed of two parts: an objective prong, which requires plaintiff to show a “sufficiently
serious” deprivation, and a subjective prong, which requires a showing of a sufficiently culpable
state of mind—one of deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837. Deliberate
indifference is “a high standard of culpability, ‘equivalent to criminal recklessness.’” Greene v.
Crawford Cnty., Michigan, 22 F.4th 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Griffith v. Franklin Cnty.,
Kentucky, 975 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Until recently, the Sixth Circuit “analyzed Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainee claims
and Eighth Amendment prisoner claims ‘under the same rubric.’” Greene, 22 F.4th 593 at 605 (6th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Brawner v. Scott Cnty., Tennessee, 14 F.4th 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted). But in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the
standard for excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment differs from the standard for excessive force claims brought by
convicted prisoners under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 391-92. The Court held that, to prove the second prong of an excessive force claim, a pretrial
detainee must show that “the officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was
unreasonable, or only that the officers’ use of that force was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 391-
92 (italics in original).
Kingsley left open the question of “whether an objective standard applies in other
Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainment context[s].” Brawner, 14 F.4th at 592. Finding that it
was “no longer tenable” after Kingsley to apply the same analysis to the “constitutionally different
groups” of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, the Sixth Circuit in “Brawner modified the
second prong of the deliberate indifference test applied to pretrial detainees to require only
recklessness[.]” Id. at 592, 596. Thus, to prove a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, “‘[a] pretrial detainee must prove more than negligence
but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.’” Brawner,14 F.4th at 597
(6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc)). He or she must prove that the defendant acted “deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also
recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that
it should be known.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
As instructed by the Court by prior Order, Plaintiff has attempted to identify the persons
responsible for his alleged inadequate medical treatment in March 2022 and forward at the
Montgomery County Jail. He identifies Jail Administrator Chief Joe Thomas and states that other
jail staff members were involved, but Plaintiff does not know their names and jail deputies refuse
to provide those names to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also states that two jail doctors were involved, male
and female, whose names Plaintiff does not know but he believes he will learn those names once
he has access to his medical records. Plaintiff alleges that these individuals were aware of his
medical needs, did not take his complaints seriously, and refused to arrange for his needed surgery.
Although Plaintiff ultimately must provide more evidence in support of his allegations, the Court
finds that these allegations state colorable Section 1983 claims based on the denial of adequate
medical care to Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claims that his federal constitutional rights are violated by having
to expose his person to female guards while showering, Plaintiff alleges that Chief Joe Thomas is
“responsible” for this situation. Construing Plaintiff’s allegations liberally and considering the
nature of Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a colorable Section 1983 claim
against Thomas for purposes of the required PLRA screening. See Mills v. City of Barbourville,
389 F.3d 568, 579 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “a prison policy forcing prisoners . . . to be
exposed to regular surveillance by officers of the opposite sex while naked–for example while in
the shower or using a toilet in a cell–would provide the basis of a claim on which relief could be
granted”); Warfield v. Crawford, No. 3:12-cv-00483, Doc. No. 9 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012)
(finding that prisoner-plaintiff stated a colorable claim under Section 1983 if he alleges that guards
of the opposite sex regularly viewed him nude while showering); Hunter v. Helton, No. 1:10-cv-
00021, 2010 WL 2405092, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. June 10, 2010) (same). Plaintiff will be required to
provide much more information in support of this claim going forward. However, the Court finds
that this claim should proceed so that Plaintiff can more fully develop it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. No. 12) will be granted. Having
screened the second amended complaint pursuant to the PRLA, the Court finds that Plaintiff states
colorable claims under Section 1983 against Chief Joe Thomas in his individual capacity, Dr. John
Doe in his individual capacity, and Dr. Jane Doe in her individual capacity, as set forth herein.
This case will move forward, and Plaintiff will have an opportunity to more fully develop his
claims and identify additional defendants.
Plaintiff's remaining motions (Doc. Nos. 3 and 7) will be addressed by the Magistrate
Judge upon referral.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
hl X. Cody
lex Cob
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE