The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MALINDA DESHELLE BARBEE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 3:22-cv-00737
v. ) Judge Trauger
)
MARK E. ZUCKERBERG, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Malinda Deshelle Barbee filed a pro se complaint against Meta executives Mark E.
Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg, musician Christopher Maurice Brown, and other “unknown”
individuals. (Doc. No. 1.) The plaintiff also filed an in forma pauperis application that sufficiently
indicates she cannot pay the full civil filing fee in advance without “undue hardship.” Foster v.
Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly,
the application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
The court must review and dismiss any complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Ongori v.
Hawkins, No. 16-2781, 2017 WL 6759020, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017) (“[N]on-prisoners
proceeding in forma pauperis are still subject to the screening requirements of § 1915(e).”). The
court applies the standard for Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010), by viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA,
LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.
2009)). The court then considers whether the factual allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement
to relief,” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)), that
rises “above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
court need not accept unwarranted factual inferences, DirectTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476
(6th Cir. 2007), or credit “legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations.” Eidson v. Tenn.
Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
Here, the brief complaint alleges that the plaintiff’s “phones and computers were hacked”
by two unknown men and “the whole world” was “allowed” to “monitor [the plaintiff’s] family
and . . . life 24/7” for over ten years. (Doc. No. 1.) In addition, the complaint alleges that
defendants Zuckerberg and Sandberg “entered the cybercrime at their own will at some point
tailoring the operation with various features to enhance the structure of cybercrime,” and that
defendant Brown “instigated crime for years in various ways . . . causing calamities.” Id. Based on
these allegations, the complaint claims that the defendants violated the Privacy Act of 1974 and
the First, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id.
First, the Privacy Act claim must be dismissed because “[i]ndividuals are not proper
defendants in a Privacy Act suit” regarding the unauthorized release of information, and only a
government agency may be sued under the Act. Stephens v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 754 F. Supp.
579, 579 n.1 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (citing Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 160 (6th Cir.
1983)). Here, the plaintiff raises no grievance against a government agency or concerning the
dissemination of information by a government agency. Second, the court construes the
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private right of action against
anyone who subjects any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights or privileges secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Abrig v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 878 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (citing Rehberg v. Paulk, 566
U.S. 356, 361 (2012)). Critically, a Section 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate the denial of a
constitutional right caused by a defendant acting under color of state law.'! Carl v. Muskegon Cnty.,
763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014). The complaint does not allege that the defendants — who are
clearly identified as private actors — have acted under color of law or in concert with any state
actor.” Thus, the Section 1983 claims must also be dismissed.
In sum, the court finds that the plaintiff fails to state any claim upon which relief can be
granted. Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED. This is the final order denying all relief in
this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b). Because an appeal would not
be taken in good faith, the plaintiff is not certified to appeal the judgment in forma pauperis. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
It is so ORDERED.
United States District Judge
' To act under color of law, a defendant must exercise power “possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
? Nor does the complaint suggest that any “unknown” persons acted under color of law.