Littlejohn v. Core Civic

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

J.D. LITTLEJOHN, III, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-00109

) Judge Trauger

CORE CIVIC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff J.D. Littlejohn, III, an inmate of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (TTCC)

operated by CoreCivic, Inc., in Hartsville, Tennessee, filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 to recover for alleged civil rights violations caused by living in the extremely violent

conditions at TTCC since 2016, and by being forced to miss a parole hearing in 2021. (Doc. No.

1.) The Complaint requested $100 million in damages and other appropriate relief from CoreCivic

and its executives and employees.

The court performed an initial review of the Complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. (Doc. No. 6.) As a result

of that review, the court (1) dismissed the plaintiff’s claim concerning his missed parole hearing;

(2) found that he failed to state a viable damages claim for emotional harm caused by the violent

conditions at TTCC because Section 1997e(e) bars any claim for monetary relief based on mental

or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical injury; and (3) found that although the

Complaint could be liberally construed as seeking injunctive relief, it failed to allege sufficient

facts to support a plausible claim to such relief. The court thus found the case subject to dismissal

but allowed the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his Complaint to more fully present a claim to

injunctive relief if he so desired. (Id. at 10–11.)

Plaintiff has filed his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 7), which the court will now screen

under the PLRA.

II. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

The court must screen the Amended Complaint to determine whether it states a colorable

claim to relief under the standards applicable to pro se civil rights complaints against state actors

under Section 1983. Those standards are set out in the court’s prior order (Doc. No. 6 at 1–2) and

incorporated herein by reference.

In the Amended Complaint, the plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief as contemplated by

the court in granting leave to amend, but now seeks an award of $200 million in damages based

on allegations that, in addition to the mental and emotional trauma he has suffered from witnessing

egregious levels of inmate violence at TTCC since 2016, he has during that time been physically

assaulted, verbally harassed with racial slurs and threats of violence, and served a poisoned meal

by correctional officers. (Doc. No. 7 at 5, 9–11.) He further alleges that he “was arbitrarily placed

on administrative segregation” during the pendency of an “assault on a[n] officer” disciplinary

charge, which “caused [him] to forfeit parole eligibility and [become] ineligible to earn or be

credited sentence credits from October of 2020 to May 2021.” (Id. at 14.) He accuses two

correctional officers of fraudulently determining “who go[es] home or make[s] parole by taking

bribes from other private officers[,] by having secret meetings with each other and accepting

money which confirms the deal,” and of doing so in his case to deny him the opportunity for parole.

(Id. at 14–15.)

As explained in the court’s prior screening order (Doc. No. 6 at 7–8), Section 1997e(e) bars

the plaintiff from recovering damages strictly for mental or emotional injuries produced by the

conditions of his confinement. While the plaintiff alleges for the first time in his Amended

Complaint that he “was physically assaulted and harass[ed] by private officer’s (sic) while being

here at [TTCC]” (Doc. No. 7 at 5), he does not name the officers, provide any factual context, or

specify the dates of the alleged assault and harassment. Likewise, the threats allegedly made by

correctional officers and one instance of physical assault “by an officer in front of the east chow

hall” are not further described, other than to note that the plaintiff filed a grievance on the officer

who assaulted him but did not receive a response. (Id. at 9.) The latest date provided in the

Amended Complaint for the occurrence of any physical or verbal encounter is 2019, when the

plaintiff was allegedly served a poisoned meal (id.); otherwise, the Amended Complaint simply

indicates that the events it describes occurred beginning in December of 2016. (Id. at 5.)1

This action was not filed until 2022. The limitations period that applies to Section 1983

actions arising in Tennessee is one year, based on the applicable statute of limitations supplied by

state law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 984 F.3d

1156, 1161 (6th Cir. 2021). Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, district

courts may apply it sua sponte on initial review where the defense obviously applies. Comer v.

Transit Auth. of N. Kentucky, No. 2:20-CV-00084-GFVT, 2020 WL 3719818, at *2 (E.D. Ky. July

6, 2020) (citing, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (“If the allegations, for example,

show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to

1 The court takes judicial notice that the plaintiff’s two prior federal lawsuits concerning his treatment at

TTCC––which were dismissed upon initial review of his allegations of harassment and assault, Littlejohn

v. F/N/U Davis, et al., No. 3:19-cv-00895 (M.D. Tenn. 2019), and racially abusive language by correctional

officers, Littlejohn v. Dodds, et al., No. 2:19-cv-02623-TLP-tmp (W.D. Tenn. 2020)––involved misconduct

that allegedly occurred in 2019. The disposition of these two prior cases is documented in attachments to

the Amended Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 7-1 and 7-2.)

dismissal for failure to state a claim; that does not make the statute of limitations any less an

affirmative defense[.]”); Franklin v. Fisher, No. 16-6464, 2017 WL 4404624, at *2 (6th Cir. May

15, 2017) (finding that dismissal at PLRA screening for failure to state a claim was proper because

complaint’s untimeliness was “obvious from the face of [the] complaint”)). Because the dates

provided in the Amended Complaint show that this action was not commenced within a year of

the alleged assaults, threats, harassment, and poisoning, any claim based on those incidents is time-

barred.

The Amended Complaint does assert one potentially timely claim to damages: it alleges

that the plaintiff lost parole eligibility and the opportunity to earn sentence credits between October

2020 and May 2021, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, when he was

arbitrarily transferred “from [‘]pending investigation[’] to administrative segregation” due to a

disciplinary charge for assault on an officer, without receiving a disciplinary report as required by

“Tennessee’s prison policy” and disciplinary procedures. (Doc. No. 7 at 14.)

In Haithcote v. Hutchinson, No. 1:21-CV-4, 2021 WL 254304 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 25, 2021),

the district court analyzed and rejected a nearly identical due process claim, as follows:

[I]t is well-established that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change

in a prisoner’s conditions of confinement. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

225 (1976). Specifically, in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the

Supreme Court specified that a prisoner is entitled to due process protections only

where a deprivation “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence” or imposes

an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–87. Thus, even where a state

regulation contains mandatory language regarding processes, a failure to provide

those processes to a prisoner will not violate the Due Process Clause unless it also

inevitably affects the length of the prisoner’s sentence or imposes the requisite

“atypical and significant hardship.” Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91

(6th Cir. 1995) (finding that a failure to provide a prisoner with hearing prior to

placing him in administrative segregation after his thirty-day punitive placement,

despite mandatory language in a state regulation, did not implicate the prisoner’s

due process rights).

Administrative segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates should

reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467–73 (1983). As such, it only requires due process in

“extreme circumstances.” Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010).

Courts generally consider the nature and duration of such confinement to determine

whether it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship.” Harden–Bey v. Rutter,

524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff’s six-month placement in administrative segregation does not warrant due

process protection. Powell v. Washington, 720 F. App’x 222, 226 (6th Cir. 2017)

(holding that “six-month confinement in administrative segregation is insufficient

to constitute an atypical and significant hardship and therefore does not implicate

[] due process rights”). Further, while Plaintiff alleges that TDOC policy 404.10

created a liberty interest related to this placement that entitled him to due process

hearing(s), TDOC policies and regulations do not create such liberty interests.

Taylor v. Dukes, 25 F. App’x 423, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). . . .

Also, while Plaintiff alleges that he lost his ability to earn sentencing credits during

and after his placement in administrative segregation, a prisoner’s inability [to]

“earn future sentence credits is not sufficient to create a constitutionally protected

liberty interest.” Sotherland v. Myers, 41 F. App’x 752, 753 (6th Cir. 2002).

Likewise, Plaintiff’s allegation that his improper placement was a factor in the

parole board’s decision to deny him parole does not create a liberty interest subject

to due process consideration under Tennessee law. Settle v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr.,

487 F. App’x 290, 291 (6th Cir. 2012) (providing that “Tennessee law has not

created a liberty interest in parole eligibility”). . . .

Plaintiff has set forth no other “extreme circumstances” during his administrative

segregation placement from which the Court can plausibly infer that it was subject

to due process considerations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a due

process claim upon which relief may be granted based on his administrative

segregation placement[.]

Haithcote, 2021 WL 254304, at *3.

This court finds the analysis and conclusion of the Haithcote court equally applicable in

the instant case where, under the most favorable reading of the Amended Complaint, the plaintiff

was confined in administrative segregation for eight months and only complains of collateral

consequences with respect to sentence credits and parole. Cf. Hairston v. Maria, No. 2:18-CV-

378, 2018 WL 6628977, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2018) (holding that placement in administrative

segregation for nine or ten months did not implicate inmate’s due process rights) (citing, e.g.,

Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that no violation resulted from more

than a year in administrative segregation)). The plaintiff's due process claim is thus subject to

dismissal under the authorities quoted above, for failure to plausibly support any right to relief.

IH. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons given here and in the court’s prior screening order (Doc. No.

6), this case is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

58(b)(1).

It is so ORDERED. Mh be

Aleta A. Trauger

United States District Judge