Lee v. The Vanderbilt University

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

MIREILLE M. LEE, )

)

Plaintiff, ) NO. 3:20-cv-00924

)

v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON

)

THE VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiff’s “Motion to Alter or Amend

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 59(e), 54(b) and 60 (b)(1)” (Doc. No. 252, “Motion to Alter or

Amend”), filed along with a sealed supporting memorandum (Doc. No. 254); and (2) Plaintiff’s

“Motion to Permit Filing of Amended Complaint” (Doc. No. 255, “Motion to File Amended

Complaint”), also filed along with a sealed supporting memorandum (Doc. No. 257) (together,

“Motions”). Defendant responded to both motions with a single “Response in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend D.E. 244 and 245 and Plaintiff’s Motion to Permit Filing of

Amended Complaint” (Doc. No. 270, “Response”). Plaintiff filed a Reply in Support of her Motion

to Alter or Amend (Doc. No. 271, “Reply”).

BACKGROUND1

In this action, Plaintiff has asserted a variety of claims based on alleged gender

discrimination while she was employed as an Assistant Professor at Vanderbilt University. On

April 12, 2022, the Court granted Defendant Vanderbilt University’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

1 The factual background of this case is set out in full in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion at

Docket No. 244.

Second Amended Complaint, which resulted in the denial of (Doc. No. 244 (“the Opinion”), 245

(“the Order”)). Plaintiff now seeks via the Motions: 1) an order altering and/or amending the Order

and Opinion pursuant to Rules 59(e), 54(b), and 60(b); and 2) an order permitting Plaintiff to file

an Amended Complaint to cure defects identified by the Court in the Order and Opinion pursuant

to Rule 15(a). (Doc. Nos. 252, 255).

LEGAL STANDARD2

1. Rule 59(e)

Motions to alter or amend, brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), are entrusted to the

Court's sound discretion. United States v. Tenn. Walking Horse Breeders' and Exhibitors' Ass'n,

263 F. Supp. 3d 679, 681 (M.D. Tenn. 2017). A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an opportunity to

re-argue a case. Id. Rather, the Court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion only if there is: (1) a clear

error of law; (2) newly-discovery evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a

need to prevent manifest injustice. Id. A motion to alter or amend should not be used to relitigate

previously considered issues, to submit evidence which could have been previously submitted in

the exercise of reasonable diligence, or to attempt to obtain a reversal of a judgment by offering

the same arguments previously presented. Id.

Generally, relief under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy” restricted to those

circumstances in which the moving party has set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature

that indicate that the court's prior ruling should be reversed. Harris v. Perry, No. 2:12-cv-02668-

STA-dkv, 2016 WL 5396701, at * 3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2016). Essentially, a showing of

2 Plaintiff includes Rule 54(b) in the title of the Motion to Alter or Amend, yet mentions this rule

only once in the supporting memorandum—and even then mentions the rule only in passing and

only as being “potentially implicated.” (Doc. No. 254 at 3 (“Rule 54 is potentially implicated

because the Court declined jurisdiction on several claims.”)). The Court thus finds it unnecessary

to discuss Rule 54 here.

manifest injustice requires that there exists a fundamental flaw in the court's decision that without

correction would lead to a result that is both inequitable and not in line with applicable

policy. Id. The Sixth Circuit has made clear that the standard for manifest injustice is “an exacting

standard” and that a successful Rule 59(e) motion must “clearly establish a manifest error of law.”

Heithcock v. Tenn. Dept. of Children's Servs., No. 3:14-CV-2377, 2015 WL 5970894, at * 1 (M.D.

Tenn. Oct. 14, 2015). Mere disagreement with a court's findings does not rise to the level of

manifest injustice under Rule 59(e). McDaniel v. American Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 04-2667B,

2007 WL 20842777, at * 2 (W.D. Tenn. July 17, 2007). The “manifest injustice” ground for

a Rule 59(e) motion is not meant to allow a disappointed litigant to attempt to persuade the Court

to change its mind. Harris, 2016 WL 5396701, at * 3.

2. Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may relieve a

party from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise

or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not

have been discovered earlier; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by an opposing party; (4)

the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; or (6) any other

reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears

the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence. Settle v.

Bell, No. 06-1092-JDT-egb, 2017 EL 1058365, at * 1 (W.D. Tenn. March 20, 2017). Relief from

a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. Duerson v.

Henderson County Detention Center, No. Civ. A.4:05CV-P165-M, 2005 WL 3536333, at * 1

(W.D. Ky. Dec. 21, 2005).

3. Rule 15(a)

Rule 15(a) allows a party to amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days

of service of the pleading or a response thereto, and in all other cases encourages the party to seek

leave to amend and the district court to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a)(1), (a)(2). However, “[w]hen a party seeks to amend a complaint after an adverse

judgment, it [ ] must shoulder a heavier burden. Instead of meeting only the modest requirements

of Rule 15, the claimant must meet the requirements for reopening a case established by Rules 59

or 60.” Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2010). In

other words, “unless postjudgment relief is granted, the district court lacks power to grant a motion

to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” In re Ferro

Corp. Derivative Litig., 511 F.3d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Acevedo–Villalobos v.

Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384, 389 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

DISCUSSION

1. Rule 59(e)

Plaintiff has failed to satisfy any of the four possible grounds under which a Rule 59(e)

motion may be granted. Instead, via the Motion to Alter or Amend, Plaintiff expresses her

disagreement with the Court’s dismissal of her Complaint and presents a list of arguments (with

references to facts not included in the operative Complaint) in an attempt to change the Court’s

mind. Illustratively, Plaintiff states: “It is clear from the case law that reasonable minds can differ

concerning the question of the adequacy of pleadings to state a cause of action. The Sixth Circuit

has reversed district courts which have granted dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” (Doc.

No. 254 at 5). But a difference of opinion as to the adequacy of pleadings is no reason to grant a

Rule 59(e) motion; instead, as Plaintiff’s own argument here suggests, a proper avenue to seek

relief for such a disagreement would be an appeal to the Sixth Circuit.

The Court will nonetheless discuss each of Plaintiff’s proposed reasons for why she should

be granted relief under Rule 59(e). In particular, Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend invokes the

first of the four grounds for granting a Rule 59(e) motion—a “clear error of law”—in addition to

several other arguments not clearly falling under any particular one of the remaining three Rule

59(e) grounds.

a. Clear error of law

i. Failure to discuss certain cases

Throughout the Motion to Alter or Amend, Plaintiff argues that a clear error of law

occurred because the Court failed to mention or appropriately apply certain cases in the Opinion.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Court made a clear error of law by failing to discuss or apply three

cases that involve federal pleading standards: Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), Kensu v.

Corizon, Inc., 5 F.4th 646 (6th Cir. 2021), and Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009).

But Plaintiff fails to articulate how the Court’s opinion contradicts these cases or why the Court

should find a clear error of law simply because the Court did not mention these particular cases in

the Opinion. The Opinion articulates that under federal pleading standards, “Plaintiff needed to

provide a factual basis in the Complaint from which the Court could reasonably infer a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse action” but that Plaintiff failed to do so.

(Doc. No. 244 at 33–34). Nowhere in the Motion to Alter or Amend does Plaintiff argue that any

of these three aforementioned cases would demonstrate that such a conclusion is a clear error of

law. Plaintiff thus has not demonstrated a clear error of law by mentioning (without any

accompanying substantive argument) three cases that relate to the pleading requirements of Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8. And the Court rejects any implication that it is clear error (or otherwise grounds for

reconsideration) not to discuss every case cited by a party in its briefing, especially where—as

should always be the case and is the case here—the Court gave full consideration to the party’s

argument.3

Plaintiff then asserts that the Court improperly applied Doe v. Oberlin, 963 F.3d 580 (6th

Cir. 2020): “[W]hile this Court cited [Doe v. Oberlin], this Court committed a clear error of law

by not fully applying Doe. In Doe the Sixth Circuit stated that procedural irregularities provide

strong support for Doe’s claim of bias, concluding that procedural irregularities will permit a

plausible inference of sex discrimination[.]” (Doc. No. 254 at 10). But Plaintiff does not show a

clear error of law in the Opinion related to this notion from Doe. Plaintiff states that the Court did

not “fully apply” Doe because “Geer’s violation of Vanderbilt’s procedures in denying Plaintiff

Lee’s promotion and tenure application should be sufficient under Doe [ ] to provide the

plausibility to both the allegations of gender discrimination and retaliation.” (Doc. No. 254 at 11).

It is unclear how a case involving a university’s failure to comply with written procedures

regarding sexual misconduct investigations relates to the underlying facts here, let alone serves to

3 See, e.g., Munoz v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 8:20-CV-2311-VMC-AEP, 2021 WL 2964058, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2021) (“[A]lthough the Munozes claim that they were prejudiced because the

Court did not explicitly address two cases cited in their response to CitiMortgage's Motion to

Dismiss, the Court conducted a full review of the briefings. The Court

was not required to discuss every case cited in the parties’ briefings in its Order. Therefore, the

request for reconsideration is denied.”); Apotex Inc. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 18-CV-06475-JCS,

2019 WL 2410468, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2019) (“The fact that the Court did not specifically

discuss three cases cited by Apotex in its opposition brief, see Motion at 3, does not demonstrate

a failure to consider dispositive legal arguments. Rather, the reasoning set forth by the Court in its

order granting the Motion to Dismiss makes clear that the Court did not (and does not) find those

cases to be dispositive. The Court is not required to discuss every case that a party cites in support

of its position. Therefore, Apotex has not satisfied the requirements of Civil Local Rule 7-9 for

bringing a motion for reconsideration.”).

establish a clear error of law in the Opinion. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of a clear error of

law based on Doe thus are insufficient to grant the Motion to Alter or Amend.

Finally, Plaintiff concludes the Motion to Alter or Amend by stating, “[b]y not dismissing

with leave to amend, the Court clearly erred by not following Brown v Matauszak, 415 F. App’x

608, 614 (6th Cir. 2011), specifically giving Plaintiff leave to amend.” (Doc. No. 254 at 11). But

Brown does not state that leave to amend is required in all instances of dismissal, and actually

emphasizes that “whether to allow leave to amend is a decision within the discretion of the district

court,” cautioning courts to only grant leave to amend when appropriate in that the claims are of a

particularly serious nature and warrant close scrutinization by the district court. Id. at 616. Further,

the Court in Brown focused on the fact that the plaintiff was proceeding pro se, thus warranting

particular leniency. Id. at 614 (“Particularly where deficiencies in a complaint are attributable to

oversights likely the result of an untutored pro se litigant's ignorance of special pleading

requirements, dismissal of the complaint without prejudice is preferable.”). The Court also

emphasized that they “do not hold that remand for leave to amend is appropriate or necessary in

all, or even most, cases.” Id.

Further, the plaintiff in Brown had not been given any prior opportunities to amend, while

Plaintiff here already has amended the Complaint twice. Perkins v. Am. Elec. Power Fuel Supply,

Inc., 246 F.3d 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2001) (“In deciding whether to allow an amendment, the court

should consider . . . repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments[.]”). As stated

by the Fifth Circuit, “[a]t some point, a court must decide that a plaintiff has had fair opportunity

to make his case; if, after that time, a cause of action has not been established, the court should

finally dismiss the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792–93 (5th Cir. 1986). Brown thus

does not provide grounds for a clear error of law here, where Plaintiff is represented by counsel

and has been given multiple prior opportunities to amend.

ii. Law of the case and issue preclusion

Plaintiff argues that “this court made a clear error of law in concluding . . . that the law of

the case did not apply.” (Doc. No. 254 at 2). Plaintiff cites one Sixth Circuit opinion and two non-

binding district court opinions in support of this argument, but does not demonstrate how these

cases contradict or undermine the authority cited by the Court when reaching its determination that

the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable to the present case. The particular quotation from the

binding precedent cited by Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Assoc.

of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Indus. of United States and

Canada, Local No. 120, 235 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter, United Assoc. of Journeymen],

states only that “[the law of the case] doctrine applies with equal vigor to the decisions of a

coordinate court in the same case and to a court's own decisions.” The Sixth Circuit cites United

States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990) for this proposition. In Todd, the Sixth Circuit

states that “the law of the case . . . does not foreclose a court from reconsidering issues in a case

previously decided by the same court or another court. Applied to coordinate courts, the doctrine

is a discretionary tool available to a court in order to promote judicial efficiency.” It is debatable

whether the state court here is properly considered to be a “coordinate,” inasmuch as the applicable

line of cases appears to use this term to refer to a district court that had transferred the case to

another federal district court. But in any event, the Sixth Circuit clearly articulates that this doctrine

may be applied in the district court’s discretion and that the application of the doctrine “is not an

inexorable command.” United Assoc. of Journeymen, 235 F.3d at 250.

Plaintiff also argues that the Court should have applied the doctrine of issue preclusion.

(Doc. No. 254 at 2). The Court declines to entertain this argument. Plaintiff did not raise the

doctrine of issue preclusion in response to the Motion to Dismiss, and Rule 59(e) does not afford

a party the opportunity to raise new legal arguments that the party could have raised at the

appropriate time. United States v. Tenn. Walking Horse Breeders' and Exhibitors' Ass'n, 263 F.

Supp. 3d at 681. And in any event, Plaintiff does not even identify the issue that allegedly should

be precluded by the prior state court litigation.

b. Additional arguments

Without invoking any particular Rule 59(e) grounds, Plaintiff states that “[i]t is also the

custom for courts to offer a plaintiff the opportunity to seek leave to amend after a Rule 12 (b)(6)

dismissal.” (Doc. No. 254 at 4). Unlike the above-referenced arguments, this argument seeks to

challenge not the Court’s decision to dismiss, but rather the Court’s decision that the dismissal be

without leave to amend. But Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that district courts routinely

grant, or default to granting, complainants an opportunity to amend following dismissal. Instead,

Plaintiff notes that this court dismissed with leave to amend in one particular case, Hinman v.

Valleycrest Landscape Dev., Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-00551 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2020), without

drawing any similarities between the dismissal in this instance and the dismissal in Hinman.

Plaintiff also cites the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William Darrah &

Associates, 796 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1986), for the notion that courts favor trials on the merits—

but there, the Sixth Circuit was discussing the court’s discretion to set aside an entry of default

under Rule 55(c). Shepard does not set forth a default rule that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals be with

leave to amend. Thus, regardless of the particular Rule 59(e) category this argument could fall

under, Plaintiff has failed to make any compelling argument that she should be granted an

opportunity to amend as of right or “custom” (particularly when Plaintiff has already been granted

such right—twice).4 Perkins, 246 F.3d at 605. Still less does Plaintiff show that the Court’s refusal

to allow leave to amend for a third time is grounds for reconsideration under the Rule 59(e)

standards.

Plaintiff goes on to reiterate what the Court mentions in the Opinion—that Plaintiff’s

briefing in response to the Motion to Dismiss contained additional factual allegations not included

in the Complaint. (Doc. No. 254 at 4 (“An opportunity to amend would have been particularly

appropriate in this case where this Court noted that Plaintiff had referenced additional factual

allegations in her Response to Defendant’s motion. (D.E. 244 at Page ID 2594).”)). Just as the

Opinion noted, it would have been improper for the Court to consider such evidence when ruling

on the Motion to Dismiss. Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 2009)

(“When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the district court may not consider matters beyond the

complaint.”). Plaintiff does not appear to challenge this particular notion and instead apparently

claims here that the Motion to Alter or Amend should be granted because Plaintiff alleged

additional factual material in response to the Motion to Dismiss that the Court could not consider

at the time. Plaintiff cites no authority for this position; thus, Plaintiff does not show that this was

a clear error of law nor manifestly unjust to dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend because

Plaintiff had additional factual allegations that she wished to have included in the Complaint (or

either of the two prior amended complaints) but failed to include. In deciding whether to exercise

its authority to grant leave to amend, the Court can consider that it has already twice allowed

Plaintiff to amend the Complaint. Perkins, 246 F.3d at 605. And, as stated above, a motion to alter

4 On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed one motion for leave to amend (Doc. No. 23), and on August

23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second such motion (Doc. No. 79). Each of these motions was granted

by the Court. (Doc Nos. 24, 96).

or amend should not be used to allege facts which could have been previously alleged in the

exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that her references to additional

facts in her Response to the Motion to Dismiss that were not pled in the Complaint establishes

grounds to grant Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion.

Additionally, Plaintiff states that “the Court also failed to consider that a second motion

for summary judgment had been filed by Plaintiff,” citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-

M.C.A. Music Pub., Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009) for the notion “that this is one of the

factors to be considered in deciding a motion to dismiss.” (Doc. No. 254 at 4–5). But Bridgeport

Music (and the opinion it cites for this rule, Grover by Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716 (6th

Cir. 1994)) concerns an entirely different legal standard—that of “whether a defendant will suffer

plain legal prejudice” if a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal is granted. Grover, 33 F.3d at 718. Plaintiff’s

argument is thus irrelevant and does not establish any of the Rule 59(e) grounds.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court reached the wrong conclusion on the following

issues: 1) that Plaintiff “failed to allege a nexis [sic] between Plaintiff’s tenure denial and her

gender”; 2) that Plaintiff’s allegation that her tenure and promotion file was stronger than that of

her colleague was conclusory; 3) that Plaintiff’s inference of gender discrimination and retaliation

was not plausibly alleged; 4) that Plaintiff did not adequately allege a causal connection between

her protected activity and an adverse employment action; and 5) that Plaintiff’s increased workload

did not constitute an adverse employment action. Rule 59(e) is not a proper avenue to relitigate

issues already considered by the Court or to offer arguments previously presented in an attempt to

obtain a different outcome. By making these arguments, Plaintiff does not clearly establish

entitlement to relief under any Rule 59(e) grounds; instead, Plaintiff demonstrates her

disagreement with the Court, which is not enough to prevail under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff is free to

express her disagreement to the Sixth Circuit on appeal, but she is not entitled to a do-over by this

Court merely because (according to her) the district court should find merit in her disagreement

with what the district court did.

Thus, in sum, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any of the four possible grounds under

which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted. Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion will be denied.

2. Rule 60(b)

Plaintiff argues that Rule 60(b) provides grounds for granting her Motion to Alter or

Amend because of 1) surprise, 2) mistake of law by the Court, and 3) Plaintiff (the party seeking

relief) holding a meritorious underlying claim. (Doc. No. 254 at 2). The second and third of these

reasons are not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). And while Rule 60(b) allows the Court to

relieve a party from an Order due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,”

Plaintiff’s surprise that this Court did not rule in her favor after the state court denied a motion to

dismiss a similar complaint filed by Plaintiff is not the type of “surprise” implicated by this rule.

In making this argument, Plaintiff seems to suggest that this Court should have adopted the

findings of the state court (in ruling on a different motion to dismiss a different complaint under

different state-court standards), and that any decision to the contrary would have been some sort

of mistake. This idea is not supported by any law cited in Plaintiff’s briefing. Plaintiff has thus

failed to establish, with clear and convincing evidence, any legitimate surprise or mistake

warranting the extraordinary remedy she seeks via Rule 60(b). The Court thus concludes that

Plaintiff has failed to raise any valid grounds to amend or alter the Court’s judgment under Rule

60(b).

3. Rule 15(a)

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59 or Rule 60, Plaintiffs

Rule 15(a) motion necessarily must and will be denied. See Leisure Caviar, LLC vy. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d at 616.

CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend (Doc. No. 252) and Plaintiff's

Motion to File Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 255) will be denied. An appropriate order will be

entered.

Chi Rucherdsean

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE