The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DONALD RAY REYNOLDS-BEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) NO. 3:21-cv-00890
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Donald Ray Reynolds-Bay, a federal inmate imprisoned in Terre Haute, Indiana, filed a
pro se pleading styled as a “Challenge to the Court’s ‘Assumable Jurisdiction’ Over the Proper
Status to Show Lack of Personal Jurisdiction” and paid the civil filing fee. (Doc. Nos. 1, 5).
In response to a subsequent Court Order questioning whether Plaintiff intended to seek
collateral relief from his federal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No. 7), Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Amend his Complaint as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), in order
to (1) include the label “World Habeas Corpus” in the caption, and (2) eliminate an exhibit page
that showed his 2008 arrest, indictment, and prosecution in the Eastern District of Tennessee. (Doc.
No. 8). These changes were made “[so] as to not confuse the court on irrelevant matters.” (Id. at
1). Plaintiff then filed what the Court construes as a Motion to Ascertain the Status of this case.
(Doc. No. 10).
Plaintiff’s Motions (Doc. Nos. 8 and 10) are GRANTED. The Clerk shall docket the
proposed amendment (Doc. No. 8-1) as Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
The Amended Complaint is now before the Court for initial review pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
Upon initial review, the Court must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss” the Amended
Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The review for whether the Amended Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be
granted asks whether it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488
(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), nor
can the Court “create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Brown v.
Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)).
B. Allegations and Claims
Plaintiff has filed a 30-page, typewritten Amended Complaint asserting that he is “a
Moorish American National of the Tennessee state territory”1 who “challenges the Courts (sic)
personal jurisdiction over [his] correct proper status[.]” (Doc. No. 8-1 at 2). He sues the United
States of America, the State of Tennessee, the United States Supreme Court, and the United States
Congress. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 2). Although Plaintiff has clarified that he is not challenging his 2008
federal conviction and sentence, he broadly challenges the validity of any exercise of judicial
authority over him, based on his status as a Moorish American national who cannot be subjected
to the jurisdiction of American courts because of an allegedly unresolved conflict between the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
According to Plaintiff, Moorish America emerged “from the heart of its former ruling
sovereignty” when slavery was abolished in 1865 (Doc. No. 8-1 at 19), as “the Congressional
Thirteenth Amendment was also a Manumission Treaty with the African descendants of former
slaves” that “created a 2nd New Nation of [Moorish American] People.” (Id. at 14). However, this
treaty was allegedly broken three years later “by the covert and needless Fourteenth Amendment”
(id.), which was designed to appear to confer full citizenship on former slaves and their
descendants, but was actually a “document[ ] of re-enslavement.” (Id. at 10, 14, 25). Plaintiff
purports to present a conflict between federal and state laws that falls within the Supreme Court’s
1 Copies of the founding documents of the “Moorish American Nation,” and of the documents that
purportedly establish Plaintiff’s registration with the Tennessee Secretary of State as a sovereign
commercial entity in which the “Moorish Science Temple of America” has a security interest, are attached
as exhibits to the Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 40–46).
original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (see id. at 2),2 but in fact he appears to assert a conflict
between the post-14th Amendment law of the United States and the alleged sovereignty of Moorish
America.
The Amended Complaint does not assert any demand for relief against any Defendant.
Instead, it demands answers from this Court to three questions. These questions––which concern
labels historically applied to persons “of African descent . . . [that allegedly] reinstate[d] such
persons as chattel property” when used in state and federal laws after 1865––are offered to support
Plaintiff’s conclusion that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. (Id. at 31).
C. Analysis
The Amended Complaint is not a proper opening pleading that claims entitlement to relief
and demands that such relief be awarded over and against an opposing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a). Instead, it is a disquisition on the birth and lineage of the so-called “Moorish American
Nation,” followed by an attempt to certify questions of law for this Court to answer. As such, it is
subject to dismissal as frivolous. See Brown-Bey v. Hooks, No. 1:18-CV-15-FDW, 2018 WL
576309, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2018) (dismissing complaint as “wholly frivolous” on initial
review, because it “does not assert a case or controversy for the Court to adjudicate” but “is simply
a tome on why [the plaintiff] believes he is not subject to the laws of the United States or of the
individual States by virtue of his membership as an Indigenous Moorish American National”).
Courts swiftly and routinely reject the claims of individuals who travel this “well-trodden” path
toward opposing the government’s exercise of jurisdiction over their person or property. Id. (citing
Hampton v. City of Durham, No. 1:10cv706, 2010 WL 3785538, at *2–3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22,
2010) (collecting cases)); see also, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011)
2 Section 1251 grants to the Supreme Court “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of,” e.g., “[a]ll
controversies between the United States and a State[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2).
(“Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a ‘secured-
party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts.”). Legal arguments that “directly correspond to meritless rhetoric frequently espoused
by tax protesters, sovereign citizens, and self-proclaimed Moorish-Americans,” U.S. v. Coleman,
871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017), or that are based on “an ideology derived from a famously
discredited notion: the illegitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment,” U.S. v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp.
2d 602, 606 (D. Md. 2005), should not be entertained in either the habeas or civil nights context,
but “should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.” Benabe, 654 F.3d at 767.
The Court discerns no factual allegations or legal assertions in the Amended Complaint
which could be liberally construed to support a colorable claim to relief. In line with the authorities
cited above, this case is frivolous and must be dismissed on that basis.
Ill. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, this action is hereby DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this decision would not be
taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(b)(1).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Wand, Cho
WAVERLY D. 2 iin JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE