Carder v. Lamb

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

COLUMBIA DIVISION

JAMES STEPHEN CARDER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 1:21-CV-00074

)

BILLY LAMB, et al., ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff James Stephen Carder, #553468, an inmate of the Hardeman County Correctional

Facility in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Billy Lamb, Sabrina Patterson, Richard Phillips, Devon l/n/u, Manco l/n/u, Ramirez l/n/u,

and Colten l/n/u, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s civil and constitutional rights that occurred while

Plaintiff was in the custody of the Marshall County Jail in Lewisburg, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1).

The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint

filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly

requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and

summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section

1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).

The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838

F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.

Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110

(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us

to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation

omitted).

II. SECTION 1983 STANDARD

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color

of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . .

.” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that

he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that

the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med.

Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527,

533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

III. ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that, from September 2019 until Plaintiff’s transfer to another

facility, staff at the Marshall County Jail used an unspecified chemical spray “on inmates,” on their

mats and linens, and on inmate masks as a state-mandated COVID-19 precaution.1 (Doc. No. 1 at

1 In support of his complaint, Plaintiff submitted the grievances he filed regarding the spray. On August 19, 2020,

Defendant Lamb responded to one of those grievances as follows: “The masks get sprayed and washed.” (Doc. No. 1

at 12). On August 25, 2020, Defendant Lamb responded to another grievance as follows: “State Guidelines are being

11, 12). Plaintiff was in the custody of the Marshall County Jail during this time. On June 15, 2020,

Plaintiff first had the ability to read the label on the spray. (Id. at 6). The label indicated the spray’s

toxicity to humans and, in Plaintiff’s opinion, “explained [Plaintiff’s] breathing problems as well

as [his] eyesight being affected.” (Id.) Plaintiff also had developed a painful rash on his neck and

back since the spraying began.

Plaintiff told Officers Ramirez, Colton, and Marco about his concerns regarding the spray.

Ramirez and Marco “expressed reluctance in continued sprayed and agreed it should not be

continued with this particular chemical but was told to proceed and make inmates have matts [sic]

sprayed.” (Id. at 32). The officers relayed Plaintiff’s concerns about the spray to Defendant

Patterson. Plaintiff also wrote numerous grievances about this issue.

Plaintiff asked on six occasions to see an eye doctor “and was told that the jail did not pay

for [an] eye doctor and family would have to pay for it.” (Id. at 6).

Each named Defendant continued to spray the offending product even after Plaintiff

expressed his concerns and explained his health conditions. Plaintiff’s eyesight has deteriorated

since Defendants’ use of the spray. Plaintiff must use glasses to see anything within four feet of

him. Plaintiff since has been transferred to the Hardeman County Correctional Complex.

IV. ANALYSIS

The complaint names as Defendants the following: Billy Lamb, Marshall County Sheriff;

Sabrina Patterson, Marshall County Jail Administrator; Richard Phillips, Assistant Administrator;

Devon l/n/u, Corrections Officer; Marco l/n/u, Corrections Officer; Ramirez l/n/u, Corrections

Officer; and Colten l/n/u, Corrections Officer. Each Defendant is sued in his or her individual and

followed concerning Covid 19. Spray is being investigated and waiting on answer from company chemist!” (Id. at

11).

official capacities. The complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 3).2

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

To satisfy an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he is incarcerated under

conditions that exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm. Miller v. Calhoun Cnty, 408 F.3d

803, 821 (6th Cir. 2005). A constitutional violation only arises when the deprivation is objectively

sufficiently serious. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (2013). Only deprivations denying “the

minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” are sufficiently grave enough to form the basis of

an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. Subjectively, deliberate indifference entails conduct that

“amounted to more than ordinary negligence or medical malpractice.” Atkins v. Parker, No. 19-

6243, 972 F.3d 734, 739 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). It

has been described as “something approaching a total unconcern for [the inmate's] welfare in the

face of serious risks, or a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm.” Slone v. Lincoln Cnty., Ky.,

242 F. Supp. 3d 579, 591 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (quoting Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir.

2 The statute of limitations for a Section 1983 action is the “state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury

actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claims arise.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510

F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). The limitations period for Section 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year

limitations provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a). Porter v. Brown, 289 Fed. Appx. 114, 116

(6th Cir. 2008). “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by

reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Claims accrue and the statute of limitations period

begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason “to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Roberson

v. Tenn., 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). This inquiry is objective, and courts look “to what event should have

alerted the typical layperson to protect his or her rights.” Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir.

2000). It is the Court's responsibility to “determine whether the alleged precipitating event or events occurred more

than a year before [the plaintiff] filed the complaint.” Standridge v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., No. 3:08–CV–

133, 2009 WL 348782, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2009).

Here, Plaintiff submitted his complaint to the prison mailing system on November 11, 2021. (Doc. No. 1,

Attach. 1 at 1). The complaint alleges that Plaintiff became aware of the toxicity of the chemical spray in June 2020

and attempted to persuade Defendants to cease the spraying, but the harm to Plaintiff caused by the chemical spraying

continued until his transfer to another facility on November 12, 2020. For purposes of the required initial review, with

the limited information before the Court at this time, it appears that at least some portion of Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims related to the spraying are timely. These matters can be more fully developed after the PLRA screening.

1992)). A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with

“deliberate indifference” to an inmate's health or safety only if that official knows that the inmate

faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to prevent it. Wilson, 501 U.S. 294, 298

1. Chemical Spraying

The complaint alleges that each Defendant sprayed Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s personal

belongings with a toxic chemical that caused Plaintiff to develop a rash and experience a

significant decline in his eyesight. This allegation satisfies the objective component of an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim.3

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff personally notified Sheriff Lamb and Officers Ramirez,

Colton, and Marco about the dangers of the chemical spray and asked the officers to notify

Defendant Patterson of the same. According to the complaint, Officers Ramirez and Marco

subsequently expressed their desire to discontinue the spraying, unspecified superiors told the

Officers to continue, and the Officers continued using the spray even after being made aware of

the risk of harm to Plaintiff. The complaint also alleges that Defendants Patterson and Lamb

continued to spray Plaintiff and his belongings after having been notified of Plaintiff’s health and

safety concerns. The complaint does not include any allegations as to the states of mind of the

other named Defendants. The Court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges that, although

3 Plaintiff’s allegation that he experienced a significant, sudden decline in his vision is distinguishable from the

prisoner-plaintiff’s claims in Harris v. Likens, No. 1:20-cv-00049, 2021 WL 1213287, where the plaintiff alleged that

he may need prescription eyeglasses. Id. at *3. There, the Court found that the plaintiff’s allegations were not sufficient

to establish an objectively serious medical need where “[n]owhere in the complaint or attached sick call and grievance

filings does Plaintiff allege that the vision loss he suffered was dramatic or abrupt.” Id. (citing Wagner v. City of Saint

Louis Dep't of Public Safety, 4:12CV1901 AGF, 2014 WL 3529678, at *8 (E.D. Mo. July 16, 2014) (“Courts in this

District and others have concluded as a matter of law that the denial of eyeglasses and eye medication or headaches

and blurry vision resulting from an incorrect eyeglass prescription are insufficient to establish an objectively serious

medical need.”) (citing, e.g., Davidson v. Scully, 155 F. Supp. 2d 77, 88–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that

headaches and blurry vision resulting from an incorrect eyeglasses prescription “are not a sufficiently serious

condition” to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment)).

Defendants Ramirez, Colton, Marco, Lamb, and Patterson knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial

risk of serious harm if they continued to use the chemical spray, these Defendants disregarded that

risk, causing additional harm to Plaintiff.

Thus, for purposes of the required PLRA screening, the Court finds that the complaint

states colorable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims under Section 1983 against

Defendants Ramirez, Colton, Marco, Lamb, and Patterson in their individual capacities based on

their continued spraying of the chemical on Plaintiff and his belongings even after being made

aware of the dangers of the chemical and the negative health effects Plaintiff was experiencing.

As to the other named Defendants, the complaint does not allege that those Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference regarding the chemical spray. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against

these Defendants, therefore, will be dismissed without prejudice.

As noted above, the complaint also names all Defendants in their official capacities. When

a defendant is sued in his or her official capacity as an employee of the government, the lawsuit is

directed against “the entity for which the officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d

652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, Defendants are employees of Marshall County, Tennessee. A claim

of governmental liability requires a showing that the alleged misconduct is the result of a policy,

statement, regulation, decision or custom promulgated by Marshall County or its agent. Monell

Dep’t of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). In short, for Marshall County to be liable to

Plaintiff under Section 1983, there must be a direct causal link between an official policy or custom

and the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

385 (1989); Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978)); Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 2014 WL

2596562, at *12 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2008)).

A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the

following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official

with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of

inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom or tolerance or acquiescence

of federal rights violations. Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478.

Construed liberally, the pro se complaint alleges that Marshall County had or has a policy

or practice of spraying inmates’ persons and their personal property (such as masks and mats) with

a toxic chemical spray as a COVID-19 precaution and that this spray caused physical harm to

Plaintiff. The complaint further alleges that at least some of the named Defendants who are

responsible for the development and implementation of county policy knew about the risk of harm

to inmates. Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint contains sufficient allegations to state

a claim for municipal liability against Marshall County. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against

all Defendants in their official capacities, which is essentially a claim against Marshall County,

Tennessee, therefore will proceed.

2. Denial of Medical/Optical Care

Next, the complaint alleges that, while in the custody of the Marshall County Jail, Plaintiff

sought medical care for his deteriorating eyesight on at least six occasions and an unspecified

individual or individuals told Plaintiff that the Marshall County Jail did not provide no-cost eye

doctor visits and Plaintiff’s family would have to pay for any such visits.

It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff must attribute factual allegations to particular

defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must

make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has

consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations

of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant

did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir.

2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Thus,

the instant complaint is subject to dismissal against all named Defendants in their individual

capacities because Plaintiff failed to identify the person or persons responsible for denying needed

optical/medical care to Plaintiff. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App'x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)

(dismissing plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity

which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged

violation of rights). These claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

With respect to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against all Defendants, construed

liberally, the pro se complaint alleges that Marshall County has a policy or practice of failing to

provide free optical care to inmates. While the Eighth Amendment requires jails to provide basic

medical care to inmates, there is no requirement that the jails provide the medical or dental care

free of cost. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir.1997) (deliberate indifference

standard does not guarantee prisoners the right to be entirely free from cost considerations that

figure in medical-care decisions made by most non-prisoners in society). Inmates may be

constitutionally required to pay for their own medical expenses if they can afford to do so.

Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1999) (requiring inmates to pay for their own

medications if they can afford to do so is not a federal constitutional violation); see also Jensen

v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1981) (no basis for due process claim where deductions

from prisoner accounts were assessments for value received).).

“It is only when medical care is denied to inmates because of their inability to pay that

deliberate indifference is implicated,” Miller v. Blackwelder, 2008 WL 2940534, at *6 (E.D. Tenn.

July 24, 2008). Plaintiff does not allege that inmates are being deprived of medical care because

they cannot pay. Neither does Plaintiff allege any denial of medical care to himself even when he

or his family attempted to pay for it; thus, Plaintiff has not alleged any harm to him as a result of

the county’s alleged policy. See Miller, 2008 WL 2940534, at *6 (rejecting inmate’s Eighth

Amendment claim based on jail’s requirement that inmate submit a co-pay every time he receives

medical services); see also Coleman v. Whitney, 2006 WL 3791316, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2006)

(“Programs that require inmates to bear part of their own medical costs remain within

constitutional bounds so long as the program does not condition the providing of necessary medical

services on an inmate's ability to pay.”). Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, therefore, will be

dismissed.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

In the complaint, Plaintiff states that he brings claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). The complaint does not provide any detail as to the nature of

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides pre-trial detainees with

rights analogous to those under the Eighth Amendment. See Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273

F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001). However, Plaintiff does not allege that he was a pre-trial detainee

at the time he was in the custody of the Marshall County Jail.4 The complaint does not allege any

violations of Plaintiff’s privacy rights. See Block v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1998)

(quoting J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981)). Neither does the complaint allege

that any Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of his race, see Henry v. Metro. Sewer

Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1990), or violated Plaintiff’s due process rights, see Sandin v.

4 The complaint alleges that, at the time he filed his complaint, Plaintiff was a convicted and sentenced state prisoner.

(Doc. No. 1 at 5).

Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Plaintiff does not claim the use of excessive force by any Defendant.

See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).

Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court cannot “conjure up allegations.”

McDonald, 610 F.2d 16, 19. Plaintiff here has simply failed to articulate a colorable Fourteenth

Amendment claim. Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff's against all named Defendants in

their individual and official capacities fail to state Fourteenth Amendment claims under Section

1983 upon which relief can be granted. These claims and Defendants will be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

Having screened the complaint pursuant to the PRLA, the Court finds that Plaintiff states

colorable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims under Section 1983 against

Defendants Ramirez, Colton, Marco, Lamb, and Patterson in their individual capacities based on

their continued spraying of a toxic chemical on Plaintiff and his belongings even after being made

aware of the dangers of the chemical and the negative health effects Plaintiff was experiencing.

Further, the Court finds that the complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a claim for

municipal liability against Marshall County with respect a policy or practice of using the chemical

spray on inmates and their belongings. As to the other named Defendants, the complaint does not

allege that those Defendants acted with deliberate indifference regarding the chemical spray.

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against these Defendants, therefore, will be dismissed

without prejudice. All other claims and Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice for the

reasons stated herein.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

hla X. Cb

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10